

**BROOM &
SELZNICK**

**PRINCIPLES
OF
SOCIOLOGY**



From **SOCIOLOGY: A Text With Adapted Readings**, fourth edition

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PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY

FROM

SOCIOLOGY

A TEXT WITH
ADAPTED READINGS
FOURTH EDITION



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PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY

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
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P. S.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

SECTION 1 THE DISCIPLINE OF SOCIOLOGY

Sociology is one of the social sciences. Its long-run aim is to discover the basic structure of human society, to identify the main forces that hold groups together or weaken them, and to learn the conditions that transform social life. In this, sociology, like any pure or basic science, is a disciplined, intellectual quest for fundamental knowledge of the nature of things. Most sociologists believe that they stand only at the outermost rim of this understanding.

Although some sociologists devote themselves to the development of first principles and fundamental concepts, others pursue relatively restricted inquiries, including careful reporting of significant events, the compilation and interpretation of sociological statistics, and the testing of hypotheses about limited topics. Some of this work has a practical orientation, such as the desire to control juvenile delinquency or to reduce absenteeism of factory workers; much of it is stimulated by intellectual curiosity, the desire to understand a puzzling fact or to comprehend an important event. This book draws on the sociological enterprise as a whole, both on attempts to formulate

basic principles and on more modest efforts to contribute to the fund of verifiable knowledge.

When one seeks to draw general conclusions, he must be *selective*. The scientist is interested in *kinds* of things, in placing phenomena into categories, and this means looking at special aspects of the concrete world. Sciences are known by what they select for study and how they go about it. The same "thing" can be understood in a number of different ways. Consider your instructor's chair. If a specialist in the branch of physics called mechanics were to study it, he would see it as a combination of weights and balances; a biologist specializing in anatomy would see it as a receptacle for the human form and might assess its effect on the spinal column; an economist might see it as an item of mass production or a unit of cost and price; the psychologist might see it as part of the perceptual frame of the student; and the sociologist might see the chair as a symbol of status.

Thus like any other field of inquiry, sociology is selective. It highlights and illuminates aspects of social life that otherwise might be only obscurely recog-



*August Comte (1798–1857), French social philosopher, gave sociology its name. As a “positivist” Comte stressed the need to base scientific theories on observation, but his own writings were highly speculative. He saw in human history three stages of “universal progress”—theological, metaphysical, scientific. He also offered elaborate proposals for a new Positivist State in which there would be a supreme priesthood of sociologists to direct society. Few of Comte’s specific ideas are now accepted, but he gave impetus to the discussion out of which present-day sociology emerged. His major work was *The Positive Philosophy*, first published in French in six volumes, 1830–1842.*

nized and understood. Its specialized knowledge about basic elements and processes in the social world can enrich understanding and may have practical uses as well. The sociologist may be called upon for help with a special problem, such as racial conflict, urban blight, or the war on poverty. However, sociology’s present capacity to give “answers” to social problems should not be exaggerated. At this

time the sociologist’s practical contribution lies in the ability to clarify the underlying nature of social problems, to estimate more exactly their dimensions, and to identify aspects that seem most amenable to remedy with the knowledge and skills at hand.

Adaptation 1, pages 6–8, discusses some of the objectives, methods, and problems of sociological inquiry.

SOCIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

There has been diminishing controversy about whether sociology should be called a science or a more neutral name such as “discipline.” Some believe that sociology is not a science and that because of the nature of its subject matter it cannot be one. They point to the difficulty of applying the experimental method to social phenomena as a major obstacle.

However, science is not a single method or routine, such as the classic before-after experiment or the use of special implements such as glass tubing or lenses or precise measuring instruments. Each of the old and established sciences has developed more or less distinctive techniques, instruments, and routines. But research procedures, which vary from discipline to discipline and from time to time, should not be confused with science itself. All science is characterized more nearly by an attitude, an approach, a point of view, than by any special technique. One is entitled to call sociology a science if its theories are progressively refined and tested by observation, and if the ideals of objectivity and exactness guide inquiry.

By a variety of research methods, the social scientist attempts to go as far as he can toward uncovering what is persistent and repeatable in the social world. He recognizes, however, that for him “nature” is more elusive and inconstant than it is for the physical scientist.

Sociology shares with other social sciences—notably anthropology, economics, political science, and social psychology—the task of scientific exploration of social behavior and its products. There is no hard and fast division between one social science and another, nor should there be. There are, how-

ever, important differences of emphasis that mark off one discipline from another.

Social psychology is largely concerned with connections between group experience and the psychology of the individual, an area of knowledge to which both sociologists and psychologists contribute. In their attempts to understand individual behavior and personality, social psychologists recognize the need to see the influence of interpersonal relations and group membership. This has led to studies of social roles, of the emergence of personality in social interaction, of the analysis of attitudes, and the investigation of small groups. In social psychology the emphasis is placed on the direct effect of groups on individuals. Aspects of social psychology are treated in the study of *SOCIALIZATION*,¹ *PRIMARY GROUPS*, and *COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR*.

Anthropology is partly a biological and partly a social science. Physical anthropology deals especially with the biological origins of man and with variations in the human species, including the study of race. Because of the social importance of race differences, sociology texts have traditionally given much attention to this problem. We have not done this because the study of races (though *not* of race-conscious groups) is now recognized as a technical problem in genetics and human biology. We have also excluded discussion of such topics as fossil men and the characteristics of the lower animals.

Social and cultural anthropology have contributed greatly to the comparative analysis of societies by exploring the ways of life among preliterate communities throughout the world. We have drawn upon these materials and the ideas developed from them largely in *CULTURE* and *SOCIALIZATION* in this book. In many ways, anthropology and sociology have drawn closer together in recent years, particularly as anthropologists have turned to the study of literate societies. A central emphasis on the analysis of culture, however, continues to characterize anthropological inquiry. In sociology this is a significant but not a predominant preoccupation.

Economics deals with the phenomena of cost and

price, of savings and investment, of supply and demand. The economist necessarily makes assumptions about the goals men seek in economic life, and sometimes he questions those assumptions. When he does, psychological and sociological analyses are indicated. Furthermore, the economic order is related to and dependent upon many noneconomic forces, including government, public opinion, family life, and migration. Specialists in industrial sociology explore these relations and trace their significance for industrial stability and change. Some aspects of industrial sociology are treated in *PRIMARY GROUPS* and in *ASSOCIATIONS*.

Political science is mostly concerned with the study of government, and traditionally it has had a strong legal and administrative orientation. In recent years, however, there has been a growing interest among political scientists in exploring all of the factors that influence political and administrative decisions, not merely the legal and official relationships. The political order does not stand alone but is rooted in culture and social organization. These considerations have stimulated a renewed interest in political sociology. Political institutions and the political process are discussed in *ASSOCIATIONS* and in *COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR*.

History is classified by some as a social science, by others as one of the humanities. In either case historical documentation is invaluable for sociological research, and sociological analyses are of interest to historians of the contemporary scene.

Sociology is complementary to the other social sciences. It explores the varieties of group structure and the ways they affect political, psychological, and economic relationships. Sociologists are not interested in business decisions *as such*, but they are interested in the social conditions that make certain types of business relations possible. For example, they study the effect of kinship on economic participation in newly industrialized countries or the effect of group relations on factory output. Although not specialists in military science, sociologists study leadership and morale in military units.

¹ To facilitate cross-reference, the titles of chapters appear in small capital letters throughout the book.

Adaptation 1 / Trow **NOTES ON SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH**

Growing up in a society teaches its members much about how it works, but there are some kinds of knowledge that one is not likely to gain in the pursuits of everyday life. For example, adult Americans are aware of prejudice and discrimination against Negroes. But in the ordinary course of events the individual may not learn much about what lies behind these feelings and actions. Nor is he likely to know very accurately how widespread anti-Negro sentiments are, what forms they take, how they differ in different parts of the country and among different groups in the population, and whether such sentiments are on the rise or are declining in extent and intensity. Similarly, many people are aware that college enrollments are growing rapidly, but few people know how fast, what kinds of institutions are absorbing the bulk of the growth, and how this growth is affecting the character of higher education.

Sociological research is the purposeful effort to learn more about society than one can in the ordinary course of living. How the sociologist goes about his work depends on (1) his objectives, (2) the available materials or data, and (3) the knowledge and theory already established on the same or similar topics.

Sociological description For many purposes, what is needed is a factual account of an event, such as a political rally, or a summary of the characteristics of a population, such as the proportion of aged or the number of divorced persons. In this sense, sociology is a kind of reporting. However, sociological reporting has two special characteristics:

1. *Precision.* The sociologist tries to be as precise as possible in his descriptions. If he can do so, he finds ways of counting and measuring, but much valuable sociological research does not involve the use of statistics. It may consist of the careful study of historical records or the close observation of some single event, situation, or group. The evidence may be assembled and analyzed with care even though numbers are not used.

Accuracy in reporting and analysis has two basic requirements: *objectivity* in observation and *skepticism* toward other people's reports of what is going on. Objectivity does not require that the observer approach the world with a blank mind; rather, he should be equally prepared to find that the facts do or do not support his prior beliefs. Skepticism does not require that the scholar doubt everything he hears or reads, only that he try to distinguish reliable from un-

reliable reports, knowledge from opinion.

In numerical descriptions of populations a number of questions must be considered. For example, were the data collected or reported according to uniform criteria? The importance of uniform criteria is illustrated in the following hypothetical case. Suppose a sociologist compared juvenile delinquency rates for a number of small and large cities and found higher rates in the larger cities. He might then go on, very sensibly, to investigate what it is about large cities that makes for greater delinquency. His efforts might be pointless, however, if it happened that the smaller cities were in states that defined a juvenile as any person under eighteen, while the larger cities were in states that defined a juvenile as anyone under twenty-one. Thus the higher delinquency rates of the larger cities might reflect merely a more inclusive legal definition of who is a juvenile.

Many similar problems arise in the use of official statistics. Record-keeping is often more complete and detailed in cities than in rural areas, and this difference may distort comparisons between areas. There are similar problems in making comparisons over periods of time. At least part of the reported increase in juvenile delinquency in

recent years is due to changes in official reporting rather than changes in juvenile behavior.

Besides using public records, sociologists gather data on their own, often by interviews and questionnaires. A sociologist interested in a community's attitudes toward an increase in school taxes would have to gather his own data. Since he could not interview everyone, he would select a sample. If his findings are to describe accurately the distribution of attitudes in the population, his sample must be "representative," that is, it must be a reflection in miniature of the whole community. There are scientific ways of constructing such samples and of estimating the probability that they are representative. When a sample is used to assess the characteristics of a whole group or population, the precision with which it is chosen is of fundamental importance.

On the other hand, much can be learned from studies that do not use representative samples. Detailed interviews with ten members of a college fraternity can tell many things about fraternity life. But unless the men interviewed (the "respondents") are selected according to principles of scientific sampling, the findings cannot be applied to the fraternity as a whole.

2. *Guidance by sociological ideas.* Precision alone does not make a description distinctively sociological. The sociologist has a fund of ideas that help him to form hypotheses about the particular situation or problem he is studying. These leading ideas or "concepts" comprise a large part of what the student of sociology learns. They are his armory of analysis, his guides to inquiry.

From description to explanation Sociologists are rarely content with simply counting things or with straight reporting. They want to understand and explain, to go beyond descriptive fact-gathering to comparison, interpretation, and the assessment of how different aspects of the social world are related.

The search for an explanation may in turn require new facts. For example, it has long been known that high school boys from working-class backgrounds are less likely than middle-class boys to go to college. Why? Some of the difference, but not all, can probably be accounted for by the expense of a college education. But this is not the whole story. In pressing for a fuller explanation, sociologists have applied another idea—the notion of a group atmosphere or "climate." Recently researchers have investigated the influence on college-going of different high school climates, especially attitudes in the student body toward academic achievement.

One study demonstrated the following: fewer middle-class boys from predominantly working-class high schools went to college than boys from the same backgrounds who had attended high schools with predominantly middle-class students. Conversely, more working-class boys in predominantly middle-class high schools aspired to college than boys from similar backgrounds in high schools whose students were mostly working-class in origin. By looking more closely at the students, studying their school environments as well as their origins, a more accurate and a more sophisticated understanding of the conditions affecting col-

lege attendance can be achieved. Thus sociological description becomes a search for explanations.

Empirical indicators Many things sociologists want to study cannot be seen or measured directly. An example is the "morale" of a team of working men or a company of soldiers. Morale is said to be high when there is cheerful obedience to orders, confidence in supervisors or officers, and willing participation in the life of the organization. But to refine this idea, and to study the factors that affect morale, one needs some way of measuring the level of morale in one group as compared with others.

The strength of morale can be indicated by directly observable events that usually accompany high or low levels of morale. Thus morale can be measured by such *indicators* as rates of absenteeism, rates of infraction of rules, number of men who report themselves sick, willingness to put in extra work, and other acts or attitudes. An empirical indicator is an *observable* sign of some *unobservable* or *obscure* characteristic of an individual or a group. To rely on empirical indicators in sociology is like relying on the observation of smoke as an indicator of fire.

One of the continuing tasks of social research is to test the *validity* of empirical indicators. For example, using the number of men who report themselves sick as an indicator of low morale may not always give valid results. Unhealthful living or working conditions might also produce higher sick-call rates in one group than in another with which it is compared. For this reason sociologists often

try to find more than one indicator for the same phenomenon. In the case of army units, low morale would be expected to show up in high rates of absence without leave (AWOL), high rates of sick call, high rates of disobedience, and other signs of discontent.

The search for valid indicators also helps to clarify ideas. For example, the meaning of morale as used above includes *both* willing participation in group life *and* confidence in leaders. But when morale is measured, it may be found that participation and confidence do not necessarily go together. The

members of a group may work well together with considerable satisfaction but in opposition to their leaders. Conversely, men may have confidence in their leaders but show little interest in active participation, as is often the case in trade unions and political organizations. Such findings invite a clarification of the working definition of morale.

Critical analysis of indicators may also lead to the discovery that the same behavior may have different meanings for different people. For example, is cutting classes a good indicator of "commitment to

education"? Some students cut classes because they are indifferent to studies; for them high rates of cutting indicate low levels of commitment to education. For other students, however, cutting classes may point to a serious but independent pursuit of learning.

Sociological research is a union of observation and analysis, of gathering data and reflecting on it. Doing research on social life and theorizing about it can scarcely be distinguished. At every step the design of research is guided by and contributes to the body of sociological ideas.

SECTION 2 PLAN AND CONTENT OF THE BOOK

In order to present a systematic introduction to sociology, this book follows a carefully designed plan, the understanding of which is essential to the most efficient use of the book. Reference to the detailed Table of Contents (pp. vii-x) will be helpful in reading the following discussion.

ELEMENTS OF SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

A glance at the program of the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association would show a tremendous variety of topics and interests. Nevertheless, some ideas, themes, and skills are fundamental. They constitute the sociologist's special perspective. They are his armory of analysis.

No matter what a sociologist's specialty may be, or the particular problem he studies, he must have an understanding of basic concepts and principles. The specialist in the study of social stratification must also be well grounded in the study of culture so that he will be alert to the significance of the formation of subcultures among the different social strata or classes. He should be familiar with the dynamics of socialization so as to understand how class-related values are inculcated in the youth; and

he should control the skills of population analysis so that he can critically interpret the evidence on levels of income, occupation, and education, which are the basic ingredients of social strata. In other words, the best specialist in sociological inquiry is likely to be a generalist as well.

Taken together, the chapters present the main ideas with which the sociologist approaches any special area. For example, the sociological study of education could not overlook any of the major themes developed in this book. On the other hand, the arrangement and division of the chapters is largely a matter of convenience and emphasis. For instance, Chapter IX combines two closely related fields, POPULATION AND ECOLOGY, while separate chapters are given to ASSOCIATIONS and PRIMARY GROUPS. The chapters are not neat and watertight compartments. The broad subject of social organization, for example, includes the study of primary groups, associations, and social stratification. But these important and specialized aspects of social organization are also given detailed treatment in separate chapters. There is no separate chapter on the family, which is extensively treated in other

chapters, especially SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, CULTURE, SOCIALIZATION, and PRIMARY GROUPS.

Each chapter includes factual material as well as concepts, application as well as theory. For example, the chapter on ASSOCIATIONS analyzes political parties and factories to bring out general principles in the sociology of complex organizations. The chapter on PRIMARY GROUPS looks closely at friendship, work situations, the military setting, and the family. In COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR lessons are drawn from the analysis of a specific race riot.

THE PRINCIPLES EDITION

Increasing experimentation with academic calendars and with the curricula of introductory sociology, as well as the availability of supplementary teaching materials and study aids, have led some instructors to suggest the separate publication of the first part of *Sociology: A Text with Adapted Readings*. Especially teachers who conduct short courses have pointed out the convenience of such an edition. Colleagues outside the United States have also urged a shorter edition in order to enable them to introduce additional teaching materials that bear directly on their own societies without unduly lengthening their syllabi. The present edition is in response to those suggestions. It is restricted to the Elements of Sociological Analysis and comprises the first nine chapters of *Sociology*. It does not include the following chapters from the complete work: RELIGION, EDUCATION, and LAW that make up the Analysis of Major Institutions, nor URBAN MAN, INDUSTRIAL MAN, and POLITICAL MAN that make up what we have called Master Trends.

Except for such editorial modifications as the elimination of inappropriate cross references and the updating of a few citations, this Principles Edition is identical with the first nine chapters of *Sociology*. The main topics in the basic subject matter of sociology are therefore covered, but detailed application to special areas of interest given in Chapters X–XV of the larger book are not included. However, this edition is a coherent whole that covers those phenomena found in all societies and in most areas of sociological interest. The

main skills and interests comprising the sociologist's tools of analysis and interpretation are thus made available to the introductory student in compact form in a book of about 300 pages. Extensive illustrative examples are given to communicate a sense of concreteness and relevance.

FORMS OF PRESENTATION

The subject matter is handled in two main ways, in *Text* and in *Adaptations*. The text gives a coherent exposition and analysis. Separately identified adapted readings present aspects of important studies published in books, monographs, and learned journals. Because much of the material was prepared originally for a professional public, we have often simplified, condensed, and reorganized it to make it as useful as possible to beginning students of sociology. That is, we have "adapted" to the introductory level studies that illustrate or further develop discussions in the text. In a number of cases we have adapted only a portion of a major work or we have presented in Adaptation format our own summaries and interpretations of important books. In every case, Adaptations further develop points covered in the text discussion or are complementary to it.

Some Adaptations are primarily reports of research and are included for their factual and interpretive detail: for example, "Fertility and Family Organization in Ceylon," "Family and Society in Israel," "Race Riot: Los Angeles, 1965," and also "The Web of Friendship." Others are more theoretical: Mead on "Mind, Self and Society" and Michels on "The 'Iron Law' of Oligarchy." Still other Adaptations are simple research exercises or comments on research methods: "Exercises in Stratification Research" and "Public Opinion Polls."

Brief illustrative materials or, in the language of the printer, "text inserts," highlight particular topics and are set off from the rest of the text: for example, "Evaluating Percentages," "A Case of Jitters," and "The Case of the G.E. Babies."

Extensive use is made of charts and tables, which are essential parts of the text and should be studied with as much care as pages of exposition. See Adaptation 2 on "Reading a Table," pages 10–12.

Student research and privacy Outlines of research procedures ("Exercises in Stratification Research" and "The Technique of the Sociogram") are included to encourage the student to try his hand at original research. Such work should be undertaken only after careful review and planning with the instructor. Studies that depend on observation or interviewing are potentially invasions of privacy. It should be clearly understood that the privacy of informants

and subjects will be protected. Real people and real social relations are the subject matter of the sociologist. He shares with other scientists the obligations of objectivity and rigor. To these, whether he is a mature scholar or a new student, he must add respect for the privacy and personal integrity of his subjects. For example, experiments that deceive subjects in order to gauge their responses, or that lead them to lie, raise serious ethical problems.

Adaptation 2 / Wallis and Roberts **READING A TABLE**

Once the reading of tables is mastered, the reader's time is economized by studying the tables carefully and then skimming the text for anything that is not evident in the table, or perhaps not in the table at all. This approach to study not only saves time but often results in a better understanding: verbal descriptions of any but the simplest statistical relationships are usually hard to follow, and besides, authors sometimes misinterpret, misrepresent, or overlook important facts in their own tables.

By following a systematic procedure it is possible to grasp quickly the information presented in a table. Here are the main steps (using Table I:1):

1. *Read the title carefully.* A good title tells precisely what the table contains. In this case, the title shows that the table tells about illiteracy in relation to the variables of age, color, and sex, that the data are for the year 1959, and

that they are presented as rates—percent illiterate.

2. *Read the headnote or other explanation carefully.* The headnote of Table I:1 gives a more precise indication of the basis for classifying people as illiterate. It was taken for granted that any person who had completed six or more years of school was literate. The mentally deficient, criminals, and others in institutions have been excluded, as have the armed forces, so that the data relate to people in everyday civilian life. Finally, we note that the data are based on a large sample of the population 14 years old and over. Information of the kind given in this headnote is often not attached directly to a table but must be sought elsewhere in the accompanying text.

3. *Notice the source.* Is the original source likely to be reliable? In this case, the answer is definitely "yes," for the Bureau of

the Census is one of the most competent statistical agencies in the world. The primary publication source is the Bureau's *Current Population Reports*, and the secondary source is the *Statistical Abstract*, which is a model of its kind. But, as presented here, the data are from a tertiary source—this book. At each step in the copying process errors can creep in. If there is ever a reason to question data in any table, the primary source should be checked.

4. *Look at the footnotes.* They affect the data you will study. Sometimes a footnote applies to every figure in a row, column, or section, but not every figure to which it applies has a footnote symbol. Although Table I:1 has no footnotes, many tables do. See Table V:1, page 137.

5. *Find out what units are used.* Reading thousands as millions or as hundreds is not uncommon. Long tons can be confused with

short tons or metric tons, meters with yards, nautical with statute miles, rates per 1,000 with rates per 100,000, and so on. In Table I:1 illiteracy is expressed in percent—incidence per 100—and age in years.

a. *Know what column headings and stubs mean.* Stubs are the age categories at the left in Table I:1.

The foregoing steps are, in a sense, all preliminary orientation. They do not take long and ought to become habitual, but if you omit them you may suffer a rude awakening later—or never awaken at all.

6. *Look at the overall average.* The illiteracy rate for all ages, both colors, and both sexes—the whole population, in other words—is shown in the lower right-hand corner as 2.2 percent, or one person in 45. This may surprise you,

for probably not one in 450 of your acquaintances 14 years of age or older is illiterate. On a matter like this, for a country that in 1959 had about 140 million people 14 or older, neither one's own impressions nor the consensus of friends' impressions are valid. You are a member of a college population which by the definition in the headnote has no illiterates, and you are likely to know people much like yourself.

7. *See what variability there is.* It is quickly evident that there are percentages less than 1 and more than 25 in the table. There is, therefore, large variation in illiteracy among the twenty-four basic groups into which the population has been divided (two sexes, two colors, six age classes).

8. *See how the average compares with each variable.*

a. *Age.* In the section for

"both colors," look down the column for both sexes. We see that the illiteracy rate is lower than the average of 2.2 percent from ages 14 to 44, but it is average or higher through the remainder of the age classes to a rate of 6.5 percent in the highest age class. This is 5.9 percentage points larger than, and nearly eleven times as large as, the rate of 0.6 in the lowest age class. (Avoid phrases such as "illiteracy increases with age" or "rises sharply," which suggest that individuals change as they age.) These data are taken from a cross section of the population at a given point in time, and there is no implication that individuals become illiterate with age. We know from other evidence that older people on the average have had less schooling, and the association between age and illiteracy is, therefore, about what we would expect.

TABLE I:1 ILLITERACY RATES BY AGE, COLOR, AND SEX, UNITED STATES 1959

[Excludes Alaska and Hawaii. Based on a sample of about 76,000. Persons unable to both read and write in any language were classified as illiterate, except that literacy was assumed for all who had completed six or more years of school. Only the civilian, noninstitutional population 14 years of age and over is included.]

AGE (Years)	WHITE			NONWHITE			BOTH COLORS		
	Male	Female	Both	Male	Female	Both	Male	Female	Both
14 to 24	0.7	0.3	0.5	1.7	0.7	1.2	0.8	0.3	0.6
25 to 34	0.9	0.6	0.7	5.1	3.4	4.2	1.3	0.9	1.1
35 to 44	1.1	0.6	0.9	9.1	3.5	6.1	1.9	0.9	1.4
45 to 54	1.6	1.1	1.3	15.0	5.8	10.2	2.9	1.5	2.2
55 to 64	2.5	2.2	2.3	16.5	9.6	13.0	3.7	2.8	3.2
65 and over	5.3	5.0	5.1	28.3	23.0	25.5	6.9	6.2	6.5
14 and over	1.7	1.4	1.6	9.8	5.4	7.5	2.5	1.8	2.2

SOURCE: *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1966*, Table 159, p. 116. Original source: Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, Nos. 45 and 99.

b. *Sex.* In the both-colors section, comparison of the entries at the bottoms of the male and female columns—totals that apply to all ages—shows that the illiteracy rate for males (2.5 percent) is about 39 percent larger than that for females (1.8 percent).

c. *Color.* To see the association with color, we compare the entries at the bottoms of the both-sexes columns in the white and nonwhite sections and find that the nonwhite rate (7.5 percent) is 4.7 times the white rate (1.6 percent). At the youngest age the percent illiterate is low for both colors (compare the "both" columns under white and nonwhite), but more than twice as high for nonwhites as for whites. At the older ages nonwhite illiteracy is much greater.

This fact, too, is what we would expect from the trend in education. The older age groupings went to school when educational facilities for nonwhites were far from equal. The younger part of the nonwhite population had the advantage of improved, but not yet equal, educational facilities.

To this point we have used only summary data from the margins of the table. But this is not all that can be gleaned from reading a table. Turning to the cells in the body of the table we could compare the differences between males and females separately for whites and nonwhites. For every age bracket the illiteracy rate without exception is higher for males than for females. That is, white and nonwhite males show higher illiteracy

rates than white and nonwhite females respectively. We would also find that nonwhite females have a greater advantage over nonwhite males than white females have over white males.

However, without further attention to detail, some main conclusions that can be read from Table I:1 may be summarized. Illiteracy in 1959 among the civilian, noninstitutional population 14 years of age and older—

1. Averaged 2.2 percent.
2. Varied greatly with age, color, and sex.
3. Was higher for older people than for younger.
4. Was higher for males than for females.
5. Was higher for nonwhites than for whites.

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Periodicals

The following journals contain articles on topics pertinent to each of the chapters in this book and are not separately listed in succeeding chapters.

Acta Sociologica

American Journal of Sociology, until 1935 the official journal of the American Sociological Society, now Association. See the Index to Volumes 1–70, 1895–1965.

American Sociological Review, established in 1936 as the official journal of the American Sociological Association. See the Index to Volumes 1–25, 1936–1960 and the Index to Volumes 26–30, 1961–1965.

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science

Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology

Behavioral Science

British Journal of Sociology

Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology

Current Sociology

European Journal of Sociology

Human Organization

International Journal of Comparative Sociology

International Social Science Journal

New Society

Pacific Sociological Review

Rural Sociology

Social Forces

Social Issues

Social Problems

Sociological Abstracts

Sociological Analysis (formerly *American Catholic Sociological Review*)

Sociological Inquiry

Sociological Quarterly (formerly *Midwest Sociologist*)

Sociology and Social Research

Sociometry

Southwestern Social Science Quarterly

Trans-action

Transactions of the World Congress of Sociology, published by the International Sociological Association.

CHAPTER II

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION

Whether his subject of study is student life, poverty, crime, the urban revolution, or the emerging nations, the student of society gives a large share of his attention to discovering *how persons and groups relate to each other*. In a specific inquiry, his task is to identify the kinds of relations and their effects on individual conduct and institutional history. Social organization is the pattern of individual and group relations. Every human setting has some degree of social organization.

Many writers refer to social organization as "the social fabric," a metaphor which suggests that human relations are closely interwoven and that strains on one part may weaken the whole fabric in unanticipated ways. This figure of speech emphasizes the harmonious, the interdependent, and the cohesive. Social organization consists also of relations that isolate people or groups and that foster disharmony and conflict. For example, the social organization of a business may segregate blue-collar from white-collar employees and create conflicts of interest among various groups within the enterprise.

In placing the adjective "social" before "organization," the sociologist emphasizes that individual and group relations are mostly unplanned, adaptive outcomes of social processes. *Social* organization emerges in day-to-day interaction—problem-solving, conflict, and cooperation. By itself the word organization connotes a technical arrangement of parts and does not suggest the complexity and texture of human association.

A good way to grasp the general idea of social organization is to consider a familiar case, for example, a modern American university. On the campus there is a wide variety of groups, some permanent and formally recognized, others formed *ad hoc* for special tasks and occasions. In addition, but less discernible, are the lines of communication and influence best known only to the most active participants in campus life. The student government may be a "sandbox" with little power and little communication with the student body, or it may be a source of effective leadership. None of this can be read from an organization chart or official description. The social

organization of the campus can be discovered only in the course of experience or through systematic inquiry. And it is a dynamic, living thing, changing from year to year.

SOCIAL SYSTEMS

In pursuing the study of social organization, the sociologist often uses the term "social system." This idea emphasizes the interaction and interdependence of social phenomena. Separate social facts or units are studied as parts of interrelated wholes.

The concept of social system is useful for two reasons. First, it encourages a *contextual* view of individual and group behavior. By studying the social system of a prison, a neighborhood, or an occupation, it is possible to observe the limits that constrain participants as well as the opportunities opened up to them. Their decisions and activities are seen in context, that is, as conditioned by the social situation.

Second, the idea of social system invites attention to relationships that are not ordinarily visible and for which there are no commonsense names. For example, the interdependence of police and informers constitutes a social system; its reasons for being and its effects on law enforcement are not obvious. Social systems may cut across or extend beyond what are conventionally defined as social units. Thus the intersection of military, political, and industrial life may form a significant unity or complex, and may properly be thought of as a social system. Sometimes the analyst is interested in only selected aspects of a larger whole, for example, the communication system or the status system within a particular group or community.

Social systems may be small or large, stable or unstable. The idea of system encourages the analyst to look for contexts and connections; it does not tell him what he will find. It cannot be known in advance whether systematic connections will be found or, if they are discovered, how stable they may be. Indeed, the most important thing one may learn about a system is its internal stresses and tensions, that is, the sources of instability that are breaking it down or changing it into something else.

For example, in studying the social system of a

family—how its members respond to one another, how their activities are organized, how they depend on one another—the sociologist is at least as interested in the tensions within the family, both actual and potential, as he is in the smooth accommodations that have taken place. Similarly, when Marx analyzed what he called the "capitalist system," he was interested both in the forces that held it together and its latent internal conflicts. He saw the system as producing a "class struggle" and thereby generating problems it could not solve.

Some sociologists avoid the term "social system" because it seems to them to connote too great an intellectual concern for integration or stability, or to be an undesirable prejudgment about the existence of stable systems. "Patterns of social organization" can serve much the same purpose, with perhaps fewer special connotations, and some prefer that usage.

LEVELS OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

It is helpful to think of social systems as located at three levels of social organization—the interpersonal level, the group level, and the social-order level.

1. *Interpersonal relations.* (See Sec. 2, pp. 17–20.) An interpersonal relation is the most elementary social bond, occurring when two persons stand in some relation to each other, such as leader to follower, neighbor to neighbor. The term *interpersonal* means between persons and does not imply that the relation must be a personal one; it may be either impersonal or intimate.

The study of interpersonal relations is fundamental to the science of sociology because they are the "building-blocks" of social structure. Although groups differ they are all made up of the same elementary units, especially roles and modes of interaction. In a criminal gang, or any group, some men are in authority over others, some are friends, some may be teachers. The more that is understood about authority and friendship as general phenomena, the more readily will *any* group be understood. Therefore the student of social organization may devote himself to a detailed investigation of the dynamics of leadership as such or to some other important interpersonal relation. He studies the conditions that sus-

the interpersonal level	ordered interactions role behavior
the group level	initiates, builds upon and sustains interpersonal relations distinctive characteristics of various types of groups relations among groups
the social order level	broad patterns of group life that characterize an entire community or society

FIG. II:1 Levels of social organization

tain the relation and the strains to which it is subject. In doing so, he contributes to knowledge of the basic elements of all groups.

Although the study of interpersonal relations may concentrate attention on limited elements of social life, the implications may be far-reaching. Particular interpersonal relations, such as those involved in kinship, slavery, or the relations to a feudal lord, may be so pervasive and important that they characterize an entire society. In that case, intensive analysis of the interpersonal bond is vital to understanding the whole community and broad social changes.

2. *Group relations.* Section 3 (pp. 30–38) treats the interaction of groups and the stable or uneasy arrangements that result as well as the group structure of society. There is a great deal of difference between intergroup relations and interpersonal relations. When groups oppose one another, the individual members are often hostile, but by no means always. And the group may not be able to do what an individual can do, such as withdraw from a trying situation.

Knowledge of the group structure of a community or society gives clues to potential conflict or solidarity, as well as to forces that may determine the future character of the society or subsociety. New occupations or new patterns of residence may sig-

nificantly alter the group structure of the society. Behind the headlines reporting dramatic events such as the eruption of conflict—in industry, or in a racial ghetto, or in the Middle East—there is a history of groups and their relationships.

3. A *social order* exists when an entire community or society for a significant portion of its history is characterized by distinctive and interwoven patterns of social organization. A social order is a *type of society*, a comprehensive social system. For example, European feudalism was a type of society. This system had a number of key characteristics: a personal tie of loyalty between lord and vassal, the binding of serfs and villeins to the soil, a manorial system of agriculture, and decentralized military control by barons who dominated the countryside from fortified castles. These and other features define the ingredients of a feudal order, its weakness and strength.

Sociologists are also interested in the distinctive features of other social orders: nomadic societies, the modern American society, totalitarian social organization, and other large social systems. Not all of these are readily reducible to a few simple elements, but the sociologist is primarily concerned with finding out how the social order functions as a system, what it depends upon, and the main points of inner strain and conflict.

These studies have largely been the province of historical sociologists interested in social orders that embrace and give form to large systems and long epochs. The study of social systems can also be applied to limited areas of life. The medical world, for example, is strongly controlled by professional organization, by a specialized technology requiring centralization of many activities in large hospitals, by the doctor-patient relationship, and by the way the private physician cooperates with hospital personnel. Anyone interested in medical care needs to understand this network of social relations that extends from the doctor at his patient's bed to the social ranking of hospital personnel.

No sharp separation can be made between studying large institutional settings and small-scale situations. The social organization of the medical world

reaches into the hospital ward and affects the human relations within it, just as the social organization of

feudalism left its mark on personal interaction in the baronial halls and in the fields.

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SECTION 2 THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

A major objective of this book is to explore the following general principle: *the way men behave is largely determined by their relations with each other and by their membership in groups.* Social relations are at the foundation of both motivation and control. The goals and aspirations that set people into motion are greatly influenced by their social relations. Social relations are also instruments of control, for they limit action and restrain impulses that might threaten the orderly arrangement of independent lives.

A corollary of the basic principle stated above is that individuals respond most to the immediate situations in which they find themselves. A member of a street gang or a sales force is also a member of groups that touch him less closely, but in his everyday life it is the proximate membership that has the greatest effect. It follows that behavior determined by social

relations is not necessarily conformist from the standpoint of the larger society. The individual may be drawn into delinquency while conforming to immediate group influences.

INTERACTION AND RELATEDNESS

In his daily life an individual continually meets people, cooperates with them, obeys them, irritates them, ignores them. Even to begin a list of such actions shows how diverse are the ways human beings deal with each other. The process of acting in awareness of others, and adjusting responses to the way others respond, is called *social interaction*. Much interaction follows an established pattern; as soon as an individual identifies another person as his teacher or employer, for example, he knows how he is expected to respond.

Other interactions, however, are less closely governed by established patterns.¹ In Western society the individual is faced with many alternatives—whom to have as friends, whom to marry, where to work, what political party to join, and many others. In the course of making these choices, he establishes ties with other individuals, accepts membership in many groups (for instance, when he becomes a student or employee) and gradually comes to have a settled place in the world. The individual's interactions and his group memberships are determined more by how he solves the problems of everyday life than by a fixed set of rules. As an outgrowth of the individual's daily choices and decisions, enduring relations are established, and he thus makes a contribution to social organization. These topics are illustrated in Adaptation 3 which describes interaction and social organization in a suburban housing development.

The sociologist is mainly concerned with interactions that attain stability, that is, those that are recurrent and patterned. This central concern for stable, recurrent interactions does not mean that the less stable ones are uninteresting or unimportant. Sociologists also study spontaneous, relatively uncontrolled forms of human behavior, such as fads and fashions, panics and riots, but in doing so particular attention is given to the emergence of shared patterns of behavior, even though they are transitory. Sociologists also recognize that in the more stable relations, such as marriage, there is room for a variety of responses and adjustments. While searching for what is orderly, it must be remembered that change and instability are characteristic of social life. Much interaction is casual, tentative, or unstable, and does not lead to enduring social bonds.

The variety of social relations is enormous. Friendship, fatherhood, employment, leadership, neighborliness, partnership, citizenship, marriage, and a host of other terms signify important and differing relations. The sociologist tries to understand the nature of these relations by examining their elements, classifying

them, and studying what happens to them under changing conditions.

Some social bonds are strong and others weak. A shipboard romance is a notoriously weak social relation; marriage, even in present-day society, remains a relatively strong and stable relation. Some social relations, such as family relations, have lasting significance for the entire life of the individual while others, even if they endure, are far less meaningful. Some relations are of great importance to the community because they involve tasks that must be performed, such as the care of children. Other relations, for example a friendship, may be of little concern to anyone except those who are immediately involved.

The strength of a social relation depends in part upon its scope and whether it fits into a larger pattern. For example, if a marriage involves the husband in economic ties to his wife's family, this broadens and often strengthens the foundation upon which the marriage rests, despite the fact that it also introduces unusual strains. In addition, the strength of a relation depends on whether it serves or frustrates the needs of the individual. Both aspects of any social relation—its place in a larger social setting and its significance for personal satisfaction—affect whether the relation is strong and enduring or weak and transitory.²

ROLES AND ROLE STRAIN

A role (sometimes called "social role") is a basic unit of social structure. It may be defined as a pattern of behavior associated with a distinctive social position, e.g., that of father, teacher, employer, or patient. The *ideal* role prescribes the rights and duties belonging to a social position; it tells the individual what is expected of him in his role as father or teacher, to whom he has obligations, and upon whom he has a rightful claim. *Actual* role behavior is always subject to the influence of a specific social setting as well as the personality of the individual.

Some sociologists restrict roles to the ideal or pre-

¹ For studies of interaction with emphasis on situational rather than established patterns, see R. F. Bales, *Interaction Process Analysis: A Method for the Study of Small Groups* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1950), and Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (Garden City, N.Y.: [Anchor] Doubleday, 1959).

² For a treatment that relates interaction to larger social structure, see Peter M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York: Wiley, 1964).

scribed pattern, using role *performance* to designate the actual conduct.³ However, the distinction between ideal and actual breaks down in the case of informal or emergent roles for which there are no clearly defined expectations. For example, in small-group interaction one person may be a sparkplug or idea man, another a joker who helps relieve tension. These roles are often independent of formally assigned positions or tasks and tend to be expressive of personality traits and group needs. From such role behavior stable expectations may in time develop, but at first there is no ideal or prescribed role.

Most roles are more complex than they appear to be at first glance. A mother is a mother in relation to a child; yet being a mother is more than just one social relation. It is a bundle of relations to other members of the family and to the community, as well as to the child. Part of the role of mother may involve membership in the PTA, just as part of the role of employer may involve membership in a Chamber of Commerce. Although many roles are rather definitely specified, in practice they are often too complex to be learned except through experience. The mother, the employer, the student, the foreman only gradually learn through their interactions with others what is expected of individuals in their social position.

To analyze a role completely it is necessary to specify in detail the social position with which it is associated. In some respects, all students occupy similar social positions. Insofar as this is true, it is possible to describe general features of the student's role. But there are many ways of being a student, even within a particular college. The married student, the disciple, the student leader are all significantly different in the positions they occupy within the social structure of the college. Close analysis usually reveals specific roles, reflecting the particular way a given family, school, or other group is organized.

Role conflict In the course of his role behavior the individual is subject to conflicting pressures and strains.⁴ Some of these strains arise because different and inconsistent kinds of behavior are required. For

example, a role may call for friendship or intimacy but also may require impersonal judgment or command. To the extent that a professor's role leads him to attempt to influence some students deeply, he needs to be on friendly terms with them, to treat them as unique persons, and to develop a sense of mutual loyalty. But the professor must also be a judge who evaluates the work of the student, and makes decisions that may affect the latter's career. These conflicting demands require painful adjustments.

Some roles are designed to meet this type of problem. To preserve authority, close personal relations between those in command and their subordinates may be carefully avoided. For example, the impersonality and severity of military discipline are supported by creating a strong sense of social distance between officers and enlisted men. This is not always a satisfactory solution, however. A more personal leadership is necessary to win deep loyalty or to summon extraordinary energies in battle; and distance between ranks handicaps effective communication even in everyday activities. Hence, the wise leader seeks various ways of overcoming the distance between himself and his followers. For example, he may show by public acts that he is proud of his men and understands their problems.

Role conflicts in industry and military life arise when the attempt is made to create a bridge from the commanding group to those who must obey. Many noncommissioned officers in the army and foremen in industry play this bridging role. They are men "in the middle." They must communicate orders from above, but they must be close enough to the working group to understand how these orders will be received; they must have the confidence of the working group lest fear and hostility undermine effective communication and the will to cooperate. At the same time, these lower-level leaders must be able to take the point of view of their superiors whose orders are to be communicated and enforced. The result is a continuing necessity to take account of two approaches to daily experience and of two sets of interests that are often in conflict.

³ See Erving Goffman, *Encounters: Studies in the Sociology of Interaction* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961), p. 85.

⁴ William J. Goode, "A Theory of Role Strain," *American Sociological Review*, 25 (August, 1960), 483-496.

Thus strains and inconsistencies are *built into the role*. When these built-in conflicts are known, the problems set for the individual by his role are also known. His role involves him in relations that make demands upon him, limit the alternatives he can choose, and create the problems he must try to solve. This point illustrates the dynamic, motivating, and problem-setting nature of social organization.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL CONTROL

The individual gains much from his involvement in social organization, but he always pays a price. That price is the acceptance of restraints, of limitations on the freedom to do as he pleases.

Social organization produces social control mainly because people are *dependent* on each other. One way of mapping the social structure of a group or community is to explore the mutual dependencies that have been created.⁵ The more people an individual is dependent upon for his satisfactions, the more claims will there be upon him to exercise self-restraint lest he offend those he needs and risk the loss of their cooperation.

Dependency is not necessarily an expression of narrow self-interest. Dependency may invoke ideals that might otherwise be inoperative. The social ideals of parenthood do not have much influence on a bachelor. His behavior cannot be restrained by responsibility to children he does not have. It is only through relations to others and by participating in social institutions that responsibilities arise; only in this way do ideals become effective instruments of social control.

Isolation and control Social isolation weakens social control. If a person is uninvolved with others, there are fewer occasions to assess the consequences of his actions either for himself or for others dependent upon him. Durkheim's explanation of the different rates of suicide (see Adaptation 4) is grounded in a theory of social organization. He pointed out, for example, that unmarried people are "freer" to choose suicide as a response to despair than are married people, because the unmarried are relatively isolated from controlling social bonds.

⁵ Richard M. Emerson, "Power-Dependence Relations," *American Sociological Review*, 27 (February, 1962), 31-41.

Adaptation 3 / W. H. Whyte, Jr. THE WEB OF FRIENDSHIP

Students of social organization are interested in both the *sources* and the *consequences* of patterned interaction. In the new suburb, one may observe the spontaneous growth of social organization among people previously unrelated to each other. The effects of this patterning on the personal lives of the residents can then be analyzed.

This procedure is followed in Whyte's description and interpretation of life in Park Forest, Illinois. He traces the emergence of different micro-communities that develop their own social characteristics. These characteristics are based on the physical placement of homes by the designers of the housing development and on the patterns of relations established by the first residents.

Also considered are the effects of the highly patterned and intense social life of these small subcommunities on (1) civic participation and (2) the individual's dilemma of personal autonomy and group loyalty.

In suburbia, friendship has become almost predictable. Given a few physical clues about the area, you can come close to determining its flow of "social traffic," and to a diagnosis of who is in the gang and who is not.

Park Forest has the principal design features found in other suburbs: its 60 x 125 plots are laid out in the curved superblocks typical of most new developments, and the garden duplexes of its rental area are perhaps the most intense development of court living to be found anywhere. Park Forest is like other suburbs, only more so.

The architects wanted a good basic design that would please people and make money for the developers—but not since the medieval town have there been neighborhood units so well adapted to the predilections and social needs of its people. In many ways, the courts are remarkably similar to the workers' housing of the fifteenth century. Like the Fugger houses in Augsburg, the courts are essentially groups of houses two rooms deep, bound together by lines of communication, and the parking area unifies the whole very much as did the water fountain of the Fugger houses.


When the architects designed the 105 courts and the homes area, they tried hard to introduce some variety, and no two courts or superblocks are physically alike. But neither are they alike socially; some neighborhood units have been a conspicuous social success from the beginning, others have not. Each court produces a different pattern of behavior, and whether newcomers become civic leaders or bridge fans or churchgoers is determined to a large ex-

tent by the gang to which chance assigns them.

Court residents talk about these differences a great deal. In some areas, they will tell you, feuding and cussedness are chronic. "I can't put my finger on it," says one resident, "but as long as I've been here this court has had an inferiority complex. We never seem to get together and have the weenie roasts and parties they have in B 18 across the street." In other courts they will talk of their *esprit de corps*. "At the beginning we were maybe too neighborly," says one housewife. "Your friends knew

more about your private life than you did yourself! But it's still real friendly. The street behind us is nowhere near as friendly. They knock on doors over there."

A routine plotting of the rate of turnover in each area, the location of parties, and similar data revealed geographical concentrations that could not be attributed to chance. For example, when the location of leaders of church and other civic organizations was plotted, certain courts displayed a heavy concentration while others showed none at all. The pattern, furthermore, was a persistent one.



How Homeowners Get Together: (1) Individuals tend to become most friendly with neighbors whose driveways adjoin theirs. (2) Deviates or feuding neighbors tend to become boundaries of the gang. (3) People in the most central positions make the greatest number of social contacts. (4) Street width and traffic determine whether or not people make friends across the street. (5) People make friends with those in back of them only where some physical feature creates traffic—such as the short-cut pavement one woman on the lower street uses on her way to the supermarket.

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When leaders for the same organizations as of two years earlier were studied, the same basic pattern emerged. Several leaders were still hanging on, but there had been enough turnover to show that the clustering was closely related to the influence of the court.

Other indexes show the same kind of contagion. The map of active members of the United Protestant Church indicates that some areas habitually send a good quota of people to church while other areas send few. Voting records show heavy voter turnouts in some areas, apathy in others, and this pattern tends to be constant—the area that had the poorest showing in the early days is still the poorest (six people voting out of thirty-eight eligibles). The same courts may also make more complaints to the police about parking-space encroachments, litter left on the lawns, and similar evidences of bad feeling. Courts that keep on producing an above-average number of complaints prove to be the ones with relatively poor records of churchgoing and voting. Another key index is the number of parties and such communal activities as joint playpens. Some courts have many parties, and though the moving van is constantly bringing in new people, the partying and the group activities keep up undiminished. On closer investigation, areas with high partying records usually prove to be the ones with the physical layout best adapted to providing the close-knit neighborly group that many planners and observers feel needs to be re-created.

Court traditions Of all the factors making for differences among the courts, the character of the

original settlers seems the most important. In the early phase, the court's inhabitants must function as a unit to conquer such now-legendary problems as the mud of Park Forest, or the "rocks and rats" of Drexelbrook. During this period, though the level of communal sharing and brotherhood is high in all courts, the impact of the strong personality, good or otherwise, is magnified. Two or three natural leaders concentrated in one court may so stimulate the other people that civic work becomes something of a tradition in the court; or, if the dominant people are of a highly gregarious temper, the court may develop more inwardly, along the one-big-family line. Conversely, one or two troublemakers may fragment a court into a series of cliques, and the lines of dissension often live long after the troublemakers have gone.

In time, the intensity of activity weakens. As the volunteer policemen are replaced by a regular force, as the mud turns to grass, the old *esprit de corps* subsides into relative normalcy. First settlers will tell you that the place is in a dead calm. But what seems like dead calm to them will not seem so to anybody from the outside world, and for all the settling down the court continues to be a hothouse of participation. Occasionally, there are sharp breaks in the continuity of tradition; in one court, several forceful women ran for the same post in a community organization, and the effect of their rivalry on the court spirit was disastrous. Most courts, however, tend to keep their essential characters. Newcomers are assimilated, one by one, and by the time the old leaders are ready

to depart, they have usually trained someone to whom they can pass on the baton.

Space and sociability The social patterns show rather clearly that a couple's behavior is influenced not only by which court they join but by the particular part of the court in which they are placed.

It begins with the children. There are so many of them and they are so dictatorial in effect that a term like *filiarchy* would not be entirely facetious. It is the children who set the basic design; their friendships are translated into the mothers' friendships, and these, in turn into the family's. "The kids are the only ones who are really organized here," says the resident of a patio court at Park Merced in San Francisco. "We older people sort of tag along after them." Suburbanites elsewhere agree. "We are not really 'kid-centered' here like some people say," one Park Forester protests, "but when your kids are playing with the other kids, they force you to keep on good terms with everybody."

That they do. With their remarkable sensitivity to social nuance, the children are a highly effective communication net, and parents sometimes use them to transmit what custom dictates elders cannot say face to face. "One newcomer gave us quite a problem in our court," says a resident in an eastern development. "He was a Ph.D., and he started to pull rank on some of the rest of us. I told my kid he could tell his kid that the other fathers around here had plenty on the ball. I guess all we fathers did the same thing; pretty soon the news trickled upward to this guy. He isn't a bad

sort; he got the hint—and there was no open break of any kind.”

Placement of driveways and stoops: If you are passing by a row of houses equally spaced and want a clue as to how the different couples pair off, look at the driveways. At every second house there are usually two adjacent driveways; where they join makes a natural sitting, baby-watching, and gossip center, and friendship is more apt to flower there than across the unbroken stretch of lawn on the other sides of the houses. For the same basic reasons the couples who share adjoining back stoops in the courts are drawn together, even though equidistant neighbors on the other side may have much more in common with them.

Lawns: The front lawn is the thing on which homeowners expend most time, and the sharing of tools, energies, and advice tends to make family friendships go along and across the street rather than over the back yards. The persistence of this pattern furnishes another demonstration of the remarkable longevity of social patterns. At first, some people thought that lack of over-the-back-fence fraternization was strictly temporary. It has not proved to be so. As the areas have matured, some of the reasons for the concentration of activity in the front area have disappeared; but despite this fact and despite the turnover, over-the-back-fence socializing is still the exception.

Centrality: The location of your home in relation to the others not only determines your closest friends; it also virtually determines how popular you will be. The more central one's location, the more social contacts one has. In the streets

containing rental apartments there is a constant turnover; yet no matter who moves in or out, the center of activity remains in mid-block, with the people at the ends generally included only in the larger gatherings.

Some Park Forest veterans joke that a guide should be furnished newcomers so that if they had a choice of sites they would be able to tell which would best suit their personality. Introverts who wished to come out of their shell could pick a house in the middle of a block; while introverts who wished to stay just as they are would be well advised to pick a unit more isolated.

Barriers: The rules of the game about who is to be included, who left out, are not simple. Suppose you want to give a party? Do you mix friends out of the area with the neighbors? How many neighbors should you invite? Where, as social leaders chronically complain, do you draw the line? Physical barriers can provide the limiting point. Streets, for example, are functional for more than traffic; if it is a large street with heavy traffic, mothers will forbid their children to cross it, and by common consent the street becomes a boundary for the adult group.

Because of the need for a social line, the effect of even the smallest barrier is multiplied. In courts where the parking areas have two exits, fences have been placed across the middle to block through traffic; only a few feet high, they are as socially impervious as a giant brick wall. Similarly, the grouping of apartment buildings into wings of a court provides a natural unit whose limits everyone understands.

Ambiguity is the one thing the group cannot abide. If there is no line, the group will invent one. They may settle on an imaginary line along the long axis of the court, or, in the homes area, one particular house as the watershed. There is common sense behind it. If it is about time you threw a party for your neighbors, the line solves many of your problems for you. Friends of yours who live on the other side understand why they were not invited, and there is no hard feeling.

In this need, incidentally, the deviant can be of great benefit. The family that doesn't mix with the others or is disliked by them frequently furnishes a line of social demarcation that the layout and geography do not supply. So functional is the barrier family in this respect that even if they move out, their successors are likely to inherit the function. The new people may be normal enough themselves, but unless they are unusually extroverted the line is apt to remain.

The outgoing life The effect this web of friendship has on the individual is a problem suburbanites think about a great deal. One of the first points they make is how it has altered their personality—or how they and the rest of the group altered someone else's. For the good. “I've changed tremendously,” says one typical transient. “My husband was always the friend-maker in the family—everybody always loves Joe; he's so likable. But here I began to make some friends on my own; I was so tickled when I realized it. One night when the gang came to our house I suddenly realized I made these friends.”

The cumulative effect can be summed up in a word. People are made *outgoing*. If the person is too shy to make the first move, others will take the initiative. In almost every court, patio, or superblock there is usually someone who enjoys doing the job, and the stiffer the challenge, the more the enjoyment. "When Mr. and Mrs. Berry came, they wouldn't give you the time of day," one leader recalls. "But I knew they were real shy and unhappy beneath it all. I said to myself, 'I'm going to conquer them if it kills me.' I have, too. She was one of the organizers for the Mothers' March and he's gotten tremendously interested in the school. They're part of the gang now—you wouldn't know they were the same people."

The sin of privacy On the matter of privacy, suburbanites have mixed feelings. Fact one, of course, is that there isn't much privacy; people don't bother to knock and they come and go furiously. The lack of privacy, furthermore, is retroactive. "They ask you all sorts of questions about what you were doing," one resident puts it. "Who was it that stopped in last night? Who were those people from Chicago last week? You're never alone, even when you think you are."

Few things are sacred. "It's wonderful," says one young wife. "You find yourself discussing all your personal problems with your neighbors—things that back in South Dakota we would have kept to ourselves." As time goes on, this capacity for self-revelation grows; and on the most intimate details of family life, court people become amazingly frank with one another.

No one, they point out, ever need face a problem alone.

In the battle against loneliness even the architecture becomes functional. Just as doors inside houses are disappearing, so are the barriers against neighbors. The picture in the picture window, for example, is what is going on *inside*—or, what is going on inside other people's picture windows. Walls in the new apartments are thin, but there is more good than bad, many transients say, to the thinness. "I never feel lonely, even when Jim's away," goes a typical comment. "You know friends are near by, because at night you hear the neighbors through the walls."

Even the most outgoing, of course, confess that the pace of court life occasionally wears them down, and once in a while they reach such a point of rebellion they don't answer the phone. One court resident moves his chair to the front rather than the court side of his apartment to show he doesn't want to be disturbed. Often a whole court or a wing of it will develop such a signal; a group in one Drexelbrook court has decided that whenever one of them feels he or she has finally had it, she should draw the venetian blinds all the way down to the bottom of the picture window. The rest spot it as a plea to be left alone—for a little while, anyway.

But there is an important corollary of such efforts at privacy—people feel a little guilty about making them. Except very occasionally, to shut oneself off from others like this is regarded as either a childish prank or, more likely, an indication of some inner neurosis. The individual, not the group, has erred. So, at any rate, many

errants seem to feel, and they are often penitent. "I've promised myself to make it up to them," one court resident recently told a confidant. "I was feeling bad that day and just plain didn't make the effort to ask them in for coffee. I don't blame them, really, for reacting the way they did."

The moral basis of conformity

However one may view this responsiveness to the group, it is important to acknowledge its moral basis. That friendship in the new suburbia transcends personal characteristics so much is due in part to the increasing homogeneity of American middle-class values. But it is also due to a very active kind of tolerance, and unless this is recognized one cannot appreciate the true difficulty of the suburbanites' dilemmas.

Very consciously, they try to understand one another's backgrounds and prejudices, and make a great effort to meet one another half way. Farm-bred Republicans learn to appreciate that not all urban Democrats are Communists. "The people who lived in the other half of our duplex," recalls one Republican, "were as different as could be from us. They were the kind who worshipped F.D.R.'s name. But we got to like them just the same. We just didn't talk politics. We used to go bowling together and that sort of thing. I didn't make him a Republican, but I think he appreciates my views a lot more than he did before, and I understand him better."

This seeking of common values applies markedly to religion. The neighborhood friendship patterns would be impossible unless religious beliefs had lost much of

their segregating effect. And it is more than a passive, live-and-let-live attitude.

Even where there is conflict, suburbanites lean over backward to see the other point of view. "When Will and Ada had to dash East last month—they're devout Catholics—I took care of little Johnny for them," recalls one non-Catholic. "It really tickled me. Here I was picking Johnny up at St. Irenaeus School every afternoon and seeing to it that he said his Rosary every night before he went to bed." Park Forest abounds with such stories, and the good will implicit in them is real.

The suburban group also has a strong effect on relations between husband and wife, in many ways a beneficent one. The group is a foster family. In the transient organization life the young family has to take a good part of its environment with it; no longer is there the close complex of aunts and uncles and grandparents to support the couple, and when they come to their first crisis this absence can have a devastating effect. All the other young couples are in the same boat, and in a sort of unspoken mutual assistance pact they provide for one another a substitute for the big family of former years.

What unites them most are the concerns of parenthood, and this preoccupation with children is a potent factor in keeping marriages on keel. "The kind of social situation you find here discourages divorce," says the United Protestant Church minister. "Few people, as a rule, get divorces until they break with their groups. I think the fact that it is so hard to break with a group here has had a lot to do with

keeping some marriages from going on the rocks."

The group as friend and tyrant

But the group is a jealous master. It encourages participation, indeed it demands it, but it demands one kind of participation—its own kind—and the better integrated with it a member becomes the less free he is to express himself in other ways.

When we first went to Park Forest we thought that the courts and blocks most notable for their friendliness and social activity would contribute the greatest number of civic leaders. As a check we plotted the location of all the leaders in the principal community organizations. To our surprise, the two did not correlate; if anything, there was a reverse relationship. By and large, the people who were active in the overall community did not tend to come from the courts that were especially "happy."

The cause-and-effect relationship is not too difficult to determine. For some people, of course, it does not make much difference whether the neighborly gang is a happy one or not; they would be leaders in any event. But such people are a minority. The majority are more influenced by the good opinion of the group, and its cohesiveness has a considerable bearing on whether they will become active in community-wide problems. Where the group has never jelled enough to stimulate a sense of obligation, the person with any predilection for civic activity feels no constraints. The others would not be annoyed if he went in for outside activity; they don't care enough. If the group is strong,

however, the same kind of person is less likely to express such yearnings. It would be divisive. There are only so many enthusiasms a person can sustain, only so many hours in the day, and the amount of leisure one expends outside the group must be deducted from that spent inside.

It is not merely that the group will resent the absenteeism. The individual himself feels a moral obligation to the group. A young housewife had been toying with the idea of getting involved in the little theater, for she felt she and her husband were culturally very lacking. But she decided against it. "If we do it'll mean we'll have to spend more of our free evenings away from the gang. I'd hate to be the first to break things up. The two play areas for the kids—my, how we all pitched in on that! I know we spend too much time just talking and playing bridge and all. Frankly Chuck and I are the only ones around here who read much more than the *Reader's Digest*. But have we the right to feel superior? I mean, should we break things up just because we're different that way?"

Is this simple conformity? Consider the man who is wondering about something he knows would upset the group—like not painting his garage white, like the rest. He may have been one of the first settlers of a block where the people have suppressed potential dislikes in a very successful effort to solve their common problems. Quite probably, a piece of bad luck for one of the group might have further unified them. If one of the wives had come down with polio, the rest might have chipped in not only with their money but with

their time to help out the family through the crisis.

In other words, there had been a great deal of real brotherhood, and the man who is now figuring about his garage faces a decision that is not entirely ludicrous. He knows instinctively that his choice will be construed by the others as

an outward manifestation of his regard for them, and he does feel a real obligation to help sustain the good feeling.

If he goes along with them he is conforming, yes, but he is conforming not simply out of cowardice but out of a sense of brotherhood too. You may think him mis-

taken, but grant at least his problem. The group is a tyrant; so also is it a friend, and *it is both at once*. The two qualities cannot easily be separated, for what gives the group its power over the man is the same cohesion that gives it warmth.

Adaptation 4 / Durkheim SUICIDE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

The French sociologist, Emile Durkheim, was interested in the various types of social integration and in social disorganization, the weakening of social bonds. He used rates of suicide as an index of social integration. The suicide rate was higher for Protestants than for Catholics, higher for the unmarried than for the married, higher for soldiers than for civilians, higher for noncommissioned officers than for enlisted men, higher in times of peace than in times of war and revolution, and higher in times of both prosperity and recession than in times of economic stability.

Durkheim reasoned that since different groups have different suicide rates, there must be something in their social organization that prevents or fails to deter people from suicide, or which may even prompt them to it. He acknowledged that individual reasons were many and varied: financial distress, disappointment in love, failing to pass an examination, ill health, and so on. But these reasons did not explain why some groups have higher suicide rates than others.

Durkheim suggested that the degree to which the individual was integrated into group life determined whether he could be motivated to suicide. However, he recognized that no single set of circumstances explains suicide. The individual can be motivated to suicide at either of two extremes: if he is highly integrated or if he is only superficially integrated into society.

Altruistic suicide When the individual is tightly bound into a highly integrated group with a strong sense of solidarity, he accepts the values and norms of the group as his own. He does not distinguish between his interests and

those of the group, nor is he likely to think of himself as a unique individual with a life separate and apart from the group. Under these circumstances what would prompt him to commit suicide?

He will be willing to sacrifice his

life for group goals. The Japanese *Kamikaze* of World War II is an example of military self-sacrifice. Japanese airmen crashed their planes onto enemy ships in order to disable them, despite the fact that it meant certain death. In

SOURCE: A summary and interpretation of Emile Durkheim, *Le Suicide* (Paris: Alcan, 1897). English translation and introduction by George Simpson (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951).

highly integrated societies where there is a strong sense of social solidarity, self-destruction may be looked upon as self-affirmation and fulfillment; death, as well as life, has meaning and value. Closely related to this kind of suicide is ritualistic self-sacrifice. In India a practice called *suttee*, now outlawed, was sometimes performed, in which the Hindu widow threw herself on her husband's funeral pyre.

If the individual fails to meet group standards, death may appear preferable to life. Identification with the group can be so intense that group condemnation is tantamount to self-condemnation. Failure in such a case is total and absolute. The individual puts all his eggs in one basket. He stakes his entire self-respect on approval of one particular group; when that is withdrawn, he has no other basis for self-esteem.

Suicide that results from an excessive degree of group integration Durkheim called *altruistic*, and it is committed for the sake of the group or according to group norms of conduct. Altruistic suicide may be a manifestation of overinvolvement in one group and social isolation from other groups.

Durkheim used his theory of altruistic suicide to explain why the suicide rate was higher for soldiers than for civilians, higher for non-commissioned officers than for enlisted men, and higher for volunteers and those who reenlisted than for conscripts. He suggested that suicide increases as the soldier identifies himself more completely with the values and norms of military life. The officer is better integrated into the military organization than the ordinary soldier,

the volunteer more involved with military life than the conscript. The more fully the soldier is integrated into military life, the greater is his isolation from other groups in society; the more dedicated he is to military values, the more he stakes his self-respect on success in the army. No other paths are open to him.


Egoistic suicide What happens to the individual when he is only weakly attached to the social order?

1. He lacks the restraints that intense participation in group life imposes on him. If he has an inclination to commit suicide, he is not deterred because of deeply felt obligations to others. Nor does he consider the consequences of his suicide for the group. An individual not bound to others is free of any claims that they may have on his survival.

2. The individual lacks the emotional attachments to others that make life worth while and less self-centered.

3. The individual lacks the emotional supports that deep immersion in group life can provide. He is thrown back upon his own resources. He gains no satisfaction from the achievements of the group; success or failure are his alone. Wrongdoing is not defined solely by group standards, but is a matter of personal judgment and responsibility. Under the burden of individual responsibility, the individual is susceptible to the emotional disturbances which may lead to suicide, and he cannot fall back upon relations with others to help him over a personal crisis.

This kind of suicide Durkheim called *egoistic*. It is self-centered



Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), a profound student of social organization. His lifelong interest was in the forces that hold a society together or tend to disorganize it. In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, he studied the contribution of religion to social cohesion; his Division of Labor in Society analyzed two basic types of social solidarity and introduced the concept of anomie. Another of his studies of social integration was Suicide, one of the first modern examples of the use of statistical method in social research.

rather than group-centered. Altruistic suicide occurs because the individual is deeply involved in group life; egoistic suicide occurs because the individual is uninvolved and detached.

According to Durkheim, the relatively higher rate of Protestant suicide could be explained as egois-



Suicide as a demonstrative political act: the ultimate personal decision may reflect the strength or weakness of group ties.

tic. Both Catholicism and Protestantism condemn suicide, but Catholicism makes its injunction effective by attaching the individual to the church as a social institution. Protestantism, on the other hand, makes salvation a matter of individual faith and religious belief, of personal responsibility. It

tends to detach the individual from all religious constraint except his own conscience. In doing so, however, it removes the very social restraints that would be most effective in deterring him from suicide.

The relatively higher suicide rate among the unmarried is also an instance of egoistic suicide. The

unmarried are both socially and emotionally isolated from others. They have fewer responsibilities as well as fewer attachments. The married are restrained by both formal obligations and emotional ties. They are also apt to be less self-centered. Their lives are perforce taken up with the care of others, and they develop shared interests and values and find emotional support in their interpersonal relations.

During wars and revolutions people are led to forget themselves and their troubles in uniting for a common effort. At least temporarily, social crises result in a stronger integration of society. For this reason, Durkheim claimed, the suicide rate tends to fall during social disturbances and wars.

Anomic suicide A highly integrated and unified group develops norms to regulate behavior and interpersonal relations. The group provides the individual with a sense of security by establishing clear rules of right and wrong and by limiting his aspirations to what he can hope to achieve.

Durkheim believed that an ever-present source of acute anxiety is unrestrained aspiration. When people live without established, attainable goals and definite alternatives, when there is "only empty space above them," they are subject to emotional distress. When group norms are weakened, the individual feels less restraint on his aspirations and conduct. At the same time, he loses the security that group control and regulation provide. His ambitions soar beyond possible fulfillment and he is uncertain of what is right and wrong.

According to Durkheim, a society that lacks clear-cut norms to govern men's aspirations and moral conduct is characterized by *anomie*, which means "lack of rules" or "normlessness." Suicide resulting from anomie Durkheim called *anomic*.

Anomic and egoistic suicide both spring from low social integration, but they are nevertheless independent. Although the egoistic suicide does not have the personal bonds that would deter him from the act, he has not necessarily rejected social norms. On the contrary, the egoistic suicide may be a highly moralistic person who feels a deep sense of personal responsibility for his behavior. His morality, however, stems from "principle" rather than from felt loyalties to other persons or institutions. Indeed one of the sources of his emotional disturbance may be that he is overdisciplined, that he conforms in an overly rigid way. According to Durkheim, egoistic suicide is apt to occur among intellectuals and professionals, people who are primarily concerned with ideas and are only loosely attached to specific persons or groups.

In anomic suicide, on the other hand, the individual may be deeply

involved in society, but group life fails to provide him with controlling standards of behavior. Life may be unbearable to the egoistic suicide because of *excessive* self-discipline; life may be unbearable to the anomic suicide because of *inadequate* self-discipline.

Durkheim offered two kinds of evidence to support his theory that a lack of limiting norms would result in a high suicide rate.

1. He noted that the rate was higher in countries that permitted divorce than in countries that did not permit it, and the rate was still higher where divorce was frequent. Durkheim reasoned that by allowing divorce a society weakened an important regulatory principle.

When the relation of suicide to divorce is considered, a distinction must be made between the fact of divorce and the possibility of it. The fact of divorce tends to isolate the individual and thereby contributes to the rate of egoistic suicide. The possibility of divorce reflects permissive norms that open up alternatives and generate anxiety; therefore it is relevant to anomic suicide.

2. Durkheim also noted that suicide is associated with economic conditions. In periods of depression the suicide rate is high. How-

ever, the cause is not the hardship of poverty but rather the dislocation attendant upon economic crises. Spain was much poorer than France but had only a tenth as many suicides, and rates were generally low in areas of persistent poverty.

Durkheim felt that any abrupt economic changes, whether of boom or of depression, would unsettle established expectations. Sudden prosperity is unsettling, for it brings increased desire and excitability. "Poverty protects against suicide because it is a restraint in itself. . . . Wealth, on the other hand, by the power it bestows, deceives us into believing that we depend on ourselves only. Reducing the resistance we encounter from objects, it suggests the possibility of unlimited success against them. The less limited one feels the more intolerable all limitation appears."⁶

Durkheim's generalization about poverty was correct. The high suicide rates of depressions are due to the suffering that accompanies a *relative* loss of wealth or social standing. But his hypothesis about prosperity is rather weakly supported in *Suicide* and has not been confirmed.⁷

Conclusion His study of suicide furthered Durkheim's broader interest in the nature of social order and social disorganization. The significance of *Suicide* is the light it casts on human relatedness, both to groups and to group norms. The types of suicide—altruistic, egoistic, anomic—point to the phenomena of integration and isolation.

The concept of anomie has a prominent place in contemporary sociological thought. It has helped focus attention on the personal disorientation that can occur when people lack a sense of belonging to a secure moral order.⁸

⁶ Emile Durkheim, *Suicide* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), p. 254.

⁷ Andrew F. Henry and James F. Short, Jr., *Suicide and Homicide* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954), p. 23.

⁸ See Marshall B. Clinard (ed.), *Anomie and Deviant Behavior* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

Suicide was published in 1897 and was based on data that seem crude by modern standards. On the other hand, many of Durkheim's conclusions have been supported by later studies,⁹ and the ingenuity of his analysis and interpretation is a continuing challenge to contemporary social scientists.

⁹ A number of findings are reviewed in Henry and Short, *op. cit.*, Appendix I. See also Jack P. Gibbs and Walter T. Martin, *Status Integration and Suicide* (Eugene, Oregon: University of Oregon Books, 1964).

SECTION 3 THE GROUP STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY

Sociological analysis contributes to the understanding of the group structure of a community or nation, industry, or political order. In the study of political behavior sociology inquires into the group basis of politics:¹⁰ instead of conceiving the political community as made up of individual citizens, account is taken of the social divisions within the public, based on their occupational, ethnic, family, or other affiliations. In industrial studies the sociological approach has helped counter the "rabble hypothesis,"¹¹ which viewed employees as individual wage earners unaffected by the social life of the factory.

TYPES OF GROUPS

The word "group" is used in a very general sense. It refers to any collection of persons who are *bound together by a distinctive set of social relations*. This includes everything from members of a family, adherents to Catholicism, participants in a mob, to citizens of a national state. Two persons form a group if they are friends or partners or otherwise *held together and set apart from others* by their relationship. Groups can be highly organized and stable or very fluid and temporary.

Groups and social categories People who have similar incomes or who are alike in other ways, such as age, occupation, or reading habits, do not neces-

sarily form social groups. Such classifications may be called statistical aggregates or social categories. A persistent interest of sociology is the study of the conditions under which various social categories become or produce social groups.

The aged are a significant social category, and there is considerable interest today in the kinds of groups older people are likely to form or accept. Is there an old-age style of life that can be the natural basis for separate housing? Or do older people feel little sense of identity with each other despite their similar age and dependency? There have been some old-age political pressure groups, such as the Townsend movement of the 1930s. Should more and increasingly powerful groups of this sort be expected as the proportion of older people in the population rises? What effect would this have on the political order? These questions indicate the problems raised when the group potential of a social category is explored.

Although *consciousness of kind*—the awareness of belonging to a certain category—is an important element in the formation of groups, it is not indispensable. Many workers belong to lodges, bowling clubs, and other groups that are distinctively working-class in character; yet if asked, they would not necessarily identify themselves as belonging to any particular social category. Nevertheless they unconsciously enter and create ways of group life based

¹⁰ See David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951), Chap. 2, "Groups and Society."

¹¹ Elton Mayo, *The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (Boston: Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration, 1945), Chap. 2.

on similarities of occupation and income. Similar life experiences lead to social interaction and the formation of groups, even though people are not aware of why and how this takes place.

Comprehensive and specialized groups A *community* is a comprehensive group with two chief characteristics: (1) within it the individual can have most of the experiences and conduct most of the activities that are important to him; (2) it is bound together by a shared sense of belonging and by the feeling among its members that the group defines for them their distinctive identity. Theoretically, the member of a community lives his whole life within it; he feels a sense of kinship with others who belong to it; and he accepts the community much as he accepts his own name and family membership.

Communities are usually based on locality—a village, city, or nation. The geographical area and a sense of place set the boundaries of common living and provide a basis for solidarity. However, without respect to geography, one may speak of the “Catholic community,” in the sense that there is a unique set of Catholic activities and institutions which, taken together, permit many Catholics to live out much of their lives within boundaries set by religious affiliation. They can be educated as Catholics, live in a Catholic neighborhood, work for a Catholic organization, belong to a Catholic professional society, and read a Catholic newspaper. Similarly, one may speak of a Japanese-American community, a Jewish community, and even an academic community. However, most fully developed communities do share a common locality.

Special-purpose organizations, such as trade unions, corporations, and political parties, are called *associations*. In this category are factories, where the main incentive to participation is money income, as well as “voluntary associations,” such as clubs or veterans’ groups.

Associations are usually based on limited, utilitarian interests. However, there are variations in the

range of interests served and in the resulting meaning of membership. The more specific and practical an association’s objectives, the more impersonal and narrow will be the individual’s relation to the group.

When an association serves broad rather than narrow interests, and does so in an accepted, orderly, and enduring way, it may be called an *institution*. The word institution also refers to practices, to *established ways of doing things*. Constitutional government, marriage, private enterprise, and Thanksgiving dinner are called institutions, although they are practices rather than groups. This book follows common usage and refers to both of these related phenomena as institutions. An institution, therefore, may be a type of group or it may be a formalized practice or procedure. In this sense, the Methodist church is an institution, and it conducts itself in institutionalized ways.

Considered as a type of group, an institution is less specialized than other associations and therefore has some of the attributes of a comprehensive group. One hears of a “university community,” even though it may be difficult to achieve the ideal of community in the large “multiversity.” Perhaps the most important difference between comprehensive and specialized groups is the capacity of the former to treat the individual as a unique and total person rather than as an instrument for the achievement of specialized goals. Discussions of the “organization man” have centered on this problem, emphasizing the dilemmas that arise when a large, impersonal business enterprise seeks broad loyalty from the employee as well as conformity to an approved pattern of life.¹²

KINSHIP AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION¹³

For most people, group affiliation begins with membership in a family. The family mediates between the individual and society, helping him to take his place in the larger world and at the same time providing an island of protection and privacy. In every society kinship has at some time been the key unit of social organization, asserting its influence in the

¹² See William H. Whyte, Jr., *The Organization Man* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956).

¹³ This discussion draws on material written in collaboration with Ralph H. Turner and included in earlier editions of this book.

KINSHIP TERMS

A technical vocabulary is necessary to describe precisely the intricate web of kinship. The following selection of important kinship terms suggests the variety of family types and relationships in preliterate and modern societies:

Choice of partners

Exogamy—partner must be chosen from outside a defined group, e.g., members of the same extended family lineage may not marry
 Endogamy—partners must be members of the same group, e.g., a religious community

Number of partners

Monogamy—marriage of one man to one woman
 Polygamy—marriage involving more than two partners:
 Polygyny—one man to two or more women
 Polyandry—one woman to two or more men (rare)

Descent

Patrilineal—the privileges and duties of descent follow the male line (e.g., child to father to father's father, etc.)
 Matrilineal—follow the female line
 Bilineal—follow both lines

Residence

Patrilocal—husband and wife take up residence with the husband's parents
 Matrilocal—with the wife's parents
 Neolocal—husband and wife reside by themselves

Authority and dominance

Patriarchal—father dominant
 Matriarchal—mother dominant
 Equalitarian—equal dominance of father and mother

economy, political life, religion, and even in warfare. Sometimes kinship *is* social organization:

There are cultures with little or no economic organization beyond division of labor, by sex, within the family. This is true of the Polar Eskimo who live in the bleak environment of the shores of Smith Sound, N.W. Greenland, the furthestmost northern settlement. Without agriculture and with few wild vegetable foods, they depend for meager subsistence upon hunting, fishing, and collecting. To survive, they must live in small groups, which (during the summer) usually consist of one or two primary families who hunt caribou and fish. Even in winter, when they live in villages, the community rarely exceeds seven or eight families. The village is transitory and has no head. Since hunting bands may include mem-

bers who are not kin, there is some economic organization apart from the family, but not much.¹⁴

In anthropological studies of social organization, kinship is the major topic. For example, Murdock's *Social Structure*,¹⁵ which includes a chapter on "Evolution of Social Organization," is entirely devoted to the family and kinship.

Meaning of kinship Broadly speaking, kinship is a relationship that is close and enduring enough to sustain a sense of common origin or commitment. Theoretically kinship can be founded in long association and shared tradition, with only a vague biological reference. But a more definite way of recog-

¹⁴ M. F. Nimkoff (ed.), *Comparative Family Systems* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 33.

¹⁵ George Peter Murdock, *Social Structure* (New York: Macmillan, 1949). However, Robert H. Lowie's *Social Organization* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1948) includes discussion of property, law, and political organization.

nizing relatives is necessary to fix specific rights and responsibilities. Hence a reckonable common ancestry is the usual basis of kinship, supplemented by other recognized ties, such as affinity through marriage or adoption.

The essential point is that who is counted as kin is socially defined. The biological basis is a convenient starting point, but it is not the sole determinant. Kinship may be closely defined—for example, tracing ancestry only in the father's line—or every conceivable relative may be counted. The *consanguine* family is based on biological relatedness; it is the family of blood relatives and is the main basis of kinship. The *conjugal* family is the group formed by marriage. The children have blood (consanguineal) ties to their siblings, parents, and parents' relatives, but the married partners or conjugal pair may or may not be counted as kin. Although every marriage creates a network of in-laws, the latter may have few or many responsibilities to each other, and they may not be recognized as kin at all.

Kinship is a more inclusive idea than family, for kinship does not necessarily define a functioning group. Sometimes, however, family is used as a synonym for kin, for example, "family tree" in reckoning genealogy. It is important to distinguish between a network of relationships, i.e., *kin* and a kin-based cooperative unit or household, i.e., *family*.

Universality of the nuclear family Linton suggests that the conjugal family is a more basic social unit than the consanguine family, because the conjugal family reflects the biological facts of sexuality, especially the absence of a clearly defined human mating season, and the need for security and satisfaction in personal relationships. According to Linton the consanguine family "... is a social artifact

whereas the conjugal family is a biological unit differing little, in its essential qualities, from similar units to be observed in a great variety of mammalian species."¹⁶ This point of view is supported by Murdock's finding, based on a study of 250 societies, that some form of *nuclear* family is found in every society. The nuclear family consists of a conjugal pair and their offspring, sometimes augmented by other individuals. From the standpoint of husband and wife, the nuclear family is the conjugal family; from the standpoint of the children, it is part of the consanguineal family.

Murdock's conclusion that the nuclear family is universal is widely accepted, but it has been questioned.¹⁷ The sticking-point is his insistence that the nuclear family always has "the distinctive and vital functions" of the family—sexual, reproductive, economic, educational.¹⁸ It is argued that not all of these functions are necessarily performed by the nuclear family, and in rare cases the nuclear family may be attenuated or disappear altogether. In *Adaptation 5* one such setting is discussed—the Israeli Kibbutz at an early stage of its history.

Another apparent exception to the universality of the nuclear family was the social system of the Nayar caste in India during the nineteenth century, before British rule. The Nayar husband owed most of his responsibilities to his sister's children, but had minimal obligations to his conjugal family and was usually absent as a mercenary soldier. Although there was a concept of marriage and paternity, the nuclear family defined as including the husband hardly existed.¹⁹

The kin-based unit that most often supplements the nuclear family—and theoretically may displace it—is the *extended* family. In one form of extended family, three generations live together under the

¹⁶ Ralph Linton, "The Natural History of the Family," in Ruth Nanda Anshen (ed.), *The Family: Its Function and Destiny* (rev. ed., New York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 34.


¹⁷ Marion J. Levy and Lloyd A. Fallers, "The Family: Some Comparative Considerations," *American Anthropologist*, 61 (August, 1959), 647-651.

¹⁸ Murdock, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹⁹ See Joan P. Mencher, "The Nayars of South Malabar," in Nimkoff, *op. cit.*, p. 176; also E. Kathleen Gough, "Is the Family Universal?—The Nayar Case," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 89 (1959), Part 1, reprinted in Norman W. Bell and Ezra F. Vogel (eds.), *A Modern Introduction to the Family* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), pp. 76-92.

same roof or in a family compound. Several married siblings, their spouses and offspring, and the grandparents together form a residential, economic, and educational unit. In such a setting, where perhaps twenty closely related people live together, the nuclear family, as such, is less important and less sharply defined. The economic unit is the extended family, and aunts, uncles, and cousins have a part in child rearing. Nevertheless, most nuclear families in nearly all societies retain their identity and some of their distinctive functions, despite being embedded in an extended family system.

Another kind of composite or extended family is the *polygamous* family. The most common form of polygamy (plural marriage) is *polygyny*, where one man has several wives. In this arrangement, two or more nuclear families share the same husband-father:



The extended family in its various forms is frequently found where agriculture is the main occupation. Smaller, independent families predominate in hunting-gathering economies and in modern industrial society. "The hunter is mobile because he pursues the game; the industrial worker, the job."²⁰

Social change and the family A basic fact of modern history is the decline of extended kin groups

and the emergence of the detached nuclear family as the representative form of family life. This trend is associated with (1) free choice of mates, in the sense that marriages are contracted without reference to the larger kin group; (2) more divorce as marriage has become increasingly a matter of choice rather than necessity (see Fig. II: 2); (3) greatly increased residential mobility, with accompanying weakening of kinship ties; (4) emancipation of women and their entry in large numbers into the labor force; and (5) diminished responsibility of children for their parents and grandparents.

The detached nuclear family maximizes freedom, but it also takes on a heavy burden of responsibility and is subject to severe internal strains. Although there is less responsibility for kin who are not members of the nuclear family, there is greater responsibility for children and for the psychic well-being of husband and wife. When divorce occurs in the American system, extensive readjustments in economic arrangements, care of children, social participation, and emotional involvements are necessary.

In sharp contrast, in the Hopi pattern the married couple lives with the wife's parents and her sisters and their husbands, sharing in many communal activities.²¹ Loss of an adult from the Hopi extended family requires only minor readjustments. Children are already part of the larger kin group, and all the adults have served to some degree as parents. Because intimacy between husband and wife is only slightly greater than among all the adults in the extended unit, the suffering over loss of a spouse is minimized. There is little disruption in the life of a divorced wife who has a steady pattern of sociability and close cooperation with kin.

The detached nuclear family in contemporary America is also strained by the new and often uncertainly defined role of women, as well as by the dependence of all participants on the small family unit for psychic gratification. The small nuclear family has limited resources and offers few alternative


²⁰ M. F. Nimkoff and Russell Middleton, "Types of Family and Types of Economy," *American Journal of Sociology*, 66 (November, 1960), 225.

²¹ Stuart A. Queen and John B. Adams, *The Family in Various Cultures* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1952), pp. 23-43.

FIG. II:2 Divorces per 100 marriages in the same year: United States, 1870–1965

For simplicity of presentation, decade figures are used, except for the 1945 peak and for 1965.

SOURCE: Ruth S. Cavan, *The American Family* (New York: Crowell, 1953), pp. 645–647, and the *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1966, Table 48.



opportunities compared to the extended family with many siblings and other relatives. Furthermore, the American nuclear family, which is seldom a unit of economic organization such as a family farm or small family business, lacks the sustaining continuities of shared work and responsibility.

Conditions of suburban life in the United States have given rise to a *matricentric*²² family pattern within a formal patriarchalism. Because commuting keeps the husband out of touch with the family during daylight hours, because the wife controls day-to-day expenditures, and because she is the family "social secretary," she makes most decisions about the domestic and social life of the family, and the children look to her as the effective authority. The tension created by this imbalance between formal authority and working control is a recurring theme in popular comic strips. The husband may resort to arbitrary acts to validate his formal authority, and the wife may fret alternately over the authority the husband does exercise and over his failure to be a sufficiently strong and masculine figure.

While there is some decline in family stability,

as shown in Fig. II:2, there is no apparent decline in the acceptance of family living. (See Fig. II:3.) Much of the increase in percent of the population married during recent decades is due to earlier marriage, especially for men. But even allowing for this and other factors, marriage still shows no decline and a possible increase between 1890 and 1965.

Persistence of kinship Although the detached nuclear family is the dominant form in modern life, it is not the exclusive form. Kinship ties remain important, especially in the working class, but among middle-class people too. A study of Bethnal Green, a community in East London, showed an extensive kinship network, with important effects in economic life (father-son succession in occupations, helping relatives to get jobs), as well as in personal relationships. However, the same study shows the importance of residence, of staying in the same immediate community, for the nurturing of kinship ties. Families who moved to a new housing "estate" less than twenty miles away from Bethnal Green tended to become more isolated.²³

²² Ernest W. Burgess and Harvey J. Locke, *The Family* (New York: American Book Co., 1953), pp. 111–113.

²³ Michael Young and Peter Willmott, *Family and Kinship in East London* (rev. ed.; Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1962). See also Herbert J. Gans, *The Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life of Italian-Americans* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 45 ff.

The relation of family and community under conditions of change and stress are explored in Adaptation 5, "Family and Society in Israel."

GROUP RELATIONS

At any given time, there are dominant groups and subordinate ones, allies and enemies. Some are dependent, others relatively independent. Some are strategically located and can communicate with or influence many parts of the community; others are on the fringes with limited access to other groups. Knowing the pattern of group relations is essential to understanding a community or society and the processes of social control.

Group structure is not static; it is the product of continuous interaction in which the relations among groups are tested and transformed. A few of the basic forms of group interaction, and the stable relations that they produce, are considered here.

Competition, rivalry, and conflict The interests of one group are often inconsistent with those of others. For example, several organizations may want to recruit the same people: colleges may compete for the better students or staff; several nations may want the same economic resources; many retail stores want to sell to the same customers. *Competition* is

this mutually opposed effort to secure the same scarce objectives.

Competition does not necessarily involve direct interaction; it may be impersonal and unconscious. Cotton farmers in Mississippi compete with cotton farmers in Egypt, but they may be unaware of each other. When groups become aware that they are in competition they are called rivals. *Rivalry* is a form of conscious competition between specific groups: for example, the Democrats and Republicans, the Ford Motor Co. and General Motors, the Army and the Air Force, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. This kind of competition is more direct, with mutual awareness and often self-conscious strategy and tactics.

When the clash of interests is so keen that groups do not merely compete for the same scarce goals but seek to injure or even destroy each other, there is *conflict*, and the group itself is endangered in a direct way. Intense feelings may be aroused and, as a result, the rules governing competitive and rivalrous activity may be abandoned.

Rivalry and conflict are *dissociative* forms of interaction. They pull groups apart rather than bind them together. However, these processes are not *purely* dissociative. Rivalry is usually based upon commonly accepted rules, as in athletics. Conflict tends to increase the *internal* solidarity of opponents.




FIG. II:3 Percent of the population married, fourteen years old and over, standardized for age, 1890–1965

Because the age distribution of the United States population has changed since 1890, figures reporting only percent married would be misleading. Above percentages are, therefore, standardized to the 1950 age distribution, i.e., each percent married has been recomputed as if the age distribution were the same as that in 1950.

SOURCE: Data in the *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1966, Table 31.

It is sometimes believed that conflict is a result of poor communication, that conflict arises because people do not understand each other. If communication means the ability to see another's point of view, then some conflicts truly rooted in false perceptions may be eased by increasing communication. However, many conflicts are grounded in mutually inconsistent needs and aspirations. Increased contact and improved communication may intensify conflict by making groups aware of their differences, increasing their fears, and revealing opposing interests of which they were unaware.

Accommodation and assimilation After a long and bitter strike, union and management may come to agreement and the men go back to work, but hostility may persist. Each side may prepare to renew open conflict at another time. Under such circumstances, the agreement represents an unstable accommodation. *Accommodation* is the mutual adjustment of groups that retain their own identity and interests. In an unstable accommodation a temporary adjustment is made and the conflicting groups adapt themselves to immediate realities, despite the existence of unresolved issues.

In settling conflicts, accommodation must first be achieved. The problem is not to gain full communication or understanding but to discover what is essential to each group if it is to cease hostilities and offer the essential minimum cooperation. The American Constitution written *after* the Revolution was an accommodative document. It adjusted the interests of large and small states, of Southerners and Northerners, and thereby won support for the foundation of the United States. It was not essential that the states see all things alike or that the citizens cease to view themselves as Virginians and New Yorkers.

A stable accommodation resolves the major differences of interest, particularly those vital to continued group existence. If stable accommodation is reached, there is a basis for deeper harmony involving more extensive mutual understanding. Groups may then enlarge their contacts and even come to think of themselves as sharing a single identity.

The process by which the identity of groups is

fused is called *assimilation*. In this process the breakdown of communication barriers is essential. In the assimilation of immigrants in the United States the schools have carried a heavy burden. Many classes were conducted in large cities to teach adult immigrants the English language and some essentials of American history and government. Despite these efforts, few first-generation immigrants are really assimilated. Differences in social background persist as barriers to effective communication.

Cooperation Group cooperation is agreed-upon joint action. Agreement may be based on similar group aspirations, e.g., organizations interested in preventing delinquency; groups may have a common enemy and thus have temporarily convergent interests; or they may agree upon a set of common rules to regulate their competition. The amount of communication depends on the basis of cooperation; when people act together out of loyalty to family or community, there is much more communication than when there is a limited alliance in defense against a temporary threat.

In cooperation each group gains, either in an immediate advantage or indirectly in seeing its ultimate goals advanced. However, they need not gain *equally*. Weak groups usually gain more from cooperation than do strong groups, and the latter are therefore often reluctant to enter agreements with weaker groups. They may feel impelled to do so, however, when they share the social ideal that cooperation is a good thing.

Cooperation as well as conflict can threaten group independence. When two groups cooperate, communication between them is greatly increased. The boundaries of group membership may become obscure, and leaders may be called upon to justify the independent existence of their organizations. If pressure is generated for the amalgamation of groups, it may threaten the vested interests of the leaders as well as the long-run aims each group represents. This is a serious problem among churches, government agencies, and political groups. Leaders of government agencies—for example, of the different military services—carefully examine proposals for ad-

ministrative cooperation with other agencies to see what the consequences will be for the sharing of public credit, for the justification of independent budgets, and for maintaining the distinctive loyalties and outlooks of their staffs. Cooperation among community welfare agencies raises similar problems. They need to be reassured that their independent existence is not threatened by a proposed joint ven-

ture, such as fund-raising through a community chest.

Because cooperation is highly valued, the word easily becomes a symbol to which people must pay their respects. In fact, however, responsible leaders who are alert to group interests always pose the question, "Cooperation for what and with whom and at what price?"

Adaptation 5 / Talmon-Garber **FAMILY AND SOCIETY IN ISRAEL**

This study analyzes the impact of radical and rapid social change on patterns of family organization and on the relation between the family and the community. Three types of family found in Israel are considered: (a) the family in collective settlements (Kibbutzim), (b) the family in cooperative settlements (Moshavim), and (c) the family among European refugees in the Israeli cities. Three distinct modes of interaction between family and community are portrayed. In the Kibbutzim the community is supreme and the family is subordinated to it. The traditional family in the Moshavim is kinship centered: the elementary family is subordinated to wider kin groupings that mediate between it and the community. The isolated refugee family in urban centers is cut off from kin and estranged from the community.

THE COLLECTIVIZED FAMILY

The *Kibbutz* (plural: *Kibbutzim*) is a form of collective settlement, first founded in 1910, long before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. The early settlers of the Kibbutzim were young and unattached migrants from Eastern and Central Europe, who were unaccompanied by parents or other relatives.

In the Kibbutz, which may range from less than 100 to 2,000

members, there is common ownership of property, except for a few personal belongings. The members agree to subordinate their personal interests to the attainment of communal goals and to seek self-expression only through service to the community. In theory, and to a large extent in practice, devotion to communal ideals takes precedence over kinship obligations. Feeling for fellow members and for the community is more significant than family loyalty. Relatives

who are not members are by definition outsiders, almost strangers.

The revolutionary phase From its inception the Collective Movement realized the risk of conflicting loyalties and set out to redefine and curtail family obligations. The community took over most of the traditional functions of the family. Many ingenious devices were evolved to prevent the consolidation of the family as a distinct and independent unit. Members of the

SOURCE: Abridged and adapted from Y. Talmon-Garber, "Social Change and Family Structure," *International Social Science Journal*, XIV, No. 3 (1962), 468-487. Published in this form by permission of the Unesco publication, *International Social Science Journal*. At the time of her death in 1966, Dr. Talmon-Garber was Associate Professor of Sociology at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

same family were not assigned to the same place of work. All meals were taken in the common dining room. Families looked after their own rooms but had few other household responsibilities.

At this stage the family was not even relied on to maintain the community's population or to rear its children. The Kibbutzim ensured their continuity and growth by recruiting volunteers rather than by natural increase. The care and rearing of children were basically the responsibility of the Kibbutz, not of the parents. In most Kibbutzim children lived apart from their parents. They slept, ate, and studied in special children's houses.

Children met their parents and siblings in off-hours and spent the afternoons and early evenings with them. On Saturdays and holidays they stayed with their parents. There were thus frequent and intensive relations between parents and children; but mainly the child was in the hands of community agencies.

Persistence of the family Even during the earliest phases, when antifamilism was strongest, the family remained a distinct unit. Although premarital sexual relations were permitted, there was a clear-cut distinction between casual sexual experimentation, love affairs, and more durable and publicly sanctioned unions. By asking for a room of their own, a couple made public their wish to have permanent relations and eventually to have children. Residence in a common bedroom-living room allocated by the Kibbutz conferred legitimacy on the couple. While children did not share a common domicile with their parents, they visited the parents' room every

day, and it was their home by reference. The parents could exert influence on the trained personnel in charge of their children. Interaction among family members, though less frequent than contacts with friends and work associates, was often more meaningful and intense. The emotional ties that bound husband and wife and parents and children were much more intimate and exclusive than their ties with other members of the community. The family's unconditional love and loyalty insulated its members from communal pressures and enhanced their security.

Changes in the Kibbutz As the Kibbutz became better established and its work more routine, as it accepted new groups of settlers, and as a new generation grew up within it, the community became more heterogeneous and less cohesive. There were more different types of people with different interests and perspectives. New settlers, who joined the founders at different stages of the community's development, contributed to this process of differentiation. In time the collectives became more tolerant of the existence of subgroups, and hostility toward the family abated. It was assigned a place among other subgroups.

The coming of the second generation gradually transformed the relations between the generations. Whereas the first settlers broke away from their own parents, the children of the Kibbutz are expected to continue their life work in the Kibbutz. Parents and children are now members of the same community. They live in close proximity and share, at least to some extent, the same ideals; iden-

tification with one's family reinforces identification with the collective.

Restoration of family functions

The new emphasis on continuity between the generations is expressed in a partial "emancipation" of the family. As the family regains some of its lost housekeeping functions, more meals are eaten at home, "rooms" become "flats," and more of the couple's personal allowance is spent on the flat. The flat is an important symbol of family solidarity and a physical manifestation of its separateness.

At the same time, the family increases in importance as an agency of reproduction and child rearing. There is a considerable increase in the fertility of the women of the Kibbutz. The difficulties experienced by the Kibbutzim in recruiting and absorbing new immigrants have underscored the importance of natural increase. Emphasis has shifted from recruitment of volunteers to expansion from within. The family is now called upon to help the Kibbutz ensure its continuity and growth. As a corollary, the parents take a more active role in the care and education of the child. There is more parental supervision of behavior and parental involvement in choice of friends, reading habits, and future occupations. In some Kibbutzim, which have introduced a more radical reorganization, children no longer sleep in the separate children's houses. They stay with their peers during the day but return home every afternoon.

The tendency toward a more familistic pattern may be discerned in many ways. Marriage now normally precedes the establishment

of a family. Husbands help in household duties, but in most families women are mainly responsible for domestic work. In spite of a blurring of the roles of father and mother, there are signs of differentiation.

There is also a subtle transformation of informal relations and leisure-time activities. Free time spent in public has diminished. Members of the Kibbutz are less eager to attend public meetings. Husband and wife spend most of their free time together, and it is now considered impolite to invite only one spouse.

The resurgence of familism has brought with it a gradual development and renewal of wider kinship ties. In the early days most members did not have any kin except their own elementary family living in the same community. However, when the Kibbutz embraces three generations, relatives who live in the same community establish close contacts through frequent visiting and mutual help. Wider kinship ties serve as connecting links with the outside world, and members tend to renew their contacts with relatives who live outside the Kibbutz. Kinship ties have thus broken through self-imposed isolation.

Persisting tension In spite of the changed position of the family, the Kibbutzim remain basically nonfamilistic. The Kibbutzim make far-reaching demands on their members. The proper functioning of the Kibbutz depends on wholehearted identification with its aims and ideals. The collectives cannot allow the family to become independent and self-sufficient. They still fear that the family may

become the main focus of loyalty and satisfaction, with kinship ties more important than ties among members.

The militant antifamilism of the revolutionary phase has abated but not disappeared. It is superseded by a moderate collectivism which regards the family as a useful though uneasy ally. The Kibbutzim control and limit the family and employ it for the attainment of collective goals.

THE TRADITIONAL FAMILY

A second important pattern of immigration and settlement in Israel is illustrated by North African Jews who migrated to Israel later than the founders of the Kibbutzim and after the establishment of the State of Israel.

Historically Jews in North Africa lived in small communities composed of large patriarchal families of three or four generations. The father directed his married and unmarried sons in work and maintained discipline within a common residence. There were close kinship ties. Males customarily held dominant positions, and female roles were limited to home and family. The synagogue was an important place of male gathering. Allegiance to Jewish ritual and observance centered around the synagogue and religious schools.

This traditional pattern remained more or less intact in the villages and small towns, but it was undermined in the cities of North Africa. Rapid urbanization dispersed relatives and splintered the kinship group. Young men became independent, their ways secularized.

The traditionalist North African Jews went to Israel with a deep

sense of Jewish solidarity and a vague Messianic striving. The more urbanized migrant from North Africa was mainly interested in security and economic advancement. But neither shared the basic values and dynamic aspirations of the new Israeli society. They took their old life with them and hoped to continue their former ways unmolested. Families, neighborhoods, and sometimes even whole communities migrated together.

The Moshav Some of the North Africans were settled in cooperative communities known as *Moshavim*. The Moshav presumes a semi-independent family working on a family farm. In the Moshav a familistic division of labor is combined with mechanized farming and centralized management of cooperative institutions. Land and machinery are publicly owned. There is rough equality in size of farm and basic investment, cooperative marketing and purchasing, and a ban on hired labor.

The Kibbutzim were formed by volunteer pioneering groups who sought to realize both personal and national ideals. The Moshavim are "administered communities," planned and managed by governmental and quasi-governmental agencies. State planners, guided by defense considerations and by a desire to disperse the Israeli population, ordered the construction of 274 cooperative settlements and directed new immigrants to these villages.

The settling agency regarded the traditional kin-centered social organization of the immigrants as inimical to the development of modern cooperative villages. The

planners did not take into consideration the former group composition of the settlers and intentionally disregarded their former attachments and loyalties. In organizing the settlements, kinship groups were dispersed.

Reassertion of kinship The traditional kinship structure soon reasserted itself. Settlers sought out their relatives and encouraged them to settle in the same village. After a period of reshuffling, most villages have emerged with two or three major kinship groups. Although the Moshav economy is based on the nuclear family and each nuclear family has a separate household and a separate farm, there is much cooperation among members of the same extended family.

Reunion of kinsmen occurred more easily and rapidly in traditional families which had maintained wider kin ties and had arrived in the country in family or neighborhood groups. However, even relatives who were separated before they left North Africa and had not seen each other for years sought each other out. In the unfamiliar and unstructured social setting, kinship ties regained their lost significance and served as a major basis of spontaneous organization.

Kinship and social structure In this setting kinship has pervaded the social structure of the village. It is the keynote of the social system. Village politics center on control of community institutions, especially the central committee, which brings practical advantages as well as prestige to the family. The kin groups become rival factions, each struggling with the

other for power. The political history of each village involves a continuous struggle among the kinship groups, and politics reinforces the ties of kinship. Paradoxically, in this context, radical modernization has strengthened and revived the kin-dominated traditional order.

Kinship solidarity has been helpful to the immigrants as well as to the new community. The kinship group is itself a strong cooperative unit: authority, obedience, and the incentive to help others are supported by emotional ties and long-established expectations. The extended kin group mediates between the nuclear families and the community, and thereby links the traditional order to the new one.

Yet the growing dominance of the kinship group is troublesome to the village community. Village officers, elected on the basis of kinship ties, discriminate without compunction against nonrelatives. The nepotism of officeholders breeds inefficiency and suspicion, as well as bitter feuds. Deadlocked factions may immobilize the management of cooperative institutions for many months. It sometimes becomes necessary to transfer one of the warring factions to another village. The solidarity of the kinship group develops at the expense of the solidarity of the village community.

The planners have come to realize that the kinship groups are vitally important units in the absorption of traditional immigrants. On the other hand, they understand the risks. They therefore accept the kinship groups but try to limit their influence on central cooperative institutions. In some of the villages, there is a growing tendency to replace officeholders by hired

experts who have no kin in the village. They are not involved in the village feuds and are better trained. Consequently, they are more objective and more efficient. Management is thus partly disentangled from the kinship network, and cooperative institutions can continue to function even when there is conflict among the families.

THE ISOLATED FAMILY

European Jewish refugees who settled in Israel after World War II did so under conditions of great stress and suffering. In many centers of Jewish population only a few people managed to escape the Nazi annihilation, and few families remained intact. Uprooted and isolated, they arrived with few, if any, relatives. Their former lives were destroyed and most had spent long periods of compulsory collective living in concentration camps.

The refugees were unprepared for the difficult conditions of settlement in the new country. Many remembered their shattered prewar past with nostalgic yearning and tended to idealize it. They had diffuse positive attitudes toward Israel but no strong identification with its aims and values. The experience of concentration camp life had left them with a deep desire for privacy and undisturbed personal development. This preoccupation with personal aspirations ran counter to the ideological and collectivist orientations of the absorbing society.

The family turns inward The reaction to isolation and alienation is a wholehearted attachment to the nuclear family, which withdraws to its small and isolated private world. The immigrants seek

solace and security in the intimacy of family life. They defend the independence of the family against the demands of the absorbing society. In the family they are their own masters and need not constantly accommodate to outside influences. They can continue to cultivate their former ways of life.

The immigrants work indefatigably to benefit the family, but are unconcerned with purely occupational problems and uninterested in the wider implications of their work. Isolated families develop only a few significant contacts outside the family circle. Informal relations and recreation are family-centered. The members refrain from joining organizations, dis-

trust authorities at any level, and hold political parties in cynical contempt. They keep aloof from political or social activities and are apathetic to the goals of the society as a whole.

Costs of isolation The isolated family protects the uprooted individual and supports him, but eventually the self-imposed isolation adversely affects family unity. The outside world does have its effect as the children gradually adopt the values of the surrounding society. The parents cannot help their children find a place in the Israeli society. The children become ambivalent and frustrated. Isolation of the family thus weakens its own

solidarity on which it has staked so much.

Local agencies have tried to cope with these problems by conducting periodic campaigns among members of isolated families, calling on them to participate in voluntary activities, recruiting them to various associations and nominating them to committees. These efforts meet with success only when they concentrate on activities that affect the family directly. Participation in local school committees is the best example. Taking an interest in the school is a way of relating to the problems of the children. The school may serve as a major link between the isolated family and the wider social setting.

Conclusion Immigration to Israel deepened the solidarity of the traditional and isolated families. Moshav and refugee families segregated their members from the larger society, which was perceived as threatening and hostile.

In the early Kibbutz, on the other hand, the youth of the settlers, their pioneering spirit, their socialist ideology, and an intense communal life made the family irrelevant—for a time.

Each situation had its distinctive problem: the Kibbutz faced the problem of allowing family units more privacy and independence without harming the cohesion of the community. The Moshav had to preserve the unity of the kinship group while limiting its influence on village management. The communities containing a considerable number of isolated families had to preserve the internal solidarity of the elementary families and, at the same time, find ways of extending their participation and identification.

SECTION 4 BASIC PATTERNS OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Individual and group relations are best studied in the historical and sociological context within which they developed. Students of social organization attempt to describe the general features of whole societies or social orders. They try to identify the most important institutions, the most pervasive social relations, the basic social trends.

When the broad patterns of organization and change are known, individuals and groups are seen as part of larger settings. The roles of factory worker, professor, minister, and middle-class mother are all placed within the context, for example, of industrial society. The implications of industrial society for work, education, religion, and family life are thus

brought into focus. No study of an important group or role is complete without some consideration of how it reflects a pattern of change, such as increasing specialization, or how it fits into the dominant features of the society or the epoch.

Because human societies are so complex, it is difficult and risky to formulate generalizations regarding broad patterns or trends in social organization. Nevertheless, much scholarship has been devoted to this task, and it is possible to state some conclusions with confidence.

This section discusses five *key forms* of social organization: (1) kinship, (2) fealty, (3) status, (4) contract, and (5) rational coordination. In various societies or historical periods one or another of these modes of organization has been salient. If it is considered the chief foundation of social order in a society or age, it gives the society its distinctive character. But no matter how dominant a principle of order may be, *all* of the key forms will be found in *some degree*.

KINSHIP

As discussed above, pages 31–32, in some societies kinship is the most important social bond and the family is the basis of social organization. The family firm and the family farm are reminders of economic activities based upon the family. Only a few centuries ago, in England, families vied for preeminence in politics, for the right to rule as the Royal House, or to be counted among the more favored nobility. Nor is this unknown in contemporary United States, as the political activities of the Kennedy family make plain.

Societies may be called *familistic* when the family is the dominant type of social group and carries the main burden of maintaining order, producing goods, and propitiating the gods. In such a society the individual is dependent on his relatives. They are his chief sources of practical aid, and they hold the keys to social esteem. The interests of the family—wealth, honor, continuity—are placed above the interests of the individual.

FEALTY

Another fundamental social bond is the *personal relation of follower and leader*. Fealty is the recognized obligation of one person to be faithful to another, to be “his” man. More than a contract of service is involved. Fealty presumes a personal commitment to do whatever may be needed to serve the interests of the leader, to take the bad with the good. In a limited sense, it is like a marriage. And indeed, oaths of fealty have sometimes matched the sacredness and binding character of marriage vows.

In Europe and England, for about four hundred years, fealty was a principal social bond. This was the epoch of *feudalism*, which may be roughly dated from about the tenth century, when its outlines were already clear, to the thirteenth century, when it began a gradual decline.

A chief characteristic of feudal life was lordship—a system of political obligation in which a group of followers, allies, and servile dependents owed personal loyalty and service to a powerful individual. An especially powerful lord might be called a duke or a king. In the heyday of feudalism, a great hierarchy of lords and their respective dependents, all knit together by bonds of loyalty and protection, gave the social order a remarkable symmetry and a precarious cohesion.

The development of lordship presumed that no effective central authority existed, and this was so in western Europe and England after the decline of Roman power. Moreover, lordship was an alternative to the bond of kinship. Some men sought the protection of lords, who were not their relatives, because there was no kin group capable of establishing order at the local level.²⁴

Functions of fealty As feudalism developed, increasing emphasis was placed on the fidelity of a man to his lord, and the most important crime was treason against a lord. The bond of fealty had a dual importance. First, fealty helped create a small but devoted band of personal followers for the king or local

²⁴ Marion Gibbs, *Feudal Order* (New York: Henry Schuman, 1953), p. 21.

lord. In the formative period of feudalism, power was in the hands of small bodies of armed men. The lord was the leader of such a band and his influence depended on his capacity to maintain continuing loyalty. The development of a code of honor, with loyalty to the lord a supreme virtue, was helpful in sustaining this relationship.

Second, fealty was a way to maintain the cohesion of a society made up of local domains, each ruled by a supreme personal leader. As feudalism matured, the local barons became entrenched in their power. They were vassals of the king and took an oath of fealty to him, but they had independent power, with troops and resources of their own. Fealty and vassalage were in effect ways of recognizing an alliance or creating a federation. It was as if the governors of the fifty United States were considered personal rulers and recognized the central government by taking an oath of personal loyalty and submission to the President.

As a social bond, fealty belongs not only to a remote and exotic age, but also to contemporary society. Many executives of large enterprises rely on the personal loyalty of a few staff members. When an executive is promoted or moves to another organization, he often takes with him the key assistants on whose personal loyalty he can rely and who help him in establishing effective control over the organization he manages.

Ties of fealty are of continuing significance in modern political life. Because elections are often popularity contests and center on the man rather than on the party, politics tends to be based on personal leadership. In many areas, candidates create their own political organizations to supplement the work of the regular political party. To build campaign organizations often requires ties of personal loyalty, and in practical politics the capacity to win loyalty is of great value to the leader, the capacity to give it is highly prized in the follower.

Despite the continuing importance of fealty, it cannot be said to be a major principle of social organization in modern society. The trend is toward more impersonal modes of organization, and the areas within which ties of fealty count are few.

STATUS

The term "status" as used by students of society has two different but related meanings, distinguished by the context in which the word is used.

1. Status may refer simply to a person's social position. Each role in society is associated with a social position or status. (See above, p. 18.) In this meaning, status does not necessarily have any connotation of higher or lower.

2. Status is also used to designate an individual's place within a system of social ranking. Thus, sergeants rank higher than privates, and the whole set of ranks may be referred to as a "status system." This second meaning is narrower than the first, and is focused on the idea of rank.

Where status is a dominant principle of social organization, the society depends for its stability on the widespread belief in the rightness and permanence of one's "station" in life. Social discipline is maintained by inculcating and reinforcing the view that every man has a proper place within the social scheme of things. His place tells him how to conduct himself in relation to others, and it defines the limits of his aspirations.

A society based on fixed status emphasizes rank and uses many devices to maintain distinctions of place and privilege. In such a society a man's occupational status is stable and is usually transmitted from generation to generation. The cobbler sticks to his last and teaches his trade to his son.

Traditional Japan offers a striking example of a society based on fixed status, where personal qualities and expectations depend on social rank.

At all levels the lamentable principle prevailed that a man's status was irrevocably fixed at birth; and to the present day Japanese life is governed by the subtle ubiquity of the concept of *mibun* (personal position); a person's *mibun*, which depends on his sex, age, birth, education, rank, and occupation, governs his behavior at all stages. This means that the same conduct can be praiseworthy, indifferent, or actually reprehensible, depending on a person's *mibun*. The merchant's duty is to enrich himself, but a samurai who concerns himself with money is unworthy of the name; a second son is permitted amorous adventures; indeed they earn him applause and respect; his elder

brother, however, is expected to behave irreproachably. . . .²⁵

As European and English feudalism matured, status became more important as the foundation of social order. In the earlier period, kingship was highly personal, and the hereditary principle was not well established. A king was a king because he won and maintained the personal loyalty of a group of followers. Later a subtle and decisive transformation took place. The king received loyalty as a right *because he was king*. At the same time, hereditary monarchy, based on status fixed by birth, was strengthened. Thus status joined fealty as a cardinal principle of feudal order.

In the contemporary world *fixed* statuses are less important to the social order, but the desire to achieve status and the effects of status are continuing features of everyday life. The assignment of status remains a powerful device for allocating respect and defining an individual's social worth. Man's desire for the respect of his fellows is a large part of the human condition. The allocation of status in modern society is treated in SOCIAL STRATIFICATION.

CONTRACT

Under feudalism men could determine their obligations by entering into free agreements, mainly to exchange services for the lord's protection. The contract was especially important for the lower classes, to whom the idea of fealty, with its connotations of personal honor, was not relevant. Later, rights originally established on the basis of contract and fealty became entrenched and hereditary, and were conceived of as attributes of status.

In the post-feudal era there was a basic trend toward contract as a principle of social organization. By the sixteenth century, society was beginning to be seen in a new light. The Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation, and the growth of business enterprise all helped give the individual a new hold on the political, economic, and philosophical imagination. More and more, the basis of obligation was sought in

the agreements made by freely acting, personally responsible individuals. This perspective advanced steadily and reached its greatest influence in the nineteenth century.


In contract a bond is created based upon an exchange of one promise for another; or a promise may be made in consideration of some act already done. The relation is a *specific* one and covers only those matters about which the promise is made. No commitment beyond the terms of the contract is intended or required. In contrast, marriage and fealty are more than contracts, since they entail a broad responsibility of one person for another. Marriage contracts are typically either promises to marry or agreements to define some special aspects of the relationship, such as the disposition of property. For the most part, marital responsibilities are *diffuse* rather than specifiable; they cannot be completely foretold nor restricted to a particular exchange of services.

When the principle of contract is a dominant feature of social organization, private initiative and autonomy are encouraged. Especially during the nineteenth century, contract became almost a sacred principle to those who believed most strongly in individualism and in private rather than government initiative.

In today's commercial civilization, contract is a significant part of social organization. It is the institutional mainstay of the market economy. Nevertheless, there are signs that unregulated, voluntary agreement is losing ground within the social order. Government is assuming an increasingly active role in limiting freedom of contract by setting standards, especially where the parties to the bargain are unequal in power. The most striking examples are in labor relations, but the trend is growing in the fields of consumer economics, food and drug administration, and the regulation of rates charged by telephone and power companies.²⁶ When people are dependent on large organizations, they often have little to say about the terms of their "contract."

²⁵ Fosco Maraini, *Meeting with Japan* (New York: Viking, 1959), p. 240.

²⁶ See W. Friedmann, *Law in a Changing Society* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), Chap. 4.



Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) was one of the most influential English writers of the late nineteenth century. He developed a theory of evolution which he summarized in the following famous “formula”: “Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.”

On the basis of this resonant principle Spencer worked out a sociological system emphasizing an evolution toward greater social complexity and increased individualism. Society, he said, is like a complex organism in delicate balance, and only natural processes of evolution should be allowed to affect its development. This emphasis on individualism and on natural adaptation led him to oppose reform through governmental action.

BUREAUCRACY

The principle of social organization most characteristic of twentieth-century industrial society may be called *rational coordination*. In this pattern men are brought together in complex organizations run by professional managers. The managers are often called “bureaucrats” and the organizations they run are known as “bureaucracies.”²⁷

During the past two generations, many writers have called attention to the increasing bureaucratization of human activity. By this they mean that more and more spheres of life are dominated by large organizations and increasing numbers of people are becoming employees of the big corporation or government. The “organization society” produces the “organization man.”

Few aspects of modern society can be studied without reference to the bureaucratic trend. Most obviously in the business world and in modern military establishments, the coordination of specialists in accordance with an impersonal logic of efficiency is highly developed. The same trend may be observed in educational institutions and even in church organization.

Where bureaucracy develops, there is increased specialization, impersonality, reliance on general rules, and distance between top management and the ordinary worker, citizen, or soldier. Up to a point, this is usually associated with increased efficiency, but there is growing evidence that new techniques are needed to offset some of the characteristics of bureaucracy that tend to limit initiative and personal satisfaction.

THE MASTER TREND

Over many centuries, Western society has shifted from an emphasis on kinship and status to a reliance upon more impersonal and instrumental modes of organization. This broad historical development is characterized by two attributes: (1) specialization, and (2) secularism and rationality.

Specialization The historical trend toward social

²⁷ For the characteristics of bureaucracy, see ASSOCIATIONS, p. 199.

differentiation (specialization and heterogeneity) may be seen in the separation of major institutions from one another, in the development of the division of labor, and in the growth of many social groups with varying perspectives and interests.

1. *Differentiation of institutions.* The major economic, political, and religious institutions have become increasingly distinct and specialized. In earlier times, for example, church and state were fused or, at least, their responsibilities overlapped. Citizenship made one subject to the jurisdiction of the church, which could command obedience. The head of the state was also the "defender of the faith." Secular and religious education were not distinct. The separation of these institutions was marked by centuries of conflict, sometimes violent, sometimes carried on in the obscurity of legal argument over the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical and secular courts.

2. *Division of labor.* Even primitive society has a division of labor, based largely on age and sex. Modern industry and commerce have pushed specialization to an extreme. Consequently, new interests and groups are created, because those engaged in the same specialized activities tend to see the world alike and have a common stake in it. In addition, the individual's life is less unified and more compartmentalized.

Secularism and rationality Western society has moved away from reverence for and uncritical acceptance of established institutions. Few things are removed from worldly, secular judgment. Modern man feels freer to ask, "What good is it?" The world has become "disenchanted," more "sensate," more "materialistic," less "spiritual," to use terms that have been applied to this trend toward *secularism*.

Secularism encourages *rationality* in social organization. Group ways of acting are consciously designed and measured by effectiveness and efficiency. Weber studied the increasing emphasis on rationality in modern industry, military organization, and other spheres of life.²⁸ He saw that the business world, in



Georg Simmel (1858–1918) was a German philosopher who influenced the pioneers of sociology in the United States, particularly through the translations of Albion W. Small. A generation ago Simmel was best known for his effort to identify the distinctive subject matter of sociology, which he conceived as the study of "forms of social interaction," such as subordination, competition, and division of labor. Today there is more interest in his perceptive analyses of sociability, city life, the money economy, and the consequences of group size.

its drive for efficiency, was becoming increasingly impersonal and machinelike. Weber traced the emergence of what has already been mentioned as one of the characteristic social forms of our time, the bu-

²⁸ In his *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Weber studied the contribution of religious austerity and self-discipline to the development of rationality in early capitalism.

reaucratic administrative hierarchy, in which the principle of rationality in social organization is fully developed.

Secularism and rationality are associated with *impersonality* in human relations. With a weakened sense of kinship and with a utilitarian orientation, it is easy to treat people as means rather than as ends. Simmel showed how the growth of a money economy contributes to impersonality in social relations. When compensation is based strictly on money, people tend to restrict their relations with one another and to ignore personal considerations. A money economy brings into association people who have no other interactions. Their relations may be limited to the exchange of goods or services for money without further involvement.²⁹

From Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft Tönnies contrasted two types of society, *Gemeinschaft* (communal society) and *Gesellschaft* (associational society).³⁰ In a *Gemeinschaft* people feel they belong together because they are of the same kind. Broadly speaking, they are kin and cannot freely renounce their membership, which involves emotional meaning for the group as well as for the individual. People do not decide to join a *Gemeinschaft*. They are born into it or grow into it in the way the bonds of friendship grow. This model of a communal society closely fits the "folk" or primitive society and the ideal conception of the feudal social order. The decline of *Gemeinschaft* is a decline of the sense of kinship with other members of a community.

To this type of society Tönnies contrasted the *Gesellschaft*, in which the major social bonds are voluntary and based upon the rational pursuit of self-interest. People enter into relations with one another

not because they must or because it is "natural," but as a practical way of achieving an objective. The typical relation is the contract, and the typical group is the voluntary special-purpose association. The long historical trend is toward the *Gesellschaft*, with more and more activities governed by the voluntary action of freely contracting individuals.

Gesellschaft weakens traditional bonds and encourages rationality and the division of labor.³¹ The result is a mass society made up of individuals who are only loosely bound together. "Mass" suggests an aggregate rather than a tightly knit social group. Mass society is the "participant society."³² In earlier periods, small well-insulated minorities controlled decision-making in the major institutions. The rest of the people lived out their lives within the confines of work, household, and parish. In mass society popular demand tends to govern policy in many areas, including government, education, and the production and distribution of consumer goods. Mass culture is discussed in *CULTURE*, pages 80–81.

Countertrends The trends culminating in mass society represent a movement away from a highly integrated social order to a more loosely knit one based on individualism and group autonomy. In the twentieth century these trends have come to their fullest development, but this century has also seen the rapid development of countertrends leading to closer social integration. Two of these countertrends are centralization and the "quest for community."

1. *Centralization* is a dominant theme in modern society, especially in political and economic life. The centers of decision have moved away from local areas and small units to the capital cities of government and industry.

²⁹ See *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, translated and edited by Kurt H. Wolff (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1950); also N. J. Spykman, *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925), pp. 219 ff.; and Lewis A. Coser (ed.), *Georg Simmel* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

³⁰ Ferdinand Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1st ed., 1887), tr. and ed. by C. P. Loomis as *Fundamental Concepts of Sociology* (New York: American Book Co., 1940). (See PRIMARY GROUPS, p. 124.)

³¹ See especially Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1949); also Jose Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (New York: Norton, 1932); and William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959).

³² See Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), p. 60 *et passim*.

2. The *quest for community* also runs counter to the emphasis on rationality and individualism. Millions feel the need to find or reaffirm a common identity, and this sometimes leads to a denial of individualism and a revived but distorted sense of kinship. The most extravagant example is Hitler's Germany, which purported to offer a rebirth of *Volksgemeinschaft*, a communality of "blood and soil."

In every age there are certain key words which by their repetitive use and re-definition mark the distinctive channels of faith and thought. . . . In the

nineteenth century, the age of individualism and rationalism, such words as *individual*, *change*, *progress*, *reason*, and *freedom* were notable. . . .

Today a different set of words and symbols dominates the intellectual and moral scene. It is impossible to overlook, in modern lexicons, the importance of such words as *disorganization*, *disintegration*, *decline*, *insecurity*, *breakdown*, *instability*, and the like.³³

The survival of rationality and of individual freedom depends upon man's ability to solve the problems which these ideals, together with industrialism and urbanization, have set for the modern world.

³³ Robert A. Nisbet, *The Quest for Community* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 3-4, 7. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER III

CULTURE

SECTION 1 THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE

As commonly used in the social sciences, the term culture refers to a *social heritage*, that is, all the knowledge, beliefs, customs, and skills that are available to the members of a society. The social heritage is the product of a specific and unique history; it is the "distinctive way of life of a group of people, their complete design for living."¹

The idea of culture has a rich intellectual background.² In the philosophical, literary, and historical tradition, culture refers mainly to ideals of enlightenment and refinement, especially in the realms of intellect, morality, and art. This *humanist* view of culture emphasizes creativity and excellence. The cultured man in this tradition is sophisticated, sensitive, and educated. He can appreciate and perhaps teach the richness of his cultural tradition.

In the nineteenth century, especially in Germany, a connection was made between culture as a moral and intellectual ideal and culture as the distinctive "genius" of a people or an epoch.³ Styles of art, conceptions of law, philosophical systems, religious orientations, and literary themes were studied for the way they reflected and shaped the *ethos*, or fundamental character, of a people. While the emphasis remained on intellectual, aesthetic, and moral attainment, a transition was made toward applying the idea of culture to certain aspects of a whole society at a stage of its history.

Nineteenth-century anthropologists often used "culture" and "civilization" interchangeably, and they were fascinated by the possibility of an evolution of society from lower to higher stages. (See Sec.

¹ Clyde Kluckhohn, "The Study of Culture," in Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell (eds.), *The Policy Sciences* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), p. 86.

² See A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (New York: Vintage Books, 1963); Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society, 1780-1950* (Garden City, N.Y.: [Anchor] Doubleday, 1960).

³ See Kroeber and Kluckhohn, *op. cit.*, Part I; also George L. Mosse, *The Culture of Western Europe* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961); Bruce Mazlish, *The Riddle of History: The Great Speculators from Vico to Freud* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966).

4, p. 75.) Culture was something man attained as he developed his skills and rational capacities. Gradually, however, the ideas of culture and civilization were disentangled.⁴ Civilization retained its evaluative connotation, but culture came to refer to the *way of life* of a people, whatever that might be.

At the same time that evolutionary theories of society were being proposed and debated, anthropologists were trying to delimit the races of man and assess the influence of race differences on human accomplishment. Some attempted to account for different ways of life by the influence of biological heredity, and the achievements of Western civilization were claimed to be due to the inherent superiority of the "white" race. For example, Gobineau's *Essay on the Inequality of Human Races* (1853–1855) argued that white "Aryans" or "Nordics" were responsible for the development of civilization.

Anthropologists like Franz Boas, however, read the lesson of cultural variation differently. They showed that biological heredity was of minor importance compared to social heredity. The difference between one people and another was a matter of historical opportunity, not of biological endowment.

Anthropologists wanted a concept of culture that would (1) be descriptive, free of value judgments, useful for analysis of any people's way of life, no matter how crude or primitive they might seem; and (2) direct attention to the social rather than biological influences on human nature and human achievement.

By the early decades of the twentieth century the anthropological concept of culture had come to center on the social heritage taken as a whole. The humanist concept, with its selective emphasis on ideas and the arts, was set aside as unsuitable for anthropological inquiry:

Culture is not restricted to certain special fields of

knowledge; it includes ways of behaving derived from the whole range of human activity. The designs for living evident in the behavior of the Eskimos, the natives of Australia, or the Navahos are as much a part of culture as those of cultivated Europeans and Americans. Culture includes not only the techniques and methods of art, music, and literature, but also those used to make pottery, sew clothing, or build houses. Among the products of culture we find comic books and popular street songs along with the art of a Leonardo da Vinci and the music of a Johann Bach. The anthropologist does not employ the contrast "cultured versus uncultured," for this distinction of popular usage represents only a difference in culture, not its absence or presence.⁵

This viewpoint rejects provincialism and underscores the receptiveness of the social scientist in studying cultures other than his own. A comprehensive, inclusive idea of culture avoids invidious distinctions. It assumes that man's humanity may be achieved through any sustained social experience. A forest pygmy, an Eskimo, an ancient Roman, an advertising account executive, a member of a delinquent gang, or a "hippie" are all equally human and all participate in culture.

Thus the history of anthropology and its moral concerns have encouraged a comprehensive view of culture as equivalent to the entire social heritage. Within that broad definition, however, certain topics stand out as bridges between the interests of the social scientist and those of the humanist. These include: (1) culture as symbolism and (2) culture as the realm of values.

THE SYMBOLIC ORDER

Of all the animals man alone has culture, because only he is capable of creating symbols. Without symbols there could be social life, as there is among other animals, but it would be rudimentary.

A symbol⁶ may be broadly defined as anything that

⁴ See George W. Stocking, Jr., "Matthew Arnold, E. B. Tylor, and the Uses of Invention," *American Anthropologist*, 65 (1963), 783–799, and "Franz Boas and the Culture Concept in Historical Perspective," *American Anthropologist*, 68 (1966), 867–882.

⁵ Ralph L. Beals and Harry Hoijer, *An Introduction to Anthropology* (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 207.

⁶ Some writers use "sign" as the most general term to include "natural signs" (smoke is a sign of fire) and conventional signs, or symbols. See Ernest Nagel, "Symbolism and Science," in Lyman Bryson, et al. (eds.), *Symbols and Values: An Initial Study*, Thirteenth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), pp. 39–71. This volume contains a number of articles pertinent to the present discussion.

stands for or represents something else. The word "pencil" is a symbol; it may stand for the idea of a pencil or for a specific object. The meaning of a symbol is social in origin: meaning is given to a symbol by those who use it. Thus symbols are always man-made. While words are the most common symbols, acts or objects are symbols too, for example, a threatening gesture or a river that marks a boundary.

For the purpose of understanding culture, two kinds of symbols should be distinguished, the *referential* and the *expressive*.⁷ Referential symbols are denotative, they are words or objects that have a specific reference; they are instrumental. "Portable typewriter" is a referential symbol; it is a convenient way of referring to a specific class of objects.

Expressive symbols are *connotative*. They evoke associations that are diffuse and open-ended rather than specific and limited. The word professor *denotes* one who holds a position on a faculty, but the same word *connotes* a wide range of associations, not fully specified, suggesting authority, knowledge, and wisdom, or perhaps subversion and impracticality. "Cross" denotes a physical arrangement, but it connotes religious martyrdom and the perspectives of Christianity.

Expressive symbols have a special importance for culture. When symbols are narrowly denotative and technical—for example, a code for filing books in a library—they do not sustain personal and group identity. A symbol invested with connotation evokes responses that are personally meaningful, that is, the connotations are experienced by the person as comforting or threatening, uplifting or degrading. Thus "home" is a more expressive symbol than "house"; "boss" probably conveys more person-centered meanings than "employer"; "convocation" evokes associations of a ritual occasion while "meeting" is more narrowly referential. Expressive symbolism is capable of contributing to social solidarity by affirming shared ideals and perspectives.

Group-sustaining symbolism is not restricted to

such clear-cut examples as flags and rituals. Etiquette, for example, has symbolic meaning:

On a relatively obvious plane of symbolism etiquette provides the members of society with a set of rules which . . . express society's concern for its members and their relation to one another. There is another level of etiquette symbolism, however, which takes little or no account of such specific meanings but interprets etiquette as a whole as a powerful symbolism of status. From this standpoint, to know the rules of etiquette is important, not because the feelings of friends and strangers are becomingly observed but because the manipulator of the rule proves he is a member of an exclusive group.

[One who affirms his group membership in this way is not necessarily without malice or individuality.] By reason of the richly developed meanings which inhere in etiquette, both positive and negative, a sensitive person can actually express a more bitter hostility through the frigid observance of etiquette than by flouting it on an obvious wave of hostility."

George Orwell's novel *1984* depicts the decay of social relations and culture in a totalitarian society dominated by "Big Brother." A phase of that decay is described in "Newspeak and Expressive Symbolism," page 53.

Symbolism and the arts In all societies, though in varying degrees, expressive symbolism is sustained and enriched by aesthetic activity—dance, music, sculpture. The arts help celebrate occasions that are significant to the group. The artist is a specialist in creating symbolic representations that convey the spirit of a culture or an age, though he may be unaware that he is doing so. Artistic creations are therefore important to the student of culture. In the study of expressive symbolism the humanist and the social scientist find common ground.

However, expressive symbolism is not restricted to the arts. Any repetitive human act, any object, however simple or routine, can have expressive meaning. A meal, a form of dress, a greeting, a

⁷ Edward Sapir distinguished referential and "condensation" symbolism, the latter "allowing for the ready release of emotional tension in conscious or unconscious form." "Symbolism," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 14 (1934), 493.

* Sapir, *ibid.*, p. 494.

NEWSPEAK AND EXPRESSIVE SYMBOLISM

The name of every organization, or body of people, or doctrine, or country, or institution, or public building, was invariably cut down into the familiar shape: that is, a single easily pronounced word with the smallest number of syllables that would preserve the original derivation. In the Ministry of Truth, for example, the Records Department was called *Recdep*, the Fiction Department was called *Ficdep*, the Teleprograms Department was called *Teledep*, and so on. Even in the early decades of the twentieth century, telescoped words and phrases had been one of the characteristic features of political language; and it had been noticed that the tendency to use abbreviations of this kind was most marked in totalitarian countries and totalitarian organizations.* It was perceived that in thus abbreviating a name one *narrowed and subtly altered its meaning*, by cutting out most of the associations that would otherwise cling to it. The words *Communist International*, for instance, call up a composite picture of universal human brotherhood, red flags, barricades, Karl Marx, and the Paris Commune. The word *Comintern*, on the other hand, suggests merely a tightly knit organization and a well-defined body of doctrine. *Comintern* is a word that can be uttered almost without taking thought, whereas *Communist International* is a phrase over which one is obliged to linger at least momentarily. In the same way, the associations called up by a word like *Minitrue* are fewer and more controllable than those called up by *Ministry of Truth*.

What was required, above all for political purposes, were short clipped words of unmistakable meaning which could be uttered rapidly and which roused the minimum of echoes in the speaker's mind. For the purposes of everyday life it was no doubt necessary, or sometimes necessary, to reflect before speaking, but a Party member called upon to make a political or ethical judgment should be able to spray forth the correct opinions as automatically as a machine gun spraying forth bullets. His training fitted him to do this, the language gave him an almost foolproof instrument, and the texture of the words, with their harsh sound and a certain willful ugliness, assisted the process still further.

The Newspeak vocabulary was tiny, and differed from almost all other languages in that its vocabulary grew smaller instead of larger each year. Each reduction was a gain, since the smaller the area of choice, the smaller the temptation to take thought. Ultimately it was hoped to make articulate speech issue from the larynx without involving the higher brain centers at all. This aim was frankly admitted in the Newspeak word *duckspeak*, meaning "to quack like a duck." Provided that the opinions which were quacked out were orthodox ones, it implied nothing but praise, and when the *Times* referred to one of the orators of the Party as a *double-plusgood duckspeaker* it was paying a warm and valued compliment.

SOURCE: From "The Principles of Newspeak," Appendix to *Nineteen Eighty-Four* by George Orwell; copyright, 1949 (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World), pp. 309-311. Used with permission.

* For example, "Gestapo" from *Geheime Staatspolizei*; "Comintern" from *Communist International*; "Agitprop" from *Agitation and Propaganda* department.

dwelling, a public gathering-place—any of these may be rich with connotation. Thus culture includes everything that is produced by, and is capable of sustaining, shared symbolic experience.⁹

CULTURAL VALUES AND NORMS

A *value* is anything that is prized or of benefit. "Values do not consist in 'desires' but rather in the desirable, that is, what we not only want but feel that it is right and proper to want for ourselves and for others. [Values are] abstract standards that transcend the impulses of the moment and ephemeral situations."¹⁰

In the discussion of culture, value is usually considered from the standpoint of how the group acts, feels, or thinks. A *cultural value* may be defined as a widely held belief or sentiment that some activities, relationships, feelings, or goals are important to the community's identity or well-being. Because they are often held unconsciously, or are expressed as themes cutting across a variety of specific attitudes, the values of a people are not immediately apparent.

A suggestive effort to summarize the major value orientations in the United States has been made by Williams. One merit of this statement is its propositional form, which invites the reader to test the validity of each theme against his own knowledge. The list of themes follows a cautionary note:

(In the nature of the case, anyone—including the author—can think of numerous exceptions to each of these generalized formulations, as well as widespread alternative themes.)

1. American culture is organized around the attempt at *active mastery* rather than *passive acceptance*. Into this dimension falls the low tolerance of frustration; the refusal to accept ascetic renunciation; the positive encouragement of desire; the stress on power; the approval of ego-assertion, and so on.

2. It tends to be interested in the *external world* of things and events, of the palpable and immediate, rather than in the inner experience of meaning and affect. Its genius is manipulative rather than contemplative.

3. Its world-view tends to be *open* rather than closed: it emphasizes change, flux, movement; its central personality types are adaptive, accessible, outgoing and assimilative.

4. In wide historical and comparative perspective, the culture places its primary faith in *rationalism* as opposed to *traditionalism*; it deemphasizes the past, orients strongly to the future, does not accept things just because they have been done before.

5. Closely related to the above is the dimension of *orderliness* rather than unsystematic *ad hoc* acceptance of transitory experience. (This emphasis is most marked in the urban middle classes.)

6. With conspicuous deviations, a main theme is a *universalistic* rather than a *particularistic* ethic.¹¹

7. In interpersonal relations, the weight of the value system is on the side of "*horizontal*" rather than "*vertical*" emphases: peer-relations, not superordinate-subordinate relations; equality rather than hierarchy.

8. Subject to increased strains and modifications, the received culture emphasizes *individual personal-ity* rather than group identity and responsibility.

In broadest outline, then, American society is characterized by a basic moral orientation, involving emphases on active, instrumental mastery of the world in accordance with universalistic standards of performance. It is a pluralistic system in which it is not easy to secure unitary commitment to collective goals. It permits a wide range of goals for achievement.¹²

Thus whole cultures are sometimes characterized by values that reinforce each other and affect the most varied and important kinds of behavior.


Norms Cultural norms are based on cultural values. They are guides to conduct, specifying what is

⁹ See Gertrude Jaeger and Philip Selznick, "A Normative Theory of Culture," *American Sociological Review*, 29 (October, 1964), 653-669.

¹⁰ Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture and Behavior* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 289.

¹¹ A "universalistic" ethic emphasizes the application of uniform rules or principles, e.g., that all men are equal before the law or should have equal opportunities. A "particularistic" ethic emphasizes claims to special treatment on the basis of friendship, kinship, social status, or other specific criteria.

¹² Robin M. Williams, Jr., *American Society: A Sociological Interpretation* (2nd ed., rev.; New York: Knopf, 1960), pp. 469-470.



William Graham Sumner (1840–1910), influential sociologist and author of *Folkways* and *The Science of Society* (with A. G. Keller). Sumner's work emphasized the conservative influence of custom. He was also a staunch conservative on both political and economic issues. Perhaps the best-known chapter title in social science is from *Folkways*: "The Mores Can Make Anything Right and Prevent Condemnation of Anything."

appropriate or inappropriate, setting limits within which individuals may seek alternate ways to achieve their goals. Norms are usually framed as rules, prescriptions, or standards to be followed by people who occupy specified roles. Thus there are norms for the conduct of citizens, friends, parents, schoolteachers.

A value is more general than a norm. The society may value privacy, but the specific norms governing the handling of mail or the administration of public toilets necessarily depend on the situation and circumstances. While some norms apply to narrowly specified situations that may occur only rarely, others apply to the most common activities of everyday life.

When the occurrence is rare, as in the case of funerals and other ceremonies, specialists are needed to instruct the participants on proper conduct.

Norms vary in how closely they are connected with cultural values. Many norms are technical arrangements for organizing work or serving public convenience. They are important to the functioning of the society but they are not *experienced* as important, either symbolically or in their bearing upon cultural values. The *mores* are culturally salient norms, such as prohibitions on murder and blasphemy or the prescriptions governing parental responsibility for children. Sumner observed that "the Romans used *mores* for customs in the broadest and richest sense of the word, including the notion that customs served welfare and had traditional and mystic sanction so that they were properly authoritative and sacred."¹³

Sumner distinguished mores from *folkways*, which are less salient norms. The intensity of feeling associated with folkways is relatively low and conformity is more nearly optional. Norms specifying appropriate dress, for instance, evoke little emotion, except where the deviance is perceived as extreme.

CULTURE AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Social organization is made up of interpersonal and group relations. The family is a unit of social organization, and the form of the family and much familial behavior are prescribed by the culture. One culture may value a kind of family in which the father is dominant; another may relegate him to a lesser role. Culture is the design and the prescription, the composite of guiding values and ideals. Hence, culture and social organization are interdependent. The separate treatment of the subjects is a matter of selective interest and emphasis.

On the other hand, much of social organization is not culturally prescribed but arises out of the give and take of personal and group interaction that is not entirely governed by definite rules. For example, a hierarchy of social classes may be culturally defined as it was in medieval Europe or classical China.

¹³ William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (New York: [Mentor] New American Library, 1960), p. 48. (First published in 1907.)

In American society stratification exists, but it has much less support in the design for living.

The interrelations between culture and social organization may be illustrated by the Tanala,³⁴ a hill tribe of Madagascar. Originally they subsisted by the cultivation of *dry rice*. They cut down and burned jungle growth, thus clearing the land for planting. After one or two crops the land had to be abandoned until the jungle overran it again. The jungle about a village was thus exploited until it was exhausted, and then the village was moved. There was no individual ownership of land; the village as a whole held the territory. Within the village *joint families*—groups of households connected through a common head—were the chief units of organization. Joint family members worked as a group and owned the crops from the land they cleared. The head of the joint family divided the crops among the households, and there was little variation in wealth between families. Forest products, such as game, belonged to whoever took them.

The adoption of *wet rice* cultivation from a neighboring people disrupted Tanala culture and social organization. Because at the outset wet rice planting was done on relatively small plots, it was cultivated by single households, and unlike the dry rice system, the land was in continuous cultivation. The idea of exclusive ownership of real estate developed, and because there was only a limited amount of suitable land, two classes—landholders and landless—became distinguished. Those who held wet rice land no longer

needed to be involved in the large joint-family effort in jungle clearing, and they did not want the villages to be moved. The landless, who continued dry rice cultivation, had to move into the jungle too far to return to the village at night. As a result they too began to develop separate household organization. There were numerous other effects: changes in the kinship and marriage system, in the practice of warfare, in the design of villages and village defense, in slavery, and in the growth of a centralized authority with autocratic control.

The Tanala case shows how changes in social relations are affected by changes in the key activities of a group and how the particular forms of adaptation and interaction are embedded in custom. When the food gathering technology was changed, the social system changed along with it. The sequence of changes was initiated by a modification in the technology—the shift from dry rice to wet rice cultivation. This was accompanied by changes in social organization: greater emphasis on the individual household, declining emphasis on the large joint family, and the stabilization of the site of the village. Accompanying these changes were shifts in cultural values: the joint family was displaced by the household as the chief object of loyalty, and land became valued not as something to be used temporarily but to be permanently possessed. Thus culture and social organization interact in the working out of man's relations to his physical environment and his fellow men.

³⁴ Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York: Appleton-Century, 1936), pp. 348–355; and Ralph Linton, *The Tanala: A Hill Tribe of Madagascar*, Anthropological Series Vol. XXII (Chicago: Field Museum of Natural History, 1933).

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SECTION 2 THE IMPACT OF CULTURE

The case of rice cultivation among the Tanala shows culture as a *dependent* variable, a product of other determining forces. Technological change affected social organization, which in turn influenced conceptions of property and the symbolic meaning of land. But culture is also an *independent* variable, a determinant of social patterns.

PERVASIVENESS OF CULTURE

Culture creates a world taken for granted; it forms the unconscious premises of thought and action. Culture tends to be pervasive, touching every aspect of life. The pervasiveness of culture is manifest in two ways. First, culture provides an unquestioned context within which individual action and response take place. Even rational action is subject to the cultural definition of what is a meaningful goal and what are available means. Emotional responses are governed by cultural norms that prescribe selective forms of emotion, such as appropriate feelings of grief, wounded pride, or romantic love. Culturally determined responses are built into the very physiology of the organism, for example, conditioning the individual to feel nauseated by sights, smells, or tastes, or to be sexually aroused by certain objects.

Second, culture pervades social activities and in-

stitutions. There is a strain toward consistency in culture¹⁵—consistency of perception and style, as well as of values. This is the thesis of Benedict's discussion of integrating themes in three preliterate, relatively simple societies. Benedict based her analysis on the following postulate:

A culture, like an individual, is a more or less consistent pattern of thought and action. Within each culture there come into being characteristic purposes not necessarily shared by other types of society. In obedience to these purposes, each people further and further consolidates its experience, and in proportion to the urgency of these drives the heterogeneous items of behavior take more and more congruous shape.¹⁶

Although a strain to consistency is probably universal, the amount of consistency to be found in any particular culture is highly variable. As Benedict recognized, the more complex the society, and the more exposed it is to differing influences, the harder it is to identify and make generalizations about culture themes. The postulate of consistency calls attention to the pervasive effect of cultural symbolism and values; it is a way of saying that it is always pertinent to ask to what extent a given activity, such as warfare, economic organization, or politics, is taken for granted.

¹⁵ Sumner, *op. cit.*, pp. 21, 49–50.

¹⁶ Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1946), p. 42.

When radically different customs are compared, the impact of culture is obvious. But it is often necessary to examine the details of interaction, and the interdependence of language and thought, to grasp the full significance of cultural influence. See Adaptation 6, pages 64–68.

LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

Ordinarily language is taken for granted as a way of expressing ideas and feelings and of communicating messages. Because language appears to place no restraints on the flow of ideas, we assume that it is a medium equally fitted to convey any idea. According to this commonsense view, the various spoken languages of the world are merely different inventories for the same underlying reality; although different names and sounds are used in each language, the things named are actually the same. Though the “codes” may vary, the “messages” or thoughts expressed are fundamentally equivalent.

Such a conception of languages has been challenged by a number of linguists and anthropologists. Inspired especially by the work of Benjamin L. Whorf, social scientists have come to believe that language is more than an aid to thought: it pervades the content and style of thought itself. Language is not simply a set of labels for preexisting objects. Rather, language “constructs” reality by determining the kinds of objects we carve out of the flux of experience. Languages are more (and less) than different codes for the same messages; they restrict the kinds of messages that can be conveyed, and even the kinds of messages that can be conceived.

Language is a guide to “social reality.” Though language is not ordinarily thought of as of essential interest to the students of social science, it powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes. Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become

the medium of expression for their society. . . . No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached.¹⁷

While this statement may be somewhat overdrawn, it does point to one of the most important ways culture as a symbolic realm influences the human mind.

Selective attention By sensitizing the individual to certain aspects of the external world, language accentuates some features at the expense of others. An illustration is the use of verbs. In English, tense is an important aspect of conjugation. Since in English a verb must have tense, the speaker is cognizant of a time dimension whenever he uses the language. However, the Hopi Indian language conjugates its verbs for validity rather than time.¹⁸ In naming an action the Hopi must indicate the nature of his evidence, that is, whether he is reporting (1) a direct experience, (2) a belief or expectation, or (3) a generalization about experience. For example, having watched a boy running down a footpath, the Hopi uses the verb-form *wari* (running, statement of direct observation); *wari* may be translated either as *he is running* or *he ran*, since the time of the action is unspecified. If the Hopi believes the boy is running down the footpath, but has no direct evidence for this, he uses the form *warikni* (running, statement of expectation); this form may refer to a past, present, or future action. Finally, if the speaker knows the boy runs as a matter of custom or habit, perhaps as a participant in racing games, he uses the form *warikngwe* (running, statement of a generalization or law). The Hopi language thus encourages the speaker to check his sources of information.

In Japanese, there are a number of sets of verbal triplets that denote the same action, one form indicating a humble attitude on the part of the speaker toward the listener, another an attitude of politeness,

¹⁷ Edward Sapir, “The Status of Linguistics as a Science,” in David G. Mandelbaum (ed.) *Selected Writings of Edward Sapir* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958), p. 162.

¹⁸ Benjamin Lee Whorf, *Language, Thought, and Reality* (New York: Wiley, 1956), p. 217. First published in 1940.




FIG. III:1 Languages dissect nature differently

The different isolates of meaning (thoughts) used by English and Shawnee in reporting the same experience, that of cleaning a gun by running the ramrod through it. The pronouns "I" and "it" are not shown by symbols, as they have the same meaning in each language. In Shawnee *ni-* equals "I"; *-a* equals "it."

(Redrawn after Whorf, *op. cit.*)

and the third a plain or abrupt attitude.¹⁹ For example, *iku*, which is the plain form of *to go*, becomes *irrasharu* in the polite form, and *mairu* in the humble form; *taberu* (to eat, plain form) becomes *agaru* (polite form) and *itadaku* (humble form). Since the speaker is obligated to observe the status relationship between himself and his listener, the abrupt or plain form is used in the presence of inferiors, the polite form in the presence of peers, and the humble form

in the presence of superiors. In effect, the Japanese implicates himself within the social hierarchy simply by using a verb-form. European languages, too, have formal and informal modes of address, as in the French *vous*, *tu* and the German *Sie*, *du*.

Modes of discrimination Selective attention enforced by language reflects the distinctive problems and experiences of the society. In English, for example, the same word is used for falling snow, snow on the ground, snow packed hard like ice, slushy snow, wind-driven flying snow, and so on.²⁰ An Eskimo is acutely aware that these various types of "snow" are distinct phenomena, each presenting its own problems and opportunities. The more inclusive word is not useful in the Eskimo's environment, and the Eskimo language includes a large vocabulary of specific terms.

Languages differ not only in how precisely they differentiate experience, but also in the way they do so:

A Trobriand word refers to a self-contained concept. . . . For "A good gardener," or "The gardener is good," the Trobriand word would include both "gardener" and "goodness"; if the gardener loses the goodness, he has lost a defining ingredient, he is something else, and he is named by means of a completely different word. A *taytu* (a species of yam) contains a certain degree of ripeness, bigness, roundness, etc.; without one of these defining ingredients, it is something else. . . .

There is no temporal connection between objects. The *taytu* always remains itself; it does not *become* overripe; overripeness is an ingredient of another, a different being. At some point, the *taytu* turns into a *yowana*, which contains overripeness. And the *yowana*, overripe as it is, does not put forth shoots, does not *become* a sprouting *yowana*. When sprouts appear, it ceases to be itself; in its place appears a *silasata*. Neither is there a temporal connection made . . . between events; in fact, temporality is meaningless. There are no tenses, no linguistic distinction between past and present.²¹

¹⁹ Hide Shodara, "Honorific Expressions of Personal Attitudes in Spoken Japanese," Center for Japanese Studies, *Occasional Papers* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), No. 2, pp. 31-32.

²⁰ Whorf, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

²¹ Dorothy Lee, *Freedom and Culture* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959), p. 109.



On first seeing a white man: A native of the Duna language area in the Southern Highlands District of New Guinea, photographed on his first encounter with a white man—June, 1955.

The Trobriand language orders the world in a way that may seem unnatural to one who is accustomed to thinking of the “same” entity as larger or smaller, earlier or later, ripe or unripe. This does not mean that Trobrianders are unable to conceive of entities that vary according to a temporal attribute. It would be more accurate to say that the language biases them against such categories.

Language and thought Because languages accentuate some features of experience and lend the world a special cast, they tend to produce different conceptions of reality and different thoughtways. The fact that some words are not translatable from one language to another “is merely the outward expression of inward differences between two peoples in premises, in basic categories, in the training of fundamental sensitivities, and in the general view of the world.”²³ Consider the idea of time. There is much suggestive evidence that many peoples conceive of time differently. For example, the language of the Kachin people of North Burma seems to contain no single word that corresponds to the English *time*.²⁴ Instead, there are numerous partial equivalents. In the following expressions the Kachin equivalent of *time* differs in every case:

The <i>time</i> by the clock is	<i>ahkying</i>
A long <i>time</i>	<i>na</i>
A short <i>time</i>	<i>tawng</i>
The present <i>time</i>	<i>ten</i>
Spring <i>time</i>	<i>ta</i>
The <i>time</i> has come	<i>hkra</i>
In the <i>time</i> of Queen Victoria	<i>lakhtak, aprat</i>
At any <i>time</i> of life	<i>asak</i>

A Kachin is encouraged by his language to be aware of these distinctions.

Conceptions of time, space, and other aspects of the world are rooted in language. Concealed in the structure of each language is a set of implicit assumptions. By emphasizing features of experience, vocabulary and grammar carry an implicit message: This is important. That is not important. Always distinguish A from B.²⁴

The extent to which language influences thought is not fully understood. It is clear, however, that the structure of language leaves its imprint on the consciousness and the thoughtways of a people.

²³ Clyde Kluckhohn, *Mirror for Man* (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1964), p. 145. (First published in 1944).

²⁴ E. R. Leach, *Rethinking Anthropology* (University of London: The Athlone Press, 1966), p. 124.

²⁵ Kluckhohn, *ibid.*, p. 145.

CULTURE SHOCK

To the extent that a person is imbued with his culture's values, acts according to its assumptions, and lacks awareness of alternative ways, he may be said to be "culture bound." To some extent everyone is culture bound, at least about some premises and expectations.

When unquestioned expectations are shaken, "culture shock" may ensue. Culture shock is the experience of disorientation and frustration that occurs when an individual finds himself among people who do not share his fundamental premises. Usually, disagreement over abstract ideas or variation in modes of dress, eating habits, and other daily routines can be learned and adjusted to fairly readily. Acute culture shock is most likely to be experienced when expectations about personal feelings and interaction are violated. A case in point is the description by a Peace Corpsman of "The Culture Shock of Quiet Death," page 62.

CONFORMITY AND DEVIATION

Although culture is an important determinant of thought and feeling, it is not monolithic or irresistible. The impact of culture is *variable*, depending on the particular aspect of culture involved and the circumstances.

Cultural values specify ideals, not actual regularities of behavior. Ideals involve standards of perfection, whether in the skills of the fisherman, the behavior of parents, or the performance of the artist—in all societies, preliterate or modern. The medicine man, the expert storyteller, the skilled craftsman—each stands in a different position relative to his culture than does the average participant. Similarly, the knowledge of a passenger in a plane is not equal to that of the designer, even though both participate in what might be called the aeronautical culture complex.

Men participate in culture to different degrees and are more or less responsive to values and norms because most human action is *situational* and *problem-solving*. People live out their lives in specific circumstances. They spend most of their time dealing with

the problems, stresses, and opportunities of everyday life. Therefore, culture is always *mediated* by or filtered through the routine activities and interactions that preoccupy men. Men are not culturally determined automatons who merely act out values and follow rules. They do take rules into account and are often guided by them, but they also deviate from rules, both deliberately and unwittingly.

In many situations social organization, not cul-



Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), no conformist, was a persistent critic of tradition and urged that all social practices be assessed according to their utility and the criterion of maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. In his gift to the University of London, he required that his remains be preserved in University College, where his clothed skeleton is kept in a case with his skull between his feet.

THE CULTURE SHOCK OF QUIET DEATH

I had become friendly with a farm family who also ran a little cafe out on the road where the buses stopped. One morning I was sitting around waiting for a bus to take me down to the next village when one of the farmer's sons and his wife sat down by me. She was holding a baby in her arms who was dying of pneumonia, and I sat there listening to that unbearable gasping struggle for breath while the family calmly gathered around the child and watched. Only the mother seemed to be upset.

I was sure that they were waiting for the bus to rush the baby to a doctor, but as the bus came closer and finally into sight they made no move. And suddenly using the most beautiful Spanish of my life, completely out of control I was screaming at them, "Your baby's going to die; you've got to get him to a doctor. Now. Now."

The young mother began to pant; her husband looked to his father who simply nodded his head in a sort of permission without saying anything, and the young couple ran down to the road and stopped the bus.

When I got back that night they told me that the baby was dead.

The next afternoon I was about a mile from town buying some pineapples from a small farmer—just past the graveyard. As I was coming back I met the funeral procession, the toy-like coffin painted in white and sprinkled with a silver dust being negligently packed on a farmer's shoulder.

Behind him and strung out for a hundred yards the family and their friends followed. The men carried bottles of *traigo*, stumbling and reeling in the mud of the trail. But while they advanced with a sort of dignity, there was also something slapstick about it. Some of them stopped to offer me a drink.

The statistics, of course, I knew—that in the country areas [Ecuador] three out of five babies die before their third year. And I was also aware of the Catholic philosophy which makes these deaths bearable to the country people. They hold the profound belief that when a baby dies, it dies in a state of grace and flies directly to heaven.

Within this framework then, the death of a child is something to celebrate; he has been released without sin from a life of suffering and poverty to become one of God's angels.

But knowing all this, I still could not accept it. Two mornings later, drinking coffee in the same little open air cafe and once more waiting for a bus, I had to leave and stand in a drizzle of rain to keep from watching another baby dying. The calmness with which they accepted his death was obscene to me.

I began to develop a grudge against the town and would make wild generalizations in my mind about the town and the people in it. By the end of the second week I had pretty much decided that I really didn't much like the people and that it would be impossible to work with them.

What I was going to do in that unrewarding spot for 18 more months was something that when I seriously thought about it sent me reeling into a real depression. I locked myself in my room for about three days . . .

Well, I got straightened around, but it took a little time; it took at least a month. And I write about this experience now not because it is particularly interesting, but because it is so typical of a volunteer's first reactions to another, a different culture. It is a hard and unpleasant time, but I think almost all volunteers at one time or another go through it.

SOURCE: Moritz Thomsen, "The Culture Shock of Quiet Death," *This World*, San Francisco Chronicle, April 25, 1965, p. 26. Used by permission.

ture, is the chief determinant of behavior. Who depends on whom, who communicates with whom, who can reward and who can punish may be as important as what the pertinent rules or values may be. Because people are implicated in a web of social relations—a structure of opportunities and constraints—they are subject to many pressures that lead to deviant conduct. Thus deviance is socially determined just as is conformity.

Some norms are more specifically stated than others; some have wider ranges of application than others; some permit individual interpretation to a greater extent than others. Limits are indeed set by norms, but variation in conformity is often permitted, and exceptions are also provided for. For example, a person may have to choose between one norm and another. A driver who hits another automobile to avoid hitting a child violates one norm in order to conform to another. That he does so “automatically” shows how deeply ingrained the underlying values are. In this case the relative importance of the norms is clear and there is no conflict. On the other hand, a student who sees a friend cheating on an examination must choose between conflicting norms, especially if the school has an honor system. One norm instructs him to see that honesty is upheld, the other tells him to be loyal to his friend.

Norms in conflict Few acts are more repugnant to Western man than murder and cannibalism, few assertions more readily accepted than “Self-preservation is the first law of nature.” What happens when these two norms directly conflict?

During the seventeenth century a small fishing party was driven far out to sea by a storm in the Caribbean.²⁶ Their few provisions were soon exhausted, and it became evident that it would take many days to reach land. One of the men proposed that lots be cast and that the loser sacrifice himself to be eaten, so that the others might live. Lots were cast,

and it so happened that the original proposer lost. However, no one would act as executioner and butcher, and it was necessary to cast lots again. A butcher was thus chosen, the man was killed and eaten. After 17 days the small boat reached port in a French island where the Magistrate did not hold the survivors. Because they were English, their case was again examined by an English judge on the island of St. Kitts. He released the prisoners outright saying “. . . the inevitable necessity had washed away the crime.”

Can it be taken as a general principle that under the compulsion of *necessity* the strongest of laws and mores may be overridden? Examine this case from an incident in 1884.

At the trial of an indictment for murder it appeared, upon a special verdict, that the prisoners D. and S., seamen, and the deceased, a boy between seventeen and eighteen, were cast away in a storm on the high seas, and compelled to put into an open boat; that the boat was drifting on the ocean, and was probably more than 1000 miles from land; that on the eighteenth day, when they had been seven days without food and five without water, D. proposed to S. that lots should be cast who should be put to death to save the rest, and that they afterwards thought it would be better to kill the boy that their lives should be saved; that on the twentieth day D., with the assent of S., killed the boy, and both D. and S. fed on his flesh for four days; that at the time of the act there was no sail in sight nor any reasonable prospect of relief; that under these circumstances there appeared to the prisoners every probability that unless they then or very soon fed upon the boy, or one of themselves, they would die of starvation.²⁶

The court held the prisoners guilty of murder and sentenced them to death. On the argument that the killing was an act of necessity, the court had this to say:

Who is to be the judge of this sort of necessity? By what measure is the comparative value of lives to be measured? Is it to be strength, or intellect, or what? It is plain that the principle leaves to him who is to

²⁶ See *Cox's Criminal Law Cases* (London, 1886), Vol. XV, p. 629.

²⁶ *Regina v. Dudley and Stephens* (1884), *Ibid.*, pp. 624–638. For another case bearing on the problem of necessity and a thoughtful assessment of norms and the law, see Edmond Cahn, *The Moral Decision* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955), pp. 61–71.

profit by it to determine the necessity which will justify him in deliberately taking another's life to save his own. In this case the weakest, the youngest, the most unresisting, was chosen. Was it more necessary to kill him than one of the grown men? The answer must be "No."²⁷

It is probable that this court would have found that murder had been committed even if lots had been cast and one of the mature men had been the victim, for the verdict emphasized the importance of the normative principle:

We are often compelled to set up standards we can-

²⁷ *Cox's Criminal Law Cases, op. cit.*, p. 637.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

not reach ourselves, and to lay down rules which we could not ourselves satisfy. But a man has no right to declare temptation to be an excuse, though he might himself have yielded to it, nor allow compassion for the criminal to change or weaken in any manner the legal definition of the crime.²⁸

Although sentence of death was passed, it was afterwards commuted by the Crown to six months' imprisonment. The original sentence defended a principle regarded as essential to the moral order; the commutation of the sentence acknowledged the exceptional circumstances of the crime.

Adaptation 6 / Hall THE SILENT LANGUAGE

Much cultural behavior is so deeply ingrained that the individual is unaware of it. Even such fundamental matters as dealing with space and time are approached with subtle and profound variations in different cultures. In "The Silent Language," anthropologist E. T. Hall treats the nonverbal aspects of communication.

1. Units of time gain their meaning in social situations that are culturally defined. Being an hour late in one culture is the equivalent of being five minutes late in another.
2. Comfortable interpersonal distance for a Latin American connotes undue intimacy or aggression to a North American.
3. Nonverbal communication may be as decisive as words in determining the effectiveness of the interactive process. Time and distance elements of a culture should, therefore, be studied as closely as the overt symbolic behavior of gesture, speech, and writing.

The voices of time Time talks. It speaks more plainly than words. The message it conveys comes through loud and clear. Not long ago I learned from the superintendent of the Sioux that he had been born on the reservation and was a product of both Indian and white cultures, having earned his A.B. at one of the Ivy League colleges.

During a long and fascinating account of the many problems his tribe was having in adjusting to our way of life, he asked: "What would you think of a people who had no word for time? My people have no word for 'late' or for 'waiting,' for that matter. They don't know what it is to wait or to be late." He then continued: "I decided that until they could tell time and knew what

time was they could never adjust themselves to white culture. So I set about to teach them time. There wasn't a clock that was running in any of the reservation classrooms. So I first bought some decent clocks. Then I made the school buses start on time, and if an Indian was two minutes late that was just too bad. The bus started at 8:42 and he had to be there."

SOURCE: Abridged and adapted from Edward T. Hall, *The Silent Language*, Chaps. 1, 9, and 10. Copyright © 1959 by Edward T. Hall. Used in this form by permission of the author and Doubleday & Company, Inc.

He was right, of course. The Sioux could not adjust to European ways until they had learned the meaning of time. The superintendent's methods may have sounded a bit extreme, but they were about the only ones that would work. The idea of starting the buses off and making the drivers hold to a rigid schedule was a stroke of genius; much kinder to the Indian, who could better afford to miss a bus on the reservation than lose a job in town because he was a day late. There is, in fact, no other way to teach time to people who handle it as differently from us as the Sioux. The quickest way is to get very technical about it and to make it mean something.

A well-known authority on children in the United States once stated that it took the average child a little more than twelve years to master time. This estimate is probably somewhat conservative. Why does it take a child so long to learn time? The answer is not simple. In fact when one begins to discover how many complications are involved he may wonder whether the full subtleties of time can be mastered at all.

In the social world a girl feels insulted when she is asked for a date at the last minute by someone whom she doesn't know very well, and the person who extends an invitation to a dinner party with only three or four days' notice has to apologize. How different from the people of the Middle East with whom it is pointless to make an appointment too far in advance, because their informal time system places everything beyond a week into a single category of "future," in which plans tend to "slip off their minds."

Even physiological urgency is handled quite differently by people around the world. In many countries people need less of what Americans would call urgency in order to discharge a tension. In the United States the need must be highly critical before people act. The distribution of public toilets in America reflects our tendency to deny the existence of urgency even with normal physiological needs. I know of no other place in the world where anyone leaving home or office is put to periodic torture because great pains have been taken to hide the location of rest rooms. Yet Americans are the people who judge the advancement of others by their plumbing.

Punctuality Informally, for important daytime business appointments in the eastern United States between equals, there are eight time sets in regard to punctuality: on time, five, ten, fifteen, twenty, thirty, forty-five minutes, and one hour early or late. In regard to being late there are "mumble something" periods, slight apology periods, mildly insulting periods requiring full apology, rude periods, and downright insulting periods. No right-minded American would think of keeping a business associate waiting for an hour; it would be too insulting. No matter what is said in apology, there is little that can remove the impact of an hour's heel-cooling in an outer office.

Even the five-minute period has its significant subdivisions. When equals meet, one will generally be aware of being two minutes early or late but will say nothing, since the time in this case is not significant. At three minutes a person

will still not apologize or feel that it is necessary to say anything (three is the first significant number in the one-to-five series); at five minutes there is usually a short apology; and at four minutes before or after the hour the person will mutter something although he will seldom complete the muttered sentence. The importance of making detailed observations on these aspects of informal culture is driven home if one pictures an actual situation.

An American ambassador in an unnamed country interpreted incorrectly the significance of time as it was used in visits by local diplomats. An hour's tardiness in their system is equivalent to five minutes by ours, fifty or fifty-five minutes to four minutes, forty-five minutes to three minutes, and so on for daytime official visits. By their standards the local diplomats felt they couldn't arrive exactly on time; this punctuality might be interpreted locally as an act relinquishing their freedom of action to the United States. But they didn't want to be insulting—an hour late would be too late—so they arrived fifty minutes late. As a consequence the ambassador said, "How can you depend on these people when they arrive an hour late for an appointment and then just mutter something? They don't even give you a full sentence of apology!" He couldn't help feeling this way, because in American time fifty or fifty-five minutes late is the insult period, at the extreme end of the duration scale; yet in the country we are speaking of it's just right. If he had been taught the details of the local time system just as he should have been taught the spoken language, it would have

been possible for him to adjust himself accordingly.

Coming to the point Our pattern allows very little switching of the position of "intervals" once they are set in a schedule, nor does it allow for much tampering with either the content or the position of the points on the time scale. How much this is a factor in other cultures has not been determined precisely. There are cases, however, where the content or "agenda" of a given period of time is handled quite differently. In the Middle East refusal to come to the point and discuss the topic of a meeting often means that the party cannot agree to your terms but doesn't want to turn you down, or simply that he cannot discuss the matters under consideration because the time is not yet ripe. He will not, moreover, feel it is improper to meet without ever touching on the topic of the meeting.

Our pattern calls for the fixing of the agenda informally beforehand. We do not, as a whole, feel too comfortable trying to operate in a semipublic situation, hammering out an agenda, the way the Russians do. We prefer to assume that both parties want to talk about the subject, otherwise they wouldn't be there; and that they are sufficiently involved in the topic to make it worth their while. With the Russians there is some indication that, while this is true, negotiation over the separate points of the agenda signals to the other side how the opponent is going to react during the actual conference. Softness on our part in early negotiation, because we do not technically fix the agenda but agree informally about what should be

taken up, is often interpreted as weakness. Or it may give the impression that we are going to give in on certain points when we aren't at all.

By and large, the overriding pattern with us is that once you have scheduled the time, you have to use it as designated, even when it turns out that this is not necessary or advantageous. All of which seems very strange to the Arab. He starts at one point and goes until he is finished or until something intervenes.

Space speaks As one travels abroad and examines how space is handled, startling variations are discovered—differences we react to vigorously. Literally thousands of experiences teach us unconsciously that space communicates. Yet this fact would probably never have been brought to the level of consciousness if it had not been realized that space is organized differently in each culture. The associations and feelings that are released in a member of one culture almost invariably mean something else in the next. When we say that some foreigners are "pushy," all this means is that their handling of space releases this association in our minds.

"It's as much as your life is worth to ride the streetcars. They're worse than our subways. What's more, these people don't seem to mind it at all." As Americans, we have a pattern which discourages touching, except in moments of intimacy. When we ride on a streetcar or crowded elevator we "hold ourselves in," having been taught from early childhood to avoid bodily contact with strangers. Abroad, it's confusing when

conflicting feelings are being released at the same time. Our senses are bombarded by a strange language, different smells, and gestures, as well as a host of signs and symbols.

The Latin house is often built around a patio that is next to the sidewalk but hidden from outsiders behind a wall. It is not easy to describe the degree to which small architectural differences such as this affect outsiders. American foreign aid technicians living in Latin America used to complain that they felt "left out" of things, that they were "shut off." Others kept wondering what was going on "behind those walls." In the United States, on the other hand, propinquity is the basis of a good many relationships. To us the neighbor is actually quite close. You can borrow things, including food and drink, but you also have to take your neighbor to the hospital in an emergency. In this regard he has almost as much claim on you as a cousin.

Another example has to do with the arrangement of offices. In this case one notices great contrast between ourselves and the French. Part of our overall pattern in the United States is to take a given amount of space and divide it up equally. When a new person is added in an office, almost everyone will move his desk so that the newcomer will have his share of the space. This may mean moving from positions that have been occupied for a long time and away from favorite views. The point is that the office force will make its own adjustments voluntarily. In fact, it is a signal that they have acknowledged the presence of the new person when they start rear-

ranging the furniture. Until this happens, the boss can be sure that the new person has not been integrated into the group.

Given a large enough room, Americans will distribute themselves around the walls, leaving the center open for group activities such as conferences. That is, the center belongs to the group and is often marked off by a table or some object placed there both to use and save the space. Lacking a conference table, members will move their chairs away from their desks to form a "huddle" in the middle.

The French, by contrast, do not make way for each other in the unspoken, taken-for-granted way that we do. They do not divide up the space with a new colleague. Instead they may grudgingly give him a small desk in a dark corner looking toward the wall. This action speaks eloquently to Americans who have found themselves working for the French. We feel that not to "make a place" accents status differences. If the rearrangement which says, "Now we admit you to the group, and you are going to stay," fails to take place, Americans are likely to feel perilously insecure. In French offices the key figure is the man in the middle, who has his fingers on everything so that all runs smoothly. There is a centralized control. The French educational system runs from the middle, so that all students all over France take the same class at the same time.

Conversational distance Spatial changes give a tone to a communication, accent it, and at times even override the spoken word. The normal conversational dis-

tance between strangers illustrates how important are the dynamics of space interaction. If a person gets too close, the reaction is instantaneous and automatic—the other person backs up. And if he gets too close again, back we go again. I have observed an American backing up the entire length of a long corridor while a foreigner whom he considers pushy tries to catch up with him. This scene has been enacted thousands of times—one person trying to increase the distance in order to be at ease, while the other tries to decrease it for the same reason, neither one being aware of what was going on. We have here an example of the tremendous depth to which culture can condition behavior.

This was suddenly brought into focus one time when I had the good fortune to be visited by a very distinguished and learned man who had been for many years a top-ranking diplomat representing a foreign country. After meeting him a number of times, I had become impressed with his extraordinary sensitivity to the small details of behavior that are so significant in the interaction process. Dr. X was interested in some of the work several of us were doing at the time and asked permission to attend one of my lectures. He came to the front of the class at the end of the lecture to talk over a number of points made in the preceding hour. While talking he became quite involved in the implications of the lecture as well as what he was saying. We started out facing each other and as he talked I became dimly aware that he was standing a little too close and that I was beginning to back up. Fortunately I was able to suppress my first im-

pulse and remain stationary because there was nothing to communicate aggression in his behavior except the conversational distance. His voice was eager, his manner intent, the set of his body communicated only interest and eagerness to talk. It also came to me in a flash that someone who had been so successful in the old school of diplomacy could not possibly let himself communicate something offensive to the other person except outside of his highly trained awareness.

By experimenting I was able to observe that as I moved away slightly, there was an associated shift in the pattern of interaction. He had more trouble expressing himself. If I shifted to where I felt comfortable (about twenty-one inches), he looked somewhat puzzled and hurt, almost as though he were saying, "Why is he acting that way? Here I am doing everything I can to talk to him in a friendly manner and he suddenly withdraws. Have I done anything wrong? Said something that I shouldn't?" Having ascertained that distance had a direct effect on his conversation, I stood my ground, letting him set the distance.

In Latin America the interaction distance is much less than it is in the United States. Indeed, people cannot talk comfortably with one another unless they are very close to the distance that evokes either sexual or hostile feelings in the North American. The result is that when they move close, we withdraw and back away. As a consequence, they think we are distant or cold, withdrawn and unfriendly. We, on the other hand, are constantly accusing them of breathing

down our necks, crowding us, and spraying our faces.

Getting over a spatial accent is just as important, sometimes more

so, than eliminating a spoken one. Advice to the foreign traveler might be: Watch where people stand, and don't back up. You will

feel funny doing it, but it's amazing how much difference it makes in people's attitudes toward you.

SECTION 3 CULTURAL DIVERSITY

Studies of history and anthropology compel the conclusion that man is *one* and man is *many*. Everywhere the human being is the same in his biological and psychic nature. But upon that foundation he builds a remarkable diversity of motivation, custom, and belief. The interplay of man's oneness and his pluralism, his uniformity and diversity, is considered in this section.

THE CONSTANT AND THE VARIABLE

No feature of life in society is exempt from cultural variability—from language to physical posture, from concepts of property to ways of making love, from “great ideas” to the details of etiquette. To the reader of this book, many unfamiliar customs would be reasonable or even attractive alternatives to those of his own culture, for example, wearing an Indian sari or having more than one spouse. Other variations would be hard to accept, or even to think about without pain, such as circumcision rites for adolescent boys and girls or eating live witchetty grubs.

Not all variation is equally important. Variations in dress, for example, may or may not be *salient* to a culture. In some places costume has symbolic significance; elsewhere it is almost neutral, and changes in style may be easily accepted. What is salient can be known only if the culture as a whole is understood.

Cultural universals Despite manifest and even rampant diversity, there is striking uniformity. Mur-

dock has listed the following common elements in all known cultures, arranged in alphabetical order:

Age-grading, athletic sports, bodily adornment, calendar, cleanliness training, community organization, cooking, cooperative labor, cosmology, courtship, dancing, decorative art, divination, division of labor, dream interpretation, education, eschatology, ethics, ethnobotany, etiquette, faith healing, family, feasting, fire making, folklore, food taboos, funeral rites, games, gestures, gift giving, government, greetings, hair styles, hospitality, housing, hygiene, incest taboos, inheritance rules, joking, kin-groups, kinship nomenclature, language, law, luck superstitions, magic, marriage, mealtimes, medicine, modesty concerning natural functions, mourning, music, mythology, numerals, obstetrics, penal sanctions, personal names, population policy, postnatal care, pregnancy usages, property rights, propitiation of supernatural beings, puberty customs, religious ritual, residence rules, sexual restrictions, soul concepts, status differentiation, surgery, tool making, trade, visiting, weaning, and weather control.²⁹

This list could be extended if the items were analyzed further. For example, the word “authority” does not appear, as it would if the items “community organization” and “cooperative labor” were broken down into their elements.

When the constant and the variable are considered together, a more balanced response to strange customs is possible than when either aspect is considered alone. Among the polar Eskimo of Northwest Greenland, a man may lend his wife to a friend for the night, and the temporary exchange of wives is common.³⁰ The idea of sexual property is maintained (the

²⁹ George Peter Murdock, “The Common Denominator of Cultures,” in Ralph Linton (ed.), *The Science of Man in the World Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), p. 124.

³⁰ George Peter Murdock, *Our Primitive Contemporaries* (New York: Macmillan, 1934), p. 213.

wife is not supposed to lie with another man without permission), but there is evidently no great value placed on exclusive physical intimacy. To someone reared in another tradition, wife-lending is a startling variation in what human beings can tolerate; on the other hand, he might find just as much cause for wonder in the fact that the ideal of hospitality is so widely subscribed to.

Cultural universals are general, not specific social forms. The content remains to be specified. Thus hospitality, the general phenomenon, may be offered in many different ways, of which wife-lending is one. What gives the Eskimo culture its distinctiveness is the particular way of extending hospitality and the special sensibilities associated with it. A culture is always made up of unique adaptations and elaborations. The universals, however, show that all peoples belong to the human species and the societies they create are *human* societies.

Cultural universals can be accounted for in three ways:

1. *The psychic unity of mankind.* Despite individual differences and cultural variation, all men are alike in being subject to conditioning, in having a similar range of emotions, in the need for security and response, in the capacity to symbolize, and in many other ways. This psychic unity does not determine specific adaptations; it does not make cultures *identical*, but it is a source of cultural *similarities*. When the same kind of organism responds to roughly similar circumstances, it is understandable that there should be similar outcomes.

2. *Requirements of group life.* Social life has functional necessities, that is, requirements that must be met if groups are to survive and flourish. Reciprocity, leadership, communication, specialization, and symbolic affirmations of group identity are not mere accidental developments. They are solutions to problems, rediscovered innumerable times as ways of dealing with the ever-present necessities of organization and solidarity. Here again, the common ele-

ments or universals are general, not specific. The particular form of leadership or feasting or exchange of goods reflects the experiences of the society.

3. *Limited possibilities.* Action and choice always take place within a framework of limited alternatives. Some limitations are set by the physical environment, especially when the society is isolated and has a low level of technology. In the polar north, shelters may be made of ice or skins, but few other alternatives are available. The principle of limited possibilities applies most clearly to the technical arts. There are many ways of making a boat or an oar, but certain conditions must be met if the boat is to float or the oar to pull; if, in addition, the quest is for a speedy boat or the most efficient oar, the technological limitations are even more severe. "The fewer the possibilities . . . the more likely are similar solutions."⁸¹ The principle of limited possibilities also applies to language, which must have some sort of grammar; to social organization, for example, affecting modes of kinship or forms of leadership; and even to ritual, which relies for solemnity or exuberance on available modes of congregation, dance, and incantation.

Selective adjustment and elaboration Cultural diversity means cultural selection. From a broad range of possibilities each people selects ends and means that make up its way of life. "All cultures constitute so many somewhat distinct answers to essentially the same questions posed by human biology and by the generalities of the human situation."⁸² Every culture faces similar problems, but each culture solves those problems in its own way. Some challenges must be met if the community is to survive; others may be neglected or not even perceived. What is conceived as a problem, for example, the attainment of a high standard of living or a low death rate, largely depends on cultural assessments. Nevertheless, all cultures go beyond bare survival: they provide opportunities for symbolic expression and the enrichment of experience.

⁸¹ Alexander Goldenweiser, *Anthropology* (New York: Crofts, 1937), pp. 124 ff. Quotation at p. 125.

⁸² Clyde Kluckhohn, "Universal Categories of Culture," in Sol Tax (ed.), *Anthropology Today: Selections* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 317.

In Adaptation 7 the value of personal autonomy is explored to show cross-cultural uniformity and diversity. The value appears in many cultures, but the ways of showing respect for the individual are diverse. However, comparison of cultures shows more than diversity: it helps identify the nature of personal autonomy and the conditions under which it flourishes. The author concludes (1) autonomy is found in freedom from subjection to the commands of other persons and (2) autonomy is compatible with, and indeed is supported by, the system of cultural norms. Conformity to an impersonal order or to objective rules is suggested as the key to freedom.

ETHNOCENTRISM AND CULTURAL RELATIVISM

Each group considers its way of life the natural and the best way. Strange groups, beliefs, or practices are treated with suspicion and hostility simply because they are strange. Identification with the familiar and the devaluation of the foreign is called *ethnocentrism*. It is the feeling that one's own culture is the best in all respects and that others are in varying degrees inferior—barbaric, heathen, or outlandish. Extreme ethnocentrism leads to a needless rejection of the richness and knowledge of other cultures. It impedes the sharing of ideas and skills that might bring a society closer to its own goals. Historically, man has improved his ability to cope with his environment through the exchange of techniques and knowledge among cultures. Ethnocentrism tends to inhibit this proved method of culture growth. Whether practiced by primitive or modern man, ethnocentrism denies the basic unity of mankind.

In less virulent form ethnocentrism appears as a cultural nearsightedness that takes one's own culture for granted and that passively rather than actively rejects others. Even a book like this, which tries to be sensitive to such problems, falls into ethnocentric terminology. The authors freely, if reluctantly, use "America" and "Americans" in the American (sic)

way. By "Americans," people in the U.S.A. mean nationals of the U.S.A. But it is a correct designation of all the people in North and South America. Latin Americans resent the proprietary way we use a word that belongs to them as much as to us. In polite parlance they use the term "Norte Americano," in colloquial speech the term Yankee, which can carry connotations ranging from friendly to bitter depending on intonation, and a repertoire of terms beginning with Gringo and ending with unprintable. From the standpoint of the "American" there is no convenient, neutral, all-purpose word that is the natural and readily-understood private property of citizens of the United States of America.

The critique of ethnocentrism is often associated with a moral and intellectual position called *cultural relativism*. This point of view was expressed by Sumner when he said, "Everything in the mores of a time and place must be regarded as justified with regard to that time and place. 'Good' mores are those which are well adapted to the situation. 'Bad' mores are those which are not so adapted."²³ In other words, there is no universal standard which an outside observer can use to evaluate cultures or cultural norms as good or bad. Each culture must be seen in its own terms. The worth of a custom can be judged only by the contribution it makes to the culture of which it is a part. In that sense, judgments and interpretations are relative; they must begin with an understanding of the social setting.

The social scientist looks to the cultural context to make moral sense of a particular practice, whether it be cannibalism or televised commercials. If he evaluates, he does so from the standpoint of the particular culture's own values and requirements. Cultural relativism encourages both a tolerant perspective on foreign ways and a closer inspection of what those ways really are and what their significance is.

Although cultural relativism is an important point of view for social science, certain limitations should be noted:²⁴

²³ Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

²⁴ See David Bidney, "The Concept of Value in Modern Anthropology," in Tax, *op. cit.*, pp. 436-453; also Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture and Behavior* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), especially Chaps. 16 and 17.

1. It is sometimes said that cultural relativism precludes the belief that some values are good for all mankind. In fact, however, cultural relativism itself posits a fundamental value: *respect for cultural differences*. Implicit in the doctrine is the view that all men need and deserve respect as a warrant of their common humanity.

2. Although it is proper to insist that cultural facts be interpreted according to their settings, it is nevertheless possible to discover aspects of morality that are cross-cultural:

Considering the exuberant variation of cultures in most respects, the circumstance that in some particulars almost identical values prevail throughout mankind is most arresting. No culture tolerates indiscriminate lying, stealing, or violence within the in-group. The essential universality of the incest taboo is well known. No culture places a value upon suffering as an end in itself. . . . In spite of loose talk (based upon an uncritical acceptance of cultural relativity) to the effect that the symptoms of mental disorder are completely relative to culture, the fact of the matter is that all cultures define as abnormal individuals who are permanently inaccessible to communication or who consistently fail to maintain some degree of control over their impulse life.³⁵

These considerations should give pause to an extreme interpretation of relativism.

SUBCULTURES

Complex societies like the United States contain not one homogeneous culture but a multitude of ethnic, regional, and occupational subcultures with which people identify and from which they derive many distinctive values and norms, as well as social relationships and life chances. Some sociologists have suggested that there is no such thing as American culture, but instead that there is a conglomeration of subcultures. "American culture" can be thought of in several ways: as including all the subcultures, as consisting of only those elements that all subcultures share, or as restricted to the values and orientations that are subscribed to by a dominant element or the majority of the population.

A subculture is a pattern that is in significant re-

spects distinctive but that has important continuities with a host or dominant culture. In other words, a subculture contains some of the dominant cultural values but also contains values, perspectives, or life-styles peculiar to itself. Every group has some patterns of its own, but the patterns of a specialized group do not necessarily affect the total life of its members and, therefore, do not comprise a subculture. A subculture, on the other hand, has a more general influence on the person and tends to give him a discernible identity.

A subculture may be based on an occupation, especially one that provides a total context for everyday life. Thus military subcultures are supported by the isolation of military garrisons, intensive training affecting deportment and outlook as well as skills, long-term career orientations, and the absorption of families into the military social system. Occupations that require special life-styles, setting the members off from the rest of the community, are especially likely to develop into subcultures.

More typical, however, is a subculture based on residential, ethnic, or social-class criteria. These subcultures tend to be coextensive with local communities and thus provide a setting for the entire round of life.

Continuities and discontinuities The concept of subculture has made a useful contribution to the study of juvenile delinquency. Some theories of delinquency stress the continuity of the delinquency-breeding subculture with its host society; other theories place greater emphasis on the uniqueness of the subculture.

A special sort of subcultural continuity is identified in Cohen's interpretation of the life-style of delinquent boys. The argument begins with a description of differences. The working-class boy grows up in a world that places no great store by self-discipline, high aspirations, deferred gratification, or community responsibility. "There is little interest in long-run goals, in planning activities and budgeting time, or in activities involving knowledge and skills to be ac-

³⁵ Kluckhohn, *ibid.*, pp. 294-295.

quired only through practice, deliberation, and study."⁸⁶ An immediate, close-knit world of family or gang dominates life and the rest of the world is seen as made up of victimizers and victims. These subcultural orientations are real, but the members of the subculture are not isolated from the larger society. When they come into contact with the middle-class school and other middle-class institutions, such as government agencies and large employers, they meet disapproval and rejection. The working-class boy becomes aware of his rejection and to some extent shares the low evaluation of himself. The delinquent behavior pattern is an aggressive reaction against this disapproval, both a hitting out against middle-class culture and an attempt to establish criteria of worth which the boy can meet, thus repairing his damaged self-respect.

The delinquent subculture functions simultaneously to combat the enemy without and the enemy within, both the hated agents of the middle class and the gnawing internal sense of inadequacy and low self-esteem. It does so by erecting a counterculture, an alternative set of status criteria.⁸⁷

As a counterculture, a reaction-formation, the delinquent subculture shows its continuity with the host community. According to this theory, delinquent subcultures can be understood only by seeing their relation to the larger culture within which they develop.

A contrasting view emphasizes the autonomy and distinctiveness of lower-class culture. On this theory, the delinquent boy and his gang do not react against middle-class standards but act out values, such as

masculinity, which are a positive aspect of lower-class traditions.⁸⁸

Implications While the different interpretations of delinquency-related subcultures cannot be resolved at the present time, they point to a recurrent problem. Just as the sociologist attempts to eliminate ethnocentrism in his treatment of different cultures, so he must avoid the same bias in his analysis of subcultures. Because there are continuities with the host culture, the analyst may fail to recognize the existence and the viability of distinctive subcultural patterns. This failure may result in misleading assessments. For example, the phrase "culturally deprived" is often applied to lower socioeconomic strata in the United States and elsewhere. This signifies that in some way the cultural milieu does not prepare the members to compete in the larger social and economic world. Other writers have charged that the use of terms like "cultural deprivation" is but another instance of ethnocentrism, in this case "class ethnocentrism." They point out that while, indeed, lower- and working-class milieus may leave their members ill-prepared to compete in the middle-class world, these settings in fact constitute a distinctive subculture, adapted to lower-class conditions of deprivation and discrimination.

There can be no rule for deciding in advance when to treat a subculture as autonomous and when to see it as dependent upon or reacting against the larger cultural setting. Both perspectives can be valuable; each must be assessed for the light it sheds on a particular situation.

⁸⁶ Albert K. Cohen, *Delinquent Boys* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1955), p. 30. Another study emphasizing continuity is David Matza, *Delinquency and Drift* (New York: Wiley, 1964).

⁸⁷ David J. Bordua, "Delinquent Subcultures: Sociological Interpretations of Gang Delinquency," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 338 (November, 1961), 125.

⁸⁸ See Walter B. Miller, "Lower-Class Culture as a Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency," *Journal of Social Issues*, 14 (1958), 5-19.

Adaptation 7 / D. Lee **INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE**

In every society we find some organized social unit; but not everywhere does the social unit provide freedom to the individual or the opportunity for spontaneous functioning. In some societies we find what amounts to dictatorship; in others the group may demand such sacrifice of individual uniqueness as to make for totalitarianism. On the other hand, in some societies we encounter conceptions of individual autonomy and democratic procedures which far outstrip anything we have practiced or even have conceived of as democracy.

It is often difficult for us to decide exactly how much our principle of personal autonomy involves. To what extent can we allow a child to make his own decisions, to speak and act for himself? At what point do we begin to allow him to do so? For example, when the mother first takes her infant to the pediatrician, she has to speak for him. Exactly when does she begin to remain silent, waiting for him to understand and answer the doctor's questions and to express his own likes and opinions and conclusions?

Permissiveness and respect

Many of us feel that to allow a child to decide for himself and to act according to his own wish, that is, to be permissive, is to show respect for the unique being of the child. Yet for many of the societies we know, it would be presumption for any person to "allow" another to take what is essentially his prerogative—the right to decide for himself. These people do not "permit" others. When the children of the Wintu Indians ask "Can I" they are asking for information on the rules of the structure; for instance, they may be seeking clarification about a religious taboo or social custom. They are saying in effect, "Is it permissible for me to . . . ?" and not, "Do you allow me

to . . . ?" These people do not "give" freedom to their children, because it is not theirs to give. If they do not impose an external time schedule on their infants, but feed them when they are hungry, and put them to bed when they are sleepy, they are not being "permissive"; they are showing their deep-seated respect for individual worth and their awareness of the unique tempo of the individual.

Ethnographers have presented us with many incidents, apparently commonplace and trivial, which point out for us an amazingly thoroughgoing implementation of respect for personal quality. For instance, one anthropologist visiting a Sikh household noticed that a small child, asked to entertain

his baby brother, merely went up to the playpen and put in a toy truck. He did not show the baby how the truck worked; he gave the truck silently. This amazed the visitor, since she knew that the Sikhs were a people of great empathy and warmth, and with a great love for babies. She knew, also, that the child in question had approached the baby with friendliness and affection. Then she remembered the personal autonomy of the Sikh, and realized that the boy was acting consistently with the cultural values; he was furnishing the baby with the raw material for experience, and leaving him to explore without any attempt to influence him. He was expressing respect, not noninvolvement.

Language and personal integrity Among the Wintu Indians of California, the principle of the inviolate integrity of the individual is basic to the very morphology of the language. Many of the verbs which express coercion in our language—such as to take a baby to (the shade), or to change the baby—are formed in such a way that they express a cooperative effort instead. For example, the Wintu would say, “I *went with* the baby,” instead of, “I *took* the baby.” And they say, “The chief *stood with* the people,” which they have to translate into English as, “The chief ruled the people.” To *live with* is the usual way they express what we call possession, and they use this term for everything that they respect, so that a man will be said to live with his bow and arrows. In Wintu, every interpersonal reference is couched in grammar which rests on the principle of individual integrity. Yet, for this people, the emphasis on personal inviolability did not mean that the individual was an isolate. There was such pervasive empathy among them that this, too, was expressed in the grammatical forms; if a boy was sick, the father used a special form of *to be sick* and said, “I-am-sick-in-respect-of-my-son.”

Giving orders, following precepts A corollary of the principle of individual integrity is that no personal orders can be given or taken without a violation of personal autonomy. The individual takes his cues from the impersonal system of norms, not from the commands of another. In this sense, personal autonomy is compatible with, and supported by, an intricately developed social struc-

ture. In Burmese monasteries, for example, where novices performed menial tasks, the monks did not give orders. Instead, the work was structured throughout the day; and all the monk said to get the work done was, “Do what is lawful,” reminding the novice to act according to the cultural tenet, not ordering him.

When the specific aspects of the structure are not clear, the people in such societies can turn to authority for clarification. And here we often find, as with the Burmese or the Navaho Indians, that the authority of the headman or the chief or the leader is in many ways like the authority of the dictionary, or of Einstein. There is no hint of coercion or command here; the people go to the leader with faith, as we go to a reference book, and the leader answers according to his greater knowledge, or clarifies an obscure point, or amplifies according to his greater experience and wisdom. He does not say: You must do this because I order you to. Yet he does use the *must* or its equivalent; he says, so to speak: As I see it, this is what must be done.

In Navaho autobiographies we often find the phrase, “I followed the advice of my parents,” but rarely, “I obeyed my parents.” The good Navaho does not command his child; and a mother who is aggressive toward her children, who “talks rough” to them, is strongly criticized. In teaching her children the tremendous number of taboos they have to learn for their well-being, the good Navaho mother does not say: I will punish you if you do thus-and-thus, but: Such-and-such an unpleasant thing will happen to you. If a child breaks a taboo, he is not “guilty.” He has

not committed a sin against the mother and is not in need of forgiveness. He has made a mistake which he must set right.

Guilt and self-respect This attitude is basic to all Navaho relatedness, so that here man is not burdened with guilt, and does not feel apologetic toward human or divine beings. He is neither grateful nor abject to his gods. As a matter of fact, he must never humble himself before them, since the process of healing, of the recovery of harmony with the universe, involves identification with the appropriate god, who would be slighted if the patient humiliated himself. The Navaho has, and indeed must have, as much respect and value for himself as for others. This is the Navaho version of the principle, discovered so recently in our society, that we cannot accept and respect others until we learn to accept and respect ourselves.

The competent child The Navaho do not differentiate between adults and children in the respect they show for personal autonomy. There is no minority status for children. For example, a good Navaho will not take it upon himself to speak for another, whether adult or child. A father, asked to sell his child's bow and arrow, will refer the request to a five-year-old boy, and abide by the child's decision not to sell, even though he knows the child is badly in need of the clothing that can be bought with the price of the toy. A woman, asked whether a certain baby could talk, said “Yes”; and when the ethnographer was puzzled by the “meaningless” sounds the baby was making, she

explained that the baby could talk, but she could not understand what the baby said. Traditionally, parents do not force their children to do what they unequivocally do not want to do, such as going to school or to the hospital; children are not coerced even "for their own good."

For the Navaho mother, personal autonomy means that the child has the freedom to make his own mistakes. And the child has his freedom because the mother has faith in him. This does not mean that she has high expectations of him, but that she trusts

him. When the baby starts walking, the mother does not see to it that he is out of reach of the fire, and that all the sharp knives have been put away. The child gets burned a little and the mother helps him learn from this experience. By taking a chance on her child, the mother teaches him to be ready to meet and deal with danger, instead of warning him away from danger. This trust means that the child has freedom to move, to act, to undertake responsibility.

Coercion and leadership So the individual remains inviolate.

No one coerces another among the Navaho. There is no political coercion, and all leadership is traditionally incidental. Men do not seek leadership; and white employers have found that the Navaho are reluctant to become foremen, however able they may be, and in spite of the higher pay. It is "fundamentally indecent," according to Clyde Kluckhohn, a close student of the Navaho, "for a single individual to presume to make decisions for the group."

Conclusion If the societies mentioned here present an enviable consistency in the expression of the principle of individual integrity, it is well to keep in mind that there may be no special virtue in this; at the time these societies were studied, they enjoyed great social homogeneity, and were relatively unchanging over time. The children could learn the adult role at home by gradually sharing the life of the father or mother, as a matter of course, expecting and wanting to live the life of the parents, and to hold the same values and principles. However, the consistency was there; the principle was upheld by the various aspects of the culture, even by the very grammar of the language as among the Wintu.

The practices described here are not for others to copy. They are offered as evidence that law and limits and personal autonomy can coexist effectively, that spontaneity is not necessarily killed by group responsibility, that respect for individual integrity is not an end to be achieved by specific means, but that it can exist only if it is supported by deep conviction and by the entire way of life.

SECTION 4 CULTURAL ADAPTATION AND CHANGE

This section examines several aspects of culture dynamics: (1) evolution, (2) the impact of technology, and (3) acculturation.

CULTURE, CIVILIZATION, AND EVOLUTION

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the comparative study of societies was dominated by the idea of evolution. The rise of science, industrialism, and

democracy was accompanied by philosophies that celebrated the rationality of man, his freedom from traditional beliefs, and his moral progress from darkness to enlightenment. This point of view predated the theories of Charles Darwin, although nineteenth-century biological evolutionism and the discoveries of archaeology strengthened the conviction of men who believed in social evolution.

A leading evolutionist was Edward B. Tylor (1832–1917). Like others, he believed that culture evolves in successive stages: from savagery through barbarism to civilization. The idea of a *unilineal* (one-track) development through the three stages was well established by the late nineteenth century. It had been used earlier by the Scottish historian William Robertson (1721–1793) and the American ethnologist Lewis Henry Morgan (1818–1881).

Two strands were evident in the theory of evolution. One was *technical* progress, the advance of *homo faber* (man the maker) from primitive stone-chipper to master of complex machines. The other was *moral and symbolic* progress, the development of higher moral standards and of a more complex intellectual and aesthetic life. The separation of these two strands is a major theme in the critique of evolutionary doctrines.

Tylor thought of himself as a student of natural history, and he was well aware of the need to distinguish observed development from preferences and justifications:

The rites of sacrifice and purification may be studied in their stages of development without entering into questions of their authority and value, nor does an examination of the successive phases of the world's belief in future life demand a discussion of the arguments adduced for or against the doctrine itself.⁴⁰

While Tylor believed that "civilization may be looked upon as the general improvement of mankind by higher organization of the individual and of society, to the end of promoting man's goodness, power, and happiness,"⁴¹ he recognized that there were difficulties in such a position. He noted exceptions to the general rule that technical progress leads to moral advancement:

Industrial and intellectual culture by no means advances uniformly in all its branches, and in fact excellence in various of its details is often obtained un-

der conditions which keep back culture as a whole. . . . To have learnt to give poison secretly and effectually, to have raised a corrupt literature to pestilent perfection, to have organized a successful scheme to arrest free enquiry and proscribe free expression, are works of knowledge and skill whose progress toward their goal has hardly conduced to the general good. . . . If not only knowledge and arts [the technical arts], but at the same time moral and political excellence, be taken into consideration, it becomes yet harder to reckon on an ideal scale the advance or decline from stage to stage of culture. In fact, a combined intellectual and moral measure of human condition is an instrument which no student has as yet learnt properly to handle.⁴²

Nevertheless, Tylor kept the faith as he saw it, concluding that there was a general tendency for "institutions which can best hold their own in the world gradually [to] supersede the less fit ones."⁴³

Unilineal theories are usually criticized for arguing that all cultures follow a similar course of development. It is also important that Tylor's (and his predecessors') theories were comprehensive. A comprehensive theory of social evolution sees progress as an attribute of the whole cultural system. It assumes that, at least in the long run, there is a correlation between technical advance, moral enlightenment, and symbolic enrichment. The comprehensive theory uses "culture" and "civilization" as synonyms.

Contemporary thought More recent thought and research has preserved the idea of evolution but has done so *selectively*. Archaeological findings show the gradual development of technical skills and associated ways of life. For example, recently reported excavations in the Mexican valley of Tehuacán show an evolution over thousands of years, from primitive hunting and plant collecting, using simple stone implements, to a mainly agricultural society with extensive social organization and complex tools. (See "The Rise of Civilization in Tehuacán," p. 78.)

Savagery, barbarism, and civilization are terms still

⁴⁰ Edward B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art, and Custom* (5th ed.; London: Murray, 1913), Vol. 1, p. 23. (First edition, 1871.)

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

used by British scholars, but with limited moral or aesthetic connotations. Some argue that "historical changes can be judged by the extent to which they have helped our species to survive and multiply."⁴³ Others would doubt that population growth in itself is a valid criterion of worth. However, the main stress is not on evaluation but on objective analysis of technological change and its contribution to social organization.

Savagery refers to a hunting and gathering economy beginning "perhaps 500,000, perhaps 250,000 years ago, with man emerging as a rare animal and a *food gatherer*, which lived like any other beast of prey, a parasite on other creatures by catching and collecting what food nature happened to provide." "This was the characteristic mode of life during the aeons of the Old Stone (Paleolithic) Age. *Barbarism* appears in the relatively recent past of the New Stone (Neolithic) Age, about 10,000–12,000 years ago, marked by animal husbandry, some agriculture, and permanent settlement. Civilization, the Age of Metals, is ushered in by the capacity of the economy to produce a surplus able to support urban centers and complex social organization; writing, metallurgy, commerce, and bureaucracy are hallmarks of the age.

In this scheme civilization and culture are not necessarily identical. A civilized society is one that has a highly developed technology, including a complex division of labor. It may or may not be a "good" society, and its culture may or may not be of higher quality than that of a society having a much simpler technology.

TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE

Implicit in a number of the nineteenth-century theories of cultural evolution was a postulate of *technological determinism*. The growth of culture was seen as closely dependent on the capacity of man to control his environment. Specific ways of dealing with nature determined social organization, and the latter

in turn decisively affected values, forms of government, even religion and the arts. (See the discussion of the Tanala, p. 56.)

The most influential evolutionary theory taking technological change as its starting point is found in the writings of Karl Marx (1818–1883). Marx, together with his collaborator Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), developed the doctrine of *historical materialism*, which holds that changes in technology invariably produce corresponding changes in the way work is organized. The latter includes, for example, the distribution of authority and power within the work unit. Taken together, the technology and the "relations of production" form the *material substructure* of the society. This substructure defines the nature of the society, for all the other institutions are "superstructure," ultimately serving and dependent upon the material base. For this reason Marxists think of "capitalist society" as defined by the economic substructure. Government, law, education, moral codes, family organization, and philosophy become "capitalist" institutions.

The following is a sample of Marx's argument:

These social relations between the producers, and the conditions under which they exchange their activities and share in the total act of production, will naturally vary according to the character of the means of production. With the discovery of a new instrument of warfare, the fire-arm, the whole internal organization of the army was necessarily altered, the relations within which individuals compose an army and can act as an army were transformed, and the relation of different armies to one another was likewise changed.

The social relations within which individuals produce, the *social relations of production*, are altered, transformed, with the change and development of the material means of production, of the forces of production. The relations of production in their totality constitute what is called the *social relations*, society, and, moreover, a society at a definite stage of development, a society with a unique and distinctive character. Ancient society, feudal society, bourgeois (or capitalist) society, are such totalities of re-

⁴³ V. Gordon Childe, *Man Makes Himself* (New York: [Mentor] New American Library, 1952), p. 17.

⁴⁴ V. Gordon Childe, *What Happened in History* (Baltimore: [Pelican] Penguin Books, 1964), p. 30.

THE RISE OF CIVILIZATION IN TEHUACÁN

The people of the valley of Tehuacán lived for thousands of years as collectors of wild vegetable and animal foods before they made their first timid efforts as agriculturists. Although the inhabitants of this arid highland pocket of Mexico were not the first or the only people in the Western Hemisphere to bring wild corn under cultivation, they were the first whose evolution from primitive food collectors to civilized agriculturists has been traced in detail.

From a hazy beginning some 12,000 years ago until about 7000 B.C., the people of Tehuacán were few in number. They wandered the valley from season to season in search of jackrabbits, rats, birds, turtles, and other small animals, as well as such plant foods as became available at different times of the year. Only occasionally did they manage to kill one of the now extinct species of horses and antelopes whose bones mark the lowest cave strata. These people used only a few simple implements of flaked stone: leaf-shaped projectile points, scrapers, and engraving tools.

Around 6700 B.C. this simple pattern changed,

and from then until about 5000 B.C. the people shifted from being predominantly trappers and hunters to being predominantly collectors of plant foods. Most of the plants they collected were wild, but they had domesticated squashes and avocados, and they also ate wild varieties of beans, amaranth and chili peppers, but no corn. Among the flaked-stone implements, choppers appear. Entirely new kinds of stone tools—grinders, mortars, pestles, and pounders of polished stone—are found in large numbers. During the growing season some families evidently gathered in temporary settlements, but these groups broke up into one-family bands during the leaner periods of the year. A number of burials dating from this culture phase hint at the possibility of part-time priests or witch doctors who directed the ceremonies involving the dead.

By about 5000 B.C. a new phase had evolved. In this period only 10 percent of the valley's foodstuffs came from domestication rather than from collecting, hunting, or trapping, but the list of domesticated plants is long. It includes

SOURCE: From "The Origins of New World Civilization" by Richard S. MacNeish. Copyright © 1964 by Scientific American, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

lations of production, each of which denotes a particular stage of development in the history of mankind.⁴⁵

In the Marxist scheme, technology generates economic institutions but then drops out as the immediately determining force. The economic system, not the technology as such, produces divisions within the

society and vested interests that need to be defended. These aspects of the social system affect the rest of society and culture. As technology continues to develop, new forms of organization are called for, and these in turn tend to undermine established economic institutions. The technology of mass production, it is held, calls for very large organizations and state

⁴⁵ T. B. Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel (eds.), *Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), pp. 146–147. Emphasis in original.

corn, the water-bottle gourd, two species of squash, the amaranth, black and white zapotes, the tepary bean, the jack bean, probably the common bean, and chili peppers.

Projectile points tend to be smaller than their predecessors; scrapers and choppers, however, remain much the same. The polished stone implements include forerunners of the classic New World roller-and-stone device for grinding grain: the mano and metate. There was evidently enough surplus energy among the people to allow the laborious hollowing out of stone water jugs and bowls.

In the next phase the people of Tehuacán made the fundamental shift. By about 3400 B.C. the food provided by agriculture rose to about 30 percent of the total, domesticated animals (starting with the dog) made their appearance, and the people formed their first fixed settlements—small pit-house villages. They lived at a subsistence level that can be regarded as a foundation for the beginning of civilization. In about 2300 B.C. this gave way to a culture marked by the cultivation of more hybridized, larger-yielding types of corn and the manufacture of pottery.

Thereafter the pace of civilization in the valley speeded up greatly. From about 1500 B.C. on, a more complex village life evolved with refinements of pottery and more elaborate cere-

monialism, including the development of a figurine cult, perhaps representing family gods. This culture led in turn to an even more sophisticated one that started about 850 B.C. Taking advantage of the valley's streams, the peoples of Tehuacán began to grow their hybrid corn in irrigated fields. Our surveys indicate a sharp rise in population. Temple mounds were built, and artifacts show signs of numerous contacts with cultures outside the valley.

By about 200 B.C. the outside influence on Tehuacán affairs shifted from that of the Olmec of the east coast to that of Monte Alban to the south and west. The valley now had large irrigation projects and substantial hilltop ceremonial centers surrounded by villages. In this phase some of the population proceeded to full-time specialization in various occupations, including the development of a salt industry. New domesticated food products appeared—the turkey, the tomato, the peanut, and the guava.

Starting about A.D. 700, Monte Alban influences gave way to the influence of the Mixtecs. This period saw the rise of true cities in the valley, of an agricultural system that provided some 85 percent of the total food supply, of trade and commerce, a standing army, large-scale irrigation projects and a complex religion. Finally, just before the Spanish Conquest, the Aztecs took over from the Mixtecs.

planning. At the same time, the great material surplus made possible by the new technology creates a potential for a new society and a new condition of man. Marx thought that capitalist society would inevitably be replaced by socialism. However, he did not anticipate the alternative forms that a post-capitalist world might take.

While evolutionary theory tended, on the whole,

to welcome technological advance and to look with optimism on its promise for mankind, the contemporary mood is more pessimistic, permeated by anxiety for the negative effect of technology on human values and the health and genetic constitution of all living things. It is urged that man's achievement should be judged by his symbolic life rather than by his conquest of nature.⁴⁶ Technology does not de-

⁴⁶ See Lewis Mumford, *The Myth of the Machine* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967).



Woman with Loaves, by Pablo Picasso (1905). Modern mass-produced bread—soft and frothy, thin of crust—is a distant relative of the loaves painted by Picasso. It has been argued that bread mechanized is bread degraded; that modern technology has made bread a less “organic” substance and thereby has reduced its capacity to serve as an expressive symbol of man’s relation to nature. See Siegfried Giedion, *Mechanization Takes Command*, Oxford University Press, 1948, pages 169–208.

velop evenly, and there is a continuing tension between technological achievements and the capacity of society to control their effects. The most obvious ex-

ample is the control of nuclear energy, but the same basic problem is created by the proliferation of automobiles and the widespread use of insecticides and antibiotics. A striking and unanticipated illustration was the disaster produced by the release of crude oil from a huge tanker disabled off the coast of England in 1967. The oil contaminated beaches of both England and France, destroyed birds, fish, and other marine life, and perhaps caused a profound dislocation of the natural environment.

Mass culture When the technology of mass communication makes literature, music, drama and other activities available to very large numbers, as it does in contemporary America, intellectual and aesthetic standards are likely to be lowered and creative ideals may be jeopardized. This problem is not peculiar to the twentieth century. In eighteenth-century England, for instance, there was a mass market for literary goods, such as popular novels and magazines, and much discussion of the threat to standards of taste and morality.⁴⁷ Today there is similar concern among intellectuals that standards are being debased, that “mass culture” is pushing “high culture” into a precarious position.

Mass culture is oriented toward entertainment of large numbers of people and of course has become a major industry. It offers easy access to a part of the world of art and letters, and this is a key to its success. In order to win and hold their audiences, the producers of mass culture are ready to “give the people what they want” even if this means radically lowering standards.⁴⁸

There is no doubt that some lowering of standards has occurred, but it is quite possible that improvement in popular taste has also taken place. This is not known to be so, nor is it known what effect mass culture has on the production of truly creative works of high standard. Perhaps the main question is

⁴⁷ Leo Lowenthal and Marjorie Fiske, “The Debate over Art and Popular Culture in Eighteenth-Century England,” in Mirra Komarovsky (ed.), *Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957).

⁴⁸ See Bernard Rosenberg and David M. White (eds.), *Mass Culture* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957); Max Lerner, *America as a Civilization: Life and Thought in the United States Today* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957). For an early but still valuable treatment of this subject, see Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Knopf, 1945), Vol. II, pp. 48, 51–52.

whether relatively low-grade forms of art necessarily drive out the good, or whether they can exist side by side in successful but uneasy accommodation. These matters have not been carefully studied.


ACCULTURATION

Acculturation refers to one people's taking on elements from the culture of another. The term has also been used as a synonym for *socialization*, the acquisition of ways of behaving and valuing by individuals. All cultural acquisitions are learned, and some writers use acculturation and socialization interchangeably. In doing so, they signify that they are chiefly interested in the molding of individual personality and behavior. (See *SOCIALIZATION*.) In this book we reserve the word *acculturation* for the process of cultural change induced by contact with foreign cultures. Usually both cultures in a contact situation are changed, although one may be more profoundly influenced than the other. In the modern world no culture is completely isolated and unaffected by others, but the intensity and duration of contact vary from place to place and from time to time. Many primitive peoples as well as modern men travel great distances, and in doing so, they carry with them cultural forms that are adopted by others and from whom in turn they acquire new practices. The Indians of North America traded their wares over a wide area. In the Southeast the population of whole villages visited neighboring tribes for a season of contests and recreation, and in the course of these social relations, acculturation took place.

Selectivity of acculturation Except at the very end of the process, acculturation goes on selectively. This was the case, for example, at the time of the Norman Conquest (1066), which established a new upper class in English society as well as a new political control. The Norman French influence was reinforced by continuous contact with France. Changes induced in the English language testify both to the depth of French influence in English society and the

high status occupied by the French in other than political facets of English life.

It is a remark that was first made by John Wallis and that has been very often repeated, especially since Sir Walter Scott made it popular in *Ivanhoe*, that while the names of several animals in their lifetime are English (*ox, cow, calf, sheep, swine, boar, deer*), they appear on the table with French names (*beef, veal, mutton, pork, bacon, brawn, venison*). This is generally explained from the masters leaving the care of the living animals to the lower classes, while they did not leave much of the meat to be eaten by them. But it may with just as much right be contended that the use of the French words here is due to the superiority of the French *cuisine*, which is shown by a great many other words as well, such as *sauce, boil, fry, roast, toast, pasty, pastry, soup, sausage, jelly, dainty*; while the humbler *breakfast* is English, the more sumptuous meals, *dinner* and *supper*, as well as *feasts* generally, are French.⁴⁹



Break with tradition: After World War II, young Japanese rapidly adopted "progressive" Western styles.

⁴⁹ Otto Jespersen, *Growth and Structure of the English Language* (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1923), p. 89. Reprinted by permission of Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.

Foreign influences are received differently by different parts of a population. Some occupational or status groups, such as entrepreneurs or landholders or legal experts, may be in a strategic position to benefit from the introduced technology and knowledge. Others, such as technicians in aboriginal crafts or ceremonial experts, may perceive the foreign culture as threatening and destructive to vested interests and to be resisted at all costs.

Culture contacts of migrants Even the tourist in his native land encounters a sense of strangeness and unsureness in a different community. The customs of the new place must be learned if he is to be comfortable in it. But because the language difficulties are small, a minor matter of accent or dialect, and because customs are similar, he soon feels at home. The tourist in a foreign land has greater practical difficulties. Language and customs are strange, and he may be unsure of himself. Nevertheless, his tourist status lends him a degree of invulnerability, and he is not obliged to adjust fully to the land he is visiting. He is expected not to know; he can err without reprisal; he may even break some laws with impunity. His relations tend to be of a surface character, and if there is strain or conflict, it, too, is superficial. His ties to his homeland are unimpaired, and his native culture remains a steady reference for his judgments and actions.

The immigrant, however, by the very act of his movement alienates himself from his native culture. For an English immigrant to the United States or Australia or for a Portuguese immigrant to Brazil, the adjustment is relatively easy because cultural differences are not very great, but even in cases like these, there is strangeness, dislocation, and perhaps rejection of the new land and of its different ways.

For millions of immigrants, however, the cultural gaps are very great, and some people remain for the rest of their lives strangers in a strange land. The extent of dislocation of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century immigrants and their feelings of extreme insecurity are hard to appreciate in a time when cul-

tural barriers have been reduced by easy travel and mass communication and when people of most nations are aware of other nations and, in a sense, prepared for differences. Although immigrants to the United States have come from diverse origins and statuses, many were peasants displaced from their land by economic and population pressures and the changing character of European society. Some had little conception of what awaited them in the New World, or indeed, of what their own land was like beyond their provincial confines. They knew intimately only their own locality, their neighbors, and the town to which they went to trade and for the fairs. They were illiterate and uninformed or misinformed about the city and transportation, and the trip from farm to town to port city to the New World was a series of arduous experiences in which luck and native wit had to substitute for sure knowledge.

The qualities that were desirable in the good peasant were not those conducive to success in transition. Neighborliness, obedience, respect, and status were valueless among the masses that struggled for space on the way. They succeeded who put aside the old preconceptions, pushed in, and took care of themselves. This experience . . . [brought] into question the validity of the old standards of conduct. . . .⁸⁰

The first culture conflict of the migrant was expressed as a conflict between the folk culture of the peasant and the cosmopolitan forms of an emerging commercial society. The conflict began in the migrant's homeland in his dealings with government officials and shipping agents who operated on the basis of rules strange to the migrant and mistrusted by him. It increased in the new land, where much more was strange and therefore suspect. In the New World the sense of rootlessness, of *anomie*, was compounded by more profound differences of language and custom. Only the expanding economy of America permitted so many with the skills of a folk culture to make their way in the culture of the New World. However well the immigrant learned the ways of his new country, there remained throughout his life important areas of knowledge and experience in which he was insecure and to which his adjustments

⁸⁰ Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1951), p. 61. Quoted by permission of Little, Brown & Co.


were faulty. He was, in a sense, "marginal" between the Old World and the New.

Stimulated invention Acculturative influences may stimulate inventions as well as modify or replace existing forms. One of the most remarkable cases of this kind was the invention early in the nineteenth century of a system of writing by Sequoyah, a Cherokee Indian. The stimulus for Sequoyah was an understanding of the function of writing as performed by the white man, and he wished to bring this art to his own people. Over a period of years he tried out a number of techniques, including picture writing, until he hit upon devising a separate symbol for each of the eighty-odd syllable sounds in Cherokee. The full execution of the idea required years of disciplined endeavor as well as the initial stroke of genius. The quality of Sequoyah's single-handed invention of writing and the extent of its immediate application are probably unique in recorded history.

The syllabary proved highly practical. Cherokee speakers needed only to memorize the symbols with

their associated sounds in order to become literate in their language. In this respect the Cherokee system of writing is superior to English. A Cherokee can master reading and writing in a matter of a few months, compared with the three or four years of schooling required for basic knowledge of written English. On the other hand, compared with classical Chinese, for example, English has a writing system of only moderate difficulty. Chinese takes several times as much schooling as does English for comparable levels of literacy.

In a very short time after Sequoyah's invention was accepted, the Cherokee nation became literate, and this stimulated further developments. Type was cast in the syllabary, the Bible and other religious works were translated into Cherokee, and a newspaper was established. An unanticipated consequence of the invention was to give the medicine men a means for perpetuating their tribal learning. Traditions that had been handed down by word of mouth for many generations were preserved for posterity in the notebooks of the medicine men. A folklore became a literature.



CHAPTER IV

SOCIALIZATION

*by Gertrude Jaeger Selznick in collaboration
with L.B. and P.S.*

SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION

From the point of view of society, socialization is the way culture is transmitted and the individual is fitted into an organized way of life. Socialization is a life-long process. It begins very early, and in due course the child learns to take part in group life and to embody in some degree the values of his society and of groups within it. As the individual participates in new social forms and institutions, he learns new disciplines and develops new values. While parents are usually the chief agents for socializing the child, they are themselves socialized in taking on the parental role and the values of parenthood.

From the point of view of the individual, socialization is the fulfillment of his potentialities for personal growth and development. Socialization humanizes the biological organism and transforms it into a *self* having a sense of identity, capable of disciplined and ordered behavior, and endowed with ideals, values, and aspirations. Socialization regulates behavior, but it is also the indispensable condition for individuality and self-awareness. Thus socialization has two complementary meanings: the transmission of culture and the development of personality.

BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIALIZATION

The human infant comes into the world as a biological organism with animal needs and impulses and certain innate capacities. Man's biological nature makes socialization both possible and necessary. For example, socialization is possible because man has the inborn capacity to use language, but this capacity is realized only with socialization. The following are some of the biological characteristics of the human animal on which socialization is based:

Absence of instincts An instinct is a relatively complex behavior pattern biologically fixed for a species. Nest-building techniques among birds are a familiar example: they vary between species but not within species. If man possessed such biologically fixed behavior patterns, they would limit his learning and his socialization; variation and change would then be impossible.

Man has biological drives rather than instincts. A drive, such as hunger or sex, is an organic tension that is felt as discomfort or impulse but does not

direct behavior to specific goals or in specific ways. A drive impels activity but does not determine it in detail. That man is activated by drives rather than by biologically fixed behavior patterns makes his needs amenable to social direction.

The absence of biological instincts makes socialization *possible*. Other aspects of man's biological nature make socialization *imperative*.

Interactional needs Interaction with others during infancy is a biological need of many higher animals. If deprived of bodily contact and interaction in early life, rhesus monkeys develop behavioral aberrations and are unable to mate as adults.¹ A few females who were deprived in this way were impregnated but were incapable of maternal behavior and often beat, bit, and maltreated their young.

In an experiment, infant monkeys were taken from their biological mothers and each infant was placed in a cage with two mock "mothers," one constructed of wire, the other covered with soft cloth. Some monkeys were fed by bottles attached to the wire mother, others by bottles attached to the cloth mother. Even those infants that were fed by the wire mother spent most of their time clinging to the cloth mother. Primates appear to have a biological drive for bodily contact independent of the satisfactions of feeding.


When confronted with unfamiliar objects, the infant monkeys fled to the cloth mother. As their fears diminished, they explored the new objects, with occasional returns to the mother. If no mother or only a wire mother was present, the infants cowered in terror, screaming, sucking their fingers or toes, and otherwise manifesting fear and withdrawal. The cloth mother allayed fear, the wire mother did not.

Monkeys raised with cloth mothers did not show normal development, however, unless they had con-

tact with other infant monkeys. Only then did they develop into socially and sexually competent adults. This shows the importance of interaction for biological development among primates.

These findings cannot be mechanically applied to human beings, but they are consistent with studies of children deprived of sustained human contact. One study used a Developmental Quotient to measure the progress of four groups of infants, one in a foundling home, the others in more normal environments.² The 61 foundling-home infants had an average Developmental Quotient of 124 for the first four months of their lives, the second highest of the four groups. Within the first year, their average DQ fell to 72 whereas the DQs of the other groups did not change. By the end of the second year the average DQs of the foundlings deteriorated to 45, which "would qualify these children as imbeciles."³

Two years after the end of the study the institution was revisited. Of 21 children between the ages of



Wire and cloth mother surrogates

¹ Harry F. Harlow, "Love in Infant Monkeys," *Scientific American*, 200 (June, 1959), 68-74; Harry F. Harlow and Robert R. Zimmerman, "Affectional Responses in the Infant Monkey," *Science*, 130 (August, 1959), 421-431; Harry F. Harlow and Margaret K. Harlow, "The Effect of Rearing Conditions on Behavior," *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic*, 26 (September, 1962), 213-224; Harry F. Harlow and Margaret Kuenne Harlow, "Social Deprivation in Monkeys," *Scientific American* 207 (November, 1962), 137-146.

² René A. Spitz, "Hospitalism," in Rose L. Coser (ed.), *The Family: Its Structure and Functions* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), pp. 399-425.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 418.

two and four years who were observed, only five could walk unassisted, only one dressed alone, and only one spoke in sentences; most could not talk at all or knew only a few words.

Childhood dependence Man has a longer period of physical dependence than other primates. This dependency is further prolonged by his need to learn the techniques of social living. Because the infant is helpless and the child socially inept, it is necessary to assign responsibility for child care and training. Social control transforms biological mating into the social institution of the family; the helplessness of the child thus contributes to socializing the adult.

The long period of physical dependence encourages long-term emotional dependence, and ties of feeling develop between the child and those who care for him, whether or not they are his biological parents.

Capacity to learn The child is highly educable throughout the long period of childhood dependence. Although abilities vary from one individual to another, a high level of intelligence is an innate human biological potentiality. Man can learn more than other animals and can continue to learn more over a longer period of time. For a few years the young chimpanzee learns as well as, and in some respects better than, a human infant of the same age, but his relative rate of learning soon declines.

Language Man's ability to learn is directly related to his capacity for language. Other animals have intelligence, but because he has language man alone has reason. When a chimpanzee fits some poles together to secure an otherwise unobtainable banana, he might be said to have insight into solving a problem. But without language he can neither reflect upon the principle nor elaborate it, nor can he convey it *as a principle* to another chimpanzee. Only through language can insight be formulated as knowledge and transmitted to and shared with others, thus becoming a social rather than merely an individual possession.

Language also expresses and arouses emotion, conveying values and attitudes as well as knowledge.

Whether as a vehicle for knowledge or for attitudes, language is the key factor in the creation of human society. By making possible the communication of ideas, it frees response and interaction from the limited confines of the purely biological. It makes possible *symbolic* interaction, upon which human society depends.

AIMS OF SOCIALIZATION

Through socialization society teaches the child what he needs to know to be integrated into the community, to develop his potentialities, and to find stable and meaningful satisfactions.

1. Socialization inculcates basic *disciplines*, ranging from toilet habits to the method of science. Undisciplined behavior is prompted by impulse. It ignores future consequences and stable satisfactions. Disciplined behavior restricts immediate gratifications by postponing, foregoing, or modifying them, sometimes for social approval, sometimes for the sake of a future goal.

Some disciplines reach so deep that they modify physiological responses; many people waken early whether they want to or not. Sometimes individuals become incapable of performing socially prohibited acts. A person may become physically ill after eating tabooed food. The sexual impulse may be so hemmed in by social prohibitions that impotence results.

2. Socialization instills *aspirations* as well as disciplines. Disciplines are often arduous and unrewarding in themselves, but aspirations help to sustain disciplines by making it easier and meaningful to give up immediate satisfactions.

Society transmits not only general cultural values that define its way of life but also specific aspirations. A religion organized around a priesthood must be able to motivate some of its adherents to become priests. An economy built upon an advanced technology must be able to motivate some of its members to become scientists and engineers. Such aspirations often entail self-denial, and socialization must inculcate these aspirations as ideals to be pursued for their own sake rather than merely for material reward.

3. Socialization teaches *social roles* and their supporting attitudes. Group membership calls for more

than a general ability to take account of others in a social relation; it requires the specific ability to play specialized roles.

4. Socialization teaches *skills*. Only by acquiring needed skills can individuals fit into a society. In simple societies, traditional practices are handed down from generation to generation and are usually learned by imitation and practice in the course of everyday life. In societies with advanced technology, inculcating the abstract skills of literacy through formal education is a central task of socialization. The individual who lacks intellectual skills is economically unproductive, relegated to the margins of society, and likely to feel alienated from both the society and himself. In other words, formal education is rapidly becoming a necessary condition for effective socialization.

Deliberate and unconscious socialization Much of the socialization of the child, especially within the family, the school, and the church, is deliberate. Adults hold certain values explicitly, convey them verbally to the child, and support them with rewards and punishments. Cleanliness, promptness, obedience, and manliness are familiar examples of rewarded behavior.

Socialization is also a product of spontaneous human interaction and occurs without deliberate intent to train. Because the individual is part of the environment of others, people try to control and direct his behavior, not to educate him but to ensure their own comfort and well-being. The child who spoils a game of baseball because he has not learned the rules may be socialized by the scorn of his playmates, although their interest is in protecting their own enjoyment, not in socializing him. Parents are under many different kinds of pressure to socialize the child, and not the least is the fact that the undisciplined child is disruptive of the adult environment. The child responds at least as much to postural cues and expressions of feeling as to statements of approval and disapproval. Implicit values and un verbalized attitudes are important elements in socialization when they are embodied in behavior toward the child. Verbal injunctions that are not reinforced in

the lives and attitudes of parents are relatively ineffective.

SOCIALIZATION AND CONFORMITY

Socialization inevitably produces a degree of conformity. People brought up under similar circumstances tend to resemble each other in habits, values, and personality. However, socialization does not result in complete conformity. Many factors encourage individuality and uniqueness. Only three are mentioned here:

1. Socialization is not smooth and uniform. The individual is socialized by many agencies—the family, the school, his playmates, his occupation, and in a literate society by the written word. If they emphasize different values, the agencies may compete for the loyalty of the individual and, therefore, reduce his conformity to some group values. Bright children of lower-class families may be encouraged in school to pursue advanced study, but family values may discourage intellectual aspirations.

2. Nonconformity may be a value in itself and be transmitted, like any other value, through socialization. For instance, individuals may be taught to admire people who are independent or even rebellious.

3. The kind of socialization to which the individual is exposed is to some extent modified by his unique capacities. Little is known about the relation between the biological potentialities of the newborn infant and the abilities of the mature adult. Although all capacities depend on training for their full realization, some seem to be inborn—for example, intelligence and mathematical and musical talent. It may be that irritable or placid, responsive or passive temperaments are also biologically innate tendencies. To some extent, how a person is socialized depends upon these potentialities and tendencies. The child learns only what he is taught, but what he is taught depends to some degree upon what he can learn. This is evident in the case of extraordinary talent or lack of it, but the same principle is involved when parents adjust their discipline and aspirations to the responses of the average child.

Section 2 treats the socialization of the child and the emergence of the self with special attention to

personal interaction and the interplay of response between parent and child. In Section 3 the agencies of socialization are considered, especially their unique functions and their capacities to influence the indi-

vidual. Section 4 discusses adult socialization, including the importance of social roles in the development of individual personality. Section 5 deals with culture, personality, and human nature.

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SECTION 2 SOCIALIZING THE CHILD

The molding of the child, whether deliberate or unintentional, is accomplished through person-to-person interaction. The social response of the parent, though geared to an immediate life situation, is based upon needs and values already formed in a particular culture and society. The child responds in turn, and in this mutual interaction the drama of socialization is acted out. Thus socialization is a two-way process.

RESPONSES TO THE CHILD

The newborn infant is responded to as a biological organism; he is taken care of and given physical attention. His primary need is food, and his most important early experiences center around the act of feeding. Feeding habits differ from culture to culture and from family to family. In some groups the infant may be fed whenever he cries, in others, only

at rigidly prescribed intervals. He may be breast-fed until well into childhood or weaned early. The way the infant's biological needs are met and the regularity with which he experiences satisfaction or deprivation convey an image of the world as either niggardly or indulgent, capricious or reliable. This image may remain as a permanent part of adult character, especially if it is reinforced by later experience.

The infant is also responded to in an emotional way. Attitudes of rejection or acceptance, approval or disapproval, tension or relaxation color the physical care he receives. The act of feeding, for example, is accompanied by the mother's attitudes and physical postures, which are prompted by cultural values or psychological traits. In the 1920s the middle-class culture of the United States dictated a degree of aloofness and rigidity toward the child, but in the 1940s permissiveness was encouraged in child rearing. The mother may regard the infant as a fulfillment or a nuisance, a natural product of marriage or a disruption of her life and interests.

Importance of emotional responses As the infant grows to childhood, emotional responses to his behavior take on increased importance. The adult's responses change from efforts to satisfy his bodily needs into attitudes of approval and disapproval designed to encourage him to exercise self-control. Thus the child is encouraged to feed himself and to renounce the satisfactions of being fed. He must learn to control his elimination and to stop depending upon his mother for cleanliness.

There are also emotion-laden responses to the child as a person, toward his appearance, his intelligence, and his temperament. The parents have cultural and personal images of what they are and what they expect the child to be. They respond to the child in terms of their own psychological needs, their position in the class, status, and role structure of society, and their ambitions for the child.

RESPONSES OF THE CHILD

The earliest reactions of the human infant are biological responses to his own inner states of comfort

and discomfort. When he cries, he neither knows that he cries nor does he cry to gain attention. Gradually, however, he associates his crying with the attention and satisfaction he receives. He learns to cry purposively to bring a ministering response. By employing the cry to stimulate response in another, the infant enters into interpersonal communication. Later the child is able to forego crying and say instead, "I am hungry."

The physical dependence of the child upon the parents and in particular upon the mother soon develops into emotional involvement, largely because the parents are a source of *both* frustration and satisfaction.

1. *Rage and hostility.* The human organism does not suffer deprivation and frustration passively. It reacts by manifesting rage, anger, hostility, and aggression. As the child matures and is expected to control his impulses, part of his frustration and deprivation may be expressed as hostility and resentment against those adults who are the source of his frustration. One of the important problems the child faces in the course of socialization is the management of his aggressive impulses and his frustration.

2. *Anxiety.* Rage and hostility are immediate, sharply defined emotional responses, capable of being "discharged" by some act of aggression against the offending object. Anxiety, in contrast, is a diffuse emotional state that arises from threatening uncertainty, doubt, and inner conflict. Whereas fear is a response to a definite danger, anxiety is a vague, uneasy apprehensiveness. It is experienced when the outcome of a situation is in doubt or when one feels threatened by an unknown danger.

Man has been called the rational animal and the social animal. He has also been called the anxious animal. It may be that the prolonged dependence of the human child upon the care of others makes man peculiarly prone to anxiety. In Western society, where parents are usually the primary source of attention and care, the child's anxiety is probably greater than in societies where more people care for him.

As the child matures, other sources of anxiety are introduced. In Western society, a premium is

placed upon independence and self-sufficiency. Before he enters school, the child is expected to be independent of his mother to the extent of feeding himself, managing his bodily functions, and controlling his aggressions and expressions of rage and hostility. He is then introduced to a formal and competitive system of education, where further demands are made upon his self-control. He is supposed to set goals for himself and to achieve them. Later, he is expected to choose a career, trade, or profession, to leave the parental home, and to make his own way. At every hand is the possibility of failure, and the fear of failure carries its burden of anxiety.

3. *Love and affection.* Little is known about the origins of human love. Love of the child for the mother was long thought to originate in the satisfaction of being fed. The experiments with rhesus monkeys (p. 85) separated feeding from bodily contact, which are almost invariably associated in real life. The findings suggest that the infant and young child need close bodily contact and without it normal responsiveness does not develop.

The studies of monkeys are important because they confirm what has long been suspected from the study of delinquent and maladjusted children: the child has an imperative need to evoke positive feelings from his parents or parent surrogates. Clinical studies have found that failure to evoke love in the parents may result in the atrophy of the ability to love and in what has been called a "fear" of loving.⁴ In extreme cases, even when removed to environments of love and attention, some delinquent children were unable to return the positive feelings extended toward them with anything but further hatred and hostility. In less extreme cases, the failure to evoke love results in anxiety, in a sense of uncertainty, threat, and personal inadequacy.

THE EMERGENCE OF A SELF

The initial creation of the self takes place in the process of socialization. Whenever the individual

takes on group values, some change in him and in his selfhood occurs.

Two important contributors to the understanding of the emergence of the self within the socialization process are the pragmatist philosopher, George Herbert Mead, and Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis. Their views are not incompatible, but each stressed different aspects of the relation between the self and the social group. Mead, whose views are summarized in *Adaptation 8*, emphasized the emergence of human rationality and creativity. Freud, on the other hand, emphasized the repressive and frustrating aspects of group life.⁵ Where Mead was interested in the potentialities of society for freeing the individual, Freud was interested in the ways group life constrains and distorts the self.

Both Mead and Freud divided the self into parts. Mead saw the self as partly conventional, that is, part of the self takes the attitudes and opinions of others into account; but he saw another part of the self as spontaneous and creative. Mead called this part the active "I," and the conventional and passive part of the self, the "me." If group life is rigid and restrictive, the "me" dominates the "I" and individuality is minimal. But, under appropriate social conditions, the "I" can actively and creatively influence and restructure the social process.

Freud divided the self into "id," "ego," and "superego." The superego is roughly equivalent to Mead's "me." The id is essentially the biological core of the self that society tries to but can never thoroughly domesticate. The ego is a kind of mediator trying to effect a compromise between the individual's biological needs and the demands of society. Where Mead saw the possibility of harmony between the "I" and the "me," Freud saw the potentialities for conflict among the various parts of the self.

From these views can be derived at least three important ways in which socialization creates a self.

1. *Socialization creates a self-image.* Through interaction with others and through language, the in-

⁴ Fritz Redl and David Wineman, *Children Who Hate: The Disorganization and Breakdown of Behavior Controls* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951).

⁵ Sigmund Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* (New York: Norton, 1949), pp. 19, 121.

GROWING SELF-AWARENESS



Margaret ignores the camera . . .



Karl and his playmate confront it tentatively . . .



. . . while Dotty's class poses proudly.

dividual comes to think of himself as an "I." As he perceives the attitudes of others toward this "I," he develops a self-image. He takes on a view of himself from observing the way others respond to him. For this reason Cooley spoke of a "looking-glass self."⁶ The behavior of others toward him is the mirror in which the individual sees himself.

The attitudes that enter into the individual's self-image are, for the most part, emotive; they are attitudes of approval and disapproval, acceptance or rejection, interest or indifference. They are judgments upon the child, sometimes based on his genuine potentialities, sometimes reflecting the meaning of his potentialities for the life of the significant adults around him. In either case, the judgments that others direct toward the child, expressed in their attitudes toward him, are judgments the child is likely to make of himself.

The importance of self-images is most easily observed in pathological behavior, where socialization has created a self-image harmful to the person. In situations of neglect, deprivation, and rejection, the child may come to think of himself as inadequate; because he is unloved, he may think of himself as inherently unlovable.

2. *Socialization creates the ideal self.* From the attitudes of others toward himself, the individual also creates an image of what he ought to be in order to secure love and approval. The tendency of socialization to arouse in the child a need for love and approval and to construct an ideal version of himself is a double-edged sword. The identification of the self with ideal values, goals, and roles is an important aspect of socialization because it helps to sustain disciplines. On the other hand, if there is too great a discrepancy between the potentialities of the person and his ideal self, or if the ideal self makes extreme and unrealistic demands, the result will be a sense of inadequacy and failure.

3. *Socialization creates an ego.* Much of the behavior of parents toward their children after infancy is directed toward ensuring the child's self-control

and independence. As he matures, he is expected to develop *inner* controls, to establish his own relations to the world, and to set his own goals. Socialization is directed, therefore, toward creating a self capable of controlling and directing its own behavior.

The ego is what it does. It is a name for the integrative, controlling functions of the self, some of which are listed in Table IV: 1. In recent years the importance of these functions for the well-being of personality and its integration into society has been increasingly recognized.

Static and dynamic adaptation Part of socialization is more or less routine learning and adjustment, in which habits are formed and perceptions of the self and the world are acquired. Some adjustments, however, have deeper impact upon the personality and generate inner tensions, needs, and strivings. Fromm has distinguished static and dynamic adaptation:

By static adaptation we mean such an adaptation to patterns as leaves the whole character structure unchanged and implies only the adoption of a new habit. An example of this kind of adaptation is the change from the Chinese habit of eating to the Western habit of using fork and knife. A Chinese coming to America will adapt himself to this new pattern, but this adaptation in itself has little effect on his personality; it does not arouse new drives or character traits.

By dynamic adaptation we refer to the kind of adaptation that occurs, for example, when a boy submits to the commands of his strict and threatening father—being too much afraid of him to do otherwise—and becomes a "good" boy. While he adapts himself to the necessities of the situation, something happens in him. He may develop an intense hostility against his father, which he represses, since it would be too dangerous to express it or even to be aware of it. This repressed hostility, however, though not manifest, is a dynamic factor in his character structure. It may create new anxiety and thus lead to still deeper submission; it may set up a vague defiance, directed against no one in particular but rather toward life in general. . . . This kind of adaptation creates some-

⁶ Charles Horton Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (rev. ed.; New York: Scribner's, 1922), p. 184.

TABLE IV:1 FUNCTIONS OF THE EGO

EGO FUNCTION	ADEQUATE EGO	INADEQUATE EGO
<i>Tolerating frustration</i>	Can substitute another goal for one that is blocked	Has a temper tantrum
<i>Coping with insecurity, anxiety, and fear</i>	Is able to develop psychological "defense mechanisms"	Can only flee or attack
<i>Resisting temptation</i>	Can resist immediate gratifications for long-range goals	Seeks promises of immediate gratification
<i>Assessing reality</i>	Adjusts behavior to particular circumstances and people	May see all authority figures as replicas of parents
<i>Facing guilt</i>	Has guilt feelings and can right a wrong	Has few guilt feelings and tries to evade them
<i>Establishing inner controls</i>	Can substitute inner control when external supervision is withdrawn	Quickly falls into disorganized behavior when outside controls are removed
<i>Resisting group intoxication</i>	Is slow to respond to group excitement	Easily loses control under impact of group excitement
<i>Being realistic about rules and routines</i>	Does not feel persecuted by rules and routines	Interprets rules and routines as directed against self
<i>Dealing with failure, success, and mistakes</i>	Can correct a mistake and is proud of success	A mistake signifies worthlessness; success, absolute worth
<i>Maintaining ego integrity</i>	Expresses, but does not lose, own values in group activity	Gives in easily to the authority of the group

SOURCE: Adapted from Fritz Redl and David Wineman, *Children Who Hate: The Disorganization and Breakdown of Behavior Controls* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), Chapter III, "The Ego That Cannot Perform," pp. 74-140. This is a study of delinquent children with severe psychological and social difficulties.

thing new in him, arouses new drives and new anxieties.⁷

In part because of dynamic adaptation, there is often a considerable discrepancy between what parents want their children to be and the way they actually turn out.

Conclusions 1. *The child is active in socialization.* (a) Parents respond and adjust to the characteristics of the child. (b) The child does not absorb values as a sponge absorbs water; values may be smoothly accepted, or rejected, or modified in the course of dynamic adaptation.

2. *The self is social.* There is no self prior to inter-

action; the self develops only out of communication with others.

3. *The most significant interactions are emotional.* Not all communicative interaction has equal weight in the formation of personality. When interaction has emotional import, it reaches most deeply and has a more lasting effect on the core of personality.

4. *The management of impulse and tension is a strategic goal of socialization.* As a necessary condition for social participation and learning, this management is a critical point at which the normal and pathological begin to divide.

Caution To say that the self is social does not

⁷ Erich Fromm, *Escape From Freedom* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1941), pp. 15-16. Reprinted by permission.

mean that it transcends its biological origins. The social self transforms but does not eradicate the biological. Nor is the self necessarily socialized in all its aspects. Some biological impulses may not be ade-

quately integrated with social goals. Furthermore, the idea of a social self does not imply that the individual lacks a unique identity or is other than a whole and independent person.

Adaptation 8 / Mead **MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY**

George Herbert Mead never presented his ideas in book-length form, and the four volumes published under his name are for the most part stenographic reports of lectures. *Mind, Self and Society* represents notes taken during 1927 and 1930 in Mead's social psychology, a course he had given since 1900.

Both as philosopher and social psychologist Mead was concerned with socialization. As a philosopher he was interested in the question: Which came first, the individual or society? Many philosophers, in trying to account for the existence of society, assumed that individuals endowed with mind and self-consciousness could exist prior to or outside society. According to Thomas Hobbes's version of the contract theory of society, man first lived in a state of nature in which each individual pursued his desires as best he could. This wholly individual pursuit of satisfaction resulted, however, in "the war of all against all." Therefore, in the interests of self-preservation and to render their satisfactions more secure, men "contracted" with each other to accept authority and live according to rules, that is, they agreed to create society.

Sophisticated contract theorists probably did not believe that a pure state of nature ever actually existed, and in any case were more concerned to *justify* social norms than to trace their historical origins. Nevertheless, their argument assumes a "natural man," who had mind and selfhood prior to and outside society.

Mead considered the human individual endowed with mind and self as the *product*, not the creator, of society. "The self . . . is essentially a social structure, and it arises in social experience. After a self has arisen, it in a certain sense provides for itself its social experiences, and so we can conceive of an absolutely solitary self. But it is impossible to conceive of a self arising outside of social experience." (*Mind, Self and Society*, p. 140)

Mead thought the distinctive task of social psychology is to explain how society "gets into" the individual, determines his behavior, and thus becomes part of his psychology, or of his "selfhood." He also advanced specific hypotheses concerning stages in the development of the self from the narrow capacity to take on the attitudes of other individuals to the more generalized capacity to relate to the community.

The essentials of Mead's point of view may be stated in a few key propositions. These are briefly presented and explained in the following discussion.

George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) was a member of the faculty of philosophy at the University of Chicago for many years. More than anyone else he clarified and illuminated the nature of social psychology. Mead disagreed sharply with the atomistic conception of man characteristic of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century “scientific” philosophy. This philosophy placed man firmly in the natural order of things; it was empirical in that it appealed to experience as the foundation of knowledge; yet it made the error of assuming that man was “naturally” endowed with both reason and self-consciousness. Mead contended that reason and self-awareness, though natural potentialities of man, could not be realized except in society. Early empiricism was atomistic because it conceived of individuals “forming” society the way atoms form matter. Mead recognized the atomistic analogy as a false one and showed that the individual is dependent upon society for his distinctive attributes as a human being, that is, for mind and self.



Preverbal interaction Social interaction precedes language, mind, and self-consciousness. Among many animal species sexual union and care of the young make necessary at least some continuing interaction with another individual; thus, rudimentary family life exists among species lower than man. In most cases common cooperation is made necessary by biological differences in capacity or function, of which sexual differentiation is the most striking example.

Among ants and bees, some individuals are biologically specialized to perform a single function, such as reproduction or food-getting. The survival of both individual and species depends upon the interaction of highly specific bio-

logical roles in a complex pattern of cooperative acts. In this way ant and bee “societies” arise. But their organization is, strictly speaking, a biological one, and interaction is based on physical and chemical cues.

Nonverbal communication must precede language. Interaction, even on the biological level, is a kind of communication; otherwise, common acts could not occur. A dancing male bird does not deliberately intend to communicate a readiness to mate; yet communication occurs because it is more or less guaranteed by the nervous system of his species. As a rule, the dance does arouse an appropriate response in a female, much as if she “understood” the meaning of the male’s behavior.

The dance communicates because it stands for something else. It is not an isolated, meaningless bit of behavior. It is a natural sign, a product and manifestation of a state of organic tension, of a physiological readiness to mate. The tensions behind the mating dance require for their relief appropriate behavior on the part of another. Thus, because the dance is a natural sign directed toward another, it can be viewed as a *gesture*, that is, as nonverbal communicative behavior.

If man could not first participate in a nonverbal “conversation” of gestures, he could never communicate by means of language. Before language can convey meaning to the child, the behavior of his mother must have meaning for

him. He could never understand the meaning of "angry" or "hungry" unless he first understood an angry or a nurturing gesture. Nor would his mother's gesture have meaning for the child unless both were participants in a joint activity. The emergence of language depends upon the existence of already established, albeit primitive, social interaction.

The importance of language
Language creates minds and selves.
Despite interaction and communication, neither mind nor self-consciousness need be present in these primitive social acts; indeed without language they cannot be. Language alone makes possible ideas and communication by ideas.

The male bird's mating dance has meaning for the female when it prompts an answering response from her, but it cannot be said to have meaning for the dancing male. He is simply behaving. *He* is not telling the other he is ready to mate; if anything "tells" the other, it is the dance and not the dancing bird. The bird's behavior communicates, but not the bird.

Language makes it possible to replace behavior with ideas. Though the mother can teach her child the meaning of "I am angry" only by behaving in appropriate ways, once the child learns the words, the mother need not behave in an angry fashion in order to communicate displeasure. Having learned what the words mean, the child now has the idea of anger. Because mother and child now share an idea, the child can respond to what the mother says as well as to what she does. It is the mother (not merely her behavior) that now communicates.

Furthermore, having the idea of anger, the child can think about his mother's anger; it can have meaning for him even when she is absent or not angry. Thus as the child acquires language he acquires mind. He also becomes self-conscious as he reflects not only about his mother's anger but about himself and his own behavior. Thus he acquires a self. The attitudes of others, such as his mother's anger, lead him to modify his inner self as well as his external actions. As he matures, the child no longer adjusts merely to the immediate expression of approval and disapproval; he changes himself and his ways in order to achieve a stable adjustment to other people and his environment. He *takes the attitudes of others* into himself as enduring guides and standards, as part of his own personality.

The social self *Mind and self are social.* Much of language is factual, simply identifying objects about which people communicate. Though factual, these meanings are nevertheless social; they are shared and common meanings. In time "dog" and "cat" and "cow" come to have the same factual meaning for the child that they do for others.

Through language the child also learns the attitudes and emotions with which objects are viewed by his parents and others. The factual and emotive meanings of words are separable in analysis, but in practice they are learned together, and language transmits not only names of objects but appropriate or prescribed attitudes toward the objects named. Some of these are designed to enable the child better to deal with his physical environ-

ment; for example, attitudes of wariness and caution may go along with "dog" and "fire." Others are more distinctively social. Factually "cow" means the same to a Hindu as to an American, but to the Hindu child the meaning of "cow" also includes attitudes of religious reverence and respect. Thus as he learns language the child is initiated into a world of social meanings; he shares the meanings that objects have for his social group.

Just as the child learns to take the same attitudes toward objects in his environment that others take toward them, so he learns to take the same attitudes toward himself that others take toward him. When the mother tells the child that he has done something good or bad, right or wrong, she is not trying to teach him merely what the words mean. She treats the child as an object toward which she takes a certain attitude, and tries to induce the child to do the same. He is encouraged to *take himself as an object*. He evaluates and controls himself in the same way that he evaluates and controls other objects, and he does so from the standpoint of someone else. He is taught, in short, to make appropriate or prescribed responses to his own behavior just as he has been taught to make appropriate or prescribed responses to other objects in his environment.

Because this control occurs through taking the attitudes of others toward oneself, because it is control from the standpoint of someone else, it is distinctively social in nature. This is how society "gets into" the individual. Of all the animals, man alone is able to exercise self-criticism; but all self-criticism is social criticism insofar

as the principles that guide it are the result of internalizing the attitudes of others toward oneself.

Prior to using the attitudes of others to think about himself, the young child is not *self-conscious*. As an animal, the human child is conscious. He has sensations, feelings, and perceptions of which he is aware. It is by thinking about himself in the light of the attitudes of others toward him that the individual becomes self-conscious and begins to acquire a social self.

Maturation and response to the other As the individual matures he develops the capacity to respond to (1) *significant others* and (2) *a generalized other*. All higher forms of communication depend upon the capacity of each to put himself in the place of the other, that is, to control his own responses in terms of an understanding of what the other's responses are likely to be. As he learns to control his behavior in the light of another individual's attitudes either toward that behavior or toward the environment, the individual can be said to be learning to *take the role of the other*. He responds to himself and to the world as he anticipates the other would respond. The capacity to put oneself in the place of the other emerges only with maturity and in the process of social interaction and communication.

The child first internalizes the attitudes of particular individuals, primarily his parents, toward himself. At this stage he does not have the capacity to participate in organized group life or to engage in complex, cooperative games governed by impersonal rules. Social interaction is limited to interaction

with specific individuals, and behavior is largely determined by the child's experience with those who are not merely others but *significant others* for him. At this stage of development, his play consists largely of simple role-taking. He plays at being a mother, father, doctor, or postman. He reenacts the behavior and attitudes of others as individuals.

The child gradually learns, however, a less personalized, more complex form of role-taking as expressed in his developing ability to participate in organized games. In baseball, for example, the acting out of a highly specific individual role is not required. The player adjusts his behavior from moment to moment, and does so in the light of what a number of others are doing and of the rules and purposes of the game. In performing his role, he responds to a *generalized other*.

Mead used this term to designate "The organized community or social group which gives to the individual his unity of self. . . ." (p. 154) One who takes the standpoint of the generalized other knows what is required to keep the group to its distinctive aims and rules. He sees not only his own role, not only the roles of particular others, but the ways roles are related in determining the outcome of group activity. Gradually the individual takes on the point of view of the community as a whole.

The "I" and the "me" The *social self* has a creative, spontaneous aspect. To stress the essentially social nature of the self may seem to imply that the self is completely determined by the internalized attitudes of others. This is not so. To

be sure, the internalized attitudes of others represent what the individual takes into account when he acts; they are the demands that group life actually or supposedly makes upon him. Nevertheless, his behavior has a large element of freedom and spontaneity. The demands of the social situation pose a problem to the acting individual, but there is considerable leeway in how he meets the problem. Furthermore, the individual can never predict precisely what his response in a given situation will be. The baseball player wants to play good ball; in this sense his behavior is determined by accepting the demands and standards of the group. But whether he will make a brilliant play or an error neither he nor anyone else knows beforehand.

Mead called the acting self the "I." The "me," on the other hand, is that part of the self that is an organization of the internalized attitudes of others. The "I" represents the self insofar as it is free, has initiative, novelty, and uniqueness. The "me" represents the conventional part of the self. The "I" responds to the "me" and takes it into account, but it is not identical with it.

There may be varying amounts of "I" and "me" in behavior. In impulsive behavior the "me" is absent; in Freudian language, the "I" is not being censored by the "me." Social control is present to the extent that the "I" is controlled by the "me." The oversocialized individual is overdetermined by his "me." In more normal circumstances the individual responds to a situation in its social aspects but does so with some regard for his own unique capacities and needs.

The most gratifying experiences are those in which the demands of the "me"—or of the social situation—permit the expression and realize the potentialities of the "I."

In primitive society the individual self is more completely determined than in civilized societies by the "me," that is, by the particular social group to which the individual belongs. Primitive society offers much less scope for the "I." Indeed, the development of civilization is largely dependent upon the progressive social liberation of the individual self. The "I" is the innovator, the source of new ideas and energy to initiate social change.

The enlargement of the self is dependent upon and in turn supports the breadth of community values. What the self is and how it develops depends upon the nature of the community whose attitudes the individual has internalized. Membership in a community is more than physical presence in it; the small boy belongs to his gang, not to the city in which he lives: "... until one can respond to himself as a community responds to him, he does not genuinely belong to the community." (p. 265)

The self will be isolated and alienated from other selves if it is a member of a socially isolated group or one with narrow or provincial values. The self becomes enlarged to the extent that it belongs to a group engaged in activities that bring it into contact with other groups. The rise of national states, which seems to be and often is a constraining and limiting influence, nevertheless encourages the development of internationalism and the extension of man's effective community. It does so because it fosters communication among nations rather than limiting it to communication among intranational groups. Similarly the self becomes enlarged to the extent that it belongs to a community that subscribes to universal values, such as the objective standards of science or a religious belief in human brotherhood.

Summary 1. Language is a biologically given potentiality of man. But man could not develop this potentiality without first being able to interact socially and communicate with others in a non-verbal, gestural way within shared,

ongoing activities. Without social interaction language would not be possible. Out of social interaction accompanied by language human reason and self-consciousness emerge.

2. Social interaction, when accompanied and facilitated by language, leads "naturally" to social control and the development of human society.

3. Through language the individual takes on or internalizes the attitudes of others toward both the environment and himself. In this way the human being acquires a social self. The young child internalizes the attitudes of those who are significant others to him. With maturity the individual learns to relate to a generalized other, that is, to organized group activity and the community as a whole.

4. The individual need not and indeed cannot be totally controlled by the internalized attitudes of others, that is, by the "me" part of the self. The individual is also an "I," that is, someone who takes account of the "me" but is not necessarily dominated by it. The "I" may act upon, influence, and modify the social process.

SECTION 3 AGENCIES OF SOCIALIZATION

Many groups and institutions play a part in socializing the person. These agencies of socialization teach different things at different times. The delegation of specialized responsibilities to particular groups is partly a reflection of what the groups are competent to do. For example, although the family does much to educate the child, it cannot be relied upon to impart the degree of literacy that business and industry

require of even "unskilled" employees. Consequently in Western society public education has become a basic social institution.

Socializing agencies may complement and support each other, but sometimes they inculcate independent or even conflicting values. This can lead to psychological conflict for the individual, but it is the necessary condition for freedom of choice among

values and ways of life. During early childhood, his experience in the family is the only source of satisfactions and frustrations he knows, and the young child characteristically regards parental values as universal. As he grows older, particularly in a complex and varied society, he learns that there are alternative sources of satisfaction and approval and that a choice among values exists.

REACHING THE PERSON

In primitive and folk societies a great part of the culture has access to the child. The life of the society is lived out before his eyes; very little is not open to his direct observation; and most of the agencies support each other in socializing him. There is little competition for access to him. On the other hand, in a large and heterogeneous society, the agencies of socialization are faced with the problem of *gaining access* to the individual and of establishing the conditions which make for deep rather than superficial influence. A number of factors determine a group's ability to reach the individual and exert a significant socializing influence.

Conditions of effective access Communication is necessary in order to influence the person. In early life communication requires actual physical access to the child. Whoever wishes to influence the child from a distance can do so only through those who come into direct contact with him—his parents, his peers, or his school. In a literate society, the person is soon within reach from a distance through books, newspapers, movies, radio, and television. However, not all communication is equally effective in influencing the person.

Early access is likely to be most influential because the personality is still unformed. Groups that reach the individual in his formative years have an advantage, which largely explains the special importance of the family as an agency of socialization.

When *person-to-person interaction* permits the free play of emotion, it encourages intensive sociali-

zation. Such groups as the family, in which emotional relations are prominent, are called primary groups partly because they are primary agencies of socialization. The greater the need to influence the person deeply, the more important it is for socialization to take place in and through primary group experience.

The individual must be *psychologically accessible*. The person is ready for different influences at different times in his life. What appeals to him is related to his psychological needs and capacities. His present availability is also affected by the values he has acquired in the past. Some agencies of socialization, especially the early ones, tend to limit the areas in which the individual is open to influence by other agencies.

The more *exclusive* the access of a group to the individual, the more effective its influence is likely to be. For example, the initiation of the "swab" into the life of the Coast Guard Academy includes a two-month period of isolation from the outside world. Cut off from his former ties, he is more accessible to the Academy's influence. (See Adaptation 9, pages 110–113.)

THE FAMILY

Psychological theory has long stressed the link between early parent-child interaction and the emotional development of the individual. More recently, attention has centered on the relation between the intellectual or cognitive development of the child and patterns of interaction in the family. As discussed above, pages 94 ff., G. H. Mead theorized about a general relation between social interaction and the emergence of mind. More recent thought has traced specific connections between modes of interaction in the family and the ability of the child to learn.

Children from poorly educated, low-income families tend to score lower on intelligence tests and to do less well in school than children from middle-class families.⁸ Differences are even greater for children from socially deprived minorities. These differences

⁸ Virgil E. Herrick, "What Is Already Known about the Relation of the I.Q. to Cultural Background?" in Kenneth Eels *et al.*, *Intelligence and Cultural Differences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 10–15.

tend to fix status differentials at birth and thus to violate the premises of an open society. If only for this reason, it is important to understand the relation between intelligence and modes of childhood socialization.

Intelligence tests were once believed to measure the innate capacity of the child to learn abstract materials. It is now recognized that intelligence and academic performance also depend on whether socialization arouses and develops a desire to learn. The child must "learn to learn" even when he possesses high innate capacity; whether he does learn to learn depends in part on his early experiences in the family.

Modes of socialization Methods of teaching, training, and otherwise socializing the child differ along a number of dimensions. These are presented in Table IV:2 as a set of contrasts. In practice, few parents are as consistent as the list implies. Nevertheless, research indicates that two broad patterns of socialization can be identified in American society.⁹ One pattern, oriented toward obedience, may be called "repressive socialization," the other, oriented toward gaining the participation of the child, "participatory socialization."

Reward and punishment play a part in all learning, but one rather than the other may be stressed. Repressive socialization emphasizes punishing wrong behavior, participatory socialization rewards and thus reinforces good behavior. In toilet training, for example, parents may be on the lookout for mishaps to admonish; or they may ignore mishaps and concentrate on praising instances of self-control and compliance.

If the modes of socialization are compared with laboratory condition of animals, repressive socialization is similar to administering an electric shock to an experimental rat when he takes a wrong turn in a maze. Participatory socialization is like giving the rat a pellet of food when he selects the right path. Both forms of conditioning extinguish "wrong" behavior,

TABLE IV:2 TWO MODES OF SOCIALIZATION

REPRESSIVE SOCIALIZATION	PARTICIPATORY SOCIALIZATION
Punishing wrong behavior	Rewarding good behavior
Material rewards and punishments	Symbolic rewards and punishments
Obedience of child	Autonomy of child
Nonverbal communication	Verbal communication
Communication as command	Communication as interaction
Parent-centered socialization	Child-centered socialization
Child's discernment of parent's wishes	Parent's discernment of child's needs
Family as significant other	Family as generalized other

one by the negative act of punishment, the other by the positive act of reward.

In principle, participatory socialization gives the child freedom to try things out for himself and explore the world on his own terms. This does not entail leaving the child alone. On the contrary, a great deal of adult supervision is required, but the supervision is general rather than detailed and intrusive. Repressive socialization also requires supervision, indeed so much detailed supervision that it tends to be greatly modified in practice. As a result, punishment from the child's viewpoint is arbitrarily applied, depending on whether he is caught misbehaving and the parent is in a mood to administer punishment.

Repressive socialization emphasizes obedience, respect for authority, and external controls. Parents may indulge the child but also use corporal punishment, shame, and ridicule. Two-way conversation between parent and child is not encouraged. Communication tends to be downward from parent to child and to take the form of command. Gesture and

⁹ Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Socialization and Social Class Through Time and Space," in E. E. Maccoby, T. M. Newcomb, and E. L. Hartley (eds.), *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958), pp. 400-425; Melvin L. Kohn, "Social Class and Parental Values," *American Journal of Sociology*, 64 (January, 1959), 337-351.

nonverbal communication are conspicuous.¹⁰ The child must learn to discern the seriousness of the parent's command to "shut up" by taking account of tone of voice, facial expression, and physical posture.

In participatory socialization communication takes the form of dialogue in which the child is expected to make his needs and desires known, as well as his responses to the adult world. Participatory socialization is child-centered rather than parent-centered: the adult assumes responsibility for discerning the child's needs rather than expecting the child to discern the parent's wishes.

Social class differences The two types of socialization are not randomly distributed in society, but are correlated with social-economic level and education. For many years there was debate over whether blue-collar workers or the middle class were more repressive in socializing their children. Some of this disagreement seems to have reflected historical changes in middle-class socialization, and perhaps romantic images of working-class warmth and "freedom." However that may be, the evidence indicates that repressive socialization is now more characteristic of the working class. Participatory socialization is more likely to be found among middle-class families where in recent years the trend in parent-child relations has been toward greater permissiveness and warmth.

When asked what a good mother does, middle-class mothers emphasized understanding the child, relating lovingly to him, and making sure that he is happy and contented. Working-class mothers stressed keeping the child neat and clean, training him to regularity, and getting him to obey and respect adults.¹¹

The apparent change in middle-class practices

from more strict to more lenient has been related to changes in "expert" opinion as expressed in women's magazines and in *Infant Care*, the publication of the United States Children's Bureau.¹² Early editions of *Infant Care* stressed regularity, firmness, and determination in training the child. "Successful child training meant winning out against the child in the struggle for domination."¹³

In later years, the tone of *Infant Care* changed. The child was described in benign terms as mainly engaged in exploring the world, and in need of love and affection. "When not engaged in exploratory undertakings, the baby needs care and attention; and giving these when he demands them, far from making him a tyrant, will make him less demanding later on."¹⁴ In the 1950s some doubts about permissiveness appear in the child-rearing literature and may represent yet another mode.

Practices of middle-class mothers seem to follow closely the changing trend of pediatric advice:

Both in the early and the later period, middle-class mothers were much more likely than working-class mothers to be exposed to current information on child care . . . to read Spock's best-seller, *Baby and Child Care*, and similar publications. Our analysis suggests that the mothers not only read these books but take them seriously, and that their treatment of the child is affected accordingly.¹⁵

Family organization Repressive and participatory socialization are associated with different kinds of family organization. Lower-class families gain their cohesion and unity mainly through the complementarity of traditional roles. Father is breadwinner, mother is housekeeper; they often fulfill their roles with little reference to the other and little communication with one another.¹⁶ In such families socializa-

¹⁰ B. Bernstein, "Some Sociological Determinants of Perception," *The British Journal of Sociology*, 9 (June, 1958), 159-174.

¹¹ Bronfenbrenner, *op. cit.*

¹² Martha Wolfenstein, "Trends in Infant Care," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 23 (1953), 120-130; C. B. Stendler, "Sixty Years of Child Training Practices," *Journal of Pediatrics*, 36 (1950), 122-134.

¹³ Wolfenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

¹⁴ *Loc cit.*

¹⁵ Bronfenbrenner, *op. cit.*, p. 411.

¹⁶ Mirra Komarovsky, *Blue-Collar Marriage* (New York: Random House, 1962).

tion consists largely of teaching traditional roles and conveying traditional expectations to the child. Socialization thus tends to remain at the level of the "significant other" as Mead described it (see p. 97); the family represents a set of significant personal others who are role models for the child.

Middle-class families characteristically gain their cohesion by undertaking joint activities and developing common family goals. Traditional roles are modified, depending on the abilities and inclinations of the family members, and family goals are more varied. In such a setting, communication among family members is needed, because fewer goals and activities are determined by fixed notions of what is "right." Such families are better able to serve as a "generalized other" for the child. Socialization within a context of shared goals and activities is less direct and dependent on imitation and specific rules, than socialization in the traditional family. The understanding of means-end relations is stressed rather than the performance of prescribed roles.

School performance Repressive socialization and lack of verbal communication in the lower-class family contribute to the poor academic performance of socially disadvantaged children. The child's pre-school experience does not motivate him to academic achievement because it does not teach him to govern his conduct in the light of symbolic rewards and future gratifications. Nor does it prepare him to interact with adults or to learn through the medium of language. Lower-class children "are much less likely than [middle-class] children to talk to themselves as an aid to 'thinking.' On ostensibly nonverbal tests and learning tasks which nevertheless require private verbal mediation, disadvantaged children perform especially poorly."¹⁷ Not spoken to by others, these children do not speak to themselves and do not respond to the world with language. In the crowded home environment of the poor, a child's questioning curiosity may be rebuffed rather than welcomed. The

reaction of an unresponsive adult is at once a punishment and an impediment to exploratory behavior.

In theory, and to a considerable extent in fact, participatory socialization supports the motivation to achieve, and the middle-class family provides experiences in the home that are continuous with learning at school. However, middle-class permissiveness may lead to rejection of achievement.

Our data indicate that middle-class parents are becoming increasingly permissive in response to the child's expressed needs and desires. Yet, these same parents have not relaxed their high levels of expectations for ultimate performance. Do we have here a typical instance of Benedict's "discontinuity in cultural conditioning," with the child first being encouraged in one pattern of response and then expected to perform in a very different fashion? If so, there are days of disappointment ahead for middle-class fathers and mothers.¹⁸

It might be straining prophecy to relate the foregoing comment too closely to the emergence of the "hippie" in urban centers and around college campuses. Yet the hippies seem to come mostly from middle-income backgrounds and Bronfenbrenner's observation allows for something like a hippie-type dropout. Heretofore the dropout has been regarded as a characteristic product of disprivileged and impoverished environments, and such school failures are disproportionately from poor homes. The hippie as a self-selected dropout may be a transitory phenomenon, but it is a phenomenon that brings into question the inconsistency in child-rearing practices in many American homes.

PEER GROUPS

The individual is socialized by his equals as well as by his elders. In the peer group the individual associates with others who are approximately his own age and social status. The childhood peer group is typically a play group. In adolescence it takes on the character of a clique which introduces the child to status and class values. In adult life peer groups con-

¹⁷ Alan B. Wilson, Arthur R. Jensen, and David L. Elliott, *Education of Disadvantaged Children in California*, Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, Publication M-19, 1967, p. 26.

¹⁸ Bronfenbrenner, *op. cit.*, p. 415.

tinue to provide a setting for social intercourse among equals.

Childhood peer groups and social control 1. The peer group introduces the child to *impersonal authority*. In the family, authority is vested in the parents as *persons*, and they determine what is right and wrong. In the play group, the child learns to obey the impersonal "rules of the game," to take an objective role such as pitcher in a game of baseball, and to develop a concept of justice which is applicable to all.¹⁹ In time he himself becomes a representative of law and order; he conceives himself as a protector of the rules, and exercises social control over playmates who break them.

2. Within the peer group the child *tests the limits of adult tolerance* with reduced fear of parental reprisal. Children in groups often behave more provocatively toward adults than the individual child feels free to do. At the same time, the child tests the extent to which his peers will go in defying the adult world and the degree to which he can rely on peer support.

3. The peer group may or may not support adult values. If it does, it is one of the most effective agencies for the *transmission of adult values*. The following example illustrates the power of the peer group and its role as the representative of adult class and status values:

Bill was a late adolescent who began to run around with a girl who not only lived on the other side of the railroad tracks, but who had most of the traits associated with that oft-used phrase. Bill's family was upper class, Bill was personally most attractive, and his mother knew the power of a peer group. Calling Bill to her, she explained with disarming friendliness that she had heard of his new girl and wanted to meet her. Wouldn't he bring her to the house, and to make it less formal, she would invite a few of his favorite friends. Upon securing Bill's wondering and semi-reluctant consent, the mother proceeded to promote, secretly, a gala event, to which she invited all of Bill's

extended clique. Bill's relations with the new girl just barely survived until the end of the party.²⁰

Peer group values The peer group exists for the sake of sociability. But behind this innocuous interest is a powerful force for conformity. Like any other socializing agency, the peer group represents a system of rewards and punishments, of approval and disapproval. It rewards the skills of sociability. It rejects the personality that disrupts the flow of good feeling and hinders smooth personal relations.

Riesman has suggested that the peer group is becoming the most important socializing agency. In present-day society people look primarily to their contemporaries for guidance and direction; modern man values most the judgment and approval of others in his environment. The most important values to modern man are the typical values of the peer group—for example, sociability, which minimizes differences and emphasizes similarities, cooperation, and getting along with others.

Other-directedness²¹ Riesman calls modern man "other-directed," and contrasts him with the "tradition-directed" and the "inner-directed" man. The tradition-directed type, e.g., in primitive and folk societies, looks to tradition and the past for guidance and models of behavior. The inner-directed type, exemplified by nineteenth-century man, guides his behavior by abstract ideals implanted in him as a child by family authority—ideals such as wealth, knowledge, and the moral life. The other-directed man, equipped with "radar," makes his way through the complexities and intricacies of modern life by picking up cues from his environment. Like the inner-directed man, modern man has a strong drive for success. But where the inner-directed man has internalized criteria of success, the other-directed man depends upon the approval of his peers to tell him what success is. (See Table IV:3.)

¹⁹ See Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (London: Kegan Paul, 1932).

²⁰ James H. S. Bossard, *The Sociology of Child Development* (New York: Harper & Row, 1948), p. 507.

²¹ David Riesman, in collaboration with Reuel Denney and Nathan Glazer, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).

TABLE IV:3 SOCIALIZATION AND CONFORMITY

SOCIAL CHARACTER	WHO SOCIALIZES?	WHAT GUIDES BEHAVIOR?	PSYCHOLOGICAL MECHANISM OF CONFORMITY	LIFE-STYLE
<i>Tradition-directed</i>	The clan, the tribe, the village	Detailed norms of village life learned by direct observation	Shame: wrongdoing is a transgression against the group	Politically indifferent; subsistence oriented
<i>Inner-directed</i>	The parents	General principles laid down early in life; freedom for nonconformity within these limits; built-in gyroscope steers individual	Guilt: wrongdoing is a violation of personal ideals	Politically moralistic; production oriented
<i>Other-directed</i>	The peer group	Cue-taking in particular situations; being "hep"; built-in radar steers individual	Anxiety: the ultimate evil is being unloved and unapproved	Politically manipulative; consumption oriented

SOURCE: Adapted from David Riesman, in collaboration with Reuel Denney and Nathan Glazer, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).

SECTION 4 ADULT SOCIALIZATION

Adult experiences continue to shape and develop personality. Adult socialization is most intensive during critical periods when adjustment to new situations must be made. If these adjustments are difficult to make and far-reaching in their effects, the individual may undergo great changes in his self-conception, habits, and values. Marriage, parenthood, divorce or death of a spouse, unemployment or financial success may serve to break up old behavior patterns and transform orientations. The person who moves from an urban center to the suburbs or from a Southern city to a Northern one has new experiences that may produce significant revisions of old attitudes and habits.

Specialized adult roles that depend on deeply internalized social control require intensive socialization. Adaptation 9 describes how a civilian youth is transformed into a military officer. (See pp. 110 ff.)

Three problems in continuing socialization are considered here: parent-youth conflict which may undermine earlier socializing influences, the interplay of roles and personality, and resocialization.

PARENT-YOUTH CONFLICT

In contemporary society adolescence is marked by conflict between the generations, and earlier close relations between parent and child may disappear. The adolescent looks to other authorities for guidance and support and often rejects parental values and ways. Some disparities between youth and age occur in all societies, but there are special conditions that aggravate adolescent-parent antagonism in the United States.²⁹

Differing Rates of Socialization. Socialization continues throughout life, but it does so at a decreasing rate. The adolescent is at a stage of development

²⁹ This discussion is based on Kingsley Davis, "The Sociology of Parent-Youth Conflict," *American Sociological Review*, 5 (August, 1940), 523-535.

where learning is rapid and basic, but by the time the adult is a parent, he is no longer so able to acquire new ways or to undergo fundamental personality changes. If there is rapid social change, the habits and outlooks of the older generation will become "obsolete."

Differences in Opportunity and Participation. Youth is a period of opportunity and choice among alternatives. The adult has already made his choices. He has a settled way of life, an occupation, a defined position and role. He consolidates gains instead of exploiting opportunities. The choices open to youth may result in anxieties about the future.

Conflict between young and old may be less in societies that clearly specify appropriate behavior at all age levels. The young know that as they grow older they will automatically rise in the social hierarchy, and they do not experience anxieties about the future. The adult, backed by his superior ascribed status, is not so readily judged a failure by his children.

"The much publicized critical attitude of youth toward established ways is partly a matter of being on the outside looking in."²³ The young soldier who is "old enough to die for his country but not old enough to vote" may resent being excluded from political responsibility. The adolescent who knows how to drive an automobile may resent restrictions on his holding a license.

Adult Realism, Youthful Idealism. By its very nature, socialization encourages youthful idealism. As part of their education, children are taught the "official" ideals of the culture, and these are often at variance with its "operating" standards. Youth becomes exasperated with adult "hypocrisy," or may become cynical, dismissing all ideals as worthless and irrelevant.

SOCIAL ROLES AND PERSONALITY

Part of the socialization process is learning the specified and expected behaviors appropriate to social po-

sitions. A doctor's formal role specifies that he try to cure the ill, relieve suffering, help people, and be loyal to his profession. Additional behaviors are informally expected of a role, but these are not essential to it. A doctor is expected to be kind, well groomed, poised, and hard-working. These attributes are a kind of "halo effect" around the formal role, and a doctor can discharge his formal role without conforming to them.

Anticipatory socialization By specifying the terms of relationships, roles articulate the interactions of one person with another. The individual learns how to be a patient in relation to a doctor, a student in relation to a teacher, a husband in relation to a wife. Roles and their complementary roles, taken together, organize and integrate shared experience.

Insofar as roles consist of definite and known patterns of behavior, they provide blueprints for anticipatory socialization. The individual can prepare himself beforehand for an expected or hoped-for future role. Learning professional skills is one example of anticipatory socialization.

More significant than the learning of technical and social skills for the formation of personality is the acquisition of values, self-conceptions, and perspectives appropriate to an expected or admired role. The aspiring employee may view his fellow workers from the perspectives of the employer he would like to be. The prospective priest or nun may very early begin to acquire habits of self-discipline in preparation for the religious life. The medical student may take the role of doctor in his relations with nurses though he continues to see himself primarily as a student in his relations with faculty.²⁴

Few roles are taught or learned in a wholly conscious and deliberate way. They emerge from personal interaction, and people learn what is expected of them by taking cues from others. The socialization of the person occurs in the role as he adapts himself

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 529.

²⁴ Mary Jean Huntington, "The Development of a Professional Self-Image," in Robert K. Merton, George G. Reader, M.D., and Patricia L. Kendall (eds.), *The Student-Physician* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 179-187; and Howard S. Becker, Blanche Geer, Everett C. Hughes, and Anselm L. Strauss, *Boys in White* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961).

to its requirements and to the expectations that others have of him in that role. The medical student, for example, comes to realize that patients expect him to be wise and reassuring by observing their reactions to him when he is not.

To say that the patient "searches your face for clues" is no overstatement. . . when trying to palpate a baby once, I got a little confused and frowned in puzzlement. [I] sensed at once that the mother saw the frown and was alarmed. So I reassured her that everything was all right. I have always tried to remember not to do it again.²⁵

Roles and personality integration All roles organize behavior, but some roles are so important that they serve to integrate the personality. They become part of the individual's self-conception, which is built around the behavior and the attitudes that go with a role. The individual sees the world from the point of view of a particular role and may find it difficult to take on other roles or to behave in ways alien to his critical role. Such roles are usually sex roles, family roles, and occupational roles, but an individual may also see himself as the "life of the party." He will be unhappy when this role is taken over by someone else, and he may try to act out this role even when it is inappropriate.

When identification is intense and a role is critical in personality integration, the individual may stake his self-respect on it. When deprived of his role, he loses self-esteem. People for whom a job has been the integrating element in life are disturbed by retirement and are often unable to find other sources of self-esteem and meaning.

Even where roles are satisfying to the individual and provide him with the opportunity to exercise his capacities, they may have a negative side. Attached to the role are characteristic risks, anxieties, and limitations. For example, successful business executives show common personality characteristics.²⁶ On the "positive" side are high achievement desires, strong

mobility drives, an attitude toward authority as helpful rather than inhibiting, high ability to organize unstructured situations, decisiveness, a strong sense of self-identity, and aggressiveness. These personality traits are "positive" in the sense that they support the social role and find expression within it. The "negative" traits are uncertainty, constant activity, continued fear of losing ground, inability to be leisurely, introspective, ever-present fear of failure, and limitations on the play of emotion in interpersonal relations.

Role distance Although people tend to identify with their roles, sometimes the individual may make clear to himself and others that his real self is not fully committed to a role. Such a person manifests "role distance." He shows that he does not take the role too seriously, that he has psychological distance from it, that he and the role are not identical.

Role distance signifies alienation from a role when the individual feels demeaned by what he is called upon to do:

. . . the subordinate is careful not to threaten those . . . in charge, he may be just as careful to inject some expression to show, for any who care to see, that he is not capitulating completely to the work arrangement in which he finds himself. Sullenness, muttering, irony, joking, sarcasm may all allow one to show that something of oneself lies outside . . . the role.²⁷

Role distance of this kind may become part of a role style. The newly hired worker discovers that his training on the job includes learning role distance—how to goof off, joke about the work, and otherwise demonstrate to his fellow employees that he is not overly involved in his job.

Role distance may also occur when the individual feels so secure in his role that he can step out of it without fearing loss of identity, self-respect, or the respect of others. The "stuffed shirt" is one who can-

²⁵ Merton *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

²⁶ William E. Henry, "The Business Executive: The Psychodynamics of a Social Role," *American Journal of Sociology*, 54 (January, 1949), 286-291.

²⁷ Erving Goffman, *Encounters* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961), p. 114.

not step out of a formal role and is incapable of role distance. Overidentification with formal roles tends to be self-defeating, for then the individual cannot distinguish his personal needs from the requirements of the role. In this sense, a certain amount of role distance is needed for good role performance. Some sociologists see role distance as a way of maintaining personal integrity and freedom while conforming to role expectations.²⁸

RESOCIALIZATION

Over the total life span, individuals change their attitudes, values, behavior, and self-conceptions as they assume new roles and undergo new experiences.

Adult change that is gradual and partial is called *continuing socialization*. *Resocialization* denotes change that is more basic and more rapid, especially the abandonment of one way of life for another that is not only different from the former but incompatible with it. Important examples of attempts at resocialization are "brainwashing," the rehabilitation of criminals, and the conversion of "sinners" to a religious way of life. In these cases, the aim is to make the person over in fundamental ways and to effect a break with the past.

Certain occupational and life roles demand extensive and intensive socialization, and training for them approaches resocialization. The role of priest or nun requires that the new religious life be all-encompassing and that a thorough break be made with the ways of the secular order. Adaptation 9 (pp. 110 ff.) describes some resocializing aspects of cadet life at the Coast Guard Academy.

Resocialization of the mature individual is difficult to accomplish. Generally speaking, it requires that the conditions of childhood socialization be reproduced in heightened, intense, and extreme form. Attempts at resocialization—whether forced upon the individual or assented to voluntarily—include some if not all of the following elements:

1. *Total control over the individual.*²⁹ The individual is isolated from society, from the countervailing influences of competing institutions and groups, and from his own past life. The resocializing institution has not only sole access but total access to the individual; every aspect of his life is under surveillance. The person is totally dependent upon the institution even for satisfaction of his physical needs. More significantly, he is dependent upon the institution for cues and "information" as to what is right and wrong, true and false, in his new environment.

2. *Suppression of past statuses.* Former statuses for which the person had approval or in which he took pride or pleasure are ignored. Within the resocializing institution the individual is initially devoid of status and is given approval only for the achievement of a new status defined by the resocializing agency.

3. *Denial of the moral worth of the old self.* Not only are past statuses ignored, the individual's past perspectives are seen as radically faulty, morally inferior, and blameworthy.

4. *Participation of the individual in his own resocialization.* The individual is encouraged to participate actively in the resocialization process by engaging in self-analysis, self-criticism, and "confession" of past and present failings.

5. *Extreme sanctions.* Resocialization agencies often employ extreme sanctions ranging from the negative sanctions of physical cruelty and social isolation to the positive sanction of the promise of eternal salvation.

6. *Intensification of peer group pressures and support.* Resocializing institutions rarely rely on "reforming" the individual by invoking a punishment and reward system administered from on high. Instead, efforts are made to increase the informal influence of the peer group, which is able to give and to withhold the often subtle but crucial satisfactions of group life and personal interaction.

²⁸ Peter L. Berger, *Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective* (Garden City, N.Y.: [Anchor] Doubleday, 1963), pp. 135–136.

²⁹ See "On the Characteristics of Total Institutions" in Erving Goffman, *Asylums* (Garden City, N.Y.: [Anchor] Doubleday, 1961), pp. 1–124.

Brainwashing The term "brainwashing" is a translation from the Chinese and was first used in Communist China to refer to the reeducation of the Chinese people whereby all vestiges of the old, pre-Communist system would be "washed away." In the present context, the term refers to efforts at conversion of Westerners to the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party while they are being held prisoner.

Under the impact of brainwashing, many prisoners confessed to crimes of espionage that they could not possibly have committed and that they immediately repudiated upon liberation and arrival in Hong Kong. A few, however, appear upon release to have been "converted." Despite the brutality of their imprisonment, and their innocence of any crime, they made statements like the following:

In China today a person who is not guilty of a crime could never be arrested or convicted. Before I was arrested in my heart I knew that I was guilty of being a spy. The People's Government took care of us so well! We had no pressure put on us. In order to gain self-respect one has to confess. We are grateful for such light sentences.⁸⁰

Such apparent conversions led to the widespread belief that the Communists had discovered "a new and powerful weapon to use against the mind of man."⁸¹ However, reports by repatriated Westerners indicate that, although actual physical torture plays a part, brainwashing consists of an extreme, intensive, and in itself brutal application of the entire range of resocialization measures.

The process of "thought reform" or the "ideological remodeling" of the individual begins with "total" imprisonment; the individual is entirely cut off from all contact with the outside world. Although he is charged with being a spy or an enemy of the Chinese people, no specific and refutable accusations are made. Instead he is made to review his past life in order to discover for himself what he did that was, from the point of view of his captors, morally wrong.

In order to be able to make a "sincere" confession that will satisfy his captors and secure his release, the prisoner must abandon his own concept of guilt and innocence learned in his past life, discover the concept of guilt and innocence held by his captors, and then use the latter to inspect and judge his past life. His confession must in effect consist of a moral condemnation of his entire previous self as the product of a capitalist, imperialist society. Although his confession must be buttressed by specific details—real or fabricated—the individual is required to repudiate, not only this or that specific act, but his entire past self as criminal.

Prisoners are commonly placed in a cell with other prisoners—usually all Chinese—who are well on the way to being reformed and who subject him to a process known as the "struggle" to help him recognize and admit his criminality. Hour after hour, from morning to night, they repeat the accusations against him and urge him to confess. They respond to him in no other way than as a criminal and as an object of a "struggle." The prisoner's past status as priest, doctor, or missionary is treated only as a "cover up" for his "spy personality."

. . . Each attempt on the part of the prisoner to reassert his adult human identity . . . ("I am not a spy. I am a doctor"; or "This must be a mistake. I am a priest; I am telling the truth.") was considered a show of resistance and of "insincerity" and called forth new assaults.⁸²

The prisoner is never left alone, not even to perform the most intimate body functions. Until he is able to embark on the long road to a full and satisfactory confession, the prisoner is often put into chains. Besides being subjected to pain, he is rendered as helpless as an infant, and made totally dependent upon others for the satisfaction of every physical need.

When you get back [to your cell] you are obliged to stand with chains on your ankles and holding your

⁸⁰ Quoted by Edgar H. Schein with Inge Schneider and Curtis H. Barker, *Coercive Persuasion* (New York: Norton, 1961), p. 15.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² Robert Jay Lifton, M.D., *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism* (New York: Norton, 1961), p. 67.

hands behind your back. They don't assist you because you are too reactionary. . . . You eat as a dog does, with your mouth and teeth. You arrange the cup and bowl with your nose to try to absorb broth twice a day. If you have to make water they open your trousers. . . .³³ [Subjected to such treatment, the person feels himself] deprived of the power, mastery, and selfhood of adult existence . . . men began to exist on a level which was neither sleep nor wakefulness, but rather an in-between hypnagogic state. In this state they were . . . more readily influenced.³⁴

But the prisoner sometimes begins to internalize the attitudes of others toward himself and to view himself in the mirror of the degrading and humiliating treatment he is given. He begins to believe in his own guilt, to acknowledge his utter dependence upon his captors, and to earnestly desire to be once again restored to human society on any terms.

Sudden leniency on the part of prison officials is often decisive at this point.

. . . An official came to see me and he spoke to me in a very friendly voice. "The government doesn't want to kill you. It wants to reform you. We don't want to punish you at all, we just want to reeducate you." . . . It was my first glimmer of hope. I felt finally there might be a way out. I wasn't feeling so hopelessly alone any more. The official had actually shown some human quality.³⁵

Once the prisoner begins to confess, he is subjected to intensive "reeducation." Group study programs, lasting as long as ten to sixteen hours, focus not only on academic discussions of Marxist theory and practice but on self-criticism and analysis to ensure total intellectual and emotional agreement with official doctrine. Confession and self-condemnation are continuously refined and elaborated during the period of imprisonment.

The evidence now available suggests that brainwashing is rarely successful in achieving a permanent transformation in the ideas and values of individuals subjected to it. This evidence is based almost

entirely on the experience of repatriated prisoners who returned to a Western setting. It is not known how successful brainwashing might be among prisoners who continue to live in China where their "thought reform" would be supported and reinforced daily or among Chinese themselves.

Several conclusions can be tentatively stated concerning both the success and the failure of resocialization by brainwashing techniques.

1. Resocialization is apt to be unsuccessful when, as in brainwashing, it is submitted to under duress, against the individual's will, and without "anticipatory socialization" on his part.

2. Attempts at "reform" can achieve some success if they are related to values already held by the individual. Accounts of brainwashing often include reports of efforts to arouse a sense of personal guilt by invoking the failure of the individual to have lived up to his own values in the past. This is illustrated in the following exchange between a priest and his prison "instructor":

Instructor: Do you believe man should serve others?

Priest: Yes, of course I do.

Instructor: Are you familiar with the Biblical saying, "I come on earth to serve, not to be served"?

Priest: Yes, as a priest it is my creed.

Instructor: Did you have a servant in your mission [in China]?

Priest: Yes, I did.

Instructor: Who made your bed in the morning and swept the floor?

Priest: My servant did this.

Instructor: You did not live up to your doctrine very well, did you, Father?³⁶

3. Resocialization seems to succeed insofar as it induces "spiritual humility" as in the above example. But it is not likely to be successful if it degrades and humiliates the person in his own eyes and those of others.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

4. Resocialization is unsuccessful in working a genuine transformation if it gains compliance merely by disorienting the person and then offering him a way out of his plight. When the individual is deprived

of all social supports and psychological satisfactions, he is likely to suffer a mental breakdown or, at best, become confused, apathetic, and compliant in an external, mechanical way.

Adaptation 9 / Dornbusch **SOCIALIZING THE CADET**

The function of a military academy is to make officers out of civilians or enlisted men. The objective is accomplished by a twofold process of transmitting technical knowledge and of instilling in the candidates an outlook considered appropriate for members of the profession.³⁷

The Coast Guard Academy, like West Point, Annapolis, and the Air Force Academy, provides four years of training for a career as a regular officer. Unlike the other service academies, however, the Coast Guard Academy's cadet corps is relatively small. This disparity in size probably produces differences in the methods of informal social control. Although all the findings reported here may not be applicable to the other academies, many of the mechanisms by which this academy socializes the cadet are probably used in a wide variety of social institutions.

The suppression of prior statuses The new cadet, or "swab," is the lowest of the low. The assignment of low status encourages the cadet to place a high value on successfully completing the steps in an Academy career, and requires that there be a loss of identity based on preexisting statuses. This clean break with the past must be achieved in a relatively short period. For two months, therefore, the swab is not allowed to leave the base or to engage in social intercourse with non-cadets. Complete isolation helps to produce a unified group of swabs, rather than a heterogeneous collec-

tion of persons of high and low status. Uniforms are issued on the first day, and discussions of wealth and family background are taboo. Although the pay of the cadet is very low, he is not permitted to receive money from home. The role of the cadet must supersede other roles the individual has been accustomed to play. There are few clues left which will reveal social status in the outside world.

Conflict between rules and tradition There are two sets of rules which regulate the cadet's behavior. The first is the body of regulations of the Academy, considered

by the public to be the primary source of control. These regulations are similar to the code of ethics of any profession. They serve in part as propaganda to influence outsiders. In addition, official regulations help support the second set of expectations, the informal rules. Offenses against the informal rules are merely labeled as breaches of the formal code, and the appropriate punishment according to the regulations is then imposed. This punitive system conceals the existence of the informal set of controls.

In case of conflict between the regulations and tradition, the regu-

SOURCE: Abridged from Sanford M. Dornbusch, "The Military Academy as an Assimilating Institution," *Social Forces*, 33, No. 4 (May, 1955), 316-321. Published in this form by permission of the author and *Social Forces*.

³⁷ In the original paper the process of instilling an appropriate outlook is referred to as the "assimilating function" of the military academy. Cf. Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921), pp. 735, 737.

lations are superseded. For example, it is against the regulations to have candy in one's room. A first classman orders a swab to bring him candy. Caught en route by an officer, the swab offers no excuse and is given fifteen demerits. First classmen are then informally told by the classmate involved that they are to withhold demerits for the swab until he has been excused for offenses totaling fifteen demerits. Experience at an Academy teaches future officers that regulations are not considered of paramount importance when they conflict with informal codes.

The development of solidarity The control system operates through the class hierarchy. The first class, consisting of cadets in their third or fourth year at the Academy, are only nominally under the control of the officers of the Academy. Only one or two officers attempt to check on the activities of the first classmen, so that they are able to break most of the minor regulations with impunity. The first class is given almost complete control over the rest of the cadet corps. Informally, certain leading cadets are even called in to advise the officers on important disciplinary matters. There are one or two classes between the first classmen and the swabs, depending on the existence of a three- or four-year course. The middle classes haze the swabs. Hazing is forbidden by the regulations, but the practice is a hallowed tradition of the Academy. The first class demands that hazing take place, and, since they have the power to give demerits, all members of the middle classes are compelled to haze the new cadets.

As a consequence of undergoing unpleasant experiences together, the swab class develops remarkable unity. For example, if a cadet cannot answer an oral question addressed to him by his teacher, no other member of his class will answer. All reply, "I can't say, sir," leaving the teacher without a clue to the state of knowledge of this student compared to the rest of the class. Such group cohesion persists throughout the Academy period, with first classmen refusing to give demerits to their classmates unless an officer directly orders them to do so.

The basis for interclass solidarity, the development of group feeling on the part of the entire cadet corps, is not so obvious. It occurs through informal contacts between the upper classmen and swabs, a type of fraternization which occurs despite the fact it traditionally is discouraged. The men who haze the swab and order him hazed live in the same wing of the dormitory that he does. Coming from an outside world which disapproves of authoritarian punishment and aggressiveness, they are ashamed of their behavior. They are eager to convince the swab that they are good fellows. They visit his room to explain why they are being so harsh this week or to tell of a mistake he is making. Close friendships sometimes arise through such behavior, but the friendships must be concealed. One first classman often ordered his room cleaned by a swab as a "punishment," then settled down for an uninterrupted chat. Such informal contacts serve to unite the classes and spread a "we-feeling" through the Academy.

In addition, the knowledge of

common interests and a common destiny serves to bind together all Academy graduates. This unifying force is expressed in the identification of the interest of the individual with the interest of the Coast Guard. A large appropriation or an increase in the size of the Coast Guard will speed the rate of promotion for all, whether ensign or captain. A winning football team at the Academy may familiarize more civilians with the name of their common alma mater. Good publicity for the Coast Guard raises the status of the Coast Guard officer.

Fostering self-esteem The Coast Guard regulars are united in their disdain for the reserves. There are few reserve officers during peacetime, but in wartime reserve officers soon outnumber the regulars. The reserves do not achieve the higher ranks, but they are a threat to the cadets and recent graduates of the Academy. The reserves receive in a few months the rank that the regulars reach only after four grueling years. The Academy men therefore protectively stigmatize the reserves as incompetents. If a cadet falters on the parade ground, he is told, "You're marching like a reserve." Swabs are told to square their shoulders while on liberty, "or else how will people know you are not a reserve?" Myths spring up—stories of reserve commanders who must call on regular ensigns for advice. The net effect is reassurance that although the interlopers may have the same rank, they do not have equal status.

An increase in the cadet's self-esteem develops in conjunction with identification in his new role.



Military courtesy and discipline

Told that they are members of an elite group, respected by the community, most cadets begin to feel at ease in a superordinate role. One may be a low-ranking cadet, but cadets as a group have high status. When cadets visit home for the first time, there is a conflict between the lofty role that they wish to play and the role to which their parents are accustomed. Upon return to the Academy, much conversation is concerned with the way things at home have changed.

This feeling of superiority helps to develop self-confidence in those cadets who previously had a low evaluation of themselves. It directly enters into relationships with girls, with whom many boys lack self-confidence. It soon becomes apparent that any cadet can get a date whenever he wishes, and he

even begins to feel that he is a good "catch." The cadet gains a new way of viewing the behavior of himself and others. As one cadet put it, "I used to be shy. Now I'm reserved."

Social mobility The cadets are told that they will be members of the social elite during the later stages of their career. The obstacles that they meet at the Academy are then viewed as the usual barriers to social mobility in the United States, a challenge to be surmounted. And the Academy is perceived as a status machine, a vehicle through which to achieve higher social status.

Various practices at the Academy reinforce the cadets' feeling that they are learning how to enter the upper classes. There is a strong

emphasis on etiquette, from calling cards to table manners. The Tactics Officer has been known to give long lectures on such topics as the manner of drinking soup from an almost empty bowl. The cadet must submit for approval the name of the girl he intends to take to the monthly formal dance. Girls attending an upper-class college in the vicinity are automatically acceptable, but some cadets claim that their dates with girls in low-status occupations, such as waitresses, have been rejected.

Another Academy tradition actively, though informally, encourages contact with higher status girls. After the swabs have been completely isolated for two months, they are invited to a dance at which all the girls are relatives or friends of Coast Guard officers. A week later the girls at the nearby college have a dance for the swabs. The next weekend finds the swab compelled to invite an acceptable girl to a formal reception. He must necessarily choose from the only girls in the area whom he knows.

Justification of institutional practices In addition to the social mobility theme which views the rigor of Academy life as training for higher status, there is a more open method of justifying traditional ways of doing things. The phrase "separating the men from the boys" is used to meet objections to practices which seem inefficient or foolish. Traditional standards are thus redefined as further tests of ability to take punishment. Harsh practices are defended as methods by which the insincere, incompetent, or undisciplined cadets are weeded out. Cadets who rebel and resign are

merely showing lack of character.³⁸

Almost all cadets accept, to some extent, the traditional view of resignations as admissions of defeat. Of the 162 entering cadets in 1944, only 52 graduated in 1948. The 110 resignations were largely voluntary, without pressure from the Academy authorities, and most of the resignations came at a time when the hazing was comparatively mild. Cadets who wish to resign do not leave when the hazing might be considered the

cause of their departure. One cadet's history illustrates the desire to have the resignation appear completely voluntary. Asked to resign because of his lack of physical coordination, he spent an entire year building up his physique, returned to the Academy, finished his swab year, and then joyously quit. "It took me three years, but I showed them."

Every cadet who voluntarily resigns is a threat to the morale of the cadet corps, since he has re-

jected the values of the Academy. Although cadets enlist for seven years and could theoretically be forced to remain at the Academy, the usual procedure is to isolate them from the swabs and rush acceptance of their resignation. While they are waiting to be separated, cadets who have resigned are freed from the usual duties of their classmates. This action isolates them from cadets who might be affected by their disenchantment.

Conclusion Socializing the cadet goes beyond combat training or seamanship. Cadets are systematically isolated from the outside world, given a new personal and social identity, and instilled with a sense of solidarity. The new role is a new social world.

³⁸ "At each step of the ceremonies he feels that he is brought a little closer, until at last he can feel himself a man among men." A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *The Andaman Islanders* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1948), p. 279.

SECTION 5 CULTURE, PERSONALITY, AND HUMAN NATURE

Through socialization each culture places its distinctive mark on human personality. The more homogeneous the culture, the more likely it is to produce a characteristic type of person who reflects the dominant ethos or culture theme. In one society the representative personality may be relaxed and easygoing, careless of time, and tolerant of uncleanness. In another society, quite opposite characteristics occur.

This sort of observation has been the commonplace of travelers for many centuries; but it is recognized that untrained observers leap easily to generalized images or stereotypes. Americans are apt to think of the English as "stuffy" and "unemotional," and the English to think of Americans as "brash" and "crude," and both to think of Latins as "undependable" and "volatile."

BASIC PERSONALITY³⁹

Anthropologists and sociologists approach the subject of representative personalities with caution because of the wide variation in personality observed within cultures and the difficulty of defining what is "representative." The concept of representative personality (sometimes called "basic personality," "modal personality," or "social character") points toward a *common core* of traits shared by members of a society, but there is some disagreement about the meaning of this.

1. "Representative" may mean simply the statistically frequent. Any item of behavior exhibited by a large number of people in a society would then be part of its "representative personality."

³⁹ For a discussion of "basic personality," see A. Kardiner, *The Psychological Frontiers of Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945).

2. "Representative" may mean those common characteristics of personality which exist despite differences in overt behavior. Attention is then directed not toward the minutiae of observable behavior and response, but toward basic underlying orientations and outlooks, for example, Riesman's "tradition-directed," "inner-directed," and "other-directed" types. (See Table IV:3 p. 104.)

3. "Representative" personality sometimes means the personality which most fully expresses the spirit or ethos of a culture. In this sense the representative personality may be shared by only a minority. It is a kind of personality most easily integrated into dominant social institutions. The cultivated Englishman, product of a distinctive system of education, is representative in this sense.

Basic personality is culture as it is reflected in the individual's organized way of responding. If we assume that a culture tends to make the same kind of impress on the personalities it touches, the culture itself may be studied through the regularities in personality among the members of one society compared with another. This perspective reminds us that norms and patterns have reality only as they occur in someone's behavior or personality.

National character The emphasis on propaganda in contemporary international relations and the importance of national morale have led to efforts to assess national character, which is another term for basic personality when the subject of study is a whole nation. It is assumed that knowledge of basic personality will give evidence of the dispositions of a people to respond to certain types of propaganda, to go to war, to accept defeat, or to withstand great stress. Studies of national character have usually been carried on from a distance because they have been stimulated by interest in understanding an actual or potential enemy. Notable examples are the studies of Japanese character during World War II and more

recent studies of Russian character.⁴⁰ These efforts involve considerable speculation, but they suggest the potential importance of studying basic personality.

Three limitations to this approach should be mentioned:

1. Modern societies are complex and heterogeneous. There are class differences, urban and rural differences, and ethnic differences, all of which may influence basic personality and lead to not one but a number of core types.

2. Even if there is a basic personality, it does not follow that decisions by political leaders are directly affected. Political decision is the outcome of many factors, and attitudes built up because of basic personality dispositions may be offset by other forces.

3. Even sound knowledge of basic personality is not necessarily specific enough to permit us to predict how people will behave in particular situations. If the representative personality of a culture is aggressive, for example, this does not tell what the object of aggression will be.

SEX AND TEMPERAMENT

All societies distinguish between the roles of men and women, assigning to each sex special tasks, duties, and prerogatives. In Western society, differences in the roles of men and women are associated with sharp and contrasting differences in temperament. The female is regarded as naturally nonaggressive and passive, the male as naturally aggressive and active. The contrasting temperaments of men and women have been associated with the dominance of one and the submission of the other. Thus, the more dominating a man, the more masculine he is thought to be; the more passive and pliant a woman, the more feminine.

Mead analyzed three primitive societies (Arapesh, Mundugumor, and Tchambuli), on the island of New Guinea, to determine whether temperamental differences between males and females are universal.⁴¹

⁴⁰ See Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946); Margaret Mead, *Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951); and Alexander H. Leighton, *Human Relations in a Changing World* (New York: Dutton, 1949).

⁴¹ This discussion is indebted to Margaret Mead, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies* (New York: Morrow, 1935).

The ideal *Arapesh*, man or woman, is gentle, responsive, unaggressive, and "maternal." A child is not regarded as the result of a single act of impregnation, but must be fed and shaped in the mother's womb by repeated unions of mother and father. The verb "to bear a child" may refer either to a man or a woman. After an infant is born, the husband lies down at his wife's side and is said to be "in bed having a baby." Husband and wife together observe the taboos and perform the ceremonies that accompany the birth of a child. Later, the husband shares in child care.

The minute day-by-day care of little children, with its routine, its exasperations, its wails of misery that cannot be correctly interpreted, these are as congenial to the *Arapesh* men as they are to the *Arapesh* women. And in recognition of this care, as well as in recognition of the father's initial contribution, if one comments upon a middle-aged man as good-looking, the people answer: "Good-looking? Ye-e-s? But you should have seen him before he bore all those children."⁴²

Sexual aggressiveness is attributed to neither sex. Rape is unknown among the *Arapesh*; their image of male sexuality makes it psychologically alien to them. The *Arapesh* permit polygyny (one husband, multiple wives), but it is not regarded as an ideal state.

Among the *Mundugumor*, both men and women are aggressive, harsh, and violent. In the structure of *Mundugumor* society the father and his daughters form one group, the mother and her sons another. Pregnancy is welcomed by neither parent, for the father fears a son and the mother a daughter. The crying infant is suckled only as a last resort, and then with the mother in a strained, standing position. The infant is removed as soon as he stops suckling. Weaning consists of slapping the child and thrusting him away.

Both sexes are regarded as sexually aggressive, and sex play, especially in premarital encounters in the bush, takes the form of mutual scratching and biting.

Polygyny is an ideal. Wives bring wealth and power by growing and curing tobacco, but new marriages are a further stimulus to hostility. Throughout life there is antagonism between the sexes. In this battle women "... are believed to be just as violent, just as aggressive, just as jealous [as men]. They simply are not quite as strong physically, although often a woman can put up a very good fight, and a husband who wishes to beat his wife takes care to arm himself with a crocodile-jaw and to be sure that she is not armed."⁴³

Among the *Tchambuli*, sharply divergent roles are prescribed for the sexes and are accompanied by marked temperamental differences. The roles reverse Western notions about what is naturally male and female temperament. *Tchambuli* economic life is supervised by the women, and the men devote themselves in separate establishments to art and ceremony. The women work together in easy and bantering camaraderie, and the men are anxious, distrustful of each other, and given to "catty" remarks. The women are efficient and unadorned, the men self-conscious and arrayed in bird-of-paradise feathers. The women work and support the community; the men arrange ceremonies and dances to entertain and amuse the women.

Women are regarded as more actively and urgently sexed than men. The men's emotional life centers around the women. One source of this emotional dependence is the experience of the young male child. In infancy and early childhood he lives as an integral part of the women's community, where his experiences are pleasant and intimate. For a number of years, when he is considered too old to spend all his time with the women but is still too young to be accepted into the adult male community, he lives in a kind of emotional limbo. His earliest and deepest ties are to women, and these ties are never counterbalanced by his experiences in the male community.

Caution Although men and women do take on distinctive personality traits in different cultures, in

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 39. Reprinted by permission of William Morrow & Co., Inc.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

no society is there a dead level of temperament. Among the Arapesh, for example, there were noticeable differences in the degree to which individuals were unaggressive and nonviolent. Nevertheless, even the most active Arapesh child is less aggressive than a normally active American child.

HUMAN NATURE

Because the individual's own responses seem spontaneous and natural to him, he often regards them as part of his essential humanity rather than as the result of a particular training and experience. On the other hand, once the efficacy of socialization is understood, it is easy to fall into the opposite fallacy

and to deny that there are limitations to human malleability.

When we speak of the "nature" of wood and water, we mean that it responds in ascertainable ways to known conditions. If too large a nail is driven into hard wood, it may crack; if water is heated to 212° F. at sea level, it will boil. To know the nature of anything is to know also its potentialities and limits. The problem of human nature should be understood in the same matter-of-fact way.

The idea of human nature is clear enough when it refers to the study of man as a physical organism. The more we learn about body chemistry and physiology, the more we can say about the organism's responses to the invasion of bacteria and to changes in temperature, pressure, and nutrition. Similarly, various psychological phenomena, such as learning and perceiving, seem to follow laws that are characteristic of the whole species. But man also has personality, characterized by dispositions to respond in emotional ways, by the development of a self, and by psychological defenses.

When we turn to the socially relevant aspects of man's psychic structure, such challenging questions as the following are raised: Are there universal psychological characteristics which affect the way men relate themselves to each other? Do these characteristics, if they exist, set limits on the kinds of social arrangements that are psychologically acceptable? Or are psychic tolerances so broad that *any* kind of social organization is possible? Are some aspirations, such as the quest for power, part of essential human nature, or are they products of socialization in a given culture?

Some of these questions have been explored in the comparative study of personality and society. Investigations such as Mead's study of sex and temperament and Malinowski's of the Oedipus complex test whether the asserted uniformities in human nature exist. (See *Adaptation* 10, pp. 117-119.)

A recent approach to the study of human nature is the attempt to identify emotional needs which demand satisfaction in social arrangements. Fromm asserts that man has a fundamental need for belonging, for being securely part of a community which



Communication and basic humanity: A New Guinean, knowing no English, binds an Australian soldier's wounds and guides him for two days and nights through the jungle to his camp.

can give him emotional support.⁴⁴ The growth of economic and political freedom in Western society has tended to isolate the individual and to bring about the withdrawal of older social supports. Fromm's analysis is based on neo-Freudian psychology. This point of view recognizes the importance of social influences but maintains that the human psychic structure is naturally fragile, because it grows out of and depends upon social interaction. The continued support of others through love, affection, and social approval is needed. The neo-Freudians hold that man is *anxiety-prone* and that social groups must provide conditions that alleviate anxiety. If these supports are lacking, the individual will seek a way out of

anxiety, sometimes with severe consequences for political order. Anxiety may manifest itself in several ways; in overaggressiveness, submission to authority, or in apathetic withdrawal.

A common human nature does not necessarily lead directly to uniformities in behavior. What is observed depends on the conditions within which response takes place, and what is learned is *the disposition of the person to respond*. If the need for personal security is a fundamental part of human nature, the need will be revealed in a wide variety of ways. An understanding of the underlying psychic condition can reveal much about potential responses of children and adults to anxiety-provoking situations.

⁴⁴ Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1941), and Erich Fromm, *Man for Himself* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1947).

Adaptation 10 / Malinowski **AUTHORITY AND SOCIALIZATION IN A PRIMITIVE SOCIETY**

Freud's theory According to Freudian psychoanalytic theory, the family universally gives rise to a typical constellation of feelings called the "Oedipus complex," in which the male child feels hostility toward his father because the child desires exclusive access to his mother. This hostility must be suppressed, but it manifests itself in later life as antagonism toward male authority figures. Freud held that the source of hostility to the father was sexual feeling on the part of the child for the mother. He believed that the Oedipus complex appears in disguised form in fairy tales, legends, and myths. For example, in the Greek mythical drama for which Freud named the complex, Oedipus unknowingly but inevitably killed his father and married his mother. Freud regarded the myth as evidence for the existence of the complex. The myth was a symbolic and socially acceptable form for expressing the repressed desire to return to a warm and intimate relation with the mother.

Malinowski's theory Malinowski approached the study of the Oedipus complex from the standpoint of anthropological studies, which show wide variation in family structure. He held that the pattern of "conflicts, passions, and attachments" within the family varied according to the structure. Malinowski's hypothesis was that the hostility of the male

SOURCE: A partial summary of Bronislaw Malinowski, *Sex and Repression in Savage Society* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1927).

child was directed against the father not in his role as husband of the mother, but in his role as authority over the child, and that the source of the Oedipus complex was not sexual jealousy but resentment of the father's power to dominate. He reasoned that if his hypothesis were correct, the Oedipus complex was not universal but a product of the middle-class family in Western society. This family is patriarchal, and the father has the dominant power within it. Other societies, however, distribute power differently, and the father has power in varying degrees. There are some societies in which he has very little power. Malinowski tested his hypothesis in the light of his extensive knowledge of the Trobriand Islanders (east of New Guinea), who vest authority over the child in the mother's brother rather than in the father.

The father The Trobriand Islanders are matrilineal, that is, kinship is reckoned through the mother only, succession and inheritance descend in the female line, and children belong to the mother's family, clan, and community. A boy inherits the social position and the possessions, not of his father but of his maternal uncle.

Matrimony is monogamous except for chiefs. The Trobrianders are ignorant of conception and do not regard the husband as the father of the children. He gives the children loving care and tender companionship in early childhood, but his authority over them is only by virtue of his personal relations with them. The mother's brother is the socially recognized source of authority.

Marriage in the Trobriand Islands is patrilocal: the wife goes to live with her husband in a house in his community. The children live with the father in childhood, but they belong to the mother's community. Their real home is where their maternal uncle lives.

The maternal uncle The child is integrated into the life of the community and learns his role and obligations in society from his mother's brother. This maternal

uncle, not the father, directs the boy's occupations, teaches him tribal laws and prohibitions, and requires certain services of him. The work he does with his uncle contributes to his own community in which he will eventually take his place. Although he continues to work with his father, he does so out of good will and friendship, for this work contributes to his father's community of people who are legally strangers to him. The uncle holds the key to the boy's social status, wealth, power, and family pride. Therefore, to the Trobriand boy, the uncle is idealized as the model of right behavior and is the person to please and emulate.

During adolescence the young boy learns his duties, is instructed in traditions and magic, in arts and crafts. At this time relations between the boy and his uncle are most intimate and satisfactory, and the father suffers a temporary eclipse in the child's life.

The authority and discipline exercised by the uncle inevitably prove irksome to the child, and the ideal of behavior provided by him, a burden. Although the education received from his uncle is the road to mature status in the community, it requires from him the renunciation of childhood pleasures and the repression of childhood im-

pulses. The child reveres his uncle, but he also resents him, and this hostility must be repressed and denied.

Unlike the father in our society, the Trobriand father escapes these feelings of hostility. Without authority and the power to discipline, he invokes no dislike on the part of the child. On the contrary, he provides a haven and a refuge when friction between the child and his uncle develops.

Myth and reality Following Freud's suggestion that repressed feelings find outlet in myth and legend, Malinowski examined Trobriand stories. He found that the father is not mentioned in their mythology. Myths are based upon the matrilineal family pattern, and the central male role is usually taken by the maternal uncle, who is typically the villain. He abandons the nephew or withholds the art of magic from him and is murdered by the nephew. These myths are double-edged. They may mean that the uncle finds his duties to his nephew irksome or that the nephew would be glad to be rid of his debt of gratitude to his uncle.

The mutual hostility and suspicion between uncle and nephew in myths have their parallel in reality. While it is the duty of the uncle to

pass on to his nephew the family possessions, the nephew is in fact bound to make a substantial payment for inheritance. When a father gives gifts to his son, he al-

ways does so out of sheer affection, and magic is as often received from the father as a gift as it is inherited from the uncle. However, when magic is inherited from the

uncle, there may be a suspicion in the nephew's mind that he has been cheated of his full share. Suspicion does not arise when the magic is a gift from the father.

Conclusion Malinowski disagreed with Freud on two counts. He concluded (1) that the Oedipus complex, as Freud described it, is not universal but a product of the patriarchal family in Western society, and (2) that the hostility found in the Oedipus complex is directed against the father, not because of his sexual relation to the mother, but because of his social relation to the child. This social relation is an *authority* relation, and hostility will center around whoever has dominant authority within the family.

The authority problem of the maternal uncle in Trobriand society lies in the divided loyalties of the uncle-father and the dilemma of authority and intimacy.

1. The family system of the Trobriand Islanders is subject to *divided loyalties*. The uncle is father to his own children and bound to them by ties of affection, and he may resent his obligations to his nephew—obligations which must have preference over his personal relations with his children and his wife. The nephew's fear of abandonment, hostility, and suspicion may, therefore, be not so much the result of rebellion against the uncle's authority as a recognition of the uncle's divided loyalties. By the standards of Trobriand culture, the uncle ought to be wholly committed to the nephew, but the nephew knows he is not.

2. The uncle is not only an authority figure for the nephew but his educator as well. Education must involve him in intimate relations with his nephew. When authority is combined with intimacy, it is likely to generate hostility. The intimacy leads to expectations that the person will be treated with affection and leniency, while the authority relation leads to a measure of impersonal judgment. In other words, it is not authority alone that engenders hostility, but authority combined with a personal or primary relationship.

Caution While Malinowski's study is an interesting attempt to test psychological hypotheses by anthropological investigation, it should not be concluded that the specific issue treated here is definitely settled.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ For some of the debate on this topic, see Ernest Jones, "Mother-Right and the Sexual Ignorance of Savages," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, VI, Part 2 (April, 1925), pp. 109-130. See also Harold D. Lasswell, "A Hypothesis Rooted in the Preconceptions of a Single Civilization Tested by Bronislaw Malinowski," in Stuart A. Rice (ed.), *Methods in Social Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), pp. 480-488.

CHAPTER V

PRIMARY GROUPS

SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION

Students of society have given much attention to the primary relation and the primary group—the characteristic setting within which intimate, person-centered interaction takes place. This chapter examines the nature of the primary group and shows its significance for the individual, for associations, and for society.

The term “primary group” was first used by Cooley to refer to groups

... characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideas of the individual. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group. Perhaps the simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying that it is a “we”; it involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which “we” is the natural expression. One lives in the feeling of the

whole and finds the chief aims of his will in that feeling.¹

For close analysis it is necessary to distinguish the primary relation and the primary group.


THE PRIMARY RELATION

A primary relation has the following chief characteristics:

1. *Response is to whole persons rather than to segments.* In the primary relation the participants interact as unique and total individuals. Uniqueness means that response is to a particular person and is not transferable to other persons. Wholeness means (a) that one responds to many aspects of another's character and background, and (b) that one responds spontaneously and freely, as a unified self, permitting feelings to enter the relationship. The less transferable the response and the more complete the interaction, the more primary is the relation.

¹ Charles Horton Cooley, *Social Organization* (New York: Scribner's, 1909), p. 23.

Charles Horton Cooley (1864–1929) is rightly regarded as one of the founders of sociology. He is best known for his writings on socialization and the primary group. Like the American pragmatists George H. Mead and John Dewey, Cooley emphasized the social nature of the self. It had been customary in Western thought to treat the relation between the individual and society as a philosophical problem and to ask: Why should the individual take on social values? Cooley and others held that the relation between the individual and society is an empirical one, and that the proper question is: How does the individual take on social values? They viewed socialization as a natural process.




Many human relations are not primary because they are highly transferable, readily directed and re-directed to many persons, and because they are narrowly circumscribed. For example, the relation between clerk and customer is a transferable one; each acts in standardized ways that are applicable to other clerks and other customers. Furthermore, the relation involves only those aspects of each person relevant to conducting a business transaction. To take account of another as a person instead of as a clerk or a customer is to become aware of and to adapt to many facets of the other's personality.

Entering a primary relation presumes acceptance of a whole person. For instance, the relation between husband and wife is understood to be not a contract but an unlimited commitment one to the other, where each assumes full responsibility for the other's well-

being. In contrast nonprimary relations (often called secondary) usually entail only limited, segmental response of one individual to another, for example the relation between many employers and employees.

2. *Communication is deep and extensive.* In the primary relation few limits are placed on the range and the mode of communication. In nonprimary relations communication is limited to specific topics. In the primary relation, communication is often by hints, clues, nonverbal and private behavior as well as by words; feelings and needs are revealed that are hidden in public situations. Nonprimary relations are not meant to reveal the deeper layers of personality and tend to be restricted to formal and public modes of interaction.

The depth of communication in primary relations is important because the expression of feelings and



Left, upper: The proprietor and friends are gathered around the stove in his Vermont general store.


Left, lower left: Rafer Johnson, Olympic decathlon champion, and C. K. Yang of Nationalist China. College friends, international competitors.

Left, lower right: A circus bicycle performer holds his sleeping baby just before his act goes on.

Below: A survey engineer talks with the captain of a labor gang in New Guinea.

PERSON TO PERSON

Each of these pictures is a study in personal relations, a blend of behavior defined by social roles and spontaneous person-to-person interaction. Spontaneity and intimacy afford opportunity for personal response and self-expression, but interaction is also governed and constrained by the situation, by the role, and by the past history of interpersonal experience.



beliefs tends to influence the feelings and beliefs of others. Although communication does not guarantee agreement, it does facilitate and encourage it, and where communication is intimate and extensive, similar attitudes and feelings naturally tend to develop. In nonprimary relations, though there may be agreement or understanding on some matters, it may not be carried over to other matters. In the primary relation, however, increased communication brings with it an increased opportunity for individuals to influence each other. Cooley emphasized the contribution of the primary group to the formation of character, for example, in the influence of parents upon children.

Primary relations do not presume unqualified affection and cordiality. All relationships involve tensions as well as positive responses, but they cannot long subsist on antagonism. The primary relation entails a positive valuing of the other, a sense of belonging together and sharing a common identity. When a personal relation is characterized by antagonism, communication is hampered and response is usually limited to a part of the other's personality.

3. *Personal satisfactions are paramount.* Individuals enter into primary relations because such relations contribute to personal development, security, and well-being. In the primary relation the individual is accepted for himself and not merely as a means to a practical objective. To the extent that a job gives psychological satisfaction, one may expect to find that primary relations have developed in the work situation.

Primary relations usually, but not necessarily, involve face-to-face interaction. Families, lovers, and friends may be separated physically yet maintain their primary relations. Obviously, many face-to-face settings are impersonal, for example a courtroom. Hence being face-to-face should not be considered part of the definition of a primary relation.³ It is a congenial condition and a probable accompaniment rather than an essential feature.

The chief characteristics of the primary relation—

response to whole persons, deep and extensive communication, and personal satisfactions—are observable when the quality of “primaryness” is most fully developed. In experience, primary groups vary from the ideal type, and most primary relations are incomplete, even those between friends and lovers. Nevertheless, the primary relation model can help diagnose situations in which the incompleteness of the relation is a source of tension and frustration.

THE PRIMARY GROUP

A group is primary insofar as it is based upon and sustains primary relations. Where people live or work together closely for some time, groups based on primary relations usually emerge. Families, play groups, and neighborhood circles offer congenial conditions for primary group development.

However, not all small groups are primary. For example, a committee working together over a considerable time, but composed of men of varying backgrounds, ages, and ranks, may offer little opportunity for primary group formation. Small size facilitates primary group formation but in itself is not sufficient.

On the other hand, largeness, although not a congenial condition, does not necessarily prevent formation of primary groups. Sociologists sometimes speak of whole communities as based on primary relations. *Gemeinschaft* or “primary community” designates a type of society characterized by (1) an assignment of status to the whole person so that his job and the rest of his life form a unity; (2) a high degree of cohesion based on the widespread sharing of common attitudes and aims; and (3) a sense of unlimited commitment to the community, which is conceived as an enlarged kinship group, the source of one's personal identity. (See SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, p. 48.)

Such diverse groups as families, soldier groups, boys' gangs, and factory cliques can be classified together because they are based to a significant extent on primary relations and perform functions normally expected of primary groups, such as giving the indi-

³ See Ellsworth Faris, “The Primary Group: Essence and Accident,” *American Journal of Sociology*, 38 (July, 1932), 41-50.

vidual emotional support. Clearly, however, all these groups do not protect or gratify the individual in the same way or to the same degree. A primary group within a factory can do some important things for the individual and can affect the factory organization; but it cannot do the family's job, just as the family cannot perform the factory group's functions. A primary group can be understood only in the social context within which it has developed.

Caution Because of this topic's connection with such experiences as love, friendship, and family life, the student may mistakenly conclude that primary relations are necessarily good and nonprimary relations are somehow inherently bad. It is true that primary relations bear closely on personal satisfaction. This does not mean, however, that just because a relation is primary, it is desirable, nor that direct personal satisfaction is the only criterion of social worth.

In many situations, it is advantageous to maintain relatively impersonal relations. Much business, military, educational, and legal experience suggests the

wisdom of formalizing relations in order, for example, to establish equality of treatment. Formalization permits decisions to be made with reference to the task at hand. Professional standards can be upheld or individuals assigned to hazardous duties free from the pressures of personal claims on those in authority.

The relationship between faculty and students is an instance of the problem of formal vs. primary relations. Quite properly both professors and students value informal and easy contacts; yet such contacts are engaged in with real risks. The professor who is too easily accessible may find it more difficult to make objective judgments about grades, or he may be suspected of being influenced by his personal attachments. Because of this, many professors sacrifice part of their friendly relations with students rather than jeopardize impartiality and objectivity. The problem arises even more seriously for judges and other government officials. The long historic effort to achieve "a government of laws and not of men" reflects the social value of nonprimary relations in situations where objectivity is paramount.

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Periodicals

Human Relations

Sociometry

SECTION 2 THE PRIMARY GROUP AND THE INDIVIDUAL

When Cooley first identified primary groups, he called them the "nurseries of human nature"³ because of their importance in giving social direction to the individual's developing personality. The socializing function of primary groups has been considered in the preceding chapter. This section discusses the *individual-sustaining function* of the primary group, the kinds of support it can give to the person.

The primary group is the main link between the individual and society. It does the work society requires of getting the individual to want to work or fight or exercise self-restraint, because it serves his personal needs. Membership in a primary group gives him emotional support which binds him to the group and, through it, to the aims of the larger society.

The need of the individual for group support has long been recognized and is often used as a powerful instrument of social control. The extreme form of control based on this need is banishment, a technique regarded in some societies as equivalent to capital punishment. However, the severity of this punishment varies with the completeness of the personal isolation forced upon the individual. The more isolated an individual is from his immediate primary group and from the opportunity to create new primary relations, the greater is his distress. A political exile isolated from home ties may experience severe distress, but if he goes abroad with his family and a retinue of followers, he continues to be supported by primary group ties.

The problems of aging are undoubtedly aggravated by the weakening of primary group ties. The decay has two sources. First, the old person is deprived of companionship as his friends die; second, the limited number of home-centered activities in urban America

provides slender basis for sustained mutual interests between the generations. Perhaps the rural home is a better environment for the old because there are more people and more activities—more opportunities for primary group interaction. It is not merely the fact of group membership that counts but the repeated opportunity to validate that membership by participation in activities meaningful to the group. Even activities of a routine and unemotional character perform this function as long as they draw the individual into the group.

The experience of the citizen soldier newly inducted into the army is another case in point. The organization, as he first encounters it, is impersonal, almost inhuman. All of the people are unknown quantities, and especially the recruit himself, for he discovers how dependent he is on the knowledge and judgment of people with whom he is intimate. Separated from them, he is unsure of himself. Early in his army career he depends on old ties to his family and friends. He tries to interpret new training activities in terms of the old relationships. Letters from home, visits from friends, and relatives, and daydreams about civilian life fill a large part of his unoccupied hours.

As new friendships are made with barracks mates, he comes to think of himself as a member of his army unit, and his dependence on civilian primary groups is lessened. In time of war the civilian primary group continues as a source of moral support. In the peacetime army a soldier's primary group may monopolize his relations. If he is married, his family becomes part of the army community. His wife is an army wife; his children are army "brats"; his army primary group and his family almost merge. In extreme instances, associations with civilian groups may vanish.

³ *Op. cit.*, see especially Chap. 3.

HOW THE PRIMARY GROUP HELPS

What the individual gets out of the primary group and how it sustains him are not well understood, but the following elements are undoubtedly important:

1. In the primary relation uniqueness counts. The individual recognizes that he is accepted and wanted for himself. He does not need continuously to be on guard, to put forth his best effort, to *prove* himself. He can *be* himself.

2. From his primary group membership the individual derives an image of himself; continued membership in the group sustains his identity. When Joe's buddy moves to a new environment, he must reestablish his identity, or find a new one.

In Adaptation 11, pages 128-130, Long John was identified as "Doc's pal" until Doc left the Norton Street gang for Spongi's gang. No longer thought of as "Doc's pal" with the Nortons and unable to establish an identity with Spongi, Long John lost self-confidence and his bowling deteriorated. He was unprotected by his old identity and became an object of attack by his old gang. He could not establish a new image of himself either in his own or the group's eyes, and his psychological difficulties persisted until Doc once more identified Long John as his pal in both gangs.

3. The primary group protects the individual by reinterpreting and modifying goals and rules, and by adapting them to the capacities of the individual and to his special personal circumstances. In the case study reported in Adaptation 12, pages 130-133, the distant authority (management) of a large factory set standards that failed to take account of the working primary group. Although the primary group could not directly "get at" the distant authority, it effectively modified the expression of authority through the supervisor, whose difficult role was to compromise and interpret the formal standards of the factory in a way acceptable to both management and workers. If he had tried to make the formal system work in a literal way he would have been rejected by the primary group, and his usefulness to the company would have ended. On the other

hand, he could protect the members of the group in minor violations of the rules only while the main objective of production was being satisfied. The workers were not interested in undermining production, but they wanted some control over the situation to reduce their dependence upon an impersonal industrial machine.

The large society must develop rules based on experience with average individuals. Groups that know the individual best, especially the family, intercede in his behalf and regulate his participation in the community. For example, parents may blunt the impact of the school by requiring a minimum of the child. Or they may support the standards of the school by helping the child to compensate for his learning difficulties or to exploit fully his special talents.



This soldier receives as he gives, acting out and reliving his own primary group experience.

Adaptation 11 / W.F. Whyte **STRESS AND STATUS IN STREET CORNER SOCIETY**

A stable and satisfying pattern of primary relations is of critical importance to self-security. In the following account of street corner groups, psychological difficulties and a breakdown in performance are traced to the disturbance of interpersonal relations.

The account is presented in the first person by the author. It concerns two street corner groups—the Norton Street gang and Spongi's gang—and the difficulties of two street corner members, Long John and Doc.

Long John's nightmares Long John's position in the Norton gang was ambiguous. Although he was close friends with the Norton leaders, Doc, Danny, and Mike, and shared some of their prestige, he was not a leader himself and had little influence over the rank and file of the gang.

When Doc and Danny left the Norton Street gang to join Spongi's gang and Mike drifted away, the Nortons regrouped under the leadership of Angelo, a previous follower. Long John divided his time between Spongi's and the Norton Street corner, but the realignment of the two groups placed him in a new and vulnerable position.

Those who hung around Spongi's "joint" (a local gambling house) were divided into an inner circle and the hangers-on. Danny, Doc, and three others were in the inner circle. When Spongi went for "coffee-and," for a drive, or to the movies, he would invite them, but

not Long John. Long John was excluded from the inner circle.

Without the support of Doc, Danny, and Mike, Long John lost his old standing among the boys who remained on Norton Street. Long John's bowling soon deteriorated, and he finished next to last in the individual competition that season. The first part of the next season brought no improvement. Doc and Danny, who still occasionally bowled, would say to him, "Well, it looks like you're not the man you used to be. This year maybe you won't be good enough to make the first team."

These remarks were made in a joking manner, but they were symptomatic of the changes in personal relations that had taken place. As if they sensed Long John's defenseless position, the Nortons redoubled their verbal attacks on him. The former followers had always attacked him more than they attacked Doc, Danny, or

Mike, but now they subjected him to an unrelenting barrage that was calculated to destroy his self-confidence. When he was bowling poorly, there was little Long John could say to defend himself.

One afternoon Doc came to consult me about Long John. He had confided to Doc that he had not slept well for several weeks. As Doc said, "I talked it over with him. . . . Whenever he gets half-asleep and the sheet comes up over his face, he wakes up thinking he's dead. . . ." I suggested to Doc that he might be able to dispel Long John's anxieties if he took him into Spongi's inner circle and if he and Danny began to defend Long John's bowling and encourage him when the others attacked him. Doc was doubtful but agreed to try. Within a short time he had fitted Long John into Spongi's inner circle. As he explained:

I didn't say anything to Spongi, but I already fitted with him. I just

SOURCE: Abridged and adapted from William Foote Whyte, *Street Corner Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943), especially pp. 3–25 and 255–268. Published in this form by permission of William Foote Whyte and The University of Chicago Press. The second edition issued in 1955 contains an extended appendix describing the field research methods used in the study.

made a lot of noise about Long John. If he wasn't around, I would ask the boys where he was. When he came in, I would say to him, "Here's Long John, the dirty bum," and I would ask him where he had been. I gave him so much attention that he moved in that right away. Spongi began asking him to go places with us. Now even when I'm not around John is right in there.

At the same time Doc and Danny began to support him at the bowling alleys. Long John's bowling began to improve. In a short time he was bowling as well as he had in the season of 1937/38. In the individual competition that climaxed the 1939/40 season, he won the first prize. He never again consulted Doc about his nightmares.

Doc's dizzy spells Doc's dizzy spells came upon him when he was unemployed and had no spending money. He considered this the cause of his difficulties, and, in a sense, it was. But many Cornerville men adjust themselves to being unemployed without serious difficulties. Why was Doc so different? To say that he was particularly sensitive is to name the phenomenon without explaining it. The observation of Doc's changing patterns of primary group relations provides the explanation.

Doc was accustomed to a high frequency of interaction with the members of his group and to frequent contacts with members of

other groups. While he sometimes directly originated action for his group, usually someone would suggest a course of action, and then Doc would get the boys together and organize group activity. In 1938 Doc decided to run for the state legislature (he later withdrew from the campaign). The events of Doc's political campaign indicate that his usual pattern of interactions had broken down. Mike appointed himself Doc's campaign manager and was continually telling Doc what to do about the campaign. At the same time I was telling him what to do about getting a job. However, while we were suggesting action for him with increasing frequency, he himself was unable to originate action in group events. Lacking money, he could not participate in group activities without accepting the support of others and letting them determine his course of action. Since such a pattern conflicted with Doc's image of himself as a leader, he avoided associating with his friends on many occasions. When he was alone, he did not get dizzy, but, when he was with a group of people and unable to act in his customary manner, he fell prey to the dizzy spells.

When Doc finally got a job as the director of a recreation center, the spells disappeared. He was once again able to organize action, first for the boys in his center, but also for his own corner boys. Since

he had money, he could again associate with his friends and could also broaden his contacts. When the job and money ran out, in the winter of 1939/40, the pattern of interaction on which Doc was dependent was once more upset. The dizzy spells came back, and shortly before Doc got a WPA job in the spring of 1941, he had what his friends called a nervous breakdown. When I visited Cornerville in May, 1941, he was once again beginning to overcome the dizzy spells. He discussed his difficulties with me:

When I'm batted out, I'm not on the corner so much. And when I am on the corner, I just stay there. I can't do what I want to do. If the boys want to go to a show or to Jennings or bowling, I have to count my pennies to see if I have enough. If I'm batted out, I have to make some excuse. . . . I don't want to ask anybody for anything. Sometimes I say to Danny or Spongi, "Do you want a cigarette?" They say, "No, we've got some," and then I say, "All right, I'll have one of yours." I make a joke out of it, but still it is humiliating. I never do that except when I'm desperate for a cigarette. Danny is the only one that ever gives me money.

I have thought it all over, and I know I only have these spells when I'm batted out. I'm sorry you didn't know me when I was really active around here. I was a different man then. I was always taking the girls out. I lent plenty of money. I spent my money. I was always thinking of things to do and places to go.

Conclusion Whyte's cases illuminate the importance of primary group support for individual security. They suggest that individual security is not merely a matter of belonging. Long John and Doc always belonged; neither was ever ostracized, but their old ways of belonging were upset.

The study indicates that even though primary relations approximate free, personal, and spontaneous conditions, they are nevertheless patterned and structured in definite

social ways. Patterning was based on social rank. When Long John and Doc were deprived of their social rank, they were also deprived of those particular interpersonal relations that had been satisfying and supporting.

Whyte's study also suggests that personal maladjustment occurs within a social context and can be aggravated or ameliorated by changes within the individual's social situation. Doc helped to cure Long John's nightmares by changing his social situation. By bringing him into Spongi's inner circle, Doc reestablished the close relationship between Long John, Danny, and himself. In so doing, he protected Long John from the aggressions of the former followers. Then Long John's emotional troubles disappeared, and he again acted with the self-assurance that had previously characterized his behavior.

Doc showed that he was well aware of the nature of his own difficulties, but understanding was not enough to cure him. He needed to act in the manner to which he had grown accustomed. When that was impossible, he was socially maladjusted. A man with low standing in the group, one accustomed to rely on others to initiate group activities, would have experienced far less difficulty in coping with the problem of having no money. The dependence would have fitted in with the pattern of his behavior in the group. Because Doc had been a leader of the corner boys, there was conflict between the behavior appropriate to that position and the behavior necessitated by his penniless condition. Not until this conflict was resolved could Doc master his dizzy spells.

Adaptation 12 / Roethlisberger and Dickson

THE BANK WIRING ROOM

Between 1927 and 1932 an extensive program of studies on employee satisfaction was carried out at the Western Electric Company's Hawthorne plant in Chicago.⁴ The data for these studies include management records of production, absenteeism and labor turnover, on-the-spot observation and record-taking, and an extensive and long-range interview program with management and workers.

The investigation reported here is one part of the famous Hawthorne studies, which had an important influence on industrial sociology. The interpersonal relations and social organization of a small group of factory workers are analyzed. These men wired telephone switchboards in what the company called the "bank wiring room."

The detailed study and observation of the bank wiring room was undertaken late in the research program. There was already evidence that social groups in shop departments were capable of exercising strong control over the work behavior of individuals. In some groups the wage incentive systems

SOURCE: Abridged and adapted from F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939), Part IV. Published in this form by permission of the authors and Harvard University Press.

⁴ The research was a joint activity of the company and the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. Henry A. Landsberger, *Hawthorne Revisited* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1958) is an analysis of the research and a commentary on published critiques of *Management and the Worker*.

were rendered ineffectual by group pressure for controlled output. Informal practices which put certain workers under pressure and kept them in line were brought to light. There was evidence of informal leadership by persons who assumed the responsibility of seeing that the members of a group clung together and protected themselves from interference by company representatives. Such observations suggested the line of research.

These reports of social organization among employees, and its effects, were derived almost entirely from interviews. The investigators had little opportunity to observe the groups at work, they knew little about their output except what could be learned from departmental records, which were kept for practical rather than research purposes, and they knew almost nothing about the behavior of the employees toward one another and their supervisors. In order to get a more systematic and exact understanding of behavior in the shops, it was decided to study one group intensively.

The setting For six months detailed observation was made of a group of fourteen men in the bank wiring room. The work group consisted of nine wiremen, three soldermen, and two inspectors. A completed job involved three main types of work: (1) a wireman connected the projecting points of "banks," (2) a solderman fixed the connections in place, and (3) an inspector tested the work of both men. The wired banks were assembled into a final product called an "equipment," which was ten or eleven banks long and two or three banks high.

Management's incentive system


The men worked under a system of group piecework. Part of their weekly earnings was based upon the number of equipments turned out by the group as a whole during the week. The wage incentive plan had the following three principal elements:

1. Every man was assigned an hourly wage rate based largely upon his own average individual output established by past performance. His basic hourly rate multiplied by the number of hours he worked constituted a worker's basic individual weekly wage. His basic wage was guaranteed by the

company irrespective of group output.

2. The basic wage was supplemented by a "bonus" which depended upon the number of equipments the group as a whole had completed during the week. If group output went above a certain level, each man received his share of the increased earnings.

3. Since individual hourly wage rates were based upon a man's average output per hour, allowance was made for time lost by stoppages beyond his control. Otherwise the efficiency ratings of men who had been delayed would suffer when compared with ratings



The Bank Wiring Department, showing banks at different stages of completion.

of men who had lost little time.

This wage incentive plan assumed that the men wanted to maximize their earnings. Therefore it was expected:

1. Since each individual's total wage was determined to some degree by group output, each worker would try to increase output.

2. If the workers exerted pressure at all, it would be to increase the output of the slower workers.

3. To increase his hourly wage rate, each worker would strive to increase his individual average output.

The plan also assumed a high degree of cooperation between employees and management. Efficiency ratings, for example, were meant to assure a fair distribution of wages. In order to establish efficiency ratings, however, it was necessary to keep detailed records, both of individual output and of time lost. The plan could be fair, therefore, only if the employees did not thwart management's efforts at objective record-keeping.

Management's wage incentive plan was a workable one, promoting both efficiency and a fair distribution of earnings, only if the men acted in accordance with management's assumptions.

Restriction of output Actually, the men behaved quite differently. They had their own idea of a proper day's work—about two completed equipments per man—and they felt that no more should be turned out. So far as the company was concerned, total output was satisfactory, and the foreman felt that his "boys" worked hard. Nevertheless, the men had adopted an informal norm setting output below the level it might have

reached had each man worked as hard as he could.

If a man worked too fast or produced more than the group thought right, he would be ridiculed as a "rate-buster" or "speed king." On the other hand, if he produced too little, he would be called a "chiseler." Another penalty for nonconformity was a practice the men called "binging." This was a sort of game in which one man might walk up to another and hit him as hard as he could on the upper arm. His victim was then entitled to retaliate with a similar blow. One of the objects of the game was to see who could hit the hardest. But this practice was also used as a penalty and played a role in regulating the output of some of the faster workers. Thus:

First wireman: "Why don't you quit work? Let's see, this is your thirty-fifth row today. What are you going to do with them all?"

Second wireman: "What do you care? It's to your advantage if I work, isn't it?"

First wireman: "Yeah, but the way you're working you'll get stuck with them."

Second wireman: "Don't worry about that. I'll take care of it. You're getting paid by the sets I turn out. That's all you should worry about."

First wireman: "If you don't quit work I'll bing you." (He strikes him and finally chases him around the room.)

Observer, a few minutes later to the man who was "binged": "What's the matter, won't he let you work?"

Second wireman: "No, I'm all through though. I've got enough done." (He then went over and helped another wireman.)

The employees believed that their weekly average hourly output should show little change from week to week. They felt that if

their output showed much change either from day to day or from week to week "something might happen." An unusually high output might thereafter become the standard their supervisors would expect them to maintain. The men felt it would be a way of confessing that they were capable of doing better. On the other hand, they felt that a low output would afford their supervisors a chance to "bawl them out." If output were kept fairly constant, they thought, neither possibility could happen.

In attempting to keep his production record constant, the worker was repudiating management's assumption that he would try to increase his production and with it his hourly rate. Since average hourly output was calculated by dividing total output by hours of work, the men could keep their output records constant by claiming either more or less than their actual output or more or less than the time actually spent. In practice both methods were used. Most men reported more connections than they completed, but two men who worked quite fast usually reported a little less than their actual count. The men who reported less than their actual output also claimed the least time out.

Attitudes toward supervision

The group felt that no worker should give the supervisor information which could be used to the detriment of his fellow workers. Anyone who did so was branded a "squealer" and made to feel unwelcome. One inspector was driven from the group with this treatment.

The group also felt that those in authority should not attempt to maintain social distance or act of-

fications. The wage incentive plan provided one of the means by which the group was able in an informal way to decrease the social distance between themselves and their supervisor. To measure individual output the supervisor was supposed to make a daily count of

the number of connections made by each wireman. But he did not have time for the job and left it to the wiremen to do themselves. Much the same thing occurred with regard to claims for time lost. The supervisor was responsible for deciding which stoppages were al-

lowable and which were not, but because a clear distinction was often impossible, he approved most of the claims made. In effect, therefore, the workers supervised their own records, and by doing so were able to hold the supervisor to their own informal work norms.

Conclusion The work norms of the bank wiremen may be summarized as follows:

1. You should not turn out too much work. If you do, you are a rate-buster.
2. You should not turn out too little work. If you do, you are a chiseler.
3. You should not tell a supervisor anything that will be detrimental to an associate. If you do, you are a squealer.
4. You should not attempt to maintain social distance or act officious. For example, if you are an inspector, you should not act like one.

These norms, and the behavior supporting them, were spontaneously elaborated and enforced by the workers themselves, and were contrary to management's assumptions.

The function of the norms When the men were asked why they tried to limit output and to keep their output records steady, their replies were varied. "Someone might be laid off, hours might be reduced, the slower workers would be reprimanded, the rate would be cut." Although workers elsewhere have had experiences of this kind, the men at Hawthorne had not encountered any of the things they said they were guarding against.

Their behavior seemed to be guided by the desire to protect themselves from interference of any sort on the part of management. Fearing changes which might be detrimental to their interests, the workers guarded against all change. Despite the wage incentive system, the workers maintained by their own informal controls constant group and individual output.

The work norms controlled and regulated behavior within the group. The activities labeled "restriction of output" represented attempts at social control and discipline and were able to transform a collection of individual workers into a social group.

SECTION 3 PRIMARY GROUPS IN LARGE-SCALE ORGANIZATIONS

This section considers the function of the primary group in sustaining the cohesion of large organizations. The formal structure of an association is the official system of authority and communication. In

this scheme officials are assigned powers and duties, the limits of their authority are set, and rules are prescribed for the conduct of the organization. Where such official patterns predominate, the organization

is sometimes referred to as a formal organization.

In the study of associations, the phrase *informal structure* is used to denote those patterns that arise from the spontaneous interaction of personalities and groups within the organization. (See ASSOCIATIONS, pp. 201–203.) This discussion is restricted to one aspect of informal structure, the effect of primary relations upon the capacity of the organization to do its job effectively.

When individuals relate to each other as persons rather than according to their assigned roles, they tend to initiate primary relations. A characteristic outcome is the formation of friendships and cliques. The significance of this process is that *new lines of communication and influence* develop that are not accounted for in the officially approved patterns. For example, important information may be passed among friends even though they are not entitled to it according to the rules. Or a subordinate may have personal and informal access to a high official “over the head” of his immediate superior.




FIG. V:1 Mediating primary groups

Primary groups offer the individual personal affection and response as well as protection from arbitrary rules. If the primary group is effectively linked to a larger organization, it can heighten participation, but if the link is broken, morale and discipline may suffer.

SUSTAINING THE INDIVIDUAL

Since the goals of formal organizations are impersonal, individual needs tend to be subordinated. Because the members of formal organizations are not merely members but persons as well, they feel the need to be treated as unique individuals and not as impersonal instruments. They work to establish personal relations with other participants. If they fail they feel helpless and exposed to arbitrary treatment.

The most obvious way of escaping impersonality is to make friends with the boss, but cooperation with others of the same rank is also helpful. The Hawthorne wiremen banded together informally as a defense against possible arbitrary action by management. Groups of this kind act as havens where the individual's personal needs are taken into account. For example, if he is occasionally unable to do his work effectively, the group will protect him. On the other hand, he pays a price for his protection, for he must abide by the informal norms set by the group.

Double-edged significance of the primary group
Primary groups may either support or undermine the officially approved pattern of communication and command. They may help to mobilize the participants for the achievement of prescribed goals or, on the other hand, they may have a subversive effect. An illustration of the subversive effect a primary group may have within a formal structure is the case of the Hawthorne wiremen who developed an organization of their own and whose activities resulted in a self-determined limitation of output. (See Adaptation 12.) All primary relations and groupings are potentially subversive of large-scale organizations because the special goals or interests of the self-protective group may be given priority over the official goals of the organization.

THE MEDIATING PRIMARY GROUP

The capacity of a large organization to mobilize and control members is increased if the members belong to it through a primary group. Such primary groups have a mediating function, binding the individual firmly into a larger social structure much as the fam-

ily mediates between the individual and the larger society. The stronger the mediating primary group, the firmer the bond between the organization and the individual.

It should not be assumed that mediating primary groups are indispensable to the functioning of organizations. Many enterprises do not fully mobilize the energies and loyalties of their employees or members, and yet accomplish their purposes reasonably well. However, when ordinary incentives are inadequate, the individual's attachment to a mediating primary group may encourage greater participation and even personal sacrifice.

The role of mediating primary groups received special attention in the study of cohesion and disintegration in the Nazi army (Adaptation 13.) Although primary groups were important, they were not the only source of integration. The "hard core" of indoctrinated Nazis was a strong cohesive force which held the primary group to the organization's goals.⁵

PRIMARY GROUPS AND SOCIETY

If the primary group contributes to cohesion of large organizations, it may be expected to have an important role in knitting together whole societies. Many have speculated about the deterioration of primary

relations and groups in modern industrial society, and the deterioration is sometimes suggested as the root of many symptoms of social and personal disorganization. Perhaps increasing mobility and urbanization have weakened individual ties to the extended family, the local community, and to small circles of lifelong friends. When such ties are weakened, social disciplines and aspirations are less effectively transmitted, and there may be new and sometimes pathological efforts to regain the benefits of primary group experience.

But it is not certain how much has been weakened, how far social disciplines and aspirations have deteriorated, nor the extent to which the new forms are pathological. The sociologist studies the weakening of primary relations and its consequences as one possible factor in any specific instance of social disorganization, just as he analyzes the influence of primary group ties on absenteeism in a factory. If there is evidence of high rates of mental illness, suicide, delinquency, or other manifestations of social disorganization, the sociologist will want to determine if the participants are deprived of normal primary group experience. The possible significance of the primary group in these cases offers a diagnostic hypothesis to be tested in the light of empirical research findings.

⁵ On primary groups in the U.S. Army, see Roger W. Little, "Buddy Relations and Combat Performance," in Morris Janowitz (ed.), *The New Military* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), pp. 195-223.

Adaptation 13 / Shils and Janowitz PRIMARY GROUPS IN THE GERMAN ARMY

This study was carried out by the intelligence unit of a Psychological Warfare Division. It analyzes the relative influence of primary and secondary group situations on the high degree of stability of the German Army in World War II. It also evaluates the impact of the Western Allies' propaganda on the German Army's fighting effectiveness.

Methods of collecting data included front-line interrogation of prisoners of war, inten-

sive psychological interviews in rear areas, and a monthly opinion poll of random samples of prisoners of war. Captured enemy documents, statements of recaptured Allied personnel, and the reports of combat observers were also analyzed.

Although outnumbered and inferior in equipment, the German Army maintained its integrity and fighting effectiveness through a series of almost unbroken retreats over a period of several years. Disintegration through desertion was insignificant, and the active surrender of individuals or groups remained rare throughout the Western campaign.

The extraordinary tenacity of the German Army has frequently been attributed to the strong Nazi political convictions of German soldiers. It is the main hypothesis of this paper, however, that the unity of the German Army was sustained only slightly by the political convictions of its members, and that the determined resistance of the German soldier was due to the steady satisfaction of his *primary* personality needs.

The military primary group

Modern social research has shown that the primary group, the chief source of affection and accordingly the major factor in personality formation in infancy and childhood, continues to be a major social and psychological support through adulthood. In the army, when isolated from civilian primary groups, the soldier depends more and more on his military primary group. His spontaneous loyalties are to the members of his immediate unit whom he sees daily and with whom

he develops a high degree of intimacy.

A German sergeant, captured toward the end of World War II, was asked by his interrogators about the political opinions of his men. In reply, he laughed and said, "When you ask such a question, I realize well that you have no idea of what makes a soldier fight. The soldiers live in their holes and are happy if they live through the next day. If we think at all, it's about the end of the war and then home."

The combat effectiveness of the majority of soldiers depends only to a small extent on their preoccupation with the major political issues which might be affected by the outcome of the war and which are of concern to statesmen and publicists. There are, of course, soldiers to whom such motivations are important. Volunteer armies recruited on the basis of ethical or political loyalties, such as the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War, are influenced by major political goals. In the German Army, a "hard core" of Nazis was similarly motivated.

In a conscript army, the criteria of recruitment are much less specialized, and the army is more nearly representative of the total population. Political or social values and ethical schemes do not have much impact on the determination of such soldiers to fight to the best of their ability and to hold

out as long as possible. For the ordinary German soldier the decisive fact was that he was a member of a squad or section that maintained its structural integrity and coincided roughly with the *social* unit which satisfied some of his major primary needs. If he had the necessary weapons, he was likely to go on fighting as long as the group had a leadership with which he could identify and as long as he gave affection to and received affection from the other members of his squad and platoon. In other words, as long as he felt himself to be a member of his primary group and therefore bound by the expectations and demands of its other members, he was likely to be a good soldier.

Weakness of secondary symbols

Problems and symbols remote from immediate personal experience had relatively little influence on the behavior and attention of the German soldier. Interrogation of prisoners showed that they had little interest in the strategic aspects of the war. There was widespread ignorance and apathy about the course of the fighting. Three weeks after the fall of the city of Aachen, many prisoners who were taken in the adjoining area did not know that the city had fallen. For at least a week after the beginning of the Battle of the Bulge—an important German counteroffensive toward

TABLE V:1 ALLIED LEAFLET PROPAGANDA THEMES REMEMBERED BY GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR

	DEC. 15-31 1944	JAN. 1-15 1945	JAN. 15-31 1945	FEB. 1-15 1945
<i>Number of Ps/W</i>	60	83	99	135
<i>Themes and appeals remembered:</i>				
a. <i>Promise of good treatment as Ps/W and self-preservation through surrender</i>	63%	65%	59%	76%
b. <i>Military news</i>	15	17	19	30
c. <i>Strategic hopelessness of Germany's position</i>	13	12	25	26
d. <i>Hopelessness of a local tactical position</i>	3	1	7	7
e. <i>Political attacks on German leaders</i>	7	5	4	8
f. <i>Bombing of German cities</i>	2	8	6	—
g. <i>Allied Military Government</i>	7	3	—	—
h. <i>Appeals to civilians</i>	5	4	2	—
	**	**	**	**

** The percentages add up to more than 100 percent since some Ps/W remembered more than one topic. Only Ps/W remembering at least one theme were included in this tabulation.

the end of the war—most of the troops on the northern hinge of the bulge did not know that the offensive was taking place and were not much interested when they were told of it after their capture.

Neither did expectations about the outcome of the war play a great role in the integration or disintegration of the German Army. The statistics of German soldier opinion show that pessimism about the outcome of the war was compatible with excellent combat performance. The relatively greater importance of considerations of self-preservation is shown by German prisoner recall of the contents of Allied propaganda leaflets (Table V:1). During December, 1944, and January, 1945, more than 60 percent of the sample of prisoners taken recalled references to the

preservation of the individual, and the figure rose to 76 percent in February of 1945. On the other hand, the proportion of prisoners recalling references to the total strategic situation of the war and the prospect of the outcome of the war seldom amounted to more than 20 percent, while references to political subjects never amounted to more than 10 percent. The general tendency was not to think about the outcome of the war unless forced to do so by direct interrogation. Pessimism was counterbalanced by reassuring identification with a strong and benevolent *Führer*, by identification with good officers, and by the psychological support of a closely integrated primary group.

Ethical aspects of the war did not trouble the German soldier

much. When pressed by Allied interrogators, the prisoners said that Germany was forced to fight for its life. There were very few German soldiers who said that Germany had been morally wrong to attack Poland or Russia. Most of them thought that if anything was wrong about the war, it was in the realm of technical decisions. The decision to exterminate the Jews was bad not because of its immorality, but because it united the world against Germany. The declaration of war against the Soviet Union was wrong only because it created a two-front war. But these were all arguments which had to be forced from the prisoners of war; left to themselves, they seldom mentioned them.

The "hard core" minority of fervent Nazis expressed strong politi-

cal views. But National Socialism was of little interest to most of the German soldiers. "Nazism," said a soldier, "begins ten miles behind the front lines."

The soldiers did not react noticeably to attempts to Nazify the army. When the Nazi party salute was introduced in 1944, it was accepted as just one more army order, about equal in significance to an order requiring the carrying of gas masks. The *National Sozialistische Führungsoffiziere* (Nazi indoctrination officer), known as the NSFO, was regarded apathetically or as a joke. The NSFO was rejected not for his Nazi connection but because he was an "outsider" who was not a real soldier. The highly Nazified Waffen SS divisions were never the object of ordinary soldiers' hostility, even when they were charged with atrocities. On the contrary, the Waffen SS was esteemed, not as a Nazi formation, but for its excellent fighting capacity. Wehrmacht soldiers felt safer when there was a Waffen SS unit on their flank.

In contrast to the apolitical attitude of the German infantry soldier towards most secondary symbols, an intense and personal devotion to Adolph Hitler was maintained throughout the war. There is little doubt that identification with the *Führer* was an important factor in prolonging German resistance. Despite fluctuations in expectations regarding the outcome of the war, the trust in Hitler remained strong even after the beginning of the serious reverses in France and Germany. The attachment grew in large part from the feeling of strength and protection the soldier gained from his conception of the *Führer* personality.

However, as defeat became imminent, and the danger to physical survival increased, devotion to Hitler deteriorated. The tendency to attribute virtue to the strong and immorality to the weak boomeranged, and devotion to Hitler declined. Moreover, for most of the dishevelled, dirty, bewildered prisoners, Hitler was of slight importance compared with their own survival problems and the welfare of their families.

Impact of allied propaganda A monthly opinion poll of German prisoners found there was no significant decline in attachment to Nazi ideology until February and March, 1945, shortly before the German surrender in May, 1945. In other words, the propaganda attacks on Nazi ideology seem to have been of little avail until the smaller military units began to break up under heavy pressure. Much effort was devoted to ideological attacks on German leaders but only about five percent of the prisoners mentioned this topic, confirming the general failure of ideological appeals. Allied propaganda presentations of the justness of our war aims, postwar peace intentions, and United Nations unity were all ineffective.

Promises of good treatment as prisoners of war gained most attention and were best remembered. In other words, the best propaganda referred to immediate situations and concrete problems. The most effective single leaflet in communicating the promise of good treatment was the "safe conduct pass." It was usually printed on the back of leaflets which stressed self-preservation. The rank and file were attracted by its official lan-

guage and legal, document-like character. Where General Eisenhower's signature did not appear on the leaflet, doubt was cast on its authenticity.

As a result of psychological warfare research, a series of leaflets was prepared which aimed at primary group organization in the German Army and omitted reference to ideological symbols. Group organization depended on the acceptance of the immediate leadership and mutual trust. Therefore, this series of leaflets tried to stimulate group discussion and to bring attention to concerns which would loosen solidarity. One leaflet declared, "Do not take our [the Allies'] word for it; ask your comrade; find out how he feels." There followed a series of questions on personal concerns, family problems, the immediate tactical situation, and supply problems. Discussion of these problems was expected to increase anxiety.

Factors affecting primary group cohesion If the primary group was a crucial element in the German Army, it is important to know what factors strengthened or weakened primary group cohesion.

1. *The "hard core."* The stability and effectiveness of the military primary group depended in large measure on the Nazi "hard core," who approximated 10 to 15 percent of the total of enlisted men; the percentage was higher for non-commissioned officers and was very much higher among the junior officers. Most of these were young men between twenty-four and twenty-eight years of age who as adolescents were imbued with the Nazi ideology during its zenith. They were enthusiasts for the mili-

tary life. The presence in the group of a few such men, zealous, energetic, and unsparing of themselves, provided models for the weaker men, and their threats served to check divisive tendencies. Although, as we have seen, political ideology was not important to most soldiers, the "hard core" provided the link between the ordinary soldier in his primary group and the political leadership of the German Army and state.

2. Community of experience.

German officers saw that solidarity is fostered by the recollection of jointly experienced gratifications and, therefore, the groups who had gone through a victory together when possible were maintained as units. This principle also guided replacement policy. The entire personnel of a division would be withdrawn from the front simultaneously and refitted as a unit with replacements. New members added to the division while it was in the rear had the opportunity to assimilate themselves into the group; then the group as a whole was sent forward. This system continued until close to the end of the war and helps to explain the durability of the German Army in the face of the overwhelming numerical and material superiority of the Allied forces.

Poor morale toward the end of the war was found most frequently in hastily assembled units. These were made up of new recruits, dragooned stragglers, air force men who had been forced into the infantry (and who felt a loss of status in the change), men transferred from the navy into the infantry, older factory workers, concentration camp inmates, and older married men who had been kept in re-



German prisoners: Note the varied ages of these prisoners from a mixed unit, captured near the end of World War II.

serve throughout the war and who had remained with their families until the last moment. These reluctant infantrymen, so diverse in age composition and background, could not quickly become effective fighting units. They had no time to

become used to one another and to develop the type of friendliness which is possible only when loyalties to outside groups have been renounced—or at least put into the background.

3. Family ties. Correspondence

between soldiers and their families was generally encouraged, but the families of German soldiers were given strict instructions not to mention family hardships in their letters to the front. Even so, preoccupation with family affairs often conflicted with loyalty to the military primary group.

The pull of the civilian primary group became stronger as the coherence of the army group weakened under the pressure of Allied victories. Sometimes the strength of family ties was used to keep the

men fighting in their units. For example, soldiers were warned that desertion would result in severe punishment of the deserter's family. Some men reasoned that the shortest way home was to keep the group intact and to avoid capture and a long period in an enemy prisoner of war camp. They thought those remaining in the defeated but intact army units would have only a short wait before they would be demobilized.

4. *Proximity.* Spatial proximity is important in maintaining the

solidarity of military groups. In February and March of 1945, isolated remnants of platoons and companies surrendered in groups with increasing frequency. The tactical situation forced groups of three or four soldiers to take refuge in cellars, trenches, and other underground shelters. Isolation from the nucleus (officers and "hard core" elements) of the primary group reinforced fears of destruction and helped to break down primary group relations.

Conclusion At the beginning of World War II, many publicists and specialists in propaganda attributed much importance to psychological warfare operations. The legendary successes of Allied propaganda against the German Army at the end of World War I and the expansion of the advertising and mass communications industries in the ensuing two decades had convinced many people that human behavior could be extensively manipulated by mass communications. They emphasized that military morale was to a great extent a function of the belief in the rightness of the larger cause at issue in the war; good soldiers were, therefore, those who clearly understood the political and moral implications of what was at stake.

Studies of the German Army's morale and fighting effectiveness during the last three years of the war cast doubt on these hypotheses. Solidarity in the German Army was based only very indirectly and partially on political convictions or broad ethical beliefs. Where conditions allowed primary group life to function smoothly and where the primary group developed a high degree of cohesion, morale was maintained regardless of the political attitudes of the soldiers. When conditions fostered disintegration of the military primary group, effective propaganda ignored political issues and exploited the desire to survive.

SECTION 4 INTERNAL STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS

Like all groups of significant duration, primary groups develop an internal structure, that is, relatively stable relations, mutual expectations, and patterned behavior. One way of describing group patterning is outlined in Adaptation 15, pages 148–152.

From the standpoint of internal structure and dynamics, the dilemma of the primary group is the

tension between orientation to the person and social organization. To be free and spontaneous, to experience full communication and relatedness, to be taken account of as a unique person—these are values inherent in the primary relation. But the group has problems and obligations that require some degree of discipline, at least a modicum of leadership, and a

sense of even-handed justice. The stronger these requirements, the more limits are put on freedom, spontaneity, and uniqueness.

It should not be concluded that primary relations are invariably impaired by social organization. On the contrary, primary relations may be sustained by formal arrangements that protect the relationship from being broken off too easily; and primary relations often gain in continuity and intensity from being embedded in a context of shared work and obligation.

TASK GROUPS

Many stable primary groups have goals to fulfill and tasks to perform. They are part of a work setting in which actions are initiated and directed, instructions are carried out, and some division of labor is instituted. Research on task groups emphasizes positive forms of social control, that is, the establishment of relations that satisfy the needs of the member for affection, respect, and a sense of meaningful participation. This research has been formulated as a "principle of supportive relationships":

The leadership and other processes of the organization must be such as to ensure a maximum probability that in all interactions and all relationships with the organization each member will, in the light of his background, values, and expectations, view the experience as supportive and one which builds and maintains his sense of personal worth and importance.⁶

A supportive approach to cooperation is important when people are asked to work hard and extend themselves.

However, when a group's members are mainly concerned with self-protection and defense against real or imagined threats, social control may be exercised in a negative way by aggressive or hostile behavior. Since such a group's aim is to secure passive conformity rather than to mobilize energies in a positive direction, it need not provide as many personal

satisfactions to its members. (For a case study of negative social control in a task group, see *Adaptation 12*, pp. 130-133.)

All cohesion and incentive do not stem from primary relations. Individuals may be united by fear of a common danger, and they may be coerced or persuaded to work or fight, quite apart from membership in primary groups. If, however, control is exercised through primary groups, then the conditions that make such groups effective must obtain. Among these conditions, in the case of task-oriented primary groups, is the creation of satisfying interpersonal relations.

PATTERNS OF COMMUNICATION

An experimental study⁷ of supervised play groups investigated the effects of different kinds of supervision on two groups of children, ten to twelve years of age. One type of supervision was *authoritarian*: the children were allowed little voice in determining their own activities; direction was almost completely in the hands of the adult leader. The other type was *democratic*: the adult leader encouraged the children to make their own decisions and to plan group activities themselves.

Detailed observations were made of the children's conversation, behavior, and attitudes, both toward each other and toward the adult supervisor, in order to discover what differences existed under the two kinds of direction. The investigator found sharp differences in the patterns and quality of communication in the two groups. These differences were due to the kind of supervision over the children. The children with democratic supervision, where communication was relatively free, were able to form a more stable and complex group than the authoritarian supervised group. When communication is thwarted, as it was in the authoritarian group, individual needs are unexpressed and therefore may be unfulfilled.

If patterns limiting the free flow of communication develop within a primary group, the group is

⁶Rensis Likert, *New Patterns of Management* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), p. 103.

⁷Ronald Lippitt, "An Experimental Study of the Effect of Democratic and Authoritarian Group Atmospheres," *University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare*, 16, No. 3 (February, 1940), 43-195.

threatened by instability and divisiveness. A free flow of communication is necessary so that individual interests, especially of more passive members, can be known and taken into account. Another experimental study of communication within a small group (not, however, a primary group) showed that those who were not fully involved in the communication process set up by the experimenter were deficient in morale. (See *Adaptation* 17, pp. 199–201.)

Where self-protection and defense are the principal goal of a group, communication tends to be limited, designed not so much to evoke creative energies as to constrain and channel them.

FAMILY SYSTEMS

The nuclear family is properly considered the example par excellence of a primary group. More than most groups, the family is built upon and sustains primary relations. Affection, intimacy, openness, mutual commitment, and personal satisfaction are legitimate expectations. Relations between spouses, between parents and children, and among siblings tend to be governed by the primary relations model even if they fall short of fulfilling it.

But the family is more than a setting for primary relations. It is also a unit of social organization and as such has requirements that set limits on participation and interaction. For example, family membership is not necessarily voluntary, and members who feel "caught" may withdraw from free communication or otherwise undermine the primary group ideal. Furthermore, patterns of inequality and authority are inevitable if only because of the dependency of children.

As individuals, the members of the family have personality traits, goals, and outside involvements that affect how they act and respond. In American society adolescents often reject family intimacy; they may have much closer relations with their peers outside the family than with their parents; within the family a pseudo intimacy may be maintained out of a sense of duty and propriety. Thus the primary relations model cannot account for the complexity of interaction in the family setting. The family is a *kind of* primary group, not a "pure" example or prototype.

Although all primary groups tend to develop a system of relationships, wide variation is evident in the types of systems that emerge. Two groups are no more alike than any two individuals. In some primary groups there are permanent cliques and coalitions, rivalry and conflict; others are characterized by shifting coalitions, flexibility and harmony; still others have no cliques or coalitions, maintaining a very loose integration. Some groups are more or less isolated from the larger community, others are involved in it and susceptible to external influences.

The small social system can be described with reference to three features: (a) the *group boundary*, (b) the *role-system*, and (c) the *pattern of coalitions*. The interplay of these elements as applied to the family is traced in the following discussion.

The closed family system A closed family is turned inward. It tends to be isolated from the larger community: parents have relatively few contacts outside the family and children have few friends. The members tend to draw a sharp distinction between the family in-group and the outside world. (See the case of the Israeli urban refugee family discussed in *Adaptation* 5, pp. 41–42.) In an extreme case the outside world is viewed with apprehension while the internal life of the family is idealized.

High levels of commitment and cooperation are required by the closed family. The wife who does not look to outsiders for help and sociability expects more from her husband and children. The husband, having few outside involvements, is free to participate in household chores. One result may be a blurring of sex roles. A study in London found that relatively isolated families tended to turn inward, and in doing so broke down the sharp segregation between the duties of husband and wife:

Such continuity as they possess lies in their relationship with each other rather than in their external relationships. In facing the external world they draw on each other, for their strongest emotional investment is made where there is continuity. Hence their high standards of conjugal compatibility, their stress on shared interests, on joint organization, on equality between husband and wife. They must get along well together, they must help one another in carrying out

familial tasks, for there is no sure external source of material and emotional help.⁸

The desegregation of sex roles in closed families is less likely to occur where the family is more than a consumption and child-rearing unit. If the family is a unit of the economy and runs a family farm or small business, there is a practical basis for close co-operation based on a clear division of labor.

There is some evidence, based on clinical studies of troubled families and families of schizophrenics, that the closed family is vulnerable to the formation of permanent coalitions.⁹ A typical pattern is the coalition of a mother and one child. Mother and child form a deep, though frequently ambivalent, emotional attachment, creating a schism between themselves and the rest of the family, sometimes resulting in painful isolation of another member, or scapegoating, or pathological dependency.

The open family system The classic case of the open family system is the nuclear family embedded in a homogeneous, kin-based community. In such a setting the boundaries of the nuclear family are permeable and the members have sustained outside relations. Thus "nuclear families are open in closed societies."¹⁰ The tightly organized community fully involves its members in participation, and obligations extend to the whole community.

The closely knit community fosters role segregation within the open family:

If both husband and wife come to marriage with such close-knit networks, and if conditions are such that the previous pattern of relationships is continued, the marriage will be superimposed on these preexisting relationships, and both spouses will continue to be drawn into activities with people outside their own elementary family (family of procreation). Each will

get some emotional satisfaction from these external relationships and will be likely to demand correspondingly less of the spouse. Rigid segregation of conjugal roles will be possible because each spouse can get help from people outside.¹¹

A fluid and amorphous environment, however, provides little support for open families. As a result the modern middle-class urban family has the task of balancing openness and withdrawal. To accomplish this it must create a semipermeable boundary, sufficiently closed to maintain the integrity of the family, yet open enough to draw upon the uncertain resources of the outside world and adapt to changing circumstances.

The adaptive family is characterized by *shifting* rather than permanent coalitions. In the American middle-class family the wife often accepts responsibility for managing internal relations within the family:

Insofar as this division of roles occurs, the wife is in the position of balancing the demands of the husband with those of the children. Successful mediation by the wife of the husband's and children's demands and needs is necessary for the smooth coordination of activities within the family.¹²

Effective mediation requires a sensitivity to the need for shifting coalitions. If the mother sides consistently with one family member to the exclusion of another, the family may become polarized and degenerate into conflict and permanent coalitions.

NEGRO FAMILIES

Some exceptions to the modal type of family unit, the complete nuclear family, are inevitable if only because of the exigencies of death. In the United States a high divorce rate is partially offset by a high remarriage rate. There are many incomplete families

⁸ Elizabeth Bott, *Family and Social Network* (London: Tavistock, 1957), p. 95.

⁹ Ezra F. Vogel and Norman W. Bell, "The Emotionally Disturbed Child as the Family Scapegoat," in Norman W. Bell and Ezra F. Vogel (eds.), *A Modern Introduction to the Family* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), pp. 382-397; also H. Lennard, M. R. Beaulieu, and N. G. Embrey, "Interaction in Families with a Schizophrenic Child," *Archives of General Psychiatry*, 12 (February, 1965), 166-183.

¹⁰ Bernard Farber (ed.), *Kinship and Family Organization* (New York: Wiley, 1966), p. 79.

¹¹ Bott, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

¹² Bernard Farber, *Family: Organization and Interaction* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing, 1964), p. 321.

and families with a multiplicity of parents and foster parents. A heavy concentration of exceptional cases in some part of the population tends to become "visible" and to be defined as a social problem. The precarious status of many Negro families, especially in depressed urban areas, has recently become a subject of much popular awareness and concern. The Moynihan Report¹³ and President Johnson's Howard University address in June, 1965,¹⁴ brought to the attention of the public a complex set of problems that has been a topic of sociological inquiry for many years. Adaptation 14 (pp. 145-148) based on Frazier's classic monograph published a generation ago outlines the main types of Negro families as they existed before World War II. The chief family forms identified by Frazier persist, although in different frequencies, and many of the underlying forces that created the family types also persist.

Although the middle- and upper-income Negro families, which are increasing in number, closely resemble the conventional white American types, serious impediments remain to the development of effective and stable primary relations among many low-income families. The continued migration of poorly educated Negroes out of rural areas and into deteriorated urban centers both North and South is in itself a source of stress and at least temporary maladjustment.

Negro family formation and stability are complicated by some demographic and related factors.¹⁵ In marital status more Negroes than whites are single, more Negroes are divorced, more Negroes are widowed, and many more Negroes are separated from their spouses. Whereas 87 percent of white families have both husband and wife living in the family group, only 72 percent of Negro families are complete units. Nine percent of white families have female heads but 25 percent of Negro families have female heads, and they tend to be concentrated in

economically depressed areas. These statistics forecast the continued survival of the matriarchal-type family among Negroes. It is generally understood that Negro family income is lower than white and that families with female heads are characteristically poorer than husband-wife families. It can be seen in Table V:2 how this combination of facts affects Negro families with female heads. Because the birth rate for Negroes is higher than for whites, the Negro mother has a heavier responsibility for child care

TABLE V:2 MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME BY RACE AND FAMILY TYPE, UNITED STATES, 1965

FAMILY TYPE	WHITE	NEGRO
<i>Husband-wife</i>	\$7,458	\$4,581
<i>Female head</i>	\$4,007	\$2,473

SOURCE: *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 157, December 16, 1966.

with far less resources per child. She often tries to carry this responsibility while she is the chief or only wage earner. The nonwhite mother is four times as likely to die in childbirth, so that her child is exposed to a far greater risk of orphanhood.

From the beginning of World War II illegitimacy rates in the United States have increased. Perhaps one contributing factor is an excess of females of marriageable age. For every 100 white females over fourteen years of age there are about 92 white males; for every 100 Negro females there are about 88 Negro males. From a purely statistical point of view a Negro woman has less chance of finding a husband. But the number of eligible males is only one factor. Illegitimacy is correlated with poverty. The poor use contraception less effectively, and poor women are less likely to marry when they become pregnant or to hide an illegitimate birth.

¹³ U.S. Department of Labor Office of Policy Planning and Research, *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965; reprinted in Lee Rainwater and William L. Yancey, *The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1967).

¹⁴ "To Fulfill These Rights," reprinted in Rainwater and Yancey, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-132.

¹⁵ The statistics in this discussion are derived or computed from the Bureau of the Census *Current Population Reports* and apply to the 1965-1966 period.

The facts listed here are significant because they are part of the structural conditions, largely rooted in poverty, that impair the building of strong and self-reliant families among the poor—and the poor include disproportionate numbers of Negroes.

It has been argued that an increase in the number of mother-father families would be the best way to strengthen poor (and poor Negro) family life. Al-

though there is some validity in the supposition, there is no easy way to achieve it because the prospects for adoption of Negro children are not good. There will continue to be numerous families with female heads. Many of them are effective primary groups that rear well-adjusted and self-reliant children despite the handicaps of poverty, discrimination, and the absence of a parent.

Adaptation 14 / Frazier **THE NEGRO FAMILY**

The several types of Negro families in the United States developed in the face of unique impediments to effective family organization. African family forms were largely destroyed by the transportation of captives into slavery and the forcible controls of the plantation. Slavery was not conducive to establishing new and stable types of family relations. The Civil War and Emancipation precipitated new disorganization and a high rate of geographic mobility. In this insecure environment Negro families attempted to adjust to new and uncertain trends.

Under slavery There were few forces at work to contribute to the establishment of stable forms of familial association among slaves. Relations between slave men and women ranged from physical contacts, sometimes enforced by the master, to stable unions characterized by deep sentiment between spouses and parental affection toward children. However, the very nature of slavery in the United States, with its separations of family groups and its emphasis on absolute control of the slave, was not conducive to stable unions. Even where they did exist, the unions might be destroyed. For example, the death of the master might occasion the sale of his slaves.

Because of the conditions imposed by the slave system, the mother became the most dependable and important member of the Negro family. The father recognized the mother's more fundamental interest in the children and her authority in the household. A father might be sold and separated from his family, but when the mother was sold, the master had to take her children into account. Unions between white males and slave females lacked legal and moral support, and the Negro woman was head of the household of her mulatto children.

After emancipation Immediately following emancipation there

was widespread disruption in all phases of Negro life. Family disorganization was noticeable in the numbers of Negroes who became wanderers "to prove they were free," cutting themselves off from family ties and forming a promiscuous and demoralized population. The destruction of the master's authority brought about the uprooting of many stable families. On the other hand, the disintegration accompanying the Civil War and Emancipation often tested and proved the strength of marital and family relations that had developed during slavery.

The reorganization of the Negro family following the initial confusion of emancipation was assisted



E. Franklin Frazier (1894–1962)

*His wide-ranging interests in community studies, ecology, stratification, socialization, and race and culture converged in the study of the Negro family and the influence of family life on behavior. Although best known for his work on the family, he wrote extensively on other topics. The acerbic quality of his *Black Bourgeoisie*, first published in French in 1955, caused some consternation in the Negro middle class. In 1927 an article similar in tone analyzed race prejudice in terms of mental illness, and as a consequence he was forced to leave Atlanta by a white mob.*

toward stability by five forces: Northern missionaries, missionary schools, the Negro church, the pattern established by families free before the Civil War, and developments under slavery. Where slavery was experienced in its least malignant form, slave families frequently developed a degree of stability. A number of families persisted after emancipation and were able to acquire land and work it as family groups. Thus families had a new cohesive element—the economic tie of working on their own land, and they developed toward the patriarchal form, which was the American norm. But moral instruction and even force were un-

able to hold in check the widespread family disorganization which ensued when the Negro slave became a free agent able to form and break marital and other ties.

Recent status Toward the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, two tendencies were apparent in the development of the Negro family:

1. There was an extension, especially in the rural South, of the earlier mother-centered form of family.
2. In both rural and urban communities there was an increasing

number of stable families modeled on the American pattern of family organization. They were not, however, characteristic of the Negro masses.

I. Rural South: The Matriarchal Pattern

The most striking feature of the Negro family of the rural South is the high proportion of families with female heads.

The grandmother is often the dominant figure in this type of family, and in many cases she is the *sociological mother* of the extended family group. That is, she may be the person who directly rears the grandchildren, and per-

haps also nieces, nephews, and adopted children. She exercises authority, assumes responsibility, and is called upon during the major crises of life by her own family and those outside the family. She is a repository of folk wisdom, and her superior knowledge and authority are recognized in matters concerning childbirth and child care. Midwifery is still important in the Negro South. As late as 1940, four-fifths of live births of Negroes in Mississippi and South Carolina were attended by midwives, as compared with one-fourteenth of white live births.

In isolated rural areas courtship begins at an early age and often involves sexual relations. Where pregnancy results, the young people may or may not marry. Although the moral restraints of the larger community are absent and behavior is little influenced by white laws, the economic burden which pregnancy imposes operates as a restraint on sexual behavior. Both the girl's family and the father are obligated to help take care of the child. There is little, if any, guilt associated with illegitimacy, because the folk culture defines the bearing of children as the fulfillment of a woman's destiny. The birth of a child does, however, impose on the mother obligations which are increased if the others fail to discharge their obligations towards the child.

A large proportion of the marriages are common-law relationships; but from the standpoint of stability and community recognition, these relationships have the character of legal marriages. They conform to customs and mores which have grown up among the rural folk. As one moves from the

rural South to the urban North and from lower to upper class, one finds a steady increase in the incidence of contractual marriage and observance of the formal codes governing family behavior.

II. Urban North: *The Class Pattern*

Lower class. The lower-class Negro families, which are composed in part of recent rural immigrants who have little experience with the conventional norms of marriage and divorce, most closely resemble the rural family forms. During the mass urban migration, which began at the time of World War I, many thousands of men and women cut themselves loose from their families to seek work and adventure. Family desertion remains one of the chief forms of family disorganization among urbanized Negroes.

Lower-class families are physically segregated to a large extent in the deteriorated areas where Negroes first secure a foothold in the community. They include a large proportion of families with female heads, as in the rural South. Between one-fourth and one-third of urban Negro families lack male heads. This is a result of the economic insecurity of the men and of illegitimacy. Although illegitimacy does not appear as a social problem in the rural South, sex relations and motherhood are redefined for the migrants in the city. Because of the precarious hold which women of this class have on men, their attitudes alternate between subordination to secure affection and domination because of their greater job stability and economic security.

Middle class. The effects of ur-

ban living have made possible the emergence of a substantial middle class in the Negro population. The middle class is differentiated by occupation and includes clerical and service workers and some business and professional people. Perhaps the most important accession to the middle class in the Northern cities has been the families of skilled workers. Among the middle class the male head of the family often has sufficient economic security to play the conventional role of provider for his family without the aid of the wife. The proportion of employed married women declines as the proportion of employed Negro males in industry increases.

The middle-class family is characterized by its emphasis on respectability in "getting up in the world," and it has a fairly democratic organization. The husband and father is recognized as the head of the family, but the wife and mother is not necessarily subordinated. She may work outside the home, temporarily or permanently, to help provide the extras for "getting up in the world." Her respected position derives from the tradition of independence among Negro women and is enhanced by her economic cooperation in buying a home or educating children.

Home ownership is an index of family stability among urban Negroes. The progressive stabilization of family life in the zones extending from the center of the community outward is indicated in some cities by a regular increase of the rate of home ownership in the successive zones. These increases are related to the tendency for the higher occupational classes to become concentrated on the edges of the Negro community.

Upper class. In upper-class urban Negro families, wives as well as husbands may be employed in professional occupations and other kinds of services. Among the upper class there are relatively few children per family and many childless couples.

Where the wife is employed, the upper-class family is usually equalitarian in its organization, and even where she is not employed, she enjoys considerable equality and freedom of activity. Respectability is taken for granted, but refinement and "culture" loom important. In-

dividualism is a facet of upper-class behavior, and among the "emancipated" and "sophisticated" element a new type of intelligentsia has developed. The members of this group associate freely with white middle-class intellectuals and include interracial couples.

This adaptation has reviewed the evolution of Negro family types in the United States, the emergence of characteristic adjustments, and the forces making for stability and instability. The largely disorganizing heritage of slavery and the stresses of Emancipation have in part been overcome. In the rural South families based on common-law marriage and with a matriarchal organization persist, but trends toward conventional American forms are also apparent. In the urban North family types are correlated with socioeconomic status. Lower-income families show the highest incidence of disorganization and the highest rate of survival of rural, matriarchal norms. Middle-income families resemble the characteristics of white families of similar status and are organized for upward striving. Husbands in such families are able to assume full financial responsibility, although wives may continue to work. The husband and father is the nominal family head, but the relations among the family members are democratic. Upper-income families tend to be companionate units.

Adaptation 15 / THE TECHNIQUE OF THE SOCIOGRAM

Groups develop distinctive *patterns of interaction*. They contain subgroupings that differ from group to group and within a particular group over time. Some individuals are admired and sought out by many; others are isolated.

A casual participant or observer may notice some of the relationships and may sense the "tone" of relations within a small group. If, however, the group exceeds a few members, it is unlikely that even an astute and experienced observer will have a thorough grasp of the basic relationships without prolonged observation or the aid of objective measures. One technique

for the objective presentation and interpretation of relations within groups is called the *sociogram*. It is a diagram of the *informal* relations within a group. (Charts of the *formal* relations are discussed in ASSOCIATIONS, pp. 196-197.) A sociogram shows the informal group structure, such as subgroup and friendship patterns, and the position of each individual among his fellows. A sociogram is a preliminary step in understanding group action or individual action in a group setting. It may be used to summarize verbal choices, written choices, or direct observations of a competent observer.

The student should gather data from a small group, preferably 12 or less in number, and follow through the basic steps outlined below. He may wish to ask questions regarding leadership or some other characteristic rather than friendship. The questions depend entirely upon the problem being investigated, but they must be phrased clearly and unambiguously. It is usually advisable to pretest the questions to ensure that they ask what is intended. Students may measure their degree of insight into group relations by predicting the choices that the members of the group will make and

comparing them with the actual choices.

As an illustrative exercise a third-grade teacher asked her class of fifteen boys and fifteen girls to "Write the name of the child you like best in this class," and then "the name of the child you like second best." For simplicity we shall explain the processing of the boys' choices only. It is not necessary to show the whole sociogram because only three boys chose or were chosen by girls. The procedure is described below.

Interpretation 1. The outstanding finding of the first choices is William M's position as the *star*. He received 5 first choices from the other 14 boys and 2 second choices. Clinton received 2 first choices and 5 second choices, making him a strong runner-up to William M. Between them they received 14 choices, and their choices of Alfred create a *triangle*, which dominates the sociogram. The three boys combined received 19 choices.

2. In the first choice sociogram, there is one *mutual choice*, or *pair*, between boys—William M and Alfred—and one between a boy and a girl—Robert and Sally. Additional pairs show when the second choices are counted.

3. There is an *island* consisting of Melvin, Charles, Herbert, Robert (and Sally) on the first choices. In the second choices a bridge is thrown from the island to the main group of boys by Melvin's choice of Clinton, and there are additional ties between this group and the girls. The island has other girls who do not appear in the figure, and it is interesting that the girls in this group are only weakly inte-

grated with the main group of girls.

4. There are seven *isolates*: Skipper, Michael, Herbert, Donald, Morgan, Richard L, and William R. These boys received no choices.

5. One *error* appears in Richard L's failure to make a second choice.

Note that such errors reduce the *total* number of choices made by the group.

Variations in the use of sociograms This example of friendship choices is only one of many possible uses of the sociogram. By comparing the patterning of choices on different criteria (athletic partner, study companion, etc.), the consistency and diversity of ratings in a group can be observed. Sometimes investigators wish to study a particular factor or process in relation to group structure. Whyte (Adaptation 11, pp. 128–130) wanted to know how individual security was related to patterns of primary group relations. Although he did not ask the Nortons direct questions, such as "Who are your three best friends in this group?" his observations of group interaction provided him with data on their relations. He closely observed group activities until he was able to plot the informal relations of the group members. He was then able to relate behavior (for instance, Long John's nightmares) to breaks in the individual's usual pattern of primary group relations.

Roethlisberger and Dickson (Adaptation 12, pp. 130–133) studied group norms and informal controls in relation to group structure. Sociometric techniques were used to determine the informal

structure of a work group. The authors observed who talked most frequently to whom, which cliques played what sorts of games, between whom arguments took place, and so on. They were then able to plot the informal structure of the group. This led to a more detailed understanding of how group norms emerge and how they are enforced.

Applications and limitations

Like any other research technique, the sociogram has its limitations.

1. *Validity*. Responses are influenced by the subjects' willingness to record their true feelings. If the respondents lack confidence in the investigator or if he is known to have strong preferences for certain individuals in the group, the results will probably be influenced. If there is resistance to making responses or to signing names to responses, it is unlikely that the results will be valid.

2. *Reliability*. A chart made at any given time is not necessarily a reliable indicator of relations at another time. Especially in groups of young children, there is evidence that relations are unstable. A series of sociograms would be needed to trace changes over a period of time.

3. *Cues*. We have already mentioned the possibility of cues from the investigator's preferences. Other cues should be avoided, too. For example, the students should not be given alphabetical lists of the group members. It is common knowledge that the order in which names appear on a ballot affects the number of votes candidates receive.

4. *Privacy*. The group should be confident that their choices will not be made known to others. If re-

procedure

1

We wrote each chooser's name on the left-hand side of a slip of paper with an arrow pointing to the name of his first choice, which was written on the right-hand side.

2

After a slip had been made for each choice, we sorted the slips of those who had named the same person as best friend. We found four subgroups, called sets, in which the same person had been named as best friend by several persons:

William M, chosen by Donald, Skipper, Michael, Clinton, and Alfred.

Alfred, chosen by William M and Morgan.

Clinton, chosen by William R and Curtis.

Robert, chosen by Charles and Herbert (and Sally).

3


The set with the most slips (William M's) was arranged to converge on his name.

4

William M chose Alfred, who was a member of another set. Because William M's and Alfred's choices were *mutual*, their slips were placed parallel to each other. The other choice in the 2nd set (in this case Morgan's choice of Alfred) was placed in position with the 1st set.


5

Another set which could be attached to the arrangement was Clinton's, and it was put in position.



6


The 4th set (Robert's) did not attach to the other sets, and it was arranged by itself. Robert's choice was then placed in position.



sociogram of first choices

7


The remaining individual slips were fitted into the arrangement, and the sociogram of 1st choices was completed by sketching the arrangement as a diagram.



sociogram of first and second choices

8

The second choices were processed in the same way, but a re-arrangement of the diagram was necessary to prevent an undue amount of crossing of choice lines. The completed sociogram of first and second choices is shown here.



spondents are not assured of privacy, their choices may be clouded by anxiety or may reflect some factor other than the criterion asked for.

5. *Applicability.* The sociogram is especially useful in well-defined and limited groups. A small dormitory or fraternity house would provide a good experimental setting.

6. *The sociogram* is a beginning and not an end. It is usually a first step in the analysis of leadership, morale, popularity, or another aspect of informal structure.

CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION*

*With the collaboration of
Norval D. Glenn*

SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION

Social inequality and social ranking are so closely interwoven with the division of labor and with mechanisms of self-protection and self-aggrandizement that they are, inevitably, pervasive aspects of human society. Nothing is more likely to influence the individual or the social history of a nation than the system of stratification. For this reason stratification is the sociologist's favorite independent variable. He can usually trace a connection between stratification and almost any other social phenomenon, be it child training, voting, sexual behavior, or revolution.

The major *dimensions* of stratification are power, prestige, and wealth. However, any unequally distributed reward or resource that tends to order the relations among people is also a dimension of stratification. For example, in advanced societies, knowledge and skills are becoming increasingly important criteria for the allocation of positions in the occupational structure, which in turn largely determines the system of social ranking. In traditional societies,

privilege based on custom or law governed the importance and prerogatives of social positions. For instance, in feudal times, a villein could leave the estate only with the consent of his lord.

Vertical mobility Societies differ not only in how unequally their rewards and resources are distributed but also in the amount of upward and downward movement of individuals and families. Such movement is known as vertical mobility, a special kind of social mobility. There are no known societies, past or present, with a complete absence of vertical mobility, but in some the movement of families is so slow that it is hardly perceptible during a lifetime. In these same societies, however, there is usually a predictable and institutionalized change in the authority and privilege granted the individual as he progresses through the life cycle. The contemporary United States is an example at the other extreme—a society in which small to moderate movements are

* This chapter draws upon some material included in earlier editions written in collaboration with Richard T. Morris.

very common, and in which large and rapid movements are not infrequent.

STRATA AND CLASSES

Individuals or families in a group or society who have similar ranks on any one dimension of stratification constitute a social stratum, or a social level. Thus, there are prestige strata, power strata, economic strata, and so forth. For example, families who have incomes within a certain range constitute an income stratum, and people who have completed a given number of years of school are an educational stratum. The word stratum is meaningful only when the dimension of stratification is specified.

Usually, the number of strata identified in a society is arbitrary; there is no "natural" division of the individuals or families into discrete levels. We may arbitrarily decide that each one-thousand-dollar interval on the scale of annual income spans a stratum, or that the upper ten percent of the families constitute a stratum and that each lower tenth constitutes another. In some preindustrial societies, however, people are separated by a wide gulf. The nobility and serfs of medieval Europe are examples of such "natural" strata.

Some sociologists would restrict the term "social stratification" to these naturally divided social levels. Therefore, one may read of "stratified" and "unstratified" groups and societies. However, since the existence of discrete strata in modern societies and communities is in doubt, the term social stratification is increasingly used to refer to all forms of inequality, regardless of whether the distribution of the rewards and resources is discrete or continuous. In this sense, all societies and almost all groups are stratified.

Social classes The term "social class," which is widely used in popular as well as social stratification literature, has been defined in different ways. In the sense formulated by Marx, class refers to people who share a common situation in the organization of economic production. Classes were conceived as

structural units of society and not as arbitrarily delineated strata or statistical categories. (See p. 188.) In fact, the members of one class might fall into different economic strata, and the members of an economic stratum might be members of more than one class. For example, small-businessmen differ from industrial workers in their relation to economic organization, but they may have the same income and therefore "belong" to the same income stratum.

Max Weber distinguished three orders of stratification: (1) the *economic or class order*, based upon class situation defined in a way similar to Marx, (2) the *social order*, based upon the distribution of social honor, or status, (3) the *political order*, based upon the distribution of power. In distinction to class, a *status group* consists of people who share a common social estimation of honor. "With some oversimplification, one might thus say that 'classes' are stratified according to their relations to the production and acquisition of goods; whereas 'status groups' are stratified according to the principle of their *consumption* of goods as represented by special 'styles of life'"¹ The *party*, the third unit in Weber's analysis of stratification, is made up of people organized for the pursuit of power. The membership of a class, a status group, and a party may be almost identical, but this is not invariably the case, and according to Weber, the three kinds of units, and the dimensions that define them, should be kept analytically separate.

Furthermore, the idea of class has come into general use partly because of the public interest in popularized reports of social science research. However, class has entered common use not as a rigorous idea but in what may be called a "weak" sense as an omnibus term referring to all kinds of ranked, stratified, or authentically class behavior. This fact has presented the sociologist with a minor problem: whether to adhere to exact usage and employ specialized terminology or to use broad if somewhat imprecise terms, the sense of which will be readily recognized. In fact, he has done both: class is some-

¹ H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds. and trans.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 180-184.

times used in the strong sense to connote groups who are conscious or at least potentially conscious of their common socioeconomic position, and in a weak, general sense to refer to all kinds of stratified phenomena.

APPROACHES

The principal ways of studying the complex reality of social ranking may be grouped under three headings: (1) reputational, (2) subjective, and (3) objective.

The reputational approach Since prestige consists of the evaluations people make of one another, it is measured by observing actual social interactions or more usually by asking people to rank one another. For instance, the investigator may go into a small community, select a sample of long-term residents, and ask them to rate the other members of the community on a scale from highest to lowest with seven or some other number of points. In addition, he may ask the sample of judges whether they perceive distinct social levels. If they say they do, he will ask them to identify the levels and the names of people in each one. Then to find out what criteria the judges used in defining prestige, he may ask them why they rate specific people as they do.

This technique is adequate for measuring the prestige of *individuals* if the following conditions are met: (1) all raters know or know of most of the people to be rated, and (2) all raters use the same or very similar criteria of evaluation. In other words, the method is applicable only in small and culturally homogeneous groups and communities in which there is a commonly accepted and perceived prestige hierarchy.

The reputational technique can be used more generally, however, to determine the *relative* prestige of groups, categories, and roles. On college campuses, for example, there is usually a recognized prestige hierarchy among the clubs and social fraternities. Several studies have shown that there is approximate agreement among the different categories of people

in the United States on the prestige granted to occupations. (See pp. 166-168.)

Perhaps the most common deviation from consensus is in the assignment an individual gives his own occupation or organization. Almost invariably a person tends to rate his own organization higher than the ratings given it by other individuals. This tendency is known as the aggrandizement effect.² Such bias is best avoided by asking each judge not to rate anything with which he is affiliated.

The reputational technique is sometimes used in studies of the distribution of power in communities and groups by asking a panel of judges to identify those persons who can influence important decisions. However, the technique is less suited to the study of power than of prestige. Prestige consists essentially of reputation, whereas power does not. A person may be reputed to have power and not really have it, or he may have more power than he is reputed to have. Therefore, the reputational technique is of doubtful utility in the study of power unless it is combined with other methods. However, reputed power may be significant in itself, regardless of whether the reputation correctly reflects actual power.

The subjective approach The self-rating or subjective approach investigates individuals' perceptions of their own positions in the pattern of inequality, and their self-perceptions may be quite important even though they do not correspond with their objective positions.

In this approach the investigator may ask people to indicate whether their economic standing in the society or the community is below average, about average, or above average. Or, he may be more specific and ask in what tenth or in what quarter of the population they would place themselves, in economic standing, in prestige, or in some other stratification variable.

Individuals whose objective ranks are the same may behave very differently in the system of social stratification, because they perceive their ranks dif-

²Theodore Caplow and Reece J. McGee, *The Academic Marketplace* (New York: Basic Books, 1958), pp. 45, 103-105.

ferently. People who see themselves standing at about the same ranks may evince similar feelings, even though their objective ranks are very different.

How people perceive their position in the system of economic inequality depends in large measure on their reference groups, that is, on the people with whom they compare themselves. For instance, a Negro who earns \$10,000 a year, who lives in the ghetto and has few contacts with whites, may rate himself very high because his economic rank exceeds that of most people he knows. However, if he moves into a social circle that includes white professional people, his \$10,000 income will seem relatively low. His objective economic position is unchanged, but his perception changes, and so may his reaction to it. Consequently, subjective stratification studies often try to determine the reference group or groups of the individuals studied.

In one commonly used subjective technique, persons are asked to name the "social class" to which they belong, or they are given a list of names of social classes and asked to indicate to which they belong.⁸ For instance, the respondents may be asked to identify themselves as "upper class," "middle class," "working class," or "lower class." If there is a high degree of consensus about what class labels mean and if they are a common part of the social vocabulary of a large part of the population, a class-identification technique can be used to advantage. However, in some societies—and the United States is one of these—evidence of such agreed understandings is shaky. It cannot be assumed that the people who say they are middle class are thinking of the same things, are identifying with the same objective entity, or that their perceptions of their rankings on the major dimensions of stratification are similar. In fact, many respondents probably do not identify with any social class until they are asked the question.

The objective approach The objective approach uses indicators that do not rely on the feelings, evaluations, or perceptions of the individuals studied or of a panel of judges. Delineation of strata in terms of

income, years of school completed, occupation, or formal lines of authority exemplifies this approach.

These methods allow more precise measurement than the reputational and subjective approaches, and most of the measures can be used for studies of entire societies. Therefore, the objective approach is frequently employed on large populations and as an adjunct to community studies.

The objective method by itself leaves untapped significant aspects of the total reality. For instance, when one has identified all persons whose incomes fall within a certain range, he has not delimited a population for whom the social meaning and the social consequences of their income is the same. An income of \$8,000 a year means one thing to a middle-aged skilled worker near the peak of his earning power, and it means something quite different to a young professional man just beginning his career. The significance of a given income also varies with factors such as past income, the level of income within one's reference groups, and the security of its source.

The foregoing discussion has referred to the self-rating approach as subjective and to indicators that do not necessarily involve awareness as objective. The distinction refers to types of information, not standards of evidence. Findings about socioeconomic status secured from an objective approach are not necessarily superior to subjective-type data based on attitudes and opinions. From the standpoint of scientific inquiry, the evaluation of reputational status can be as firmly founded on evidence as a measure of income, and the significance of one fact can make as dependable a contribution to the advancement of knowledge as the other.

Three exercises in the study of stratification are outlined in Adaptation 16. As presented, the methods are designed so that in the time required and the samples needed, they may be used as research projects by college classes. However, the interview schedules or questionnaires should be pretested under field conditions to make certain that they will be understood by the respondents.

⁸ For instance, see Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 77.

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Adaptation 16 / Morris EXERCISES IN STRATIFICATION RESEARCH

Three research exercises have been designed to fit each of the methods discussed above (pp. 155 ff.). The samples and the research procedures called for can be readily dealt with in a classroom or some other small-scale study. Alternative phrasings of questions may be substituted but before being used in an actual study, they should be pretested to be sure they will be understood by the subject population.

SOURCE: Prepared especially for this book by Richard T. Morris.

THE SUBJECTIVE METHOD

The sample Use a large group in your school, or a combination of small groups, or an organization meeting. Try to get at least 100 people to participate. If you can get them all at once, so much the better.

The data The questions are meant to be read to the respondents. However, they can be given ruled and numbered forms with the lists on questions 5 and 6 already typed in.

Ask your subjects to write the answers to these questions:

1. To what class in the U.S.A. would you say you belong? (Write just the name of the class.)

2. To what class in the U.S.A. would you say your father belongs (or did belong, if he is deceased)?

3. To what class in your *own community or home town* would you say you belong?

4. To what class in his home community does (or did) your father belong?

5. Now please write the following words, one under the other: "Upper, Lower upper, Upper middle, Middle, Lower middle, White collar, Working, Upper lower, Lower." Please mark with an "O" your own class, the class in the U.S.A. to which you think you belong. Please mark with an "F" your father's class, the class to which you think your father belongs (or belonged).⁴

6. Now please write the following words, one under another: "Upper, Middle, Working, Lower." Mark one of these with an "O" to indicate your own class and an

"F" to indicate your father's class in America.

7. What is it about your father which made you place him in the class you did? What characteristic did you use to place him?

8. What made you place yourself where you did?

9. What is (or was) your father's main occupation? Be specific: do not just say "businessman"; say what kind of business and his position in that business. (Example: not accountant, but cost accountant in a newsprint papermill.)

10. What occupation do you plan to enter?

11. (Optional) If you were to vote in the next presidential election, would you be apt to vote Democratic, Republican, or other? (Specify.)

12. (Optional) How do you think your father will vote?

The findings To analyze the results, list separately all of the class names used in questions 1 through 4 and enter the number of people who used each of these names. Enter separately the number of people who placed themselves and their fathers in the various classes provided in questions 5 and 6. For each class in question 6 list separately the fathers' occupations from question 9 and the intended occupations from question 10. This might be compared with the occupational distribution in the classes derived from questions 1 through 5. For each class in question 6 list the criteria used for placement of father, question 7, and self, question 8. For each class enter the

number of political affiliations, questions 11 and 12.

The interpretation A study such as this will help you to answer the following kinds of questions as they apply to your particular sample:

1. Where do people place themselves when class names are not supplied in advance?

2. How does this differ from their self-placement when names are provided?

3. What does the "middle" or "working" class consist of?

4. How do occupations spread themselves over the classes?

5. Does voting intention differ by class?

THE REPUTATIONAL METHOD

The judges Use a small community (up to 5,000) for your study. Ask approximately five people who know a large number of individuals in the town to serve as judges. Bankers, clergymen, doctors, established businessmen, town officials, or a newspaper editor might be good possibilities. If you choose judges in the upper income and occupational brackets, however, bear in mind that you will get a picture of the class structure of the community as seen *from the top*. To compare this view with the perspectives from other levels, several investigators might choose judges from different strata in the same community. These judges should also know a large number of families. They might be milkmen, bill collectors, handymen, postmen, or policemen. (See the comment on privacy in INTRODUCTION, page 10.)

⁴ Note the deliberate redundancy in the phrasing of these instructions. The purpose is to ensure clarity and therefore validity of response.

Judge A (5 classes)	Judge B (5 classes)	Judge C (3 classes)	Judge D (4 classes)	Judge E, F, G . . .
upper 6, 50	upper 6, 36	upper 6, 50	upper 6, 7, 36	FIG. VI:1 arrangement study <i>The number of the individ- ditional ran- judges will</i>
upper- middle 7, 12, 36, 41, etc.	upper- middle 50, 7, 12, 34, 22, etc.	middle 7, 12, 36, 41, 22, etc.	upper- middle 12, 50, 34, etc.	
middle 22, 9, 34, 52, etc.	middle 9, 41, 52, 8, etc.		middle 41, 22, 52, etc.	
lower- middle 8, 10, 26, 46, etc.	lower- middle 10, 26, 17, etc.			
lower 47, 17, 18 etc.	lower 46, 18, 47, etc.	lower 18, 47, etc.	lower 17, 47, 65, etc.	

FIG. VI:1 Example of plotting arrangement for reputational study

The numbers in the cells are the card numbers of the individuals ranked. Etc. indicates that additional rankings were made in the cell. Most judges will not rank all individuals in the sample.

The sample Take a sample of the town's adults. If possible, get a city directory or other list that includes *all* of the people in the community. You might use a telephone directory, but if you do you will automatically bias your sample by excluding those who do not have telephones or who have unlisted telephones. A city directory is a less biased listing, but it omits people who recently moved to town.

Take each *n*th name. (For example, if there are 5,000, take each fiftieth name for an easily manageable sample of 100.) Write the name and address of each person selected on a separate card. If they are not included, add the judges' names to the set of cards. Number each card.

The data Ask the judges to do the following operations:

1. Discard the cards listing people they do not know.

2. Sort the remaining cards into piles that represent groups of people who seem to belong together in terms of their general standing in the community. (They may make any number of groupings they wish.)

3. Arrange the piles in order of evaluation, with those who are most highly regarded in the community at the top, those least so at the bottom. (They may rate two or more groupings as having about equal value.)

After they have done this, ask the following information of the judges:

1. What do people generally call these groupings (if they have names for them)?

2. Do the groupings have any particular characteristics: in personality, character, or behavior?

3. What would you estimate is the percentage of the community in each grouping?

4. Are any important groupings omitted from this arrangement? (The judge may not personally know any people in them, or representatives of these groupings may not have been included in the original set of cards.)

5. Why did you group the individuals as you did? (What were the characteristics or criteria the judge used in his groupings?)

As the information is collected the investigator must:

1. Make a record of the cards discarded and of the groupings and ratings made by each judge. Save the discards for verification.

2. During each interview record the characteristics, estimated size, criteria, and names used for each of the groupings by each of the judges.

The findings After the data have been collected from all of the judges, make a summary of your findings. List the name or number of each judge, his position as estimated by the other judges and himself, the number of people he placed, the number of groupings he made, and their relative size.

Next, plot the rated individuals according to the positions assigned to them by the various judges. Use a large sheet of graph paper and enter the number of each individual's card in the class groupings made by each judge. This arrangement will provide a quick visual image of agreement between the judges in their perceptions of the social structure of the community. (See Fig. VI: 1.)

Make a summary statement of the characteristics, criteria, sizes, and names of the classes as perceived by the several judges.

The interpretation From such a study you may get a fairly clear picture of the class structure as seen by certain community members, the degree of agreement among them, and differences in the way the structure is seen from different vantage points.

THE OBJECTIVE METHOD

The sample Try to get about 100 people as subjects from a large college class or several small ones. Ask them the questions during a session.

The data Ask the students to write answers to the following questions, or give them mimeographed forms.

1. What is (or was) your father's main occupation? Be specific. Do not just say "businessman," but state the kind of business and your father's position in that business.

2. (Optional) What is your intended occupation? Be as specific as possible.

3. What was your father's approximate annual average income during his best five years?

4. (Optional) What income do you realistically expect to be making ten years after you graduate?

5. What educational level did your father attain? Use one of the following terms: grade school, some high school, high school graduate, some college, college graduate, some postgraduate, postgraduate degree.

6. What educational level did your mother attain? (Use the same terms as above.)

7. Now we would like to get some information about the personal tastes and preferences of your parents.⁵ What sort of pictures are (or were) displayed in your living room at home? Use one of the following terms to indicate the kind of picture. If there is more than one kind displayed, indicate the most frequent kind by "1" for most frequent, "2" for second most frequent, etc.

- photographs of family members or friends
- photographs of scenery or animals
- reproductions of traditional or representational paintings
- reproductions of abstract or modern painting
- original traditional or repre-

sentational paintings, including family portraits

- original abstract or modern paintings
- if others, describe
- no pictures

8. What kinds of entertainment do your parents prefer? If they had equal choice and opportunity to attend one of the following events, which would they choose? If more than one, number in order of preference. If mother and father differ, indicate separately by "F" and "M."

- ballet
- stage play
- night baseball, football, or basketball
- automobile races
- lecture or discussion
- symphony concert
- night club entertainment
- movie
- if others, describe

9. What magazines do your parents regularly read? Number in order of frequency if more than one. If mother and father differ, indicate separately.

10. (Optional) Ask questions 7, 8, and 9 of the students themselves.

The findings When the data have been collected, separate the occupations of the fathers as follows:⁶

- Professionals, proprietors and high officials of large businesses, including gentlemen farmers
- Semiprofessionals and lower officials of large businesses, clerical, sales, and kindred workers,

⁵ Cf. Russell Lynes, *The Taste Makers* (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), pp. 310-333.

⁶ For a finer breakdown, see W. L. Warner et al., *Social Class in America* (Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1949), pp. 140-141.

skilled workers, proprietors of small businesses including operators of modest-sized farms

3. Semiskilled workers and unskilled workers, including small-scale farmers

Separate the educational levels into:

1. College education
2. High school education
3. Grade school education only

Separate the income levels into:

1. Over \$15,000
2. \$5,000–\$15,000
3. Under \$5,000

Now distribute the answers to questions 7 through 9 according to the three kinds of strata. If you separate the strata differently, or make finer groupings, e.g., into seven categories instead of three, the differences in distribution may show up more clearly.

The interpretation The following are some of the questions that can be answered with your data. Does income, occupation, or education make the most difference in the preferences and tastes of your sample? Which area of preference

is most clearly differentiated by which criterion, i.e., does artistic preference vary most by education while entertainment preference varies most by occupation? What is the relation between occupation, education, and income in your sample?

If the optional questions are asked about students' own positions and preferences, how do they differ from their parents? Which students differ most? Summarize your findings in tables like those on pages 171–172.

SECTION 2 INEQUALITY

ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

The distribution of family incomes in the United States in 1965 is shown in Figure VI:2. Median family income was \$6,882, that is, half the families had incomes above that figure. Families with incomes of \$25,000 and over were only 1.5 percent of the total, but 25 percent had incomes of \$10,000 or more, and these included many families headed by manual workers. As recently as 1947, the proportion of families with incomes of \$10,000 or more (in 1965 dollars) was only 8 percent; it was 10 percent in 1955 and 18 percent in 1960.⁷ The society as a whole is now affluent, and yet in 1965 eight million families—17 percent of the total—had incomes below \$3,000. Furthermore, the poor were disproportionately nonwhite as shown by the concentration of nonwhite families below \$4,000 in Figure VI:3. The median income for white families was nearly double that of nonwhites.

The affluence, if uneven affluence, of the United

States compared with other prosperous countries is illustrated in the following estimates of the time an industrial worker had to work in 1958 to earn enough to pay for a standard meal:⁸

United States	60 minutes
Canada	68 minutes
West Germany	131 minutes
United Kingdom	138 minutes
France	277 minutes
Italy	298 minutes

Comparison with underdeveloped nations would show even greater discrepancies.

There is a negative, but far from perfect, correlation between the level of prosperity of nations and the economic inequality within them. In other words, there is generally less inequality in the prosperous countries. This relationship is illustrated by the following estimates of the percentage of the total national income (before taxes) going to the most prosperous 5 percent of the families. The higher the

⁷ U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports, Consumer Income* (Series P-60, No. 51, January 12, 1967), Table C.

⁸ Zoe Campbell, "Food Costs in Work Time Here and Abroad," *Conference Board Business Record*, December, 1959.




FIG. VI:2 Stratification of U.S. families by income, 1965

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-60, No. 49, August 10, 1966. Sample Survey.

percentage, the greater is the income inequality.*

United States	20%
Sweden	20
Great Britain	21
West Germany	24
Ceylon	31
Colombia	42
Kenya	51
Southern Rhodesia	65

Perhaps there is no society in which income is more evenly distributed than in the United States, although there may be slightly less inequality in such countries as Denmark, The Netherlands, and Israel.¹⁰

This discussion is not addressed to related but

complicated questions of how earnings are spent and how subsidies for housing, health services, and the like should be evaluated. There is no study that takes all of these factors into consideration. However, it seems probable that the life of the lowest income persons in the Scandinavian states is healthier and more decent than of the poor in the U.S. This is the case even though the U.S. poor have larger cash incomes and more luxury products such as television sets and telephones.

The income distribution in the United States is to a large extent dependent on the educational and occupational distributions, which are shown in simplified form in Figures VI:4 and VI:5. However, as is pointed out in the discussion of status consistency,

* Simon Kuznets, "Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 11 (1963), Table 3.

¹⁰ Herman P. Miller, *Rich Man, Poor Man* (New York: Crowell, 1964), p. 32.

there is not perfect correspondence between educational, occupational, and income levels (see page 177).

Poverty The definition of poverty differs from society to society and from time to time in any one society.¹¹ In recent years, the poverty line in the United States has often been drawn, somewhat arbitrarily, at \$3,000 for families and at \$1,500 for single and unattached persons. As inflation reduces the value of the dollar and as socially defined consumer needs increase, the line should probably be drawn at a higher level; undoubtedly, there are now many poor families with incomes above \$3,000.

By these standards, a majority of the people in the United States were poor only a few decades ago, and a great majority of the people in other countries are still poor. However, the social concern caused by poverty, and to a large extent the feelings of deprivation caused by it, are relative to the contemporary standards in each society.

There is no simple answer nor a single cause to explain why so many people in the most affluent nation cannot afford amenities that most Americans take for granted. Ironically, however, the changes in technology and economic organization that have made the overall high level of income possible are to some extent responsible. The need for unskilled and semiskilled labor has diminished relative to the supply, so that many persons who can offer only muscle power on the labor market find it increasingly difficult to contribute to the economy. For example, modern earth-moving, ditch-digging, and tunnel-boring machines have replaced the pick-and-shovel crews that employed many immigrants and others in earlier years.

Many of the poorly educated and poorly trained are minority peoples. Past discrimination accounts for their relative lack of skills, and present discrimination makes it difficult for them to reap equitable rewards from the skills they have. Not surprisingly, Negroes are only about a tenth of the total popula-

¹¹ See Miller, *ibid.*, Chap. 5.




FIG. VI:3 Family income by color, United States, 1965

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-60, No. 49, August 10, 1966. Sample Survey.




FIG. VI:4 Stratification of U.S. population twenty-five years old and over, by education, 1966

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 158, December 19, 1966, Table 3. Sample Survey.

tion but are more than a fifth of the poor. See Figure VI:3, which reports Negro and white family incomes.

Changes in technology and economic organization contribute to widespread poverty among farmers and farm laborers. In 1959, more than 15 percent of poor families lived on farms, but the proportion would be reduced somewhat if the value of food produced on the farm were included in the income data. Since 1959 many of these poor people have moved to cities, but often without the skills to compete adequately in the urban labor market. Large-scale commercial agriculture, using modern techniques and expensive farm equipment, has made the small fam-

ily farm obsolete and has eliminated the need for thousands of farm workers.

At least a fourth of all poor families have heads sixty-five years old and older, and more than half of all families with elderly heads are poor—another example of poverty exacerbated by changes in technology and economic organization. There is a secure economic niche for the elderly in agrarian societies, where age brings increased rights and privileges within the extended family, which is usually the producing unit. In contrast, the extended family in industrial societies is not an important economic unit, and the industrial society does not revere age nor




FIG. VI:5 Stratification of employed population of U.S. by occupational groupings, 1966

SOURCE: *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1966*. Derived from data in Table 323.

provide so well for the aged. The plight of the elderly worsens as technology reduces the need for manual labor and tends to lower the retirement age. At the same time advances in medical technology and improvements in nutrition and living conditions increase longevity. Aside from these major categories of the poor, many people have low incomes because they are disabled or in poor health, because they are women with children but no husband, or because they suffer from other handicaps.

Since such a large proportion of the poor consist of the elderly, the middle-aged unskilled, husbandless women with children, and persons with severe mental and physical handicaps, poverty cannot be eliminated by increasing the productivity of the poor. Rather it can be significantly reduced only by modification of the traditional norm that the right to consume beyond a minimum provided by public "relief" is proportional to the value of the individual's contribution to the economy. Proposals for a negative income tax or a guaranteed annual income, recently made even by conservative economists, indicate that the norm is already weakening.

PRESTIGE

Prestige in small communities Early and influential studies using the reputational technique were conducted by W. Lloyd Warner and his associates in Newburyport, Massachusetts, a city of 17,000 north of the Boston suburbs, and in Morris, Illinois, a community of 6,000 a few miles south of the Chicago suburbs. In the research reports Newburyport is called "Yankee City" and Morris is "Jonesville," "Elmtown," "Hometown," or "Prairie City." A team of researchers supervised by Warner also studied a

town of 10,000 population in the deep South, called "Old City," and other workers influenced by Warner investigated the distribution of prestige in communities from California to Connecticut.¹²

These studies found that people in a small, homogeneous community tend to use similar criteria in evaluating one another (that is, in granting prestige), but that there is not complete uniformity of criteria. At the lower economic levels money is a more important criterion whereas manners, taste, and family background count for more at the higher levels. Considering the community as a whole, Warner concluded that occupation was the most important basis for prestige in Morris. Among the variables measured and quantitatively analyzed, amount of income, source of income, house type, dwelling area, and amount of education followed occupation in that order.

The Warner researchers found that family background was salient in Newburyport and in "Old City" (in the deep South), but that it was less important in Morris. In the former two communities, an "upper-upper class" was differentiated from a "lower-upper class" on the basis of lineage. Although the lower-uppers had more money on the average than the upper-uppers, the latter were granted social superiority because they were from prominent old families.

Six prestige levels were distinguished in Newburyport and five in Morris. Although these levels are called "social classes" in the research reports, they are not classes in the strict sense but rather prestige strata. However, at least the higher levels appear to be cohesive social groupings, bound together by ties of intimate interaction. Therefore, they approximate

¹² The "Yankee City" Series (New Haven: Yale University Press): W. L. Warner and P. S. Lunt, *The Social Life of a Modern Community* (1941); W. L. Warner and P. S. Lunt, *The Status System of a Modern Community* (1942); W. L. Warner and Leo Srole, *The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups* (1945); W. L. Warner and J. O. Low, *The Social System of the Modern Factory* (1947); W. Lloyd Warner, *The Living and the Dead* (1959).

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For a summary statement see W. Lloyd Warner, *American Life, Dream and Reality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

what Weber called "status groups" (see page 154).

Warner claims that the people not only arranged one another into a prestige hierarchy but that they also perceived discrete strata. Other studies have found that whereas people in small communities do perceive discrete levels, rather than a continuous array of individuals and families, there is little agreement on the number and relative size of the strata perceived.¹³ The six- and five-layered prestige hierarchies Warner identified seem to reflect primarily the perceptions of some of his "upper-middle class" informants.¹⁴

The information about values, behavior, life-styles, and occupational characteristics of the "social classes" described by Warner and his associates has been widely disseminated among the American public, through social science courses in high schools and colleges and through popular books and periodicals. Such terms as "upper-middle class" and "lower-middle class" have become household terms, and the images they elicit probably approximate Warner's descriptions. For instance, the "lower-middle class," consisting of small-businessmen, clerks, salesmen, and a few skilled workers, is thought of as relatively conservative, work-oriented, thrifty, religious, temperate, chaste, and concerned with respectability.

However, Warner's picture of the different prestige levels is no longer accurate, if indeed it ever was pertinent beyond the communities where the research was done. The Newburyport study was conducted in the early 1930s and the Morris study in the early 1940s. Even then, small, static towns located just outside commuting range of large metropolises were not representative of the country as a whole, nor even of all small communities in the United States. It is hardly surprising, then, that recent national opinion poll data show clerical and sales workers to deviate markedly from Warner's "lower-middle

class."¹⁵ Instead of being relatively temperate, they report the smallest proportion of teetotalers of any occupational category. Instead of being the most conservative, they are less conservative than people in the higher ranking occupations on most political and economic issues and are less conservative than farmers and all categories of manual workers on most issues relating to sex, religion, international relations, and civil liberties. Furthermore, they evince no unusual degree of thrift, commitment to work, or religious interest. There are similar disparities between recent national data and Warner's characterization of the other prestige levels.

In most large communities prestige criteria are less uniform than in small towns, and usually there is no commonly perceived prestige hierarchy. Prestige criteria differ between Negroes and whites and among the different ethnic communities. Such deviant subcultures as the underworld, the hippies, and the homosexuals have their own bases for prestige.

Occupational prestige Individuals who cannot be ranked accurately in overall prestige can be ranked in the prestige they derive from their occupations. Studies conducted in the United States since 1925 show a high degree of agreement in the prestige granted specific occupations. In the two best-known studies done by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) in 1947 and 1963, 90 occupations were rated by a national sample. The ratings from the more recent study are shown in Table VI:1.

The prestige scores, which could vary from 20 through 100, correlate about equally well with median income and median educational attainments of workers in the occupations, but neither correlation is perfect. For instance, minister and schoolteacher rank higher in prestige than in income, but undertaker and singer in nightclub have less prestige than

¹³ Harold F. Kaufman, "Members of a Rural Community as Judges of Prestige Rank," *Sociometry*, 9 (1946), 71-85; and Gerhard E. Lenski, "American Social Classes: Statistical Strata or Social Groups," *American Journal of Sociology*, 63 (1952), 139-144.

¹⁴ Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, "Social Status and Social Structure: A Re-examination of Data and Interpretations," I, *British Journal of Sociology*, 2 (1951), 162.

¹⁵ Norval D. Glenn and Jon P. Alston, "Rural-Urban Differences in Reported Attitudes and Behavior," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, 47 (1967), 381-400.

SECTION 2 INEQUALITY

TABLE VI:1 THE RATINGS OF OCCUPATIONS

OCCUPATION	SCORE	OCCUPATION	SCORE
	94	Newspaper columnist	73
U.S. Supreme Court Justice	93	Policeman	72
Physician	92		71
Nuclear physicist	92	AVERAGE	71
Scientist	91	Reporter on a daily newspaper	70
Government scientist	91	Bookkeeper	70
State governor	90	Radio announcer	69
Cabinet member in the federal government	90	Insurance agent	
College professor	90	Tenant farmer—one who owns livestock	69
U.S. Representative in Congress	89	and machinery and manages the farm	67
Chemist	89	Local official of a labor union	67
Diplomat in the U.S. Foreign Service	89	Manager of a small store in a city	66
Lawyer	88	Mail carrier	66
Architect	88	Railroad conductor	66
County judge	88	Traveling salesman for a wholesale concern	65
Dentist	87	Plumber	63
Mayor of a large city		Barber	63
Member of the board of directors		Machine operator in a factory	63
of a large corporation	87	Owner-operator of a lunch stand	63
Minister	87	Playground director	62
Psychologist	86	Corporal in the regular army	62
Airline pilot	86	Garage mechanic	59
Civil engineer	86	Truck driver	58
Head of a department in a state government	86	Fisherman who owns his own boat	56
Priest	85	Clerk in a store	56
Banker	85	Milk route man	56
Biologist	83	Streetcar motorman	55
Sociologist	82	Lumberjack	55
Captain in the regular army	81	Restaurant cook	54
Accountant for a large business	81	Singer in a nightclub	51
Public schoolteacher	80	Filling station attendant	50
Building contractor		Coal miner	50
Owner of a factory that employs	80	Dock worker	50
about 100 people		Night watchman	50
Artist who paints pictures that are	78	Railroad section hand	49
exhibited in galleries	78	Restaurant waiter	49
Author of novels	78	Taxi driver	48
Economist	78	Bartender	48
Musician in a symphony orchestra	77	Farmhand	48
Official of an international labor union	76	Janitor	45
County agricultural agent	76	Clothes presser in a laundry	44
Electrician	76	Soda fountain clerk	
Railroad engineer	75	Sharecropper—one who owns no livestock or	42
Owner-operator of a printing shop	75	equipment and does not manage farm	39
Trained machinist	74	Garbage collector	36
Farm owner and operator	74	Street sweeper	34
Undertaker	74	Shoe shiner	
Welfare worker for a city government			

SOURCE: Robert W. Hodge, Paul M. Seigel, and Peter H. Rossi, "Occupational Prestige in the United States, 1925-1963," *American Journal of Sociology*, 70 (November, 1964), 286-302. Used by permission of Professor Hodge and The University of Chicago Press.

predicted by income. One occupation, farm owner and operator, is granted more prestige than predicted by either income or education.

Obviously, the prestige of occupations is not a simple function of their economic rewards and educational requirements. Responsibility entailed, autonomy afforded, and similar characteristics may be important determinants.¹⁶ Significantly, some manual occupations rank above several nonmanual ones, suggesting that the historic distinction between hand work and head work is not of overriding importance.

Many of the changes in the prestige scores between 1947 and 1963 are so small that they could result from chance differences in the samples of raters. (The correlation of the scores for the two dates is + .99.) However, consistency in the types of occupations for which ratings changed suggests that some of the changes are real. For instance, ratings of most scientific occupations increased while most artistic occupations declined, apparently reflecting a small, but perhaps meaningful, shift in American values.

International comparisons of occupational prestige reveal overall similarities but many moderate differences in the evaluations of specific occupations.¹⁷ Correlations of foreign studies with the 1963 NORC study average higher for white-collar than for blue-collar occupations—an indication of greater variability of prestige of manual occupations. Some scholars conclude that an overall similarity of prestige rankings of occupations in countries with dissimilar cultures indicates that prestige reflects a “functional importance,” not dependent on the peculiar values of the society.

POWER

Community power For practical reasons, the study of power in American sociology has been concentrated at the community level perhaps because it is so difficult to deal with national power systems.

Recent work on community power began with a study of Atlanta, the results of which were published in 1953.¹⁸ Hunter reported a monolithic covert “power structure,” that is, a small group of men, mostly wealthy businessmen, who did not occupy formal positions of political authority but had a determining voice in almost all important community decisions. Although the man in the street could not identify the members of the power structure, they were discovered through the reputational technique with a panel of strategically placed informants.

Other studies have found that the distribution of power in Atlanta described by Hunter is not typical of American communities and, in fact, may be rare.¹⁹ Dozens of community studies since 1953 show a remarkable variety of power arrangements. For instance, the communities vary in the visibility of their leaders. Some have *visible* leaders, influentials who are almost universally recognized as such. Others have *concealed* leaders, known to strategically placed judges but not to the general public. Others have *symbolic* leaders with reputed but not real power. Some communities have leaders of each type. Communities also differ in the scope of influence of their leaders who may exert power on a wide range of community issues or only on a few. Finally, communities vary in the cohesiveness of their leadership; the different leaders may form a social group and

¹⁶ A number of studies report some correlates of occupational prestige but there is no conclusive evidence of causation. For example, see Albano P. Garbin and Frederick L. Bates, “Occupational Prestige: An Empirical Study of Its Correlates,” *Social Forces*, 40 (1961), 131–136.

¹⁷ Robert W. Hodge, Donald J. Treiman, and Peter H. Rossi, “A Comparative Study of Occupational Prestige,” in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), *Class, Status and Power: Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective* (2nd ed.; New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1966), pp. 309–321.

¹⁸ Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision-Makers* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).

¹⁹ Charles M. Bonjean and David M. Olson, “Community Leadership: Directions of Research,” *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 9 (1964), 278–300.

exercise their influence in unison, or each may be more or less independent.

There is considerable but inconclusive evidence that the distribution of power in American communities is becoming more pluralistic and amorphous.²⁰ That is, power may be more widely distributed among competing individuals and groups, none of whom is able, nor perhaps motivated, to influence a wide range of decisions at the community level. Furthermore, interrelations of local organizations with national and regional ones may further diminish community power.²¹

National power If power is becoming more diffuse within American communities, it is not necessarily becoming more effectively shared by the population. The decline of discernible, well-defined monolithic power structures within communities may be a function of a nationwide centralization of decision-making. If few important decisions are made at the community level, local power elites have little reason for being, and there may be little motivation to monopolize local power. The apparent decline in the power of business in some communities is not proof of decline in the national power of business institutions.²² If the most important decisions affecting business interests are now made at the state and national levels, business leaders may be quite willing to abdicate local power.

There is no conclusive estimate of the trend in the national distribution of power in the United States and in other industrial societies. Some evidence points to an increasing concentration of power in a fairly cohesive power elite; other evidence points to a wider distribution of power among a variety of interest groups that operate at the national level.

C. Wright Mills held that crucial decisions are

made primarily by a rather cohesive power elite of not more than 200 to 300 individuals, consisting of (1) the *corporate elite*, major executives and board members of larger corporations; (2) the *military elite*, top-ranking admirals and generals; and (3) the *political elite*, made up of the President and the most influential members of the executive branch of the federal government.²³ Congress is relegated to what Mills calls the "middle levels of power," where relatively unimportant decisions are made. The power elite, he claims, decided to use the atomic bomb against Japan in 1945, to intervene militarily in Korea in 1950, and to set the course of United States policy in the "cold war." Furthermore, he claims that the members of the power elite are similar enough in background, outlook, and interests so that they tend to act in unison; the power of one segment does not offset the power of others.

Most sociologists and political scientists do not accept this thesis without qualifications. A contradictory "balance thesis" holds that major decisions tend to be compromises among the several interest groups, each of which has veto power that prevents decisions entirely contrary to its interests.²⁴ Those who hold this view believe that power in the United States has become more diffuse in recent decades, as a result of a proliferation of interest groups, modifications in the capitalist system, and a diversification of business interests.

Obviously, both views cannot be entirely correct, but each may emphasize important aspects of reality. In fact, Mills concedes that the balance thesis correctly describes the decision-making process at the "middle levels of power," and he is probably correct that the general public does not play an active role in major decisions of war and peace. Few would contend, for instance, that the decision to intervene

²⁰ John Walton, "The Vertical Axis of Community Organization and the Structure of Power," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, 48 (December, 1967); and Claire W. Gilbert, "Some Trends in Community Politics: A Secondary Analysis of Power Structure Data from 166 Communities," *ibid.*

²¹ Roland Warren, "Toward a Reformulation of Community Theory," *Human Organization*, 15 (1962), 8-11.

²² A decline in El Paso, Texas, is reported in William D'Antonio and Eugene C. Erickson, "The Reputational Technique as a Measure of Community Power," *American Sociological Review*, 27 (1962), 362-375.

²³ C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), Chap. 12.

²⁴ David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), pp. 242-255.

militarily in Viet Nam was made by an informed and active general public; at the time, most of the public had no well-crystallized opinions and lacked adequate information to form them. However, it is

doubtful that decisions of this nature affecting major aspects of international relations have ever been controlled by an active and informed general public.

SECTION 3 STATUS AND LIFE-STYLES

CORRELATES OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

Findings from hundreds of studies show that stratification is interwoven with the ways people live, act, and think. Examples of such data are summarized in the accompanying tables. Table VI:2 reports differences in life chances and privileges, Table VI:3 in attitudes and behavior. For illustrative purposes, cases were chosen that vary in an orderly manner from the higher to the lower strata.

The data show correlations, or statistical associations, between the stratification variables and the characteristics listed; they do not of themselves demonstrate causation. (See "Interpreting Correlations," page 173.) Many of the studies that treat stratification correlates are concerned with explaining the differences among the strata as well as describing them. The link between stratification and the correlated variable in some cases can be established as one of cause and effect, but in other cases remains a matter of statistical association. The several dimensions of stratification often show different relations to attitudes, behavior, and outlooks. For instance, Table VI:3 indicates that income is *directly* related to reported happiness, that is, the higher the income, the higher reported happiness. At most income levels, however, education is *inversely* related to reported happiness.

The differences among the social levels should not obscure the great variation in attitudes and behavior at each level. Except in cases where there is high consensus in the whole society, no social level in the United States shows a high uniformity of behavior

or attitudes. Furthermore some data show an erratic profile with the middle strata deviating from the two extremes. However, the broad trend of findings points to the fact that position in the stratification system affects a multitude of details of life, behavior, and thought.

LIFE AT THE TOP

The consequences of variation in wealth, prestige, and power are most evident in the ways of life of the rich and the poor. At the top of society is a community of mutually aware families, most of whom inherit a substantial fortune, so they may, if they wish, live without working. But the rich do not always rank at the top in prestige; for instance, the names of many wealthy financiers and executives are not well known to the public. Some celebrities are not wealthy, and some very powerful men lack high prestige. Therefore, descriptions of elites depend on which dimension of stratification is used to define the elite.

Although wealth tends to be achieved before power and perhaps prestige, it may come as a consequence of recognition of accomplishments as it has for many generals and politicians. The attainments of individuals *qualify* them for membership in elites, but their full acceptance to newly won status in many cases depends on the acceptability of the whole family. There may be doubt about the existence of class consciousness at most levels of society, but there is little question about the self-awareness of the upper class.

One reason why so little well-documented infor-

TABLE VI:2 STRATIFICATION CORRELATES: LIFE CHANCES AND PRIVILEGES, UNITED STATES

RELATED FACTORS	(*)	STRATA		
		Lower	Middle	Upper
Standardized mortality ratios ^a	(O)	Unskilled workers: 120	Skilled workers: 96	Professionals: 82
Lifetime income ^b	(E)	Less than 8 years of school—\$131,000	High school graduates—\$246,000	College graduates—\$386,000
Annual mean income ^c	(E)	Less than 8 years of school—\$3,641	High school graduates—\$6,693	College graduates—\$10,062
Attend college ^d	(I)	Children from families with incomes under \$5,000—9%	Children from families with incomes \$5,000—\$7,500—17%	Children from families with incomes of \$10,000 or more—44%
Index of marital instability ^e	(I)	Low income—23	Middle income—10	High income—6
Dental visits per year per person ^f	(I)	Family income under \$2,000—0.8	Family income \$4,000—\$7,000—1.4	Family income \$7,000 or more—2.3
Obesity of women ^g	(I)	Low income—52%	Medium income—43%	High income—9%

* Parenthetical letters indicate the bases for stratification in the studies cited: (I) income, (O) occupation, (E) education.

^a L. Guralnick, "The Study of Mortality by Occupation in the United States," (Washington, D.C.: National Office of Vital Statistics, September, 1959). (Ratio between the number of deaths and the number of deaths expected, adult white males, 1950).

^b *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1966*, Table 158. (Males only)

^c *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1966*, Table 158. (Males only)

^d Herman P. Miller, *Rich Man, Poor Man* (New York: Crowell, 1964), p. 171.

^e J. Richard Udry, "Marital Instability by Race and Income Based on 1960 Census Data," *American Journal of Sociology*, 72 (1967), 673. [The index is an estimate of the percentage of white males 25 through 34 years of age who have had one or more broken marriages. The index is higher for nonwhites at all income levels.]

^f *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1966*, Table 82.

^g Robert G. Burnight and Parker G. Marden, "Social Correlates of Weight in an Aging Population," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 45 (1967), 75-92.

mation is available about the life-styles of elites is that the rich and powerful can prevent the intrusions into their privacy that systematic and detailed study entails.²⁸ Nevertheless, the following characterization of the "old family" upper stratum in large American cities is probably both accurate and representative:

They live in one or more exclusive and expensive residential areas in fine old houses in which many of them were born, or in elaborately simple modern ones which they have constructed. In these houses, old or new, there are the correct furnishings and the cherished equipage. Their clothing, even when it is apparently casual and undoubtedly old, is somehow

²⁸ The "conspicuous consumption" and "ostentatious display of wealth" described by Veblen are more characteristic of the newly rich than of established upper-stratum people. See Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York: Macmillan, 1912).

TABLE VI:3 STRATIFICATION CORRELATES: ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR, UNITED STATES

RELATED FACTORS	(*)	STRATA		
		Lower	Middle	Upper
<i>Say they are "very happy"</i> ^a	(I)	Income under \$3,000—14%	Income from \$5,000—\$6,000—26%	Income \$10,000 or more—38%
<i>Think ideal number of children is three or less</i> ^b	(O)	Laborers—27%	Clerical and sales workers—52%	Professionals and semiprofessionals—54%
<i>Believe there is a Devil</i> ^c	(O)	Laborers—72%	Clerical and sales workers—55%	Professionals and semiprofessionals—46%
<i>Political conservatives</i> ^d	(O)	Laborers—8%	Clerical and sales workers—39%	Professionals and semiprofessionals—41%
<i>Church members</i> ^e	(O)	Laborers—59%	Clerical and sales workers—80%	Professionals and semiprofessionals—87%
<i>Report no close friends</i> ^f	(O)	Unskilled workers—30%	Skilled, small business, and white-collar workers—13%	Professionals, top business, and officials—10%
<i>Read a daily newspaper</i> ^g	(O)	Laborers—59%	Clerical and sales workers—86%	Professionals and semiprofessionals—89%

* Parenthetical letters indicate the bases for stratification in the studies cited: (I) income, (O) occupation.

^a Norman M. Bradburn and David Caplovitz, *Reports on Happiness* (Chicago: Aldine, 1965), p. 9.

^b Gallup Survey 671 (1963).

^c Gallup Survey 580 (1957).

^d Gallup Survey 649 (1961).

^e Gallup Survey 532 (1954).

^f Joseph A. Kahl, *The American Class Structure* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1957), pp. 137–138.

^g Gallup Survey 578 (1957).

different in cut and hang from the clothes of other men and women. The things they buy are quietly expensive and they use them in an inconspicuous way. They belong to clubs and organizations to which others like themselves are admitted, and they take quite seriously their appearances in these associations.

They have relatives and friends in common, but more than that, they have in common experiences of a carefully selected and family-controlled sort. They have attended the same or similar private and ex-

clusive schools, preferably one of the Episcopal boarding schools of New England. Their men have been to Harvard, Yale, Princeton, or if local pride could not be overcome, to a locally esteemed college to which their families have contributed. And now they frequent the clubs of these schools, as well as leading clubs in their own city, and as often as not, also a club or two in other metropolitan centers.

Their names are not in the chattering, gossiping columns or even the society columns of their local newspapers. . . . For those established at the top are

INTERPRETING CORRELATIONS

Correlation is a measure of how accurately the magnitude of one variable can be estimated from another. For example, the correlation between years of school completed and personal income allows the investigator to estimate one variable from knowing another more accurately than he could by guessing. The highest possible correlation coefficient—1.00—indicates that two variables are so perfectly related that one can always be exactly stated on the basis of the other. A coefficient of 0.00 shows that no relationship exists between the two variables. A plus sign before the coefficient indicates that higher values of one variable are associated with higher values of the other, and a negative sign shows that higher values of one variable are associated with lower values of the other. The coefficient of correlation is symbolized by the letter "r."

Correlation in itself is never conclusive proof of cause and effect. A correlation between variables x and y may mean either that (1) x influences y , (2) y influences x , (3) x and y influence one another, (4) x and y are both influenced by another variable or a number of other variables, (5) the correlation is accidental, a result of chance, or (6) x and y contain a common component. Sometimes one or more of these possibilities can be ruled out by the sequence in which the variables occur. For instance, in any one generation, most formal education precedes occupational attainment, and therefore the latter usually cannot influence the

former. However, the fact that education usually occurs first does not conclusively establish it as an influence on occupation (although for other reasons we know that it is). The correlation between education and occupation could partly reflect the common influence of family background, ambition, and similar variables on the two correlated variables.

Sometimes two variables are correlated because they contain a common component, in which case no causation of any kind should be inferred. For instance, two estimates, or indexes, of social standing may both be based partly on annual income, and for this reason alone they will be correlated. This is called *contamination* and means that something is being correlated with itself.

It is possible to estimate what proportion of the variation in one variable is explained by variation in another by squaring the coefficient of correlation. Suppose that income has a correlation of 0.50 with club membership. By squaring this correlation we find that income explains (accounts for) 25 percent of the variance in membership (or vice versa); 75 percent remains to be explained by factors other than income. A correlation of 0.50, although not statistically large, is fairly large in sociological research. Low correlations in social science may be due to imprecision in measurement, but more often they reflect the multiple causation of social phenomena; a social event or condition is rarely the outcome of only one or two other influences.

"proud"; those not yet established are merely conceited.

Almost everywhere in America, the metropolitan upper classes have in common, more or less, race,

religion, and nativity. . . . In each city, they tend to be Protestant; moreover Protestants of class-church denominations, Episcopalian mainly, or Unitarian, or Presbyterian.²⁰

²⁰ Mills, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-60.

In contrast to people at the middle levels, upper-stratum people are oriented to the past rather than the future, they emphasize "being" rather than "doing," and they are less individualistic and more concerned with lineage.²⁷

According to one observer, there is a subtle upper-class accent in the United States that cuts across regional differences; it may be heard in Boston, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, or Philadelphia.²⁸ Furthermore, word usage differentiates the uppermost stratum from the middle levels. Euphemisms, circumlocutions, and pretentious speech are less common at the top; speech is simpler, more straightforward, terser, and by middle-class standards, often vulgar.

Fadiman gives the following impression of upper and non-upper usage:²⁹

Upper	Non-upper
begin	commence
died	passed away
poor	underprivileged
kin	relative

Some observers believe that the social elites in the larger American cities are merging into a national upper class, largely as the result of the rise of national corporate enterprise and rapid communications and transportation.³⁰ Several institutions seem to have been instrumental in the growth of this class, the most important of which are the New England boarding schools and the fashionable eastern colleges. At these, the rich and well-born from all large cities intermingle, intermarry, and form ties that endure after they return to their respective communities. The development of the Episcopal Church into a national upper-class institution has both promoted

and been a result of the increased solidarity of the intercity moneyed elite in the United States.

LIFE AT THE BOTTOM

In contrast to the dearth of reliable information on upper-stratum life-styles, numerous studies deal with the culture and behavior of lower-class or working-class people.³¹ However, the results of these studies are somewhat inconsistent, partly because the lower strata are not uniformly defined, and partly because lower-stratum values and behavior vary by race, ethnicity, religion, region, and community size. The description below is restricted to elements that several lower-class subcultures seem to have in common. Studies frequently include all manual workers in the lower stratum, but relatively few skilled workers evince the characteristics of the lowest strata.

Lower-stratum people tend to be politically liberal, but their liberalism is usually confined to welfare and labor issues that clearly involve their economic interests. In almost all other respects, lower-stratum people, considered as a whole, are more conservative than middle- and upper-stratum people. In religious beliefs, they are often fundamentalists. Even if they are not affiliated with a church or religious organization, they usually believe in a Devil, in the virgin birth of Christ, and in a literal interpretation of the scriptures. On the average, they are less favorable to civil liberties, more ethnocentric, more authoritarian, and more isolationist than people at higher levels.

In personal sex morality, a double standard prevails; males typically begin sex relations early and may consider frequent intercourse as necessary to health and to proof of masculinity, but many men expect their wives to be virginal at marriage.³² Quite

²⁷ E. Digby Baltzell, *Philadelphia Gentlemen: The Making of a National Upper Class* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1958), p. 52.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

²⁹ Clifton Fadiman, "Is There an Upper-Class American Language?" *Holiday* (October, 1956), pp. 8-10.

³⁰ For instance, both Mills and Baltzell express this view in their publications cited in footnotes 23 and 27.

³¹ Glenn and Alston, *ibid.*

³² Alfred C. Kinsey, Wardell B. Pomeroy, and Clyde E. Martin, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (Philadelphia: Saunders, 1948), pp. 374-384; and William F. Whyte, "A Slum Sex Code," *American Journal of Sociology*, 49 (1943), 24-31. More recent studies confirm these findings.

SOCIAL RANK AND DISASTER AT SEA

Britain of the Edwardian period was characterized by well-defined social strata and a strong sense of class identity. The great trans-Atlantic liners of the time with their sharp demarcations between classes of passengers were an expression of the status system in extreme form. The *Titanic*, a ship of the British White Star Line, was commissioned in 1912. The largest and most luxurious liner of her day, she was reputed to be the safest. She carried lifeboats for about 1,200 passengers, or only 30 percent of her total capacity, but safety regulations of the time required even fewer lifeboats. On her maiden voyage she collided with an iceberg in the North Atlantic and sank with the loss of more than 1,500 of her 2,200 passengers and crew.


A few years earlier when another White Star Liner, the *Republic*, sank, Captain Sealby told passengers entering the lifeboats, "Remember! Women and children go first, then the First Cabin, then the others." * There was no such rule aboard the *Titanic*, but the survivors were not a random sample of the passengers. Histori-

cal research and cold statistics suggest that a convergence of indifference, carelessness, luck, and location worked in favor of the first-class and against the third-class passengers. Of 143 women in first class only 4 were casualties (2.8 percent), and 3 of these were casualties "by choice." Of 93 women in second class there were 15 casualties (16.1 percent). Of 179 women in third class, 81 were casualties (45.3 percent). Only one of the 29 children in first and second class was lost, but only 23 out of 76 children in steerage were saved.

Investigations were held in both Britain and the United States, but in neither country was the moral drawn nor the statistical inference made. After the disaster new rules were passed governing lifeboats and safety measures. As Lord put it, "The night was a magnificent confirmation of 'women and children first,' yet somehow the loss rate was higher for Third Class children than First Class men. It was a contrast which would never get by the social consciousness (or news sense) of today's press." †

* Walter Lord, *A Night to Remember* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1955), pp. 107-109 *et passim*. Quotation at p. 109.

† *Ibid.*, p. 108.



often, neither the husband nor the wife expects the wife to enjoy intercourse; she yields only because it is her duty to do so, but this pattern is apparently changing.³³ Relations between husband and wife are frequently lacking in warmth and effective communication;³⁴ perhaps partly because of this, rates of marital dissolution are much greater than in higher strata.³⁵ The ideal of male dominance is strong but is probably less often realized than at higher levels; unemployment and low earnings tend to undermine the authority of the husband and father.

Working-class child-rearing practices have changed in recent years; once they were more permissive than middle-stratum practices, but now they are less so.³⁶ (See *SOCIALIZATION*, p. 101.) Physical punishment is more often used to discipline children, and threat of withdrawal of affection is less often used. Working-class parents discipline their children mainly to control their present behavior, whereas the higher strata are more concerned with inculcating standards and ideals that will guide future behavior.

Lower-stratum people participate much less in formal organizations than middle-stratum people, they report fewer friends, and much of their visiting and primary interaction is with kin. If relatives do not live nearby, vacations are likely to be spent with them.³⁷

Lower-stratum people value education for its vocational and economic utility. They may sacrifice to send a son to college but think that sending a daughter is a waste of money.³⁸ If a daughter is sent to college, she is likely to be encouraged to go into ele-

mentary education or some other vocational curriculum. Neither a liberal arts education nor training in social skills is considered important.³⁹

Many working-class people do not fit the above description, and with increasing education, they seem to be moving toward behavior characterized as middle class. However, the middle strata are also changing because the higher strata are often in the vanguard of cultural change.

The poorest families are often jobless and therefore detached from integrating ties with the world of work. Frequently the father has left the family group, and children are early thrown on their own resources. The very poor generally lack the confidence and social connections to make new friends once they have left school.⁴⁰ The resulting isolation and shortage of funds, often compounded by indebtedness, moves the women to seek jobs. Many husbands object, feeling their capacity to handle responsibility being challenged. A sense of isolation pervades interaction within the family so that on important issues, notably sexual matters, embarrassment or insecurity causes aloofness.⁴¹

Exposure to sexuality both at home, where overcrowding reduces privacy, and on the streets socializes the young to sexual roles by their early teens, and there is a high rate of adolescent illegitimacy.

Lower-class teen-agers find little reason for deferring gratification and applying themselves in school. Lack of opportunity perpetuates itself by inducing behavior which, by middle-class standards, appears aimless, defeatist, cynical, and irresponsible. An attitude that fate is fickle and that prior effort

³³ Lee Rainwater and Gerald Handel, "Changing Family Roles in the Working Class," in Arthur B. Shostak and William Gomberg (eds.), *Blue-Collar World: Studies of the American Worker* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964).

³⁴ Mirra Komarovsky, *Blue-Collar Marriage* (New York: Random House, 1964).

³⁵ William J. Goode, "Marital Satisfaction and Instability," *International Social Science Journal*, 5 (1962), 507-526.

³⁶ Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Socialization and Social Class through Time and Space," in E. E. Maccoby, T. M. Newcomb, and E. L. Hartley (eds.), *Readings in Social Psychology* (3rd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958), pp. 400-425.

³⁷ S. M. Miller and Frank Riessman, "The Working-Class Subculture: A New View," *Social Problems*, 9 (1961), 86-97.

³⁸ Lower-level Negroes are a significant exception to this generalization.

³⁹ Miller and Riessman, *op. cit.*

⁴⁰ Komarovsky, *op. cit.*, Chap. 14.

⁴¹ Lee Rainwater, *And the Poor Get Children* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960), Chap. 5.

cannot prevent illness, injury, or misfortune increases an already high susceptibility to disruptive encounters.

Since lower-class people are going nowhere, their sense of time is vague and casual. Preoccupation with the immediate environment plus a cynical distrust of those in authority reduces interest in politics.

STATUS CONSISTENCY AND INCONSISTENCY

Ordinarily an individual ranks about the same on scales of prestige, power, income, and education because the dimensions are interrelated. For example, the highly educated are able to earn more, and wealthy families can afford better education for their children. Persons who are highly educated and wealthy have readily opened to them positions of responsibility and privilege. The same interrelations operate at any level of the scale. When an individual's scores are about the same on all the scales of social rank (income, education, prestige, etc.), he is said to be status consistent, regardless of whether his ranks are all high, all low, or all in the middle range.

Sometimes, however, the individual's ranks on the several scales are quite different, in which case he is status inconsistent. Inconsistency is often the result of different rates of upward or downward mobility on the dimensions of stratification. A newly rich person, for instance, is rarely able to gain the prestige or social standing commensurate with his wealth. In most societies money must go through an aging process before it has full buying power in social prestige. Knowledge of a person's less privileged background and outward signs of lower-level be-

havior may prevent the acceptance to which his wealth might otherwise entitle him. Or, ascribed characteristics such as race and ethnicity may keep him from attaining prestige consistent with his achievement. The Negro physician, for instance, is status inconsistent because he has low ethnic prestige and high occupational prestige.

It has been hypothesized that individuals with similar degrees of status inconsistency show common attitudes and behavior regardless of the particular combinations of ranks. If this is so, high prestige and low economic rank would have the same effects as low prestige and high economic rank. According to this line of reasoning, status inconsistent individuals tend to act toward others in terms of their own higher ranks, but others tend to treat them on the basis of their lower ranks. If one person has high educational and low-income status, he will tend to define his relations with others from the standpoint of his education, but others will tend to interact with him in terms of his income.

Early studies suggested that a discrepancy between expected and actual treatment leads to stress and is likely to be expressed in political liberalism and withdrawal from some kinds of social participation.⁴² However, later research indicates that not all types of status inconsistency are conducive to stress. According to one study, most persons who rank high in income but low in education report themselves as relatively happy.⁴³ Furthermore, when status inconsistency does contribute to stress, the stress may be shown in ways other than political attitudes. For instance, high ascribed status combined with low achievement may lead to psychosomatic illness.⁴⁴

⁴² Gerhard Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status," *American Sociological Review*, 19 (1954), 405-413; and Gerhard Lenski, "Social Participation and Status Crystallization," *American Sociological Review*, 21 (1956), 458-464. "Status crystallization," as used by Lenski, is synonymous with status consistency.

⁴³ Norman M. Bradburn and David Caplovitz, *Reports on Happiness* (Chicago: Aldine, 1965), pp. 10-11.

⁴⁴ Elton F. Jackson, "Status Consistency and Symptoms of Stress," *American Sociological Review*, 27 (1962), 469-480; and Elton F. Jackson and Peter J. Burke, "Status and Symptoms of Stress: Additive and Interactive Effects," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (1965), 556-564. See also Hubert M. Blalock, "The Identification Problem and Theory Building: The Case of Status Inconsistency," *American Sociological Review*, 31 (1966), 52-61; and Martin D. Hyman, "Determining the Effects of Status Inconsistency," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 30 (1966), 120-129.

SECTION 4 SOCIAL MOBILITY

KINDS OF SOCIAL MOBILITY

Vertical mobility is any upward or downward change in the absolute or relative rank of an individual or group. An alteration of position with no significant movement up or down in the system of social stratification is called *horizontal mobility*. For instance, the manager of a store in a supermarket chain who is transferred to another store with no change in salary, prestige, or authority is horizontally mobile. Change from one occupation to another at the same level of prestige and financial reward involves horizontal movement from one functional category or *situs* to another, but little or no vertical movement. Some changes entail both vertical and horizontal movement as, for instance, when a man moves to another company at a higher salary.

Examples of vertical and horizontal mobility are depicted in Figure VI:6. The strata and *situses* indicated are not single points but arbitrarily drawn bands. Mobility occurs within strata and within *situses* as well as between them. For instance, a change in occupation from accountant to bank manager in the figure would not count as mobility accord-

ing to the arbitrary delineation in the diagram. Yet according to the occupational prestige scores in Table VI:1 (p. 167), the accountant has moved from an occupation with a prestige score of 81 to a bank manager with a score of 85—small but measurable upward mobility.

Salience of occupation Vertical mobility is often inferred from occupational mobility, and the inference is generally justified because the position of the individual in the total pattern of inequality largely depends on his occupation. Change in status between father and son is called *intergenerational* mobility, whereas changes during the individual's work life are known as *intragenerational* or career mobility. Intergenerational studies of the mobility of females are usually made by comparing the occupations of father and husband. For instance, the daughter of a skilled worker who marries a professional man is considered upwardly mobile.

INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY

Apparently all societies have some intergenerational mobility as well as mobility associated with progres-




TABLE VI:4 INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY (IN PERCENTAGES)

FATHER'S OCCUPATION	SON'S OCCUPATION, ^a 1950						
	Profes- sional	Busi- ness	Cler- ical and Sales	Skilled Labor	Semi- skilled	Service Workers	Laborers (includ- ing farm)
Professional	19	9	7	4	3	4	3
Business	25	34	22	10	10	15	8
Subtotal	44	43	29	14	13	19	11
Clerical and sales	12	7	15	4	4	5	3
Skilled labor	19	22	24	35	24	18	17
Farmers and farm mgrs.	5	13	8	15	20	26	39
Subtotal	36	42	47	54	48	49	59
Semiskilled	13	8	15	19	23	11	11
Service workers	5	4	5	4	5	12	3
Laborers (including farm)	3	3	5	8	12	8	15
Subtotal	21	15	25	31	40	31	29
TOTAL PERCENTAGE (deviations from 100% due to rounding)	101%	100%	101%	99%	101%	99%	99%
Number of sons (in thousands) pro- jected from sample of 11,400 families	218	356	324	509	483	202	150

SOURCE: Herman P. Miller, *Income of the American People* (New York: Wiley, 1955), pp. 31-33. Based on unpublished data from the Occupational Mobility Survey conducted in 1951 in six cities: Philadelphia, New Haven, San Francisco, Chicago, Los Angeles, and St. Paul. For details of the survey see Gladys L. Palmer, *Labor Mobility in Six Cities* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1954).

Note—Within each cell is entered the percentage of sons whose fathers were in each occupational category. Bold-faced type indicates the subtotal of each cell. Thus, in the upper left-hand cell 19% of the professional sons had fathers who were also professionals; 25% of the professional sons had fathers who were in business; 44% (the subtotal) of the professional sons had fathers who were either professionals or in business.

^a The number of sons in farming was too small to be analyzed separately.

sion through the life cycle. There is fair consensus that intergenerational mobility, as measured between father's occupation and son's occupation, is limited, i.e., sons tend to follow their fathers' occupations or occupations of similar prestige and income.⁴⁶ However, Table VI:4 suggests that this generalization varies by occupation level. The middle of the occupational structure was most stable. More

white-collar workers and skilled workers had fathers at their own level than did the higher occupations or the lower ones. Over half of the professionals and businessmen had fathers who were in lower occupational categories than themselves; about a fifth had fathers in the lowest occupational category of semi-skilled, service workers, or laborers.

There was also a large amount of downward mo-

⁴⁶ Natalie Rogoff, "Recent Trends in Urban Occupational Mobility," in Bendix and Lipset, *Class, Status and Power* (1st ed., 1953), pp. 442-454. See also Reinhard Bendix and Frank W. Howton, "Social Mobility and the American Business Elite—II," *British Journal of Sociology*, 9 (1958), 1-14, for a comparative evaluation of research findings on the movement of individuals into the business elite.

bility: white-collar and skilled workers were almost as apt to be recruited from above as from below. Surprisingly, those in the lowest occupational level were *least* likely to be recruited from their own ranks. About two-thirds of the semiskilled, service workers, and laborers had fathers in higher occupational categories. Professionals were most frequently recruited from business, businessmen from their own ranks, white-collar workers from skilled labor, skilled laborers from their own ranks, semiskilled laborers about equally from skilled labor and their own ranks, and both service workers and laborers from farmers. Farmers' sons in urban occupations for the most part were in the lower occupations.

Conditions of intergenerational mobility The following conditions affect rates of mobility between the generations:⁴⁶

1. *Differences between parents and offspring.* If a parent occupies an important position requiring high capacity, his children who are less capable are likely to be downwardly mobile. Even in rigidly stratified societies that have few institutionalized means for vertical mobility, extreme incompetents tend to be demoted. Conversely, children who are more capable than their parents are likely to be upwardly mobile, especially in open-class societies.

The reasons for disparities in capabilities between parents and children are both genetic and social. Children are genetically different from either parent, and they can be inferior to both. Or genetically superior offspring of capable and well-rewarded parents may lack the incentive to develop their capacities; they share the rewards that accrue to the parents and therefore do not need to earn high standing on their own. For instance, the college grades of highly born students average well below those of equal measured intelligence who come from lower social strata.⁴⁷

Differences between parents and children in ambition, conscientiousness, ruthlessness, and similar qualities may promote vertical mobility. A son less capable than his father may nevertheless be upwardly mobile because he is more ambitious or because he is better able to perceive and take advantage of opportunities.

2. *Population change.* In industrial and industrializing societies, greater population expansion at the lower than at the higher levels contributes to upward mobility. Overall population growth creates new positions in the upper and middle levels, where growth is not great enough to fill the vacancies. Greater population increase at the lower levels may be due to an excess of births over deaths or to greater immigration at those levels. For instance, until World War I the steady stream of European immigrants into the lower strata created many new upper and middle positions into which native-born Americans and earlier immigrants moved. Throughout this century and probably earlier, families in the upper strata in this country have not produced enough children to replace themselves in upper-stratum positions. Therefore, there could be considerable upward mobility without downward movement.

In preindustrial societies, higher fertility or immigration at the lower levels does not necessarily generate upward mobility. Prior to the industrial revolution, downward movement seems to have exceeded upward movement in most societies.⁴⁸ More people were born in most of the strata than could find a secure niche in them, and the "surplus" population was relegated to a lower-lower stratum of "expendables," whose numbers were kept down by low fertility and very high mortality. For instance, beggars and highwaymen were among the "expendables" of medieval Europe.

3. *Changes in occupational structure.* Changes in the amount of inequality, in the proportion of people

⁴⁶ See Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Society, Culture and Personality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1947), pp. 435-437.

⁴⁷ Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958), p. 246.

⁴⁸ Gerhard Lenski, *Power and Privilege* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 289-291.

at each social level, and in the relative rewards and resources attaching to different social positions are not merely a matter of individuals changing their positions within a system of stratification. Vertical mobility due to changes in the system itself is called *structural* mobility.

A number of structural changes account for much recent vertical mobility in the United States. Many occupations have been upgraded or downgraded because their socially defined importance has changed. For instance, the relative financial rewards of physical scientists and technical workers increased during the late 1950s as a result of intensified technological competition with the Soviet Union. Other occupations have moved up or down because of changes in the scarcity of workers willing and able to perform their tasks.

The most important structural change contributing to mobility in advanced industrial nations is an expansion in the proportion of jobs in the higher levels of reward and a contraction in the lower levels. This change has led to a considerable balance of upward over downward mobility.

INDIVIDUAL MOBILITY

The following characteristics affect the individual's chances of moving up the social ladder:

1. *Community size.* In the United States, the probability that sons of manual workers will be upwardly mobile varies directly with the size of the place in which they spent their childhood and adolescence.⁶⁰ The same correlation does not hold for sons of nonmanual workers, presumably because aspirations of middle-class children are gained in the family. Larger cities generally offer better educational facilities and acquaint the manual worker's son with a wider range of occupations. The small-town boy who knows no architects or engineers and knows little of the nature of their work or the level of

their rewards is unlikely to aspire to such an occupation. Economic differences are usually greater and perhaps more apparent in larger cities and thus may be more likely to impart incentives to lower-level children.

2. *Number of siblings.* An only child and the child with only one sibling have the best chance of being upwardly mobile. Beyond one, the probabilities for upward mobility decline with each additional sibling.⁶¹ Parents with many children must divide their resources and are less able to provide each child with a good education and financial assistance early in his career. In addition, and probably more important, the number of siblings affects aspirations and measured intelligence.

3. *Mother-dominance.* The strong-mother family seems to be more conducive to upward mobility than the egalitarian or father-dominant family.⁶² The reasons for this are obscure. Possibly, dominant mothers are more ambitious, and mothers rather than fathers are primarily responsible for inculcating ambition and aspirations in their sons. In contrast, the family in which there is no father, or in which there is a succession of foster fathers, does not seem to be conducive to upward movement. (See page 144.)

4. *Late marriage.* European studies have shown marked differences in the mobility of persons who marry young and late.⁶³ According to a Danish study, males who married before age 25 tended to be downwardly mobile, those who married at ages 25 through 29 tended to be stable, and those who married at age 30 or later tended to be upwardly mobile.

There is some evidence that the same association exists in the United States. Ambitious, upwardly mobile males may postpone marriage so that they can more easily complete their education and become established in their careers. Or, postponement of marriage may be but one manifestation of a general ability and willingness to defer gratification in order

⁶⁰ Lipset and Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*, op. cit., Chap. 8.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 238-243.

⁶² W. Lloyd Warner and James C. Abegglen, *Big Business Leaders in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1955), pp. 64-107.

⁶³ Kaare Svalastoga, "An Empirical Analysis of Intrasociety Mobility Determinants." (Working Paper Nine Submitted to the Fourth Working Conference on Social Stratification and Mobility, International Sociological Association, December, 1957).




FIG. VI:7 Caste, open-class, and mixed societies

to attain a future goal. For example, at the lower levels upwardly mobile males tend to begin sex relations at a later age and to be less active sexually before marriage than immobile males.⁵³ However, the upwardly mobile apparently do not differ much from immobile males at the upper and middle levels.

5. *Few children.* Upwardly mobile couples tend to have fewer children than immobile couples in the social levels into which they move.⁵⁴ Child rearing requires time, energy, and money, all of which are essential for mobility. It is not surprising that many ambitious couples allocate these resources to mobility rather than to children. However, the observed correlation is not universal. A study of the academic elite in Australia found fertility among upwardly mobile couples to be very similar to that among the immobile ones.⁵⁵

CASTE AND OPEN-CLASS SOCIETIES

Ascribed status is based on characteristics with which the individual is born or into which he matures: race, sex, age, ethnic and family background. *Achieved* status depends upon characteristics over which the individual has more control: skills, knowledge, edu-

cation, diligence, and the like. Both ascription and achievement occur in all societies, but one may predominate. Societies that are primarily ascriptive and have very little mobility are termed caste-like.

Until recently castes were conceived as closed social categories with no mobility, but probably no society has had true castes in that sense. However, it is useful to conceive of a hypothetical caste society as one ideal type and an open-class society as the opposite ideal type. (See Fig. VI:7.) All real societies are "mixed," but with varying emphasis on caste and open-class elements, that is, on ascription and achievement.

In open-class societies, the ascriptive barriers to mobility are absent. There is free movement up and down the strata, based on achievement.

An emphasis on achievement tends to be greater in industrial than in preindustrial societies. The complex division of labor and the greater number of social positions requiring scarce capabilities in industrial societies tend toward the demotion of highly-born incompetents and the promotion of capable and ambitious persons from the lower levels.

Nevertheless, even in the most technologically ad-

⁵³ Kinsey, Pomeroy, and Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 382.

⁵⁴ Charles F. Westoff, "The Changing Focus of Differential Fertility Research: The Social Mobility Hypothesis," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 31 (1953), 24-38.

⁵⁵ H. Yuan Tien, "The Social Mobility/Fertility Hypothesis Reconsidered: An Empirical Study," *American Sociological Review*, 26 (1961), 249-257.

vanced countries the allocation of rewards is based to a large extent on ascribed characteristics. Family background, race, and ethnicity still profoundly limit or enhance the chances for people to gain wealth, power, and prestige in the United States. The "mixed society" in Figure VI:7 is a simplified example of color being so defined that it imposes caste-like restrictions on mobility and limits the operation of achievement criteria.

*Caste in India*⁶⁶ The caste order of India prior to modernization was a complex arrangement of thousands of groupings whose identity and relations were governed by rules of descent and marriage, ritual, ideas about purity and pollution, and occupation. Especially in Southern India there were restrictions on touching, approaching, or even seeing an individual of lowest caste. If a higher-caste individual did so, he would be polluted and would have to undergo purification. The lowest groupings (so-called untouchables) were excluded from temples and schools used by higher-caste groupings and were obliged to use separate paths and wells, and to live in isolated villages.

Public transportation, urbanization, and industrialization have broken down many caste rules and interfered with adherence to residential and food taboos. In 1949 the Indian government declared untouchability illegal, but the reforms engendered resistance and deep bitterness, which may have been involved in the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. Although some caste practices are under strong pressure, the system persists in altered form throughout Indian society.

Contrary to popular impressions, the Indian castes are not strata. The castes, numbering in the thousands, vary widely on all dimensions of stratification, and several castes may be at the same level. Therefore, a given caste usually does not comprise a complete stratum on any stratification variable but rather shares its standing with other castes.

Despite the elaborate regulations of the system, castes move up and down in prestige, power, and privilege. Members of a caste may perceptibly improve their collective standing over a period of years by closely adhering to standards of behavior that apply to the high-ranking castes. Furthermore, there is variation in prestige and influence within castes, and individuals and families move within this hierarchy. There is even institutionalized intercaste mobility, although the movement is to a lower-ranking caste, a penalty for failure to adhere to the standards of the caste of origin.

Although many traditional occupations are linked to castes, the castes are not identical with occupational categories. Rather, certain castes have a right to engage in certain occupations if they wish to do so. Some occupations, such as agriculture, trade, and military service, are open to all castes.

On the one hand, older caste groups such as the barbers and washermen are breaking down into smaller units because so many of their members no longer follow the traditional occupation and tend to despise those who do. On the other hand, new caste groups are being formed around new occupational specialisms—skilled mechanical work, semiskilled dock and plantation work, and so on—because caste affiliations are used, all over India, to facilitate labour recruitment. Once a caste group has attached itself to a particular kind of work it soon increases its hold by bringing into it only fellow members of the same group.⁶⁷

The survivals of the caste system of India are, therefore, of continuing interest to the student of stratification because of their impact on occupation and the tendency for mobility to be by groups rather than by individuals.

CHANGES IN THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE

Changes in the pattern of inequality in the United States during recent years have on balance tended toward upward mobility. The more important trends are as follows:

⁶⁶ See M. N. Srinivas, *Caste in Modern India, and Other Essays* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), and *Social Change in Modern India* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966); E. R. Leach (ed.), *Aspects of Caste in South India, Ceylon and North-West Pakistan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960); H. N. C. Stevenson, "Status Evaluation in the Hindu Caste System," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 84 (1954).

⁶⁷ H. N. C. Stevenson, "Caste (Indian)," *Encyclopaedia Britannica* 5 (1967), 24–33; quotation at p. 29a.

1. *Expansion in the upper and middle strata.* Technological changes and growing affluence have greatly increased opportunities for professional and technical workers, salaried managers and executives, clerical workers, and some kinds of service workers. At the same time, the demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labor has declined. The expanding lines of work are on the average more highly rewarded, both with money and prestige, than the contracting lines. The percentage of employed persons in nonmanual occupations increased from less than 20 percent in 1900 to 32.7 in 1940 to 45.7 in 1966. The proportion in professional and technical work increased from 7.5 in 1940 to 12.9 percent in 1966.

The proportions in the upper educational and income levels have increased even more. In 1940, only 24.1 percent of the persons twenty-five years old and older had completed four or more years of high school, but by 1965 the percentage was 49. In the same period, the percentage who completed four or more years of college also doubled from 4.6 to 9.4.

Reliable data on income are not available for dates earlier than 1947, but even since then there has been significant change. If dollars for earlier years are converted into the value of 1964 dollars, 31 percent of the families in 1947 had incomes under \$3,000; by 1964, the percentage had dropped to 18. In 1947, only 7 percent of the families had incomes of \$10,000 or more; by 1964 the percentage had risen to 22, and 6 percent had incomes of \$15,000 or more. It is estimated that in the prosperous predepression year of 1929, more than half the families had incomes of less than \$3,000 in 1964 dollars and would, by present standards, be considered below the poverty line.⁵⁵

Obviously an impressive upward movement has occurred in the economic and educational dimensions. Even most persons whose relative standing has declined have experienced an improvement in abso-

lute standing. There is, therefore, a pervasive feeling of upward movement. However, those who have not shared in the upward movement, who have experienced sharp losses in relative standing, or who are more aware of their relatively low standings may feel increasing deprivation. The poignancy of their condition is heightened by contrast with the general affluence. This fact undoubtedly underlies much Negro discontent.⁵⁶

2. *Changes in rewards of occupations.* As indicated on page 168, the prestige of the 90 occupations covered by the National Opinion Research Center studies was surprisingly stable from 1947 to 1963. In fact, few changes in occupational prestige have occurred since 1925, but pronounced changes in relative financial rewards are discernible. During World War II, the gap between the higher- and the lower-ranking occupations tended to close, only to widen during the 1950s.⁵⁷ Recent experience indicates that the range in inequality of rewards among occupations narrows during times of war-induced high employment and widens during recessions and periods of moderate unemployment.

The net change from 1947 through 1964 involved an appreciable increase in the relative economic rewards of craftsmen and salaried managers and a moderate increase in the relative incomes of clerical and sales workers and operatives. The relative standing of professional and technical workers remained about the same, and that of service workers and non-farm laborers declined moderately. The relative status of farmers and farm laborers declined steeply.

3. *Changes in formal education.* At the end of the Civil War most of the population of the United States had no more than grammar schooling, and most of the small minority who went to secondary school were preparing to enter a college or university.⁵⁸ Therefore, in those days, economic and occupational differentiation necessarily was based

⁵⁵ Herman P. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁵⁶ Thomas F. Pettigrew, *A Profile of the Negro American* (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1964), Chap. 8.

⁵⁷ Herman P. Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-65.

⁵⁸ See Martin Trow, "The Second Transformation of American Secondary Education," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 2 (1961), 144-166.

less on education than on ambition, initiative, luck, and skills acquired out of school.

During the early decades of this century, and especially between the two World Wars, secondary schooling became redefined as terminal education for the many as well as college preparation for the few. As more and more people not bound for college started and finished high school, the educational differentiation of the population increased and became a more important basis for economic and occupational differentiation.

Now, an equally important change is occurring. Secondary education is once again becoming college preparation, but this time for the many instead of the few. Already a majority of each cohort (persons born within a given period) is completing high school; soon this will be a large majority, and ever greater numbers will complete at least a year or two of college. Thus the trend is toward a new stage of educational homogeneity at an even higher level.

The average difference in income and occupational status associated with a year's difference in education is increasing.⁶² In 1946 high school graduates earned on the average 26 percent more than grammar school graduates; by 1958, the difference was 48 percent.⁶³

Education is now almost essential for attaining highly rewarded positions, but completion of a degree or course of study is not enough. Such factors as reputation of one's college and college grades may become even more influential than they are in occupational recruitment and advancement.

4. *Economic inequality.* Although no completely reliable data are available, economic inequality in the United States probably declined from the turn of the century through World War II, and the war itself seems to have had an important leveling influ-

ence. After the mid-1940s, however, the trend toward equality was interrupted if not halted.⁶⁴ Since 1947, the proportion of the total income going to the upper fifth of the families, to the lower fifth, and to each fifth in between has remained virtually stable. The percentage of the total income going to the highest fifth was 43 in 1947 and 41 in 1964.⁶⁵ The percentage going to the lowest fifth was 5 at both dates. The stability is explained by two countervailing trends. The movement of people out of the lowest paid occupations—farming and unskilled labor—tends to lessen inequality, but the growing income disparity between these lower-level occupations and others tends to increase it. The net result is practically no change in the income shares of the higher and lower segments of the population.

TRENDS IN MOBILITY

Intergenerational mobility Until a few years ago, most sociologists believed that intergenerational occupational mobility in the United States was diminishing, that the system of social stratification was becoming more rigid.⁶⁶ Such rigidity was believed to be the inevitable result of mature industrialization, the near cessation of immigration, the decline in fertility differentials among the social strata, the closing of the frontier, and the evolution of the "break in the skill hierarchy." This last phrase means that it is no longer possible to start at the bottom of the industrial hierarchy and work one's way to the top.⁶⁷ The worker may become a foreman or through an apprenticeship program, a craftsman, but it is now almost impossible to go from manual work to the higher managerial and executive levels. Rather, the higher levels recruit well-educated young men who have never worked at the lower levels, except perhaps temporarily.

⁶² John K. Folger and Charles B. Nam, "Trends in Education in Relation to the Occupational Structure," *Sociology of Education*, 38 (1964), 19-33.

⁶³ Lenski, *Power and Privilege*, *op. cit.*, p. 393.

⁶⁴ Herman P. Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-53.

⁶⁵ *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1966.

⁶⁶ J. O. Hertzler, "Some Tendencies Toward a Closed Class System in the United States," *Social Forces*, 30 (1952), 313-323.

⁶⁷ Warner and Low, *op. cit.* See footnote 12.

The community studies by Warner and his associates found that few people at the upper and intermediate prestige levels had come from the lower levels. In fact, they found no mobility from the lowest to the highest level, and upward movement of more than one level was very rare.

When reliable data on nationwide mobility trends became available, they showed the earlier impressions to be incorrect. In recent decades, intergenerational occupational mobility has not declined, and it may have increased moderately.⁶⁸ The small communities used in the Warner studies undoubtedly contained few upwardly mobile people, but those who generalized from these communities to the entire society overlooked the fact that upwardly mobile persons born in such communities as Newburyport and

Morris generally went to larger cities to escape the constraining local situation with its limited opportunities.

A schematic summary of the chief mobility channels in the United States is given in Figure VI:8. The young man born in a lower stratum is just as likely to move up now as he was thirty or sixty years ago, but different channels of mobility are open to him. He has little chance of becoming an independent farmer or businessman. Although thousands of manual workers each year quit their jobs to go into business for themselves, few succeed as entrepreneurs. Among those who remain small-businessmen for a number of years, many never attain income or economic security greater than they could have attained as wage workers. Any upward mobility they

⁶⁸ Otis Dudley Duncan, "The Trend of Occupational Mobility in the United States," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (1965), 491-498; Elton F. Jackson and Harry J. Crockett, Jr., "Occupational Mobility in the United States: A Point Estimate and a Trend Comparison," *American Sociological Review*, 29 (1964), 5-15; Natalie Rogoff, *Recent Trends in Occupational Mobility* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1953).




FIG. VI:8 Stratification and generational mobility in the United States

experience is on the power or prestige dimensions, and there is usually little of that. As mentioned earlier, upward mobility from the lowest strata increasingly requires formal education. Even mobility to the upper-lower or intermediate levels usually requires specialized vocational training or apprenticeship. Therefore, the foundations for upward mobility are laid during adolescence and young adulthood or not at all. Opportunities for the upward movement of poorly educated and unskilled older adults have declined, a clear product of the forces of technological change.

In spite of the fact that intergenerational mobility in the United States has not declined, its volume is only a fraction of what would occur if people born at all levels had an equal chance to attain any given

level. For instance, the sons of physicians and janitors will not end up distributed in the same manner among the social levels. In fact, there will be little overlap in their distributions. Most people experience some mobility relative to their parents, but only a few move up or down very far. Therefore, whether the rate of vertical mobility in the United States is high or low depends on the perspective from which it is viewed. It is similar to the rates of the recent past, similar to the rates in other highly industrialized countries, and higher than the rates in preindustrial societies.⁶⁰ Viewed in this light, it might be termed at least moderately high. However, viewed in relation to the rate that would exist if there were complete equality of opportunity, the present rate of vertical mobility in the United States is low.

⁶⁰ S. M. Miller, "Comparative Social Mobility," *Current Sociology*, 9 (1960); and Lipset and Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*, *op. cit.*

SECTION 5 CLASS AND SOCIETY

Two perspectives in the study of stratification may be distinguished. The first looks at the system from the standpoint of how *individuals* are distributed, whether by income, prestige, influence, education, or some other dimension; and the consequences of stratification most closely studied are those affecting life-chances and life-styles of individuals. In the second perspective social classes are seen as group formations and as dynamic forces in history; group interest and power are the major themes. The latter perspective is used in this concluding section.

THE MARXIST MODEL


The discussion of class and society is to a large extent a dialogue between the Marxist view and its critics. Although Karl Marx (1818–1883) never set

forth a systematic theory of social class, the idea of class was central to his thought, and a reasonably coherent argument can be gleaned from his voluminous writings.⁷⁰

The elements of the Marxist theory may be summarized as follows:

1. *Origin of social classes.* Social classes arise out of the "relations of production," that is, the way work is organized. Some people own land, others are tenant farmers; some work for wages, others are employers; still others are self-employed. By examining the social structure of production, it can be determined who depends on whom, who dominates whom, who has what resources, what problems and interests arise, and what the potentialities are for action based on common concerns. Marx did

⁷⁰ T. B. Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel (eds.), *Karl Marx: Selected Writing in Sociology and Social Philosophy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956); "Karl Marx's Theory of Social Classes," in Bendix and Lipset, *Class, Status and Power*, *op. cit.*; Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959); and Lewis S. Feuer (ed.), *Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy* (Garden City, N.Y.: [Anchor] Doubleday, 1959).



Karl Marx (1818–1883). His general system, dialectical materialism, includes a sociological system called historical materialism. In this theory Marx emphasized technology as a generator of social change and a direct influence on the nature of work and human relations. Technology and the forms of economic organization constituted the “material foundations” of the social order. All else was called “superstructure,” a reflection of the problems set by technology and economic class relations.

not identify class with occupation. He saw social class as a more general phenomenon, rooted in the key roles such as employer and employee, that cut across most industries and occupations and that characterize a period of economic history.

2. *Major divisions.* In the Marxist model the major social classes of the modern era, following the breakup of feudalism, are the landowners, the owners of capital, and those who work for wages. Marx recognized that the system was more complex, but he foresaw an increasing polarization that would divide society into two great camps. On one side would be the capitalists, or *bourgeoisie*, including the commercial farmers; and on the other the *proletariat*,

composed of the large mass of men who owned nothing but their labor power. On this theory the small farmer, small-businessman, and independent professional would gradually be squeezed out, most of them forced into the proletariat as employees of large business organizations owned by a few wealthy capitalists.

3. *Objective class and subjective class.* Whether or not they are aware of it, people are thrown into common circumstances by the organization of production. *Objective conditions* define the individual's class position and his class interests. If he is an employer his interests are counterposed to those of his employee, whatever may be his subjective thoughts or desires. If a worker identifies himself as middle class, this does not change his objective class position. Marx distinguished between a class “in itself” (in German, *Klasse an sich*) and a class “for itself” (*Klasse für sich*). A class “for itself” is one that has transformed its latent, objective interests into awareness and cooperation.

Marx believed that the major classes of society would in time become such subjectively as well as objectively. He noted, however, that some social groups in the system of production, though they share common interests and life situations, do not have the objective potential for becoming a fully developed social class. Thus he wrote of the French peasantry, who were the mainstay of Louis Bonaparte (Napoleon III) in the 1850s:

The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions, but . . . their mode of production isolates them from one another, instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse. The isolation is increased by France's bad means of communication and by the poverty of the peasants. . . . Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient; . . . A small holding, the peasant and his family; alongside them another small holding, another peasant and another family. A few score of these make up a village, and a few score of villages make up a Department. In this way, the great mass of the French nation is formed by simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes. In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests,

and their culture from those of the other classes and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants and the identity of interests begets no community, no national bond, and no political organization among them, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own name, . . . They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented.⁷¹

Unlike the peasants, the workers would inevitably become an organized and self-conscious class. The conditions of life in the factory bring the workers together in ways that make them aware of their common interests as well as their common strength.

4. *Class rule and class struggle.* In all past societies, with the exception of "primitive communism," a few have ruled and the many have been ruled. But ruling is not best understood in purely political terms. Rather, a dominant economic class controls the mainsprings of society, including the government. Modern governments are *bourgeois* governments because in the last analysis they serve the interests of the capitalist class. Thus politics is subordinate to economics, and important social conflicts occur between an ascendant class and a defeated one, or between a ruling social class and an occasionally desperate subordinate one, as in the case of peasant revolts.

5. *Progressive and reactionary classes.* Through class struggle history renews itself continuously. With changes in technology and social organization, new classes arise to challenge the old and carry history forward to a higher stage. The ascendant capitalist class was "progressive," for it furthered the development of new forces of production and created the conditions that made a new class—the industrial proletariat—possible and inevitable. The capitalists were reactionary, as were the feudal magnates before them, when they acted to hinder rather than further social development.

6. *The end of the class system.* The proletariat incorporates most of society and has the widest as-

pirations. Therefore the victory of the proletariat is a final victory, ushering in a new form of social organization—the classless society. Marx argued that his concept of socialism was scientific, in that the conditions for its attainment were prepared for by previous history. He referred especially to the vast increase in productivity under capitalism and the creation of "socialized" property in the form of corporate enterprise.

CRITIQUE

Marx's theories reflected a distinctive intellectual perspective and political impulse. Therefore Marxism is not easily formulated as a set of hypothetical conclusions subject to the self-corrective method of science. Because it is both a philosophy of history and a political program, Marxism has generated loyalties and responses that go beyond the realm of scholarship. Nevertheless, the Marxist model is a continuing source of intellectual stimulation and a framework for thoughtful inquiry.

Criticism of Marx centers on the following points:

1. The model overemphasizes the significance of economic class for individual conduct as well as for the explanation of historical trends. Other sources of personal identification and group action are often more important. For example, nationalism remains an enduring social force, largely overshadowing class divisions; and other dimensions of stratification, especially prestige, often are more compelling in their influence on human thought and action. While the effect of class interest on politics is at times decisive, there is much evidence that politics goes its own way, independent of class influences.⁷²

2. The concept of a "ruling class," though not without scientific merit, has limited relevance to a complex, industrialized nation. Even the idea of a "power elite" does not support Marx's contention of rule by the bourgeoisie through its governmental representatives. Although business interests often dominate government policy, the same interests are often defeated.

⁷¹ Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in Feuer, *op. cit.*, pp. 338f.

⁷² See Dahrendorf, *op. cit.*, Chaps. 7-8.

3. Marx did not give sufficient weight to the forces that mitigate the class cleavage he observed in the mid-nineteenth century. Although he hailed the advent of universal suffrage in England, he saw its inevitable result as the supremacy of the working class. Marx did not rightly gauge the significance for social integration of expanding civic participation and the enlargement of social rights.⁷³

4. The thesis of a polarization of classes has not been upheld, although it is true that modern society has become an "employee society" and that there is great concentration of wealth and power in a relatively small number of corporate entities. But polarization has been offset by the proliferation of strata based on occupation, education, and prestige. The middle classes have changed their character since Marx's time, but they have not disappeared.

5. The prediction that workers under capitalism would develop class consciousness and revolutionary aspirations has been borne out only to a very limited extent.

6. Perhaps the most important failing of the Marxist model lies in its vision of the post-capitalist future. Marx thought that a proletarian victory would bring an end to exploitation of man by man and that government would be replaced by "the administration of things." He did not foresee the rise of totalitarianism as a more likely alternative to capitalist democracy than the benign and humanist socialism he expected.

These criticisms correct but do not discredit the contribution of Marxist thought to sociology, and especially to social history. Although modern scholars do not use the specific categories or adopt the detailed arguments of the Marxist model, they are made alert to the role of class in history and to some extent they follow lines of thought that Marx began.

THE CASE OF ENGLAND

The enduring contribution of Marx to social history is his insistence that the emergence of new classes,

the reconstitution of old ones, and conflict among the classes, should be a leading preoccupation of the historian. This idea is not unique, for Tocqueville, too, thought of social classes as the principal actors of history, but Marxism has been especially influential.

Analysis of social class is an essential part of modern historical inquiry. For example, a major problem is the relation between the transformation of classes and social stability. In England, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the social classes in the countryside were the *landed nobility*, the well-to-do *gentry*, the *yeomen*, and the *peasantry*.⁷⁴ In addition there were the business interests of the towns. The government of the period was a monarchy attempting to establish its dominance over the feudal nobility out of which it arose.

Although England experienced a civil war in the seventeenth century, there was no social upheaval comparable to what occurred in France 150 years later. The English social structure made a relatively smooth transition to modernity, and this continuity probably made possible the emergence in England of a stable constitutional democracy.

Social stability in England depended on the absence of a clear-cut class struggle. There were bloody conflicts, but they tended to cut across class lines and to involve issues, such as religion, that blurred class antagonisms. Among the conditions that created this situation were the following:

1. A clash between the rising bourgeoisie and the landed classes was avoided because a considerable *amalgamation* of these classes occurred. Thanks partly to the wool trade, agriculture was commercialized, and many landowners became, in effect, landed capitalists. "Adapting early to the world of commerce and even taking the lead in the march into the new era, the landed aristocracy of England was not swept away by the convulsions that accompanied the change."⁷⁵

2. Unlike France, Germany, and Russia, England

⁷³ See T. H. Marshall, "Citizenship and Social Class," in *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964).

⁷⁴ See Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), Chap. I.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

had no peasant problem. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the small peasants were pushed off the land by "enclosures," which allowed the larger landowners, from yeomen to aristocrats, to take over what had once been open fields.

These factors, and others, allowed the landed establishment to dominate English government for 300 years. But if this was a ruling class, it was not isolated from the rest of the social system. It helped create conditions that made capitalism flourish, and it gave way relatively gracefully to the demand for social progress in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In this historical case study, the importance of class is underlined, but the Marxist model is modified by (1) taking account of a diversity of classes, and (2) allowing the historical record to say how much and what kind of class struggle occurred, with what effects on the political order.

CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES

The term "class consciousness" is now widely used in sociology, but often with a connotation somewhat different from that given it by Marx. It may refer to one of a number of related phenomena such as awareness of the range of inequality, or of one's place in the pattern of inequality, or awareness of cultural differences among the social strata. Most often the term implies a feeling of identification with others in a "social class," however class is defined, and a feeling of difference from, and perhaps opposition to, persons in other classes.

Class consciousness in this latter sense and the unity of outlook within a class are not common in the United States. Public opinion poll data and voting studies show greater unity of opinion and of voting within occupational categories in Western European countries than in the United States. Broadly defined occupational categories in the United States contain a wide diversity of opinions and political inclinations. Furthermore, there is little feeling among most occupational groupings that their interests conflict sharply

with the interests of others. Some interest groups in the United States are highly effective, but only a minority of the people strongly identify with and actively participate in them.

A number of explanations have been offered for the relatively low level of class consciousness and class solidarity in the United States:

1. Because of widespread belief in opportunities for upward mobility, efforts to improve status typically are individual mobility striving rather than concerted collective effort. For some manual workers, opportunities for upward movement may be more illusory than real, but perception of reality rather than reality itself influences class consciousness. Many wage workers retain hope that they will go into business for themselves well beyond the ages at which radical, class-oriented political activity is likely.⁷⁶ Workers who know they will never move to a higher occupation often hope their children will be upwardly mobile, and many have relatives at higher levels.

2. A leveling of differences in the life-styles of manual and nonmanual workers lessens class consciousness. Many working-class people have houses and wear clothes similar to those of higher-level people. Important cultural differences still exist among the social levels, but there may be little awareness of these differences among upper manual workers.

3. A steady improvement in the living standard of blue-collar workers tends to lessen discontent and class solidarity, even though their relative economic position may be declining. Increasing numbers of wage workers are able to own houses and equipment that were once restricted to the higher levels. This trickling down of consumer goods gives manual workers the illusion of upward mobility.⁷⁷

4. Racial, ethnic, religious, and regional differences in culture and perceived interests tend to cross-cut and inhibit class consciousness and solidarity. For instance, conflict and acrimony between Negro and white workers have prevented working-class unity in the South. Although these non-class divisions appear

⁷⁶ Eli Chinoy, *Automobile Workers and the American Dream* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), Chap. 7.

⁷⁷ Lloyd A. Fallers, "A Note on the 'Trickle Effect,'" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 18 (1954), 314-321.

to be persistent, class consciousness might increase if they diminish.

Class consciousness is relatively low in the United States, but is not absent. A Detroit study, for instance, found a rather high level of certain measures of class consciousness among Negroes and recent migrants from rural areas.⁷⁸ Surveys find a fairly high degree of political unity of manual workers in the largest cities.⁷⁹ Nor is class conflict absent; strikes, labor disputes, and even the recent battle between the American Medical Association and the supporters of Medicare are examples of the American version of the class struggle. This conflict, however, is over issues and the division of spoils. It is a far cry from the proletarian revolution envisioned by Marx. In the words of one observer, the conflict has become "institutionalized";⁸⁰ it proceeds in accordance with established rules and rarely commands the attention or the efforts of more than a minority of the population. It leads to piecemeal changes in social institutions but to no radical changes in social structure.

In the institutionalization of class conflict, the democracies of Western Europe resemble the United States. In fact, in some of these countries, the expansion of welfare-state activities may have reduced the more disruptive types of class conflict to a point below that in the United States.

IS STRATIFICATION INEVITABLE?

One school of thought holds that social inequality is inevitable and functional (beneficial) to the society as a whole.⁸¹ According to this view social inequality must exist in all societies with a complex division of labor in order to assure that important and necessary tasks are performed efficiently and conscientiously by well-qualified people. Some tasks are more im-

portant and some require scarce skills and abilities. If a position is relatively important and requires relatively scarce skills, it must be more highly rewarded than many other positions. Skills may be scarce either because they call for unusual talent or because their acquisition requires a long and arduous period of training.

The idea that people could not be socialized to prepare for and enter important positions requiring scarce skills if they were not relatively highly rewarded has been challenged.⁸² The following questions have been raised: (1) Could people who have the potential to become doctors, engineers, scientists, and executives be so socialized that they would feel obliged to enter these occupations even if they anticipated no higher reward than unskilled workers? (2) Would the intrinsic enjoyment of highly skilled work be sufficient to motivate them to prepare for their jobs and perform them diligently? (3) Is the long training undertaken by people in highly rewarded occupations a sacrifice or is the training itself essentially rewarding?

There are no conclusive answers to these questions. However, widespread agreement is emerging on the following related points:

1. Even though some degree of inequality in rewards may be necessary, not all the existing inequality in any society is necessary. For instance, the salary spread between top-ranking executives and lowest-paid employees in private corporations in the United States seems to be far greater than necessary to fill the top positions with qualified and conscientious persons.⁸³ The fact that the spread is much smaller in many publicly controlled organizations that adequately perform similar functions suggests that such a wide spread is unnecessary.

⁷⁸ John C. Leggett, "Sources and Consequences of Working-Class Consciousness," in Shostak and Gomberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 235-247.

⁷⁹ Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 265-266.

⁸⁰ Dahrendorf, *op. cit.*, part II.

⁸¹ Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification," *American Sociological Review*, 10 (1945), 242-249.

⁸² Melvin M. Tumin, "Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, 18 (1953), 387-393.

⁸³ Lenski, *Power and Privilege*, *op. cit.*, pp. 352-356.

2. In almost all societies, many people are highly rewarded who neither occupy important positions nor possess scarce skills that are applied to socially useful tasks. Indeed, some people are highly though unintentionally rewarded for criminal activities, and others derive large "windfall" profits from legitimate but rather unproductive activities.

3. The importance of positions as measured by their rewards is not necessarily determined by their contribution to the survival or improvement of the society. High rewards for certain positions may merely mean that the function performed satisfies culturally defined and perhaps ephemeral needs and tastes, as in the case of the sale of cigarettes.

4. Some inequality in one generation may be necessary for the development and efficient utilization of talent, but no such claim can be made for inequality transmitted from generation to generation. The latter kind of inequality tends to inhibit rather than foster the discovery and utilization of talent. And since the extent of intergenerational transmission of inequality tends to vary directly with the degree of inequality in the parent generation, inequality above a certain amount tends to be detrimental. Inequality in all societies probably exceeds the level that would be determined by the criterion of efficiency.

5. An amount of inequality greater than is beneficial to the society as a whole is probably inevitable. Once established inequality gives some people the means for maintaining or improving their relative standing. For instance, a differential distribution of authority is an essential aspect of social organization. Although authority is granted as a resource to be used for assigned tasks, some who possess authority are very likely to use it for their own aggrandizement.

6. High prestige may substitute for high financial rewards in motivating people to occupy responsible positions and conscientiously to perform their duties. The importance of prestige as a reward is evidenced by the fact that high-income and even moderate-income people will often make financial sacrifices to gain the prestige of an appointment with civic importance or to participate in more interesting or challenging work.



*Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) served the city-state of Florence for fourteen years as administrator, politician, and diplomat. Forced out of office, he retired to his study and wrote down his reflections on power and society. His most famous works are *The Prince* and *Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius*. Machiavelli is one of the fathers of the theory of elites—the view that political life depends on the energy and character of active minorities who have the strength and the will to rule. The rise and fall of elites, and with them the flowering and degeneration of political communities, is in the nature of things; the cycle will be repeated without end. “For, virtue begets peace; peace begets idleness; idleness, mutiny; and mutiny, destruction; and then vice versa: that ruin begets laws; those laws, virtue; and virtue begets honor and good success.”*

CHAPTER VII

ASSOCIATIONS

SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION

The word *association* as used in this book is a synonym for formal organization or, simply, organization. This chapter is called ASSOCIATIONS in order to minimize confusion with the broader idea of social organization. The association is a *special-purpose* group. The term *formal organization* is often used to emphasize that most such groups have explicit goals and official ways of doing things. An association or formal organization should be distinguished, for example, from a "web of friendship," as discussed in Adaptation 3, pages 20–26, or from a system of social stratification. The latter are examples of social organization, but they are not associations.

Schools, prisons, factories, and clubs all have distinctive characteristics, as do organizations of rural dwellers or of minorities. Different environments and different functions produce widely varying patterns of participation. In the sections on associations of the chapters in Part Two, the special characteristics of religious, educational, and legal organizations are discussed.

The sociologist views an organization figuratively

as a little society. In specialized associations are many of the features of societies, including the processes that bind them together or disrupt them. For example, stratification, socialization, and primary-group formation are important phases of organizational experience, affecting the capacity of the organization to achieve its objectives.

Whatever its special purpose, every organization attempts to coordinate the activities of human beings. Therefore, organizations have a number of common characteristics, which will claim most of the attention of this chapter. Every association must:

1. Provide *incentives* to its members so as to win and sustain their participation;
2. Set up an effective system of internal *communication*;
3. Exercise *control* so that activities will be directed toward achieving the aims of the organization;
4. Adapt itself to external conditions that may threaten the existence of the organization or its policies, that is, maintain *security*.

If these requirements of effective organization are

to be fulfilled, the social relations among the persons involved must be consistent with them. A major task of the sociologist is to explore the ways in which incentive, communication, control, and security de-

pend on the underlying relations among persons and groups. Figure VII:1 outlines how the essential elements of organization are influenced by social processes.

INCENTIVE is increased when	COMMUNICATION is facilitated when	CONTROL is strengthened when	SECURITY is fostered when
socialization builds organization's goals into personality by identification.	socialization transmits the organization's point of view—"decisional premises."	socialization creates homogeneous organization—permits authority to be delegated without loss of control.	socialization strengthens group loyalty—members protect the organization, e.g., its reputation.
primary relations provide personal satisfactions which reinforce monetary or other rewards.	primary relations break down formal barriers to communication.	primary relations provide a source of informal discipline.	primary relations create personal attachments that bind the individual to the organization.
stratification affords added rewards of prestige and privilege.	stratification tells if the message comes from an authoritative source.	stratification locates and stabilizes authority.	institutionalization adapts the organization to its social environment.

FIG. VII:1 Social relations and effective organization

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SECTION 2 FORMAL STRUCTURE

The distinction between formal and informal relations is important in understanding the sociological aspects of organizations. (See PRIMARY GROUPS, pp. 133 ff.) Sociologists have given most attention to informal patterns, but the working organization is a product of the interaction of both formal and informal patterns of behavior. Informal relations develop in the environment of the formal system.

ELEMENTS OF FORMAL STRUCTURE

Figure VII:2 is a somewhat simplified organization chart of the formal structure of a large oil company. It should be referred to throughout this discussion of company organization:

1. *Division of labor.* The company's operations have four main divisions: one produces the oil, another refines it, still another handles transportation, and a fourth is responsible for marketing. Problems of personnel are also divided. In the division of labor according to a definite plan, *specialization* is the guiding principle. Responsibilities are delegated to particular individuals and groups. This delegation of responsibilities creates new groups, and the larger association becomes an organization of organizations.

2. *Delegation of authority.* The boxes and lines of the organization chart show the chain of command. Typically, there is a *hierarchy*, in which some individuals and groups are given the right to issue orders to others. The four main operating divisions are on the same level in the hierarchy. Although apparently one step higher, the personnel department does not have the formal right to give orders directly to the operating divisions. Ordinarily, a personnel department is a staff or auxiliary group. It receives instructions from the higher administrative and policy levels and makes recommendations to those levels without directly supervising the lower

operating divisions. However, actual practice may differ considerably from the official or formal pattern.

3. *Channeled communication.* Some complex organizations, notably the military services, go to some pains to ensure that individuals transmit information or requests through channels. For example, according to the organization chart, which shows the officially approved paths for information, requests, and commands, a vice-president who wants to communicate with a member of the board of directors will not bypass the president of the company. Similarly, if the manager of an oil field, who is subordinate to the chief of the production division, wishes to communicate with the manager of an oil refinery on a matter of policy, he is expected to do so through his chief. The latter in turn communicates with subordinates in the refinery division through the chief of that division. Rules of this sort are not rigidly held to because they may interfere with the ability of subordinates to solve their problems. But even in the most relaxed organization, the wise subordinate remembers channels when dealing with important matters. Otherwise, his chief will not have the information he needs to make decisions or to defend the actions of his division when questioned by higher authority.

4. *Coordination.* In order to attain the advantages of specialization, labor is divided, but it is necessary to maintain a united and consistent effort by the organization as a whole. This is the job of the administrative and policy levels, which review the activities and recommendations of the various divisions, consider conflicts that must be resolved, and develop new policies that may be needed. Such coordinating officials often act as judges, weighing the arguments presented by divisions that differ on company policy or that have complaints against each other. Organiza-

tions differ in the extent to which top management initiates activity or simply reviews actions initiated at the working level.

Rationality and discipline There are many procedural rules and sanctions, such as the rules governing hours of work, that do not appear on the chart. In addition, the official goals of the organization may be considered part of the formal system. These elements of formal structure are governed by two related ideals: rationality and discipline.

Under a system of *rationality*, the goals of the organization are to be attained as completely as possible and at the lowest cost. This assumes that attainable goals can be formulated in a clear-cut way. However, in many multipurpose associations such as churches, universities, political groups, and even some businesses, the formulation of attainable aims is difficult and consequently administrative rationality is only partly achieved.

Discipline is necessary because the organization is basically a system of roles. When a man is given a job, he is expected to act out the role assigned to him. Since activities, not persons, are coordinated, a single individual may be assigned more than one


role. He "wears two hats," but he is expected to keep his two roles separate, and this calls for a special kind of self-discipline. Disciplined role behavior is necessary to a rational formal system. But, like rationality, it is an ideal that is never completely fulfilled.

Formal structure defined The formal structure of an organization is a system of rules and objectives defining the tasks, powers, and procedures of participants according to an officially approved pattern. The pattern specifies how the work of the organization is to be carried on, whether it is producing steel, winning votes, teaching children, or saving souls.

The officially approved pattern is not necessarily codified or written down, nor is it always fully understood by the participants. There may not be an organization chart. Sometimes the official, formal relations are so simple and well understood that there is no need to write them down. On the other hand, the relations may be so complex that a chart of the whole system would be too complicated to be helpful. To find out what patterns of a complex organization will be recognized and enforced as part of official policy is no simple task. Many patterns

FIG. VII: 2 Abbreviated organization chart of an oil company

ADAPTED from *Planning and Developing the Company Organization* by Ernest Dale (New York: American Management Association, 1952), p. 28.



receive (or are denied) official approval only when they are challenged and must be submitted to the controlling officials for review.

DEMOCRATIC AND AUTHORITARIAN FORMS

Some organizations encourage their members to participate in decision-making, while others restrict this privilege. For example, the Parent-Teacher Association, the League of Women Voters, the Republican party, and the United Automobile Workers Union are so organized as to permit, at least formally, a wide degree of membership control. On the other hand, bank tellers, soldiers, pupils, and boy scouts are not expected to participate significantly in the control of their organizations.

Differences in organizational form may reflect the values people hold, but they also arise out of practical necessity. Authoritarian controls are associated with sustained and coordinated activity. If a group does no more than meet occasionally for discussions, democratic forms may be adequate, but groups that carry on more extensive and continuous activities usually add authoritarian forms. It is convenient and effective to assign to a single individual or small group of executives the responsibility for a job. They select others who accept direction, and thus a unified effort is carried out according to a definite plan. All large organizations follow this procedure, though they vary in the rigidity of discipline, extent of supervision, and the autonomy of component units.

Democracy may be useful to an organization as well as be prized for its own sake. When other incentives are not available or are insufficient, the chance to participate in decisions adds an incentive. Usually where participation is involuntary or where it is fully compensated in money or services, democratic forms are only weakly developed. They are not needed to induce or sustain participation. But if high levels of loyalty and zeal are required or if the individual is expected to take risks, democratic forms are appropriate. Even in a factory, where authoritarian controls predominate, the company may introduce democratic participation in decision-making in order to maintain high morale.

The universe of formal organizations is not neatly divisible into democratic and authoritarian types. In fact, both forms are found in many large organizations. The United Steelworkers of America, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the Standard Oil Company are alike in their formal provisions for meetings and elections to be held by members or stockholders. They all have large staffs of employees whose activities are controlled in accordance with ideals of rationality and discipline. Democratic forms may control the relations between the members and the top officials. But the officials have an authoritarian relation to the employees of the organization. From a sociological point of view, the employees are also members, but they may not be recognized as such within the organization. A sense of membership is most often found among professional participants, such as members of a college faculty in which case the employee is a staff member. The professional "joins" an organization, and the minister is "called," but the blue-collar worker is "hired."

Not all organizations controlled from the top are equally authoritarian. Some corporations and agencies permit considerable decision-making by committees, wide autonomy for subordinate officials, and action initiated from below. Organizations that encourage these patterns may be thought of as democratic in spirit and to some extent in form, even though final responsibility and authority remain at the top.¹

Sometimes an executive is criticized as authoritarian because he shows a lack of regard for the opinions or feelings of his subordinates. Authoritarian *behavior* of this kind may be found in authoritarian *organizations*, but the two should not be confused. Some army commanders or corporation officials are authoritarian in their dealings with subordinates; others show tolerance and respect. Some pride themselves on lone-wolf decisions; others consult with subordinates. But in all armies and in most businesses, authoritarian *procedures* predominate.

The word authoritarian has a sinister ring. Indeed, if the kind of discipline and decision-making

¹ On the balance between compliance and initiative in bureaucratic structures, see Reinhard Bendix, "Bureaucracy: The Problem and Its Setting," *American Sociological Review*, 12 (October, 1947), 493-507.

SECTION 2 FORMAL STRUCTURE

that prevails in an army or even a corporation or government agency were extended to the whole society, self-government could not survive. But authoritarian forms, when limited to specific activities and controlled by law and custom, do not necessarily challenge the cultural ideals of a democratic society. So long as the men at the top, who stand in an authoritarian relation to their subordinates, are themselves responsible to some membership or electorate, and are controlled by legal or other norms that restrain arbitrary action, authoritarian forms can readily be accepted or even required. For example, there is authoritarian administration within most government agencies, but the head of the agency is responsible to a governor or a president who must stand for election.

BUREAUCRACY

Formal structure is often referred to as bureaucratic structure. That term is widely used, but occasions some misunderstandings. The following points should be kept in mind:

1. Bureaucracy as used in social science refers to the formal organization of *administrative officials*. It does not include the nonsupervisory work force in a factory or the members of a trade union. Nor

does it usually include the top policy-making leaders or directors. Formal structure is a more general term, designating the prescribed roles and procedures of all participants.

2. Webster's *New International Dictionary* (Second Edition) gives the following definition of *bureaucracy*: "A system of carrying on the business of government by means of departments or bureaus, each controlled by a chief, who is apt to place special emphasis upon routine and conservative action. . . . Hence, in general, such a system which has become narrow, rigid, and formal, depends on precedent, and lacks initiative and resourcefulness." This definition, reflecting ordinary usage, associates bureaucracy with something undesirable, even pathological. It is important to be clear that social scientists do not define the term in this way, though they may agree that under certain conditions officials are indeed apt to overemphasize routine and otherwise take on the traits suggested in the dictionary definition. A bureaucrat is simply an official within a formal system. The social scientist may study the likelihood that bureaucrats will exhibit certain tendencies, such as narrowed perception and lack of initiative, but he does not limit the idea of bureaucracy to these tendencies.

Adaptation 17 / Bavelas COMMUNICATION PATTERNS IN TASK GROUPS

In addition to determining the division of responsibility and lines of authority, formal structure establishes communication patterns. How do these fixed patterns affect the work and life of a group? Bavelas and his associates undertook some experiments to find out whether different *imposed* patterns of communication make for differences in group performance, leadership, and morale. This work (1) provides a fresh way of looking at formal structure and (2) shows how certain features of formal organization may be studied experimentally.

SOURCE: Abridged and adapted from "Communication Patterns in Task-Oriented Groups" by Alex Bavelas, *Journal of the Acoustical Society of America*, 22 (1950), 725-730. Published in this form by permission of Alex Bavelas and the Acoustical Society of America. The experiment was conducted by Sidney Smith. The full article may also be found in Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (eds.), *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory* (2nd ed.; New York: Harper & Row, 1960), pp. 669-682.




FIG. VII:3 Some different communication patterns

Each line represents a communication linkage.

Communication links Let us vary the ways in which five individuals are linked to one another, it being understood that every individual in the group will be linked to at least one other individual in the same group. To be "linked" means that individual p can communicate to q and q to p . What different kinds of communication patterns may we produce that might affect human beings in some way? First impressions of the patterns may prove misleading. (See Fig. VII:3.) Students commonly remark, upon seeing patterns C and D for the first time, that pattern C is "autocratic," while pattern D is a typical "business set-up." Actually, of course, insofar

as linkage goes, they are identical. The only difference is the arrangement of the dots on the paper. Among patterns A , B , and C , however, we may point to some real differences. For instance, in pattern A each individual can communicate with two others in the group directly—that is, without relaying a message through some other person. In patterns C and D there is only one individual in the group who can communicate directly with all the others.

To make another comparison, any individual in pattern A can communicate with any one of the others with no more than a single "relay." In pattern B two individuals must relay messages through

three others in order to communicate with each other.

An experiment Do the patterns make a difference? One experiment will be described. Eight groups of college students were studied, using patterns A and B shown in Figure VII:4. Each subject was given a card upon which were printed five symbols from among these six: $\bigcirc \triangle * \square + \diamond$. While each symbol appeared on four of the five cards, only one symbol appeared on all five cards. Each group's task was to find the common symbol in the shortest time possible. The subjects sat in separate cubicles. In each subject's cubicle was a box of six switches, each switch labeled with one of the six symbols. The task was considered finished when each member of the group indicated that he knew the common symbol by throwing the appropriate switch. The switches operated a board of lights visible to a laboratory assistant who recorded individual and group times and errors, an error being the throwing of an incorrect switch. The subjects communicated by writing messages which could be passed through slots in the cubicle walls. The slots were so arranged that any desired linkage pattern could be imposed by the experimenter. No restriction whatever was placed upon the content of the messages. A subject who had the "answer" was at liberty to send it along. The cards upon which the messages were written were coded so that a continuous record of the communication activities could be maintained.

Each experimental group worked on 15 successive problems. The same six symbols were used




FIG. VII:4 Emergence of recognized leaders in different communication patterns

The number at each position shows the total number of group members who recognized the individual in that position as the leader.

throughout, but the common symbol varied from trial to trial. Four groups worked in pattern *A*, and four other groups worked in pattern *B*. No group worked in more than one pattern.

Each of the subjects answered a questionnaire immediately after the end of the fifteenth trial. One of the questions read: "Did your group have a leader? If so, who?" The answers are shown in Figure VII:4. The findings suggest that the individual occupying the most central position in a pattern is most

likely to be recognized as the leader. From direct observation of the subjects while they worked, it appears that the morale of the individuals in the most peripheral (least central) positions of pattern *B* is the poorest.

Further experiments strengthened the hypothesis that leadership is related to "centrality" of position in the communication pattern. This principle is recognized in the design of administrative organizations, where there is usually some attempt—not always success-

ful—to give persons in high authority the readiest access to communication channels.

In another experiment using the same patterns the subjects were asked, "How did you like your job?" and "How satisfied are you with the job done?" The answers to both questions show again that those who occupy the more peripheral positions have the poorest morale. This conclusion supports the general view that participation and group morale are closely related.

Caution Conclusions from laboratory experiments using small groups are not directly applicable to large, complex organizations. However, such experiments can suggest new ways of looking at organizations and help formulate hypotheses to be tested in studies of "the real thing."

SECTION 3 INFORMAL STRUCTURE

The rules of the formal system account for much but not all of the patterned behavior in associations. Beside the formal system and interacting with it an informal structure emerges, based on the spontaneous, problem-solving interaction of persons and groups. Together the formal and informal aspects make up the *social structure* of the organization.

The informal structure is best understood as composed of patterns that develop when the participants face persistent problems that are not provided for by the formal system. The chief sources of these problems are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Impersonality The rules and prescribed roles of the formal structure are necessarily impersonal. The individual is treated as a unit in a technical, task-oriented system. In practice, however, it is often necessary to reach individuals as persons if their best efforts and their highest loyalty are to be mustered.

Some leeway must be allowed for interpersonal and group relations to supplement the formal patterns of communication and control. The importance of personal contact in organizations, not only for private advantage but to get the job done, is well known. Even in armies, where formal relations predominate, friendship and pride in one's "outfit" are important ingredients of effective organization.

Lag Like any other code of rules or laws, the formal system tends to lag behind changes in actual operations. Those who do the work must solve new problems, even problems not yet officially recognized. For example, the official rules may have been developed prior to union organizing. The elected shop stewards try to act as spokesmen for the workers on day-to-day grievances. The foreman will be under pressure to find a way to deal with the men, even though the company has not recognized the union

	Informal structure: patterns that develop during spontaneous interaction of persons and groups within the organization.
values and norms	Informal group norms within the organization, e.g., "Don't be a rate-buster." Basic attitudes about work, cooperation, loyalty, etc. brought into the organization as a result of prior socialization. Social control devices, e.g., expressing approval or ridicule.
groups	Friendships exert prior claims on the individual (may be within group or from outside). Cliques show personal loyalty (may be friendship groups or merely alliances). Interest groups share a stake in existing social arrangements (may be any groups, including formal units).
status	Informal privileges attached to positions in the formal hierarchy. Power relations, e.g., balance of power between local and headquarters units, depending on source of funds, locus of membership, etc. Dependency patterns, e.g., dependence of "staff" on "line."
	Informal structure critically affects communication and power. It is indispensable to effective functioning but may also undermine it.

FIG. VII:5 Elements of informal structure

and has developed no formal procedures for cooperating with it. Temporarily there may be an informal pattern of consultation between foremen and shop stewards. Eventually this informal procedure, usually modified and made consistent throughout the factory, may become formalized.

Generality The rules are necessarily abstract and general. Each deals with a type of problem, but all problems cannot be anticipated. For this reason, there are limits to reliance on formal rules and authority must be delegated to the man who does the job or to his immediate supervisor, so that each decision can be made according to the circumstances.

Moreover, there are usually gaps in a system of general rules. At the operating level there may be a need to regularize behavior and make decisions routine, for example in determining coffee-time privileges or the allocation of responsibility for onerous tasks. These gaps are filled by the development of informal custom or usage. In time some patterns may become formalized, others remain outside official recognition.

Personal problems and interests The foregoing comments assume that the participants are solely interested in attaining the organization's aims, that they are doing their best to supplement the formal rules in informal ways. It cannot be assumed, however, that individuals are solely interested in helping the organization to reach its goals. Personal needs and private concerns are also important. For example, a new supervisor may allay his anxieties by cultivating the friendship of an experienced worker. He thereby gains access to valuable information about the work and the employees. His friend may defend him when things go wrong. This relation, if stabilized, becomes part of the informal structure of the plant. It cannot be officially enforced, yet it is a significant fact that must not be overlooked by anyone who wants to understand or influence that segment of the organization.

The individual may also bring with him ingrained beliefs such as negative attitudes toward Negroes or foreigners and ties of loyalty to friends or kin. A study of a gypsum company reported that "the plant was enmeshed in a network of kinship relationships."³ These sentiments and attachments become part of the organization's social reality.

Roles and the spillover effect Formal relations coordinate positions and activities, not persons. The rules apply to foremen and machinists, to clerks, sergeants, and vice-presidents. However, no organization of any duration is able to restrict interaction to formally defined roles. In practice, men tend to interact as many-faceted persons, adjusting to di-

³ Alvin W. Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954), p. 65.

verse daily experiences in ways that spill over the boundaries set by their formal roles. The role usually calls for compartmentalization, for keeping in check personal needs, impulses, and orientations. The actor, however, is a unified personality. He has his own problems, his own priorities. This tension between person and role is characteristic of organizations.

Individuals participate in associations made up of *both* formal and informal relations. Therefore, the sociology of special-purpose associations stresses the interdependence of these aspects. The following sections, while emphasizing informal processes, show their relation to the formal devices for attaining organized, concerted effort.

SECTION 4 COHESION AND MORALE

The most effective organizations are able to win a sense of personal commitment. When the work the members do, the initiative they display, and the loyalty they give go beyond the minimum requirements of keeping a job, morale is high. The organization is then more than a technical arrangement of coordinated parts. It is a cohesive social group.

SOCIALIZING THE ORGANIZATION MEMBER

It is common to refer to someone as a Harvard man, a Forest Service man, or a military man. These labels suggest that the individual has been influenced by his associational experience, that is, effectively socialized. Not all organizations, however, are capable of such effective socialization.

The examples may suggest that socialization in organizations produces highly visible products, but this is not always so. Sometimes the organization's influence can be recognized only by those who are "in." Many organizations have little effect on personality. Socialization is important for the organization that requires a high degree of personal dedication and loyalty. Some organizations call for distinctive ways of thinking and responding; others must offset influences that work against their aims or policies, e.g., the civilian outlook and habits of the draftee.

When socialization is effective, the individual makes the organization's perspectives his own. This has been called the "*internalization of influence*, be-

cause it injects into the very nervous systems of the organization members the criteria of decision that the organization wishes to employ. The organization member acquires knowledge, skill, and identifications or loyalties that enable him to make decisions, by himself, as the organization would like him to decide."⁸

The effects of organizational socialization are:

1. *To strengthen group loyalty and thereby organizational security.* If the individual feels personally attacked when the organization is attacked and personal failure when it fails, he will work harder, help in crises, and require less discipline. Hence socialization motivates high levels of participation and responsibility. Socialization increases the likelihood that the members will stand united against threats from the outside. This is obviously important in voluntary action organizations such as protest groups. But it is also significant where employees have dealings with other organizations and the public, especially at the administrative level. Loyal employees are expected to defend the reputation of their organization and to pass on useful information, even if it is acquired off the job. It is probable that assessments of organizational loyalty play an important part in determining the careers of professional or executive personnel.

2. *To make official communication easier.* If the individual has absorbed the general outlook of the

⁸H. A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (2nd ed.; New York: Macmillan, 1958), p. 103. Italics supplied.

organization and its distinctive approach to its task and to other organizations, it will be easier to communicate instructions. They will not have to be spelled out in detail because their background and intent will be understood. The socialized organization member has internalized the decisional premises of the enterprise, that is, the bases on which decisions are made.⁴ One advantage of this deeper understanding is that the member knows without being explicitly told when he may modify or even disregard instructions. Because he understands the basis of an order, he need not follow it mechanically or literally.

3. *To permit greater delegation of authority without loss of control.* When decisional premises are adequately communicated, the person who gives an order shares the same understanding of what is to be accomplished as the person who executes it. The latter may then be permitted more discretion. Thus organizational socialization substitutes informal social controls for formal administrative controls. The fact that they share values and aspirations permits the college president to delegate decision-making to a dean with confidence that the decisions will conform to the college's basic policies and interests. No such assurance would be possible if the dean were not instilled with the values and point of view of the college.

The effects of socialization in organizations parallel the effects of socialization in society itself. When aspirations and disciplines are built into the individual, personal satisfactions are linked to such social aims as hard work and patriotic sacrifice, specific rules are more thoroughly understood and more flexibly applied, and the individual can be expected to act in accordance with social values even when the official agencies of the society are not present or effective. The weaker the socialization, the more society must depend upon formal controls.

Organizations need to emphasize socialization when impersonal incentives, such as wages, are not adequate to sustain participation, when instructions are so complex that the persons who are to carry them out require extensive acquaintance with decisional premises, and when circumstances require ex-

tensive delegation of authority, for example, if subordinate offices are distant or isolated.

ORGANIZATION UNITS AS SOCIAL GROUPS

The effect of personal interaction is to create social groups within the formal organization. In many cases, the social group and the organization unit have the same membership, name, and history. When a particular division or the organization as a whole becomes the object of personal identification, develops a homogeneous personnel, and shares a common fund of tradition, it becomes more than a narrowly utilitarian organization. It takes on the character of a community.

Interest groups Group members who share a stake in existing social arrangements or unite for a common objective form an interest group. Interest groups take many forms within large organizations, from a small informal group of workers seeking protection from an arbitrary supervisor (see Adaptation 12, pp. 130 ff.) to a large department of loyal members who act as an effective social unit. Some internal interest groups are weak; others are strong. Some muster support only from within the enterprise or association; others find external allies. For example, the Army Corps of Engineers acts as an interest group within the U.S. Government, but it is also supported by private associations outside the government, such as the National Rivers and Harbors Congress. Some interest groups coincide with the formal structure and transform technical units into unities of persons. Other interest groups cut across the officially approved lines of communication and weaken the formal structure.

In many large organizations, the formation of interest groups is an expected and desired outcome of the division of labor. The personnel department upholds standards of employee selection and training; accounting is supposed to maintain standards of reporting and fiscal control; the sales department protects lines of communication to buyers; production is committed to a schedule of output. All of these units

⁴ Simon, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

are expected to defend values as a way of executing the functions entrusted to them. They become interest groups, often vigorously promoting their special aims and methods. Within limits, and depending on the type of organization, some competition and even conflict among units may be tolerated. It is presumed that top officials are able to settle the resulting conflicts and hold the competing groups to the aims of the organization as a whole. The amount of leeway permitted internal interest groups depends on the extent to which the organization wishes to encourage initiative from below. A university, for example, must depend on the initiative of its academic departments to develop their respective fields of knowledge. The departments often act as interest groups, pressing for recognition and increased budgets and protecting standards of education and research.

Divided loyalties The social groups that develop in work situations do not necessarily follow the boundaries of formal organization units. Clerical and professional personnel, though in the same formal unit, may belong to distinct working groups with different identifications, perceptions, and interests. Differences in status and social background, combined with differences in the nature of the work, often create social groups that do not correspond with the formal division of labor.

Sometimes, when social groupings cut across formal organization lines, there are divided loyalties, especially for individuals whose daily work takes them into cooperative contact with members of other units or even of other organizations. The problem has practical implications in the relation of staff units to the operating or line organization. (See Sec. 5, p. 207.) Suppose a personnel department has the job of maintaining standards of recruitment, promotion, training, and employee morale in a large firm. A member of personnel is permanently assigned to work with the refining division (one of the operating divisions in Fig. VII:2). If he has repeated contact with members of refining, he may share its spe-

cial perspectives and be accepted by its members. To the extent that he identifies with refining, he acts as its representative, presenting its arguments and points of view to his superiors in the personnel department.

On the other hand, if he is given a variety of assignments that place him in contact with many operating units, his main identification is probably with personnel or, more accurately, with his section of personnel.⁵

If personnel department technicians are absorbed into working groups of the program or operating divisions, the policies of personnel may be weakened and in the extreme case might even endanger the continued existence of some sections of the department. The operating divisions might demand that they be allowed to work out their own personnel procedures. The personnel department could limit a staff member's contact with a particular operating division, thus forestalling his integration into a working group of the division.

PRIMARY RELATIONS

Primary relations contribute to the cohesion and effective functioning of organizations. (See PRIMARY GROUPS, pp. 134 ff.) These influences may be summarized as follows:

1. *Primary relations help morale*, that is, the maintenance of effective participation. This is accomplished by modifying the impersonality of the formal system. The individual gains direct personal satisfaction in companionship and identification with his work and with the enterprise.

2. *Primary relations aid communication*. By adapting formal rules to the individual's immediate situation, primary relations break down communication barriers. Instructions thus adapted are better understood and more readily accepted.

3. *Primary relations aid control of organization members*. When a man is a member of a primary group, he accepts its discipline. If the group is part of a larger association, it can hold its members to the aims and methods of the whole. For example,

⁵ See H. A. Simon, D. W. Smithburg, and V. A. Thompson, *Public Administration* (New York: Knopf, 1950), p. 101.

the pressures exerted within the primary group may help reduce absenteeism. In this way, primary relations supplement the more formal controls.

Cautions (1) There is a disruptive potential in primary groups. (See "the double-edged significance of the primary group," page 134.) (2) The con-

structive contributions of primary relations are not equally available or necessary in all associations. The more the organization depends on high morale, the greater will be the significance of primary relations. Some organizations, however, are able to carry out their functions without high levels of personal commitment.

SECTION 5 COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL STATUS

Most discussions of stratification deal with whole societies or communities, and this is the emphasis in SOCIAL STRATIFICATION. But the basic processes of stratification also occur in special-purpose associations, where they affect communication, incentive, and control.

Formal ranks and social strata The study of social stratification in organizations includes both the formal ranking systems and the informally patterned experiences of the persons who occupy the positions. The formal ranking system is readily observed. It is easy to list the official ranks between a five-star general and a buck private, between the chairman of the board of a corporation and an unskilled worker, between the president of the AFL-CIO and a rank-and-file member of a trade-union local.

Formal ranks are associated with distinctive attitudes and interests. The diverse experiences and problems of men at different levels condition (1) how individuals in similar social positions view the world and themselves and (2) the stake they have in the organization. A man's position in the hierarchy influences his manners, outlook, opportunities, and power.

Status is symbolized in many ways. The Ameri-

can office "is a veritable temple of status."^{*} The carpeted office and the privilege of smoking or of first-naming one's colleagues are cues to differential status. The way names are used is important, but the significance attached to names depends on whether one is looking up or down the hierarchy. The rank order of address by executives is outlined by Potter, the student of human and other relations, in the case of Lumer Farr, a company director who liked to be called "The Guv'nor":

In the science of Christian-naming, Lumer is associated with Farr's Law of Mean Familiarity. This can be expressed by a curve, but is much clearer set down as follows:

The Guv'nor addresses:

Co-director Michael Yates as	MIKE
Assistant director Michael Yates as	MICHAEL
Sectional manager Michael	
Yates as	MR. YATES
Sectional assistant Michael Yates as	YATES
Apprentice Michael Yates as	MICHAEL
Night-watchman Michael Yates as	MIKE [†]

Organizations are both aided and hindered by the transformation of formal, technical rankings into social strata. Men who have feelings of deference toward their superiors more readily accept com-

* W. H. Whyte, Jr., "Status in the American Office," *Fortune* (May, 1951).

† Stephen Potter, *One-upmanship* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1952), p. 44.

mands, and the system of authority is thus sustained. On the other hand, exploitation of positions of authority for personal gratification or blind acceptance of commands because they come from a superior may subvert organizational goals.

The economy of incentives Wholehearted commitment is hard to foster because most organizations can offer only a limited range of incentives. Remuneration is no guarantee that individuals will give freely of their energy and zeal. A system of status, in addition to fixing the lines of authority and communication, also provides incentives.* High status conveys social prestige, inside and outside the organization, accompanied by deference and respect from others. Many persons work hard to attain even relatively small advances of status. Sometimes merely a change in job titles with no change in actual authority or salary is an effective incentive.

In addition to prestige, higher status offers special privileges, including the opportunity to execute one's own ideas. These and other social concomitants of the formal ranking system help to win fuller commitment. The design of status systems from the standpoint of the economy of incentives has not been closely studied, but its importance is widely recognized.

Line and staff as status groups Adaptation 18, pages 208–211, shows that the difference between staff officers and line supervisors is not merely one of job assignment. A broader social differentiation occurs, extending to the images each group has of the other and reflecting the insecurities they feel on the job. This differentiation is strongly influenced by the social backgrounds of the staff personnel, including both attributes that are developed within the factory and characteristics they bring with them from their earlier social experience.

Just as in the larger society, some groups within organizations are more powerful than others be-

cause of their greater ability to influence opinion or to control essential activities and resources. The struggle for power is usually less obvious in special-purpose organizations than in society at large. Partly because of this covert quality, an important phase of the sociological study of organizations is the discovery of the relative strength and weakness of the constituent groups, not as defined by formal position alone but as conditioned by their place within the social structure of the enterprise.

The Dalton study reflects this interest. One of its main themes is the relative weakness of the staff compared with the line, but this is only partly due to the formal authority of the top line officials. The staff personnel are also dependent on line officers, who are not formally their superiors. The staff men (who often seek promotion through transfer to the line organization) are dependent because of their problems of advancement and because the line supervisors can interfere with the work of the staff. Similar cases of conflict among officials in government, business, and other organizations have been reported, though few have been so carefully documented and analyzed. For example, a perennial strain is expected between the sales and production divisions in businesses, and there is often a marked difference in status, influence, and career line between the teaching and administrative groups in schools and colleges.

Communication and the chain of command Adaptation 19, pages 211–215, describes how information is filtered as it moves up and down the chain of command. The employees' efforts to protect themselves result in distortions in communication.

Although stratification may distort communication, the formal status system is designed to facilitate it. For example, when a man receives an order or request, he wants to know if it comes from someone who is in position to know the facts and who

*This point has been emphasized by Chester I. Barnard, who did much to lay the groundwork for the sociology of large-scale organizations. See *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938) and "Functions and Pathology of Status Systems in Formal Organizations" in William Foote Whyte (ed.), *Industry and Society* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946).

will back up the action taken. Usually knowledge of the sender's place in the formal status system answers his questions. As formal ranking becomes embedded in social relations, more detailed knowledge is necessary to interpret orders. One man at a given formal rank may not need to be taken seriously,

but another at the same level might command prompt action. For example, communications from a "lame duck," a high official who is scheduled to leave office in the near future, are treated more casually than if his tenure in office were known to be continuing.

Adaptation 18 / Dalton **STAFF-LINE CONFLICT IN INDUSTRY**

This is a study of social differentiation and its consequences in two major groups of management: the line organization and the staff organization. *The line* consists of the foremen and their superiors who direct the actual work done and who are responsible for production. *The staff organization* consists of specialists who have a research and advisory function in the plant. Staff groups are relatively new in industry. They provide specialized knowledge and technical advice in such diverse fields as chemistry, statistics, public and industrial relations, personnel, accounting, and engineering.

Data on staff-line relations in this study were drawn from three industrial plants in related industries. They range in size from 4,500 to 20,000 employees and from 200 to nearly 1,000 management officials.

The problem The staff has specialized knowledge gained from training and research. In theory it advises the line officers how they can increase production and efficiency. The ideal situation involves two assumptions: (1) that the staff specialists are reasonably content to be advisors without formal authority, and (2) that their suggestions for improvements are welcomed by the line officers and carried out. This study tests these assumptions in the actual relations of the two groups as they work out their problems.

It must be emphasized that the

staff-line conflict discussed here is only one of many frictions in the plants. For instance, there is competition and tension among departments, among individuals, and between union and management.

There are two major sources of friction between the staff and line in the plants considered. One is the *social background* or composition of the two groups, that is, the personal characteristics they bring to the plant. The other source of friction is the differentiation that takes place within the plant, the differences in *social position* they assume once there.

Sources of friction: social composition The two groups differ in age, formal education, and social behavior (appearance, manners, etc.).

1. *Age.* The staff members on the average are significantly younger than the line officers. This is a source of friction revealed in the ill-concealed attitude of the older line officers. They resent receiving what they regard as instructions from younger men. The staff officers often attribute their lack of success in "selling ideas" to the line to this attitude. As one assistant staff chief remarked:

"We're always in hot water with these old guys on the line. You can't tell them a damn thing. They're bull-headed as hell! Most of the time we offer a suggestion it's either laughed at or not considered at all. The same idea in the mouth of some old codger on the line'd get a round of applause. They treat us like kids."

2. *Education.* The staff members necessarily have more education than the line officers. Education is part of the qualifications for staff jobs; experience is emphasized in the choice of line officers. The staff is in a position to exploit this difference in education, and it probably contributes to a feeling of superiority among them. The line, however, resents the proposals of the staff because of the educational difference involved as well as the age differential. The line often refers to the staff as "college punks," "slide-rules," "crack-pots," and "chair-warmers."

3. *Social behavior.* Attention to personal appearance, cosmopolitan recreational tastes, facility in speaking and writing, poise and polish in social intercourse—these also distinguish the staff from the line. The line receives occasional snubs from the staff and feels that their emphasis on social prestige is a threat to the line man's own position and not in the best interests of the plant. To quote a line officer on the matter of social intercourse during the working day: "They don't go into the cafeteria to eat and relax while they talk over their problems. They go in there to look around and see how somebody is dressed or to talk over the hot party they had last night. Well, that kind of damn stuff don't go with me. I haven't any time to put

on airs and make out I'm something I'm not."

Sources of friction: social position within the plant The different functions the two groups perform in the plant and the different opportunities they have for advancement, salary, power, prestige, and responsibility are major sources of friction.

1. *Chances for advancement.* Line officers have better chances for advancement than staff personnel for at least three reasons: (a) there are approximately twice as many positions of authority in the line; (b) the line organization reaches higher, for it has six status levels whereas the staff has only three; (c) line salaries for comparable positions are usually higher.

2. *The staff is on trial.* Continuous dispute over the relative worth of the two groups is another source of friction. The line regards the staff as on trial rather than as a managerial division of equal importance. To the line officer, his authority over production is something sacred, and he resents the implication that after many years in the line he needs the guidance of an inexperienced newcomer. He is ready with charges of "crack-pot experimentation" and "costly blunders" by the staff. The lower foremen are inclined to suspect that the staff is less an engineering and technical assistance division than a weapon of top management to control the lower line officers.

The staff member is painfully aware of these feelings and of the need of his group to prove its worth. He feels bound to contribute something significant in the form of ideas helpful to management. By virtue of his greater edu-

cation and knowledge of the latest theories of production, the staff man regards himself as a management consultant, an expert. He feels that he must be, or appear to be, almost infallible once he has committed himself to top management on some point. Whereas in practice adoption of their suggestions depends upon the amount of cooperation that can be won from line officers, the staff prefer to see themselves as agents of top management, independent of the lower line, and superior to it.

3. *The line resists innovation.* The different pressures upon the staff and upon the line in day-to-day operations create additional tension. As we have seen, the staff must make contributions in the form of suggested changes in order to prove its worth. But it is the line that is called on to change its work habits. The experienced line officer fears being "shown up" before his superiors for not having thought of improvements himself. Moreover, changes in methods may bring personnel changes which threaten to break up cliques and other informal arrangements and to reduce the line officer's area of authority. Or such changes may expose forbidden practices and departmental inefficiency and waste. In some cases these fears have led line officers to strike informal bargains with the staff to postpone the initiation of new practices for a period of time in exchange for some other cooperation from the line.

The pressure on staff personnel is to develop new techniques, but they also have to consider how their plans will be received by the line. They know from experience that lower line officers can give a "black eye" to staff contributions

by deliberate malpractices. Line officers may verbally accept a change, but they are in a position to sabotage it in practice. For this reason, there is a tendency for staff members to withhold improved production schemes when they know an attempt to introduce them might fail.

The study found evidence that the accommodation of staff to demands of the line included the manipulation (but not embezzlement) of company funds. Pressures from the lower line organization forced some staff groups to "kick over" some of the funds appropriated for staff use. The line was then able to hide inefficiencies and meet the constant pressure from the top to show low operating costs. In return

the staff received more cooperation from the line in accepting innovations, and some staff personnel who wished transfer to the line were recommended.

Weakness of the staff It is clear in the plants studied that the line is the more powerful branch of management. The position of the staff is weak and defensive. This is due to its lack of authority over production and its dependence upon top management for approval and for advancement.

The ultimate authority in the plant rests with top line officials. Usually, they have risen to the top by way of the line organization. They understand and sympathize with the daily problems of the line

in getting the main work done, and their functions as top officials bring them close to the day-to-day pressures and responsibilities of the line. Top officials also have influence over promotions in the higher staff positions. A staff member knows that if he aspires to one of the higher staff jobs, or wishes to transfer to the line, he must satisfy the top line officer. The staff member must show his ability to work with the line and to understand its problems. He must make contributions the line will accept, and be able to minimize the conflicts occasioned by the social differences in background and role we have described.

Conclusion The ideal conception of staff-line relations assumes that the staff is willing to function in an advisory capacity and that the line is willing to accept staff suggestions for improvement. The sources of tension inherent in this situation have been described. One result is a morale problem among new staff members, reflected in disillusionment and high turnover.

The new staff member, often selected because of his academic record, enters industry prepared to engage in logical, well-formulated relations with other members of management, and to carry out the precise, methodical functions for which he has been trained. He believes he has much to contribute and that his efforts will win early recognition and rapid advancement. He soon discovers that his freedom to function is snared in a web of informal commitments, that his academic specialty may not be relevant to his actual assignments, and that he must learn who the informally powerful line officers are and what ideas they welcome. The result is a disillusionment that contributes to a relatively high turnover of younger staff personnel.

In the plants studied, ambitious staff men, frustrated by the relatively low hierarchy through which they could move, appeared eager to increase the number of personnel under their authority. And in fact the personnel of staff groups did increase disproportionately to those of the line. There was also a trend of personnel movement from staff to line, presumably reflecting the drive, ambition, and qualifications of staff members who were striving for positions of authority, prestige, and higher income.

In general, staff-line friction reduces the distinctive contribution of staff personnel. Their relatively weak position, requiring accommodation to the line, tends to restrict their ability to engage in free, experimental innovation. On the other hand, the natural resistance of the line to staff innovations probably usefully restrains over-eager efforts to apply untested pro-

cedures on a large scale. The conflicts, however, introduce an uncontrolled element into the managerial system. Under such conditions, it is difficult to know when valuable ideas are being sacrificed.

Caution Dalton's analysis is valuable for the light it casts on the sources of group conflict within administrative organizations. While the specific conclusions are still relevant, the status of staff groups has probably risen, especially in industries that depend on "idea men" of all sorts. This is reflected in a tendency in some industries for top officials to be drawn from the staff rather than only from the line.

"In the mythology of the modern corporation, 'staff' groups are not supposed to have direct influence over line activities; but, in practice, as they gain reputation for their expertise, as they gain control over substantial amounts of company resources, and as they move from *ad hoc* advice-giving to long-range, comprehensive research and planning for the organization, they may, in fact, be setting most of the constraints within which 'line' managers operate."⁹

⁹ William R. Dill, "Business Organizations," in James G. March (ed.), *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 1085.

Adaptation 19 / Gardner and Moore **THE LINE OF AUTHORITY AND COMMUNICATION**

The formal line of authority or chain of command in a factory provides a *channel of communication* extending from top to bottom. But it is not the simple, direct channel it is often thought to be. By its very nature as a linkage of man-boss relationships, it has a number of peculiarities which affect the quality, accuracy, and speed of communication. In fact, much of the transmission is so difficult that it is rare for a superior who is several steps removed from the work level to have comprehensive knowledge of what goes on in the shop. This adaptation reviews some of the sources of communication difficulties up and down the line.

Communication down Because each person is sensitive to his boss's moods, opinions, likes, and dislikes, there is often much confusion and misunderstanding in communication down the line. For example, we see the superintendent passing through the shop convoyed by the foreman. Being in a jovial

mood, he comments that "the girls seem happy this morning, the way they are talking and laughing." The foreman thinks, "Is he hinting that I shouldn't allow them to talk? Does he think I don't keep proper discipline? Those girls ought to have sense enough to stop talking and act busy when he's around.

Maybe I better move Mary off by herself because she always gets the others started talking." The boss leaves, quite unaware that his comments have been interpreted as criticism. As soon as he is gone, the foreman bawls out the girls for talking and not paying attention to their work; he moves the Marys

SOURCE: Abridged and adapted from *Human Relations in Industry* by B. B. Gardner and D. G. Moore (Rev. ed.; Chicago: Irwin, 1950), pp. 33-65. Published in this form by permission of the authors and Richard D. Irwin, Inc.

A CASE OF JITTERS

Take the case of Bob, foreman in the machine department, when he suddenly discovers that he does not have enough bronze rod on hand to complete the order of part number X37A22 for the end of the week and that it will keep two hand screw machines going steadily to make delivery on time. So he talks to Charley, the machine operator who came to him asking for the rod:

Bob: "Are you sure there isn't any of that rod over in the rack? When we started on this job, I checked the storeroom records and there was plenty on hand."

Charley: "There sure isn't now. You remember when we first started on this order somebody gave us the wrong specifications and we turned out a lot that had to be junked."

Bob: "That's right. Well, I'll call the stockroom and get some more over right away." (*Thinking*, I sure did slip up on that. I completely forgot to order more rod.)

(*He calls the stockroom.*) "I'll need two hundred pounds of that $\frac{3}{8}$ th bronze rod for part number X37A22. We're in a rush for it, got to get the order out right away and a couple of machines are waiting. Can you get it right over?"

Stockman: "Sorry, we are out of that rod.

Won't be able to get it in before Friday. Why didn't you call last week?"

Bob: "Can't you get hold of any before that? If I don't deliver those parts before Monday, the gadget assembly department will be tied up."

Stockman: "We'll do the best we can, but don't expect it before Friday. Why don't you guys give us a little more notice instead of waiting until your machines shut down and then expecting us to do miracles?"

Bob: (*Thinking*: This is a terrible note! I slip up on ordering that rod the one time the stockroom is out of it. Why can't they keep some stock on hand instead of trying to work from hand to mouth. Just trying to make a good showing by keeping down inventory and they tie up production. They ought to realize that they are there to help the shop, not to give us all this trouble. Wonder what I can do now. The boss sure will give me hell when he hears this. Maybe I ought to check with Joe in gadget assembly to see how many parts they have on hand and how long before he will need more. Maybe I better let him know what's happened so he will know what to expect. Maybe he can plan his work so the people on that assembly job can do something else for a few days.

SOURCE: From *Human Relations in Industry* by B. B. Gardner and D. G. Moore (Rev. ed.; Chicago: Irwin, 1950), pp. 37-38. Reprinted by permission.

around, and it is weeks or even months before the final ripples of disturbance have died down.

Distortion up the line Because of sensitivity to the boss and dependence on him, there is much distortion in communicating up the line of authority. Along with

concern for "giving the boss what he wants," there is a tendency to "cover up," to keep the boss from knowing about the things that go wrong or the things that do not get done. No one wants to pass bad news up the line, because he feels that it reflects on him and that he should handle his job so there is no

bad news. Consequently, he does not tell the boss what a poor job he did or how stupid he was. That is, he does not do so unless he thinks someone else will get to the boss first. (See "A Case of Jitters," above.) When he does have to break some bad news to the boss, he will probably have things fixed

But if I tell him what's happened, he will tell his boss, and his boss will jump on my boss and my boss will jump on me for letting this happen and not letting him know. So before I tell Joe anything I better tell my boss. Maybe if I tell him, he can tell Joe's boss, and I won't have to say anything to Joe. Joe's going to be plenty sore anyway. He got kind of hot the other day when I tried to get him to let me make some changes in the base plate for that Model N job. Seemed like he was just being stubborn. Wonder if he might have enough parts on hand so he could just go along and say nothing about this affair. If I knew he had enough, I just wouldn't say anything and take a chance on getting some to him before he runs out. I'm afraid to risk it, though, without being pretty sure, because if he did have to shut down, my boss sure would raise Cain. Yeah, and Joe called the other day to know how we were coming on that lot we delivered yesterday, said he didn't want to get caught short. But Joe always does that. He starts crowding you for things long before he actually needs them. He seems to think no one will keep their promises unless he rides them. If I ask Joe how much he has on hand, he will suspect something and I will have to tell him.

Guess I better not take a chance on Joe. I will have to tell my boss first. But gee, how I hate to tell him! I know just what he will think. I know I should have remembered to order more when we spoiled that first run, but I was so busy getting

caught up that I forgot. Anyway, you never would expect the stockroom to be out of a standard item like that. And if they ran this place right, they never would be. But my boss won't care about that. All he'll think is that I must be asleep on the job. He expects me to keep track of everything; and if I have to do the stockroom's job for them to keep my job going, he expects me to do that. What will I tell him, anyway, that won't make me look like a fool who doesn't know his job? Maybe I better not tell him now. It won't hurt to wait till tomorrow, and maybe then the stockroom will know when I can expect the rod. Maybe they will do better than Friday, and I might squeeze by. When I do tell the boss, I want to be able to tell him just when we will be able to start on the job again, and maybe I can plan it so we won't hold up the assembly. Guess I will wait till tomorrow and see what I can figure out.)

And Bob spends the rest of the day in a state of jitters trying to figure a way out of the predicament, or at least a partial solution which he can present to his boss when he finally is forced to tell him. He goes home that night with a terrible grouch, is cross to the children because they are so noisy, gets annoyed with his wife because she seems so cheerful, can hardly eat his supper, sleeps poorly, and hates to go to work the next morning. Such is the human element of communication up the line.

up or have developed a good excuse. People at each level develop defenses, often complicated and ingenious, to protect themselves from criticism from those above them in the chain of command.

The subordinate selects what to tell the superior, trying to anticipate what the boss wants to know

or what he may want to know later, trying to present things in such a way that his boss will feel that things are not too bad, or, if they were, that they are now under control, and trying to give him good news to take the sting out of the bad. The boss goes away feeling that he knows what is going on,

that he has his finger firmly on the pulse of the shop.

Filtered information Each individual in the line acts as a filter who sorts the information coming to him and selects what he will pass on to his boss. Because the boss responds most favorably to good

news, good news goes up the line quite easily and rapidly. Information about improvements in output, quality, costs, and so on are transmitted readily from level to level. On the other hand, bad news moves more slowly; everyone is reluctant to communicate his mistakes or failures. The what-will-the-boss-think-of-me feeling encourages delays, excuses, and the development of tact in presenting bad news. The filtering of information operates at all levels in the hierarchy.

The foreman's orientation The foreman, who is usually considered the first level of management, has the most direct and detailed knowledge of the job and the workers. He plans and supervises their work; he checks and judges it; he maintains discipline and enforces the rules. To the workers he is the one who gives orders, who rewards and punishes. It is through him that the downward pressures, the demands and orders, are transmitted to the work group.

The foreman develops an orientation toward the work which is different from that of the rest of the hierarchy. In the first place, his attention is focused on the everyday details. He sees the immediate difficulties and complexities of getting the work out, and he usually knows the workers and their attitudes. As a result, he tends to be impatient with higher levels or with staff people who try to generalize on the basis of partial knowledge and make decisions which affect his job. He frequently feels that his superiors impose tasks on him and on his group without understanding the difficulties of the job.

Four characteristic orientations

of foremen may be identified: (1) worker-oriented, (2) management-oriented, (3) isolated, and (4) integrated.

1. *Worker-oriented foremen.* The foreman who has strong feelings of sympathy with the work group identifies with the workers, acts as though he were one of them, and constantly defends them from his superiors and from outside organizations. Such a foreman generally maintains little social distance between himself and his work group.

There is often a much greater distinction between the foreman and his department chief. In some cases the foreman may actually avoid contacts and force the department chief to come to him. The foreman tries to keep the department chief away from his group, to be present when he is around the job, to cover up mistakes, protect individual workers from his criticism, and otherwise to build strong barriers between them. He resists demands from above for changes, finding reasons for not accepting them or for their failure if they are forced upon him.

2. *Management-oriented foremen.* The opposite type is the foreman who has a strong identification with management and his superiors, and he holds his subordinates at a distance. He tends to be critical of the workers and feels that they are not dependable or are not trying to do a good job. They correctly feel that he is aloof, and they hesitate to talk freely to him or to discuss problems with him. He is likely to seek out his superiors, both on the job and outside. He is concerned about his relationship with his department chief and tries to make a good impression.

In this situation, the workers feel forced to be on their guard against their foreman and think of him as someone who is against them rather than for them. They develop various defenses: they watch their behavior whenever he is in sight; they may restrict output without his knowledge; and they may complain about him to the union. Sometimes the tension makes contacts so uncomfortable that even he is aware of it and may withdraw to some extent from the work situation. In extreme cases, he spends most of his time at his desk, talking to his superiors, or entirely out of the department.

3. *Isolated foremen.* Sometimes a foreman is isolated from both his department chief and the work group. In these cases, there is avoidance on the part of all concerned. If the job will run with a minimum of direct supervision, the foreman may stay out of the group most of the time and stay away from his department chief, too. As long as the work goes on, the department chief also avoids the foreman and the group, and all contacts are very formal and uncomfortable. If the job does not go well, the foreman is in difficulties because his boss will be critical of him and may make arbitrary demands. At the same time, the group is defensive and does not respond to the foreman's demands. The foreman is generally critical of them, just as his boss is critical of him. Under these conditions, both the foreman and the workers are uncomfortable, and whenever there is pressure on the foreman from above, he feels isolated and defenseless and takes it out on his subordinates. In other words, such situations may be fairly stable as

long as the work is running well, but under pressure a great deal of friction between foreman and workers develops.

4. *Integrated foremen.* Sometimes, on the other hand, we find a situation in which there is strong identification and integration among all three—the workers, the foreman, and the department chief. In such cases we see very easy interaction between workers and department chief, and the department chief is usually in close touch with the details of the job and with the individuals. The foreman is comfortable under these conditions, does not worry about the presence

of the department chief, and need not cover up mistakes or try to protect the group. In many instances of this kind, the whole department stands as a unit against outside pressures or against demands from above. These are the most comfortable and satisfactory work situations for the foreman and for the workers.

The foreman, communication, and morale As we have seen, a foreman is in constant contact with the workers and has the responsibility of putting into action many of management's policies and decisions. He is the one who inter-

prets management to the workers; he is, to a large degree, the only representative of management with whom the workers have much contact; he is the one who imposes management's controls upon them. For these reasons he influences the workers' attitudes toward the job, management, and the company generally. He is the one who can most directly affect their morale and loyalty. While his importance to employee morale has long been recognized, recent studies have shown that in many respects he is also the most important factor in the work situation.

Caution The above description might give the impression that communication between levels in the industrial status system is completely ineffectual. Actually, of course, this is not true. People at the bottom of the structure do produce the goods, and those at the top do control production and maintain their authority over those below. But because of the nature of worker-boss relations and because status relations in the system are neither clearly recognized nor understood, communication sometimes interferes with satisfactory work relations and production.

SECTION 6 INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The social processes discussed in this chapter—group formation, stratification, communication, socialization, adaptation—have the effect of building into the organization habits, values, vested interests, and other elements of structure and policy. Each organization is a creature of its own history, the kind of people who made up its membership, the groups they formed, and the way it adapted to its environment. The outcome may be beneficial if the organization has a stable and distinctive competence, an established reputation, and a network of long-nurtured alliances. Well-established organizations often have a head start over rivals come lately on the scene.

On the other hand, the process of settling down,

of becoming established and stabilized, can be costly. What began as a vigorous, purposeful group may end up institutionalized, fat, secure, and useful, but without its former energy or idealism.

Institutionalization is the development of orderly, stable, *socially integrating* forms and structures out of unstable, loosely patterned, or merely technical types of action. Stable, highly formalized technical procedures in science and industry, such as those governing the shipment of freight or the assembly of a complicated machine, do not necessarily contribute to the formation or maintenance of a social group and are, therefore, not institutional. On the other hand, some technical procedures, such as piloting a

ship, may symbolize an occupation or profession for its members and take on an institutional meaning.

Four institutionalizing processes, important in the life history of associations, are: (1) formalization, (2) self-maintenance and conservatism, (3) infusion with value, and (4) development of a distinctive social composition and social base.²⁰

Formalization The most obvious type of institutionalization in associations is the development of formal systems, which often emerge out of trial-and-error informal practices, as discussed on page 202. Social integration is directly and explicitly promoted by formal devices of coordination and communication. The transformation of informal groups and practices into legally recognized and formally established institutions occurs continuously, not only within associations but in the larger society as well. For example, many preexisting practices and duties regarding marriage and family life are formalized in the law of domestic relations. Similarly, zoning ordinances in a city often give formal approval to patterns of land use that have already developed in an unplanned way. Indeed zoning boards often approve variances to land use that are in violation of the ordinances. By so doing the deviations are defined as exceptions and brought under formal control.

Formalization is a way of increasing control. Practices hitherto spontaneous, governed only by tradition or the give-and-take of personal and group interaction, become subject to explicit rules and limitations. For example, labor-management legislation formalized some practices that were already worked out, but at the same time it made collective bargaining subject to greater public scrutiny and control. To take a simpler case, when the informal coffee break in an office is formalized, the practice is made legal, but it is also more readily controlled.

Self-maintenance and conservatism The quest for permanence and stability also makes for institutionalization. The demand for security usually occurs

rather early in the life history of an organization because many people, and especially the leaders, have a stake in its continued existence. Therefore, priority is given to (1) maintaining the organization as a going concern, (2) minimizing risks, and (3) achieving long-run rather than short-run objectives. The leaders become willing to sacrifice quick returns for organizational security.

Adaptation 20 (pp. 218–220) summarizes Michels' study of the conservative tendencies in certain types of political organization. The conservative influence is traced to the emergence of self-perpetuating leadership, an oligarchy whose main concern is to protect its vested interests.

The institutional analysis of trade unions is concerned with the effort of union leaders to gain security for their organizations. The history of the labor movement is largely dominated by efforts to win union security through provisions for compulsory membership (the closed shop and its variants), for automatic deduction of dues payments from wages (the checkoff), and for joint consultation with management. These objectives are in the interest of long-run maintenance of the union as well as immediate gains for the members.

Large corporations are also concerned with institutional security and in recent years have been particularly sensitive to the need for a favorable climate of public opinion. Institutional advertising reflects this trend. Expensive newspaper and magazine space is bought not to promote sales, at least in the short run, but to build a favorable image of the corporation and of business in general.

Infusion with value When an individual identifies with an organization or becomes habituated to its methods or otherwise mixes his personality with it, the organization becomes for him a valued source of personal satisfaction. (See Sec. 4, p. 203.) Administrative changes are difficult when individuals are habituated to and identified with long-established procedures. For example, the shifting of personnel

²⁰ A classic treatment of institutionalization is Weber's analysis of "the routinization of charisma." See Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 363–373.

is inhibited when individuals resist changes that threaten personalities. Infusion with value helps to institutionalize the organization, giving it a greater stability and social integration, transforming it from a mere tool into something that is valued for itself.

If an organization is merely an expendable instrument, it is altered or cast aside when a more efficient tool becomes available. If value infusion has taken place, however, there is a resistance to change. People feel a sense of personal loss; the identity of the group or community seems somehow violated; they accept economic or technical considerations only reluctantly. The Marine Corps has this institutional halo, and it resists administrative efforts to submerge its identity. In 1950 President Truman became irritated with political pressure favoring Marine Corps membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He wrote a letter calling the Marines the Navy's police force and likening their "propaganda machine" to Stalin's. This raised a storm of protest that ended with a presidential apology.

From the standpoint of the national community most of the many thousands of organizations are not highly valued for themselves, although certain principles on which they are based, such as free speech or competition, may have deep cultural roots. With some very important exceptions, such as the Supreme Court, when any particular organization is threatened, no national outcry is heard. On the other hand, special groups or localities are often urged to keep an organization from dying for lack of support. For example, appeals were made to keep various major league baseball teams in their "home" cities.

Development of a distinctive social composition and social base In its day-to-day activities, an organization makes many kinds of decisions. Most are easily revised and have no permanent effect. Other decisions, however, are more binding and impart to the organization a particular character, especially when the social composition of the organization is affected. For example, selective recruiting may bring persons with distinctive backgrounds or orientations

into an organization. Sometimes this is done deliberately in private schools or colleges that attempt to preserve tradition by admitting students with appropriate family backgrounds. More often the development of a distinctive social composition is gradual and inadvertent, resulting from the unplanned selectivity that takes place because of the tendency to bring in people who share the backgrounds and perspectives of incumbent personnel. Deliberate or not, the result is a membership or personnel characterized by distinctive attitudes and habits of work.

The social base of an organization is closely related to its social composition. Many organizations, such as political pressure groups, are connected to a particular clientele or constituency upon whose support they are dependent. Because of this dependency the personnel and methods of the organization tend to reflect the social characteristics of the constituency. Even in business, adaptation to a particular market (by locality or quality of goods) may affect the habits and outlook of the sales and production departments. For example:

The first boats made by Gar Wood were high quality craft, made of the finest materials by master boat builders. Later the company decided to mass-produce a comparatively low cost speed boat for wide distribution. It developed that the entire organization found itself unable to cope with the effort to shift commitments. Workmen and shop supervisors alike continued to be preoccupied with high cost quality craftsmanship. Members of the selling staff, too, could not shift emphasis from "snob appeal" to price appeal. The quality commitment was so strong that an entirely new division—operating in a separate plant hundreds of miles away and therefore recruiting from a different labor market—had to be created to do the job successfully.¹¹

Analysis of an organization's social base can reveal the pressures that play upon it and can help one understand its historical evolution and the role it plays in the community. The social base of the American Federation of Labor lay in the craft-organized skilled workers, and the split that led to the formation of the Committee for Industrial Organization (later

¹¹ From notes by the late Edward Boehm, formerly a Vice-President of Gar Wood Industries.

the Congress of Industrial Organizations) in 1935 reflected the effort to shift the base so as to include the semiskilled workers in the mass production industries. New social forces in the American electorate, particularly the labor and minority vote, have changed the social base of the Democratic party with significant consequences for its program and its chances of victory. The Anti-Saloon League was based on rural

Protestant churches, from which it drew heavy support but whose influence in American life was waning. (See *Adaptation* 22, pp. 246 ff.) The structure and policies of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, especially at the outset, were affected by the paucity of leadership in the Negro population and an orientation toward the Negro middle class.

Adaptation 20 / Michels THE "IRON LAW" OF OLIGARCHY

"Who says organization says oligarchy." With these words the German political sociologist, Robert Michels (1876-1936), summed up his famous "iron law of oligarchy." Although his "law" is stated in unqualified form, the actual argument of Michels' book leads to more limited generalizations. His analysis does not show that organization as such necessarily leads to oligarchy, or self-perpetuating leadership. Rather, certain kinds of organization have that tendency, and then only when certain additional processes are at work. The study was based mainly on the history of socialist and trade-union organizations in Europe before the first World War.

His influential book attempts to trace a connection between the basic necessities of organization and the evolution of self-perpetuating oligarchies. Following Michels' argument, we shall first consider the general need for organization

and then the special circumstances that make for the drift to oligarchy.

The need for organization The degree of organization and the importance of leadership vary with the size of the group, the permanence of its aims, and the complexity of the organization. In a small undifferentiated group, leadership may be but weakly developed; leaders arise spontaneously and serve temporarily, unofficially, and without many rewards. The leaders remain members of the group, sharing its interests and influenced by the same social conditions as the members. Since the group is small, all or most members may participate in decisions and actions. The delegated authority is limited and temporary and may be exercised by any member.

On the other hand, no organization of any size or duration can exist without leaders. Someone has to organize meetings or determine

the consensus, represent the group and its decisions to other organizations or the public, and make the countless small and large decisions that are necessary to carry out its aims.

Democratic action, like any action that strives for definite ends, requires organization.

Organized, concerted action requires the delegation of special tasks, responsibilities, and powers to a few leaders.

These statements are not enough to justify the view that organization leads to oligarchy. The mere fact of organization, that is, the division of labor and delegation of tasks and powers to leaders, is not in itself undemocratic, so long as the leadership cannot perpetuate itself. Something more is needed to state the conditions that give rise to oligarchy.

Conditions making for oligarchy The delegation of tasks and

SOURCE: A summary and interpretation of *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* by Robert Michels (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949). First published in German in 1911 and in English in 1915. Quoted material used by permission of The Free Press.

powers to leaders results in a concentration of skills and informal prerogatives in their hands. Not all members can perform the tasks of leadership in complex organizations. The jobs become specialized and require experience, knowledge, and individual aptitude.

Administrative skills are required to keep the organization functioning and to get things done. Relations with the outside world, such as diplomacy, collective bargaining, or public relations, require technical skills that the leaders alone possess. Their skills set them apart from the rank and file, and social differentiation begins. This specialization makes the members dependent on the leaders in office, because they are the ones who can keep things going and get things done that further the aims of the group. The dependence of the rank and file—a central theme in Michels' work—makes the leaders indispensable and hence gives them increased power.

Leadership carries prerogatives. When he chooses the organization's staff, the leader can select men whose first loyalty is to him. Thus personal machines are built. Leaders also control the channels of information within an organization, and their control gives them special access to and influence over the opinions of the members. These prerogatives and similar opportunities that characterize the social position of leadership tend to make leaders independent of the rank and file, and the power inherent in the concentration of skills is consolidated.

The position of leaders is strengthened by the members' political indifference and by their sense of obligation to those who

guide them and do the main work. The ordinary member does not have the inclination or time to participate in the demanding, complex tasks of an organization, and he is glad to have the work done by someone else. Moreover, he recognizes his own incompetence compared with the skills of his leaders. The rank and file then submit willingly rather than reluctantly to the widening power of the officials.

The concentration of skills and prerogatives in the leaders' hands and the willing submission of the rank and file create opportunities for the self-perpetuation of the leaders. It is not surprising that they take advantage of the situation and try to stay in office. Michels holds that leaders try to keep their power because it is inherent in human nature to seek power and retain it. "The desire to dominate, for good or for evil, is universal." (Michels, p. 206) This is a dubious and unnecessary assumption, and perhaps Michels' weakest point.

He gives other more defensible reasons for the self-perpetuation of leaders. Certainly leaders have a desire for personal security, and the prerogatives of leadership give them social status distinct from the ordinary members. They wish to retain their status and prerogatives, including the accustomed way of living and type of employment. The union official resists returning to the shop. Leaders may also believe sincerely that they are serving the best interests of the organization and that a threat to them is a threat to the group as a whole.

Consequences of oligarchy Self-perpetuation of leaders tends toward subversion of the aims of the organization. If leaders are in-

dependent of rank-and-file control, there is a temptation to use the organizational machinery and power to further personal aims. There is a divergence of interest between the leaders and the led, and in the absence of effective democratic control, leaders follow policies that may not serve the aims for which the group was organized.

Because he studied social reform movements, Michels was especially interested in the subversion that comes from the conservatism of an oligarchic leadership that places stability and security for the organization (and for the leaders) above all other action aims. Action is slow and cautious, risks are minimized, powerful enemies are placated, and aims are modified to assure stability. There was a strong tendency among the trade unions of Europe to move from revolutionary to more conservative aims once they had achieved extensive membership, financial security, and discipline. Organization was necessary for the achievement of the original goals, and it introduced new interests that modified group aims.

Oligarchy is inherent in democracy and cannot be eliminated. Michels holds that the social differentiation between leaders and led is universal. This does not mean that tyranny abounds everywhere but that there is a predisposition to oligarchy which requires definite social checks. "Nothing but a serene and frank examination of the oligarchical dangers of democracy will enable us to minimize these dangers, even though they can never be entirely avoided." (Michels, p. 408)

Countervailing forces To min-

imize the dangers, it is necessary to capitalize on a counter-tendency of democracy to stimulate and strengthen the individual's aptitude for criticism and control. "This predisposition towards free inquiry, in which we cannot fail to recognize one of the most precious factors of civilization, will gradually increase in proportion as the economic status of the masses undergoes improvement and becomes more stable, and in proportion as they are admitted more effectively to the advantages of civilization. A wider education involves an increasing capacity for exercising control. Can we not observe every day that among the well-to-do the authority of the leaders over the led, extensive though it be, is never so unrestricted as in the case of the leaders of the poor? . . . It is, consequently, the great task of social education to raise the intellectual level of the masses, so that they may be enabled, within the limits of what is possible, to counteract the oligarchical tendencies of the working-class movement." (Michels, pp. 406 f.)

COMMENTARY

An argument similar to Michels' thesis was put forward by Berle and Means in their study of the modern corporation.¹² In the very large company there is wide dispersion of stock ownership: no indi-

vidual or group owns more than a small fraction of the total shares. Even as early as 1929 no one owned more than 1 percent of the stock of the Pennsylvania Railroad, American Telephone and Telegraph, or United States Steel. Spreading ownership and risk among many shareholders permits the massing of large quantities of capital for industrial development, but the individual stockholder has only a small voice in the company's affairs and ownership is separated from control. Power is concentrated in the hands of management, which often becomes self-perpetuating.

Thus, self-perpetuating leadership is a general phenomenon, by no means restricted to the political organizations studied by Michels. The following points apply to most large-scale organizations.

1. The members of many organizations abdicate their formal right to make decisions, even important ones. They are willing for someone else to take over the task so long as their own special interests (for example, the continued flow of reasonable dividends) are not seriously affected. When members abdicate their powers in normal periods, the incumbent leaders are able to consolidate their positions, and the members find it hard to assert themselves in times of crises.

2. The weakness of members can be ameliorated if they band together in organized factions. If strong, new power centers are created in the organization, the leaders may be called to account for their actions. This is what happens in the organization of pressure groups and parties in a political democracy. In special-purpose organizations, however, the narrowness of member interests does not sustain permanent opposition groups that can mobilize opinion and supply alternative leadership.¹³

3. The analyses of Michels and of Berle and Means indicate a basic trend toward self-perpetuating leadership in large-scale organizations. However, leaders of corporations and labor organizations are occasionally challenged or ousted, and the business pages of American newspapers report the internal contests for control of large corporations and unions. Perhaps the most notable in recent years was a financier's successful effort in 1954 to oust the incumbent management of the New York Central Railroad. Internal conflicts are exceptional, however, because the opposition must be well organized and well financed if it is to make an effective appeal to the stockholders and take over control.

¹² A. A. Berle and G. C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (New York: Macmillan, 1933).

¹³ For a study of a deviant case, see S. M. Lipset, M. A. Trow, and J. S. Coleman, *Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of the International Typographical Union* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956).

CHAPTER VIII

COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION

By common agreement the term "collective behavior" designates the study of relatively *unstructured* social situations and their products, such as crowds, riots, revivals, rumor, public opinion, fads, and social movements. These phenomena are not fully controlled by cultural norms and ordered social relations. In such situations there is often free play of emotions, a high degree of personal interaction, influence and competition, and the emergence of transitory opinions and allegiances.

Collective behavior is important, not only because dramatic events make headlines and sometimes change history, but also because spontaneous activities may give rise to new norms and values. The early phases of social change are usually marked by unstructured forms of action. The organization of workers often begins in spontaneous protests against some immediate threat to jobs or wages. Many of the respectable religious denominations of today originated in movements that excited crowd behavior. Once-popular fads, such as wearing wristwatches, collars attached to shirts, and

low-cut shoes, have become customary. The study of collective behavior illuminates the dynamics of social change and the ways in which new customs and institutions become established.

Through collective behavior new forms of action and new groups are created in response to felt needs, pressures, and excitements, rather than as a result of consciously coordinated activity. The development of informal structure in associations is a product of collective behavior. (See ASSOCIATIONS, p. 201.) Spontaneous actions often occur in conjunction with concerted and organized behavior, even in such dramatic episodes as mass protests and insurrections.

Collective behavior is a part of the everyday life of society and does not always take dramatic form. The study of collective behavior views the social world from the standpoint of action, of constant regrouping and continuously changing perspectives. There is always some degree of unstructuredness in human situations, because the rules cannot fully take account of all the variation in situations that may arise and the diversity of human response.

CONDITIONS OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

Three conditions characterize relatively unstructured and unstable situations:

1. *Absence or weakness of social forms.* Where existing social arrangements do not prescribe what is proper and acceptable behavior, people improvise. A crisis or disaster, such as a flood or famine, a revolution or an invasion, is something for which people are usually unprepared. Action is called for, yet routines to cope with the emergency are lacking or inadequate. The ordinary processes of orderly communication break down, and rumors, perhaps exaggerated and fear-provoking, take their place. Panic may result. In a pioneer country where law-enforcement agencies are weak or nonexistent, vigilante groups often go beyond their legitimate limits. In crowds people come into contact with each other outside the restraining influence of a social structure.

2. *Ambiguous and open decisions.* Especially in a democratic society, much government policy is deliberately left open, to be determined by expressions of public opinion. While a broad framework of orderly rules is maintained, decisions are not reached by agreement on a traditional and commonly accepted authority but are worked out in the interplay of competing interest groups. It is assumed that public opinion is not predetermined and fixed but may be influenced. As political contests progress, appeals may take on the emotional character associated with collective behavior.

3. *Changed perspectives and values.* Innovations, such as the growth of factory technology, bring about changes in goals and outlooks. Old ways are questioned, and pressure is exerted on custom and tradition. A period of fluidity ensues. When the prevailing patterns cannot be readily changed in prescribed ways, individuals often band together outside the official framework. Such conditions make for social movements, often with radical ideologies and a high degree of emotional involvement. If the movement is successful and its new perspectives are accepted, institutionalization occurs and the collective behavior aspects diminish in importance.

These conditions, widespread in modern society, lend importance to the study of spontaneous and temporary social relations and groups. Section 2 discusses crowds and collective excitement. Section 3 deals with publics, public opinion, and propaganda. Section 4 reviews social movements and social change.

Collective behavior, socialization, and the study of primary groups are the fields in sociology most closely related to psychology. Indeed, they are often studied and taught under the title "social psychology." An understanding of these topics depends in part on the development of knowledge about human motivation, emotion, perception, and communication. The sociologist is oriented to the social conditions that produce collective behavior and the effect it has on group conflict, morale, consensus, and changing patterns of social organization.

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SECTION 2 CROWDS AND COLLECTIVE EXCITEMENT

EMOTIONAL CONTAGION

Emotional contagion occurs in a wide range of phenomena, including crowd behavior, panics, sightings of flying saucers, cheering sections, and *esprit de corps*. These phenomena, and others that are less dramatic, show a *common mood*, a state of mind affected by emotion. The mood shared in a group colors the thought and action of the participants by facilitating some acts and inhibiting others.

Elements of emotional contagion The processes that induce or sustain emotional contagion are not fully understood, but they include the following:

1. *Heightened suggestibility.* In unstructured situations people tend to look to others for cues. The readiness to take cues can be heightened by the presence of emotional tension, because emotional

tension narrows the field of consciousness. A fearful person is alert to signs of danger and responds to cues that promise relief from anxiety. At the same time, he is apt to ignore other stimuli in his environment. An important consequence of heightened suggestibility is the *loss of critical ability*. When tension dominates consciousness, the weighing of alternative courses of action and the costs of action recede into the background.

2. *Heightened stimulation.* Different personalities show different degrees of suggestibility. However, suggestibility can be induced and the field of consciousness narrowed when there is an increase in the volume and intensity of stimuli from other persons who are excited. In large crowds where there is close physical proximity, stimulation takes the form of *circular response*. A stimulates B to fear. B's fear not only stimulates C in turn but is reflected back to A

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND PARLIAMENTARY PSYCHOLOGY

On October 28 [1943], there was the rebuilding of the House of Commons to consider. One unlucky bomb had blown to fragments the Chamber in which I had passed so much of my life. I was determined to have it rebuilt at the earliest moment that our struggle would allow. I had the power at this moment to shape things in a way that would last. Supported by my colleagues, mostly old Parliamentarians, and with Mr. Attlee's cordial aid, I sought to re-establish for what may well be a long period the two great principles on which the British House of Commons stands in its physical aspect. . . . The first is that its shape should be oblong and not semicircular. Here is a very potent factor in our political life. The semicircular assembly, which appeals to political theorists, enables every individual or every group to move round the centre, adopting various shades of pink according as the weather changes. I am a convinced supporter of the party system in preference to the group system. The party system is much favoured by the oblong form of chamber. It is

easy for an individual to move through these insensible gradations from Left to Right, but the act of crossing the Floor is one which requires serious consideration. I am well informed on this matter, for I have accomplished that difficult process, not only once, but twice. Logic is a poor guide compared with custom. Logic, which has created in so many countries semicircular assemblies with buildings that give to every member not only a seat to sit in, but often a desk to write at, with a lid to bang, has proved fatal to Parliamentary government as we know it here in its home and in the land of its birth.

The second characteristic of a chamber formed on the lines of the House of Commons is that it should *not* be big enough to contain all its Members at once without overcrowding, and there should be no question of every Member having a separate seat reserved for him. The reason for this has long been a puzzle to uninitiated outsiders, and has frequently excited the curiosity and even the criticism of new Members. Yet it is not so difficult to understand if

SOURCE: Abridged from *Closing the Ring*, by Winston S. Churchill (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), pp. 168-169. Reprinted by permission of Houghton Mifflin Company.

and stimulates him further. Propinquity also calls to attention such physical manifestations of emotion as heavy breathing, perspiration, and muscular tension. If emotion is present in one participant, others are likely to be aware of it.

3. *Homogeneity of experience.* To sustain emotional contagion, there must be shared dispositions and background. Crowd stimuli are not strong enough to make a guard join a prison riot. Fads and

crazes are often limited to a particular age, class, or ethnic group whose members share emotional needs and attitudes. People from different ethnic, age, and educational backgrounds are less likely to develop emotional contagion.

CROWDS

In common usage any large number of people gathered in one place is called a crowd, but crowds dif-

you look at it from a practical point of view. If the House is big enough to contain all its Members, nine-tenths of its debates will be conducted in the depressing atmosphere of an almost empty or half-empty chamber. The essence of good House of Commons speaking is the conversational style, the facility for quick, informal interruptions and interchanges. Harangues from a rostrum would be a bad substitute for the con-

versational style in which so much of our business is done. But the conversational style requires a fairly small space, and there should be on great occasions a sense of crowd and urgency. There should be a sense of the importance of much that is said, and a sense that great matters are being decided, there and then, by the House.



Chamber of the rebuilt House of Commons, identical with the earlier House.

fer in the extent to which interaction occurs or leads to unity of feeling and behavior. The "sidewalk superintendents" gathered around a building under construction form a *casual crowd* in which interpersonal relations are at a minimum. What captures attention is of no great emotional import. Nevertheless, a crowd is a potential medium for arousing emotion and for encouraging its expression. Large gatherings provide congenial conditions for emotional

contagion. Stimulation and suggestibility are heightened; the presence of others gives the individual a sense of security and approval; and crowds convey a feeling of anonymity. In times of social unrest or of racial tension, street crowds have often been transformed into *acting crowds* or *mobs*, when the event that attracts attention is exciting and stimulates existing hostilities.

By their very nature casual crowds and mobs are

not part of an organized and controlled system of social relations. They arise spontaneously without orderly preparation. There is no etiquette of crowd behavior. If feelings of hostility, anger, or resentment are aroused, the socially uncontrolled interaction of the crowd may have serious consequences. (See *Adaptation* 21, pp. 230–233.) In modern history the calling of general strikes has often been a prelude to revolutionary attacks upon governments. The effect of a general strike, in addition to raising the level of tension and excitement, is to draw people away from stable institutionalized activities at work and home, and to encourage the formation of street crowds. One of the first moves of a fearful government is to attempt to break up gatherings of more than two or three people, because even small knots of excited people might expand into uncontrollable street crowds.

Integrative crowd behavior Not all crowd behavior is spontaneous and unguided. Controlled emotional contagion is often encouraged and can serve a useful social function. It may offer release for emotions and tensions that ordinarily find no expression, and may stimulate feelings that enhance group solidarity. Organized gatherings of many kinds provide settings that articulate crowd behavior with the social structure.

1. *Expressive crowds.* Parties, dances, and some spectator sports are gatherings in which certain emotions and tensions can find an ordered release. In parties and dances emotional contagion makes for freer interpersonal relations. Football games permit and encourage shouting, singing, and a degree of aggressiveness. Without the unity of the crowd, people would not feel so free to engage in emotional or boisterous behavior.

2. *Audiences.* Many audiences are similar to casual crowds in their passivity and low degree of emotional unity. Nevertheless they may be susceptible to emotional contagion. In some audience situations, like lectures or concerts, the presence of others encourages expressions of enthusiasm. Performers have been known to employ claquees, people hired to cheer and stimulate the spread of approval.

3. *Religious services.* Services that arouse contagious emotions of humility and piety may support deep religious feelings. In some religious sects, emotional contagion is encouraged and results in relatively uncontrolled and predominantly expressive behavior. As institutionalization develops, more restrained services appear. (See *ASSOCIATIONS*, pp. 215–216.)

4. *Mass meetings and deliberative assemblies.* Meetings of voluntary associations usually have two functions. As deliberating bodies they hear and pass upon reports from leaders and choose new leaders. They are also designed to stimulate feelings of solidarity. Meetings in a political campaign are largely of the latter kind, and people go as they do to a football game, expecting to cheer and otherwise express their feelings. When large numbers are involved, it is common for deliberative meetings to become subject to emotional contagion. Although conventions of unions, veterans, and political parties are usually highly organized, the leaders are aware of the danger that the meeting may get out of hand. An unimportant individual may gain the attention of the meeting and develop influence he might not otherwise have.

Assemblies are called “mass meetings” when the solidarity aspect is predominant and emotional demonstrations are expected and encouraged. The emotions displayed are often stereotyped, however, and need not reflect real feelings. The “demonstrations” at national political conventions are often calculated efforts to put on a show of enthusiasm for a candidate.

In “The House of Commons and Parliamentary Psychology,” page 224, Churchill takes account of the crowd potential even in the highly institutionalized British Parliament. The small rectangular chamber has two effects. At ordinary meetings, it encourages a conversational style. On the other hand, at historically significant sessions when all members are present and the chamber is packed, there is a “sense of crowd and urgency.”

Integrative behavior in crisis In less than a century four American presidents met death by assassi-

nation: Lincoln in 1865, Garfield in 1881, McKinley in 1901, and Kennedy in 1963. The death of President Kennedy was the first loss of a national leader reported with the full resources of television, and the coverage, which was immediate and pervasive, reached into 90 percent of American homes. For a period of four days nearly the whole population shared a common mood. The violence attending President Kennedy's death, his youth, and the omnipresent television camera translated the assassination and its aftermath into a collective experience for the people. "Over half of all Americans apparently heard the news before the President was pronounced dead, only thirty minutes after the shooting. . . . There were times . . . when a *majority of all Americans* were apparently looking at the same events and hearing the same words."¹

Agreement and disagreement The extent of public exposure and public involvement were without parallel, and the sense of distress and horror were almost universal. Yet reactions differed in extent, duration, and emotionalism. Some statements in a survey elicited high consensus:²

"It leaves the country without a leader" met strong disagreement.

"... shows the power of the country to pull together" met strong agreement.

But other statements, such as the following, had a wide diversity of responses:

"It shows how much prejudice and hatred there is."

"It shows there's a lot of political unrest in the country."

"It's too shocking to know what to think."

Education Differences in attitudes were strongly associated with educational differences. "The college

group was less suspicious of Communism, but also less likely to define the event as showing prejudice and hate; it was less likely to say there was political unrest, and less likely to say there was too much of guns and violence. In short, the college-educated were less likely to see *any* object as the cause of the event." In response to almost all propositions, the more educated in the sample were less passionate. Formal education apparently tempered and dampened the extremity of reaction.³ The more highly educated, although fully aware and fully engaged, were less likely to seize upon some object, circumstance, or condition to blame.

Several post-assassination studies⁴ suggest that the event itself and the intensive coverage on television had the following effects:

1. Allayed anxiety
2. Relieved grief
3. Reduced guilt feelings
4. Induced a sense of participation and a sense of involvement in the political system
5. Gave reassurance of institutional continuity
6. Strengthened social norms
7. In sum, the effects were reintegrative, making a single public of the American people.

MOBS

A mob is a crowd bent upon an aggressive act such as lynching, looting, or the destruction of property. The term refers to one crowd that is fairly unified and single-minded in its aggressive intent. Mob action is not usually randomly destructive but tends to be focused on some one target or identity.

The target of mob aggression is an individual or group that is resented or perceived as a source of frustration. The socially defined nature of mob action is evident in "scapegoating," in which aggression is *displaced* from the real sources of frustration,

¹ Wilbur Schramm, "Communication in Crisis," in Bradley S. Greenberg and Edwin B. Parker (eds.), *The Kennedy Assassination and the American Public: Social Communication in Crisis* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 4.

² James S. Coleman and Sidney Hollander, Jr., "Studies of Changes in Responses Over Time," in Greenberg and Parker, *op. cit.*, pp. 256-258.

³ Coleman and Hollander, *ibid.*, pp. 262-263; quotation at p. 262.

⁴ See the studies collected in Greenberg and Parker, *op. cit.*

such as economic distress, to a group or individual defined as a legitimate object of hostility.

Of all the forms of action involving emotional contagion, mob activity is the most goal-oriented and the most dependent upon leadership for its direction. Mobs are composed of a nucleus of active and militant leaders and an acquiescing mass of spectators who give the leaders a sense of support and approval. The leaders in turn provide the mass with cues for aggressive behavior. Mob leaders are often those least likely to achieve leadership under ordinary circumstances. Because of the role of leadership and rumor in mob activity, situations of group conflict and social unrest are fertile soil for fanatical and irresponsible persons.

RIOTS

"Riot" connotes randomly destructive behavior, occurring in several places and possibly involving many mobs. Rioting tends to express generalized resentment and rebelliousness rather than definite purpose.

Race riots Until the recent past most American race riots were initiated by whites, although during the course of a riot Negroes sometimes attacked whites. In many cases, neither whites nor Negroes were clearly the initiators. The scenes of violence were usually Negro slums, the downtown business districts, or all-white neighborhoods where white mobs attacked individual Negroes. White marauders frequently invaded the Negro slums, and Negro mobs attacked individual whites in Negro neighborhoods.⁵

The Civil War draft riots have been referred to as "the archetype of most of the racial clashes that took place before the summer of 1964."⁶ For four

days in 1863, white mobs controlled much of New York city, looted stores, burned Negro dwellings, and beat or lynched Negroes. Occurring during a time of national tension and anxiety, they were a reaction by predominantly working-class whites to a requirement that they assist Negro emancipation by military service. The rioting went on throughout the city with attacks and counterattacks between whites and Negroes. In one incident, a white mob attacked, looted, and burned a Negro orphan asylum. The violence was prolonged because officials were reluctant to invoke military measures and because the troops and police sympathized with the rioters.⁷

In the 1919 Chicago race riot,⁸ gangs of hoodlums and "athletic clubs" formed the nuclei of mobs. Although the initial clash between Negroes and whites occurred at a relatively isolated bathing beach, rumors and gang activity carried the conflict beyond its original locale. Soon after the spontaneous outbreaks between Negroes and whites, there was organized raiding by neighborhood gangs in search of victims. These activities went on for several days.

The release of tension and the expression of aggression in mobs signify not an individual but a group phenomenon. Even in a riot situation, where tension is high, violence is not usually committed by isolated individuals but by organized gangs or crowds transformed into mobs. Most people are not able to engage in socially destructive or violent behavior except as members of a group or an emotionally unified mob. Riot violence is, therefore, intermittent and concentrated, sparked by the transformation of crowds into mobs.

Precipitants and underlying conditions In almost every one of 76 cities in the United States where

⁵ See Allen D. Grimshaw, "Lawlessness and Violence in America and Their Manifestations in Changing Negro-White Relationships," *Journal of Negro History*, 44 (1959), 52-72; and "Urban Racial Violence in the United States: Changing Ecological Considerations," *American Journal of Sociology*, 64 (1960), 109-119. See also Elliott M. Rudwick, *Race Riot at East St. Louis, July 2, 1917* (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1966), and A. M. Lee and N. D. Humphrey, *Race Riot* (New York: Dryden, 1943). The last reference is a study of the Detroit riot of 1943.

⁶ The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact—An Assessment* (Washington, D.C., 1967), Chap. 9, "Riots and Crime." Quotation at p. 117.

⁷ Lawrence Lader, "New York's Bloodiest Week," *American Heritage*, 10 (June, 1959), 44-49.

⁸ Chicago Commission on Race Relations, *The Negro in Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1922). For a brief summary, see Leonard Broom and Philip Selznick, *Sociology: A Text with Adapted Readings* (3rd ed.; New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 267-274.

riots occurred between 1913 and 1963, the precipitant was a confrontation between Negroes and whites in which members of one race were "wronged" in fact or in rumor by members of the other. In most cases, the alleged offense was committed by Negroes and the violence was initiated by whites.

Riot cities did not differ appreciably from other cities of similar size and location in percentage of recent increase in Negro population, white unemployment, Negro unemployment, or quality of Negro housing. On the other hand, the riot cities when compared with the non-riot cities showed a smaller Negro-white occupational difference, a smaller Negro-white income difference, a smaller number of Negro store owners per 1,000 Negro population, lower white incomes, and fewer Negro policemen per 1,000 Negro population.⁹

These findings suggest that riots of the period tended to occur where Negroes were a more definite competitive threat to whites, where whites felt more economically deprived, where few merchants in Negro neighborhoods were Negro, where few policemen were Negro, and where the means of dealing with grievances of both Negroes and whites were less adequate. Some of these apparent underlying conditions of riots may be conducive to riots initiated by one race but not by the other. For instance, a small economic advantage of whites over Negroes may predispose whites to act violently against Negroes, but a large white advantage may have the opposite effect.

In spite of these findings, the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of riots may be determined largely by chance factors. The predisposing conditions for riots are probably now present in all large American cities, and riots are likely whenever a sufficient precipitant happens to occur.

White attacks on "uppity" Negroes continue, especially in the South, but the mass violence of the mid-1960s was not directly initiated by whites. The

initial incident in most cases, as in the Los Angeles riot of 1965 (see pp. 231-232), usually involved the police and individual Negroes. Such incidents were less typical of earlier riots. Beyond the precipitating event, Negroes usually have taken the initiative in recent riots, and whites have participated chiefly as law-enforcement officials, National Guardsmen, and troops. The great majority of victims as well as rioters have been Negroes, and the violence has been concentrated in the ghetto. White attacks on Negroes outside the ghetto have been rare.

Interpretations It has been suggested that in the Watts-type riot the rioters ". . . were asserting a claim to territoriality, an unorganized and rather inchoate attempt to gain control over their community, their 'turf.'"¹⁰ This thesis is supported by (1) a low gunfire casualty rate of police despite the large volume of sniper fire and (2) apparent selectivity in the stores chosen for looting and arson. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of rounds were fired by snipers, who shot out many street lights and auto headlights. It is thought they could have taken a far heavier toll of police. Their failure to do so supports the idea that the primary intent of the rioters may have been to intimidate and drive off the police and firemen. The second observation may be correct for Watts and some other places. Negro store owners operated on the hope that they would be given immunity and it seems their hopes were in part realized. But some riots in other places were not so discriminating, and apparently both Negro- and white-owned stores and homes were destroyed in the Detroit riot of 1967.

Another hypothesis holds that recent race riots are a "cry for help,"¹¹ an effort to get "Whitey" to listen. The composition of the active rioters and the interpretation of the riot by Watts residents may support this line of reasoning. (See Adaptation 21, esp. page 235.) If this hypothesis is supported, the riots

⁹ Stanley Lieberson and Arnold R. Silverman, "The Precipitants and Underlying Conditions of Race Riots," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (December, 1965), 887-898.

¹⁰ Robert Blauner, "Watts and the Riots of 1966: Colonialism in Our Midst," in *Ghettos, Riots and the Negro Protest* (Houston: University of Houston, 1966), pp. 16-27; quotation at p. 16.

¹¹ The President's Commission, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

may be regarded as a phase of the civil rights movement.

RUMOR

A rumor is an unconfirmed, but not necessarily false, communication usually transmitted by word of mouth in a situation of anxiety or stress. Rumors spring up in unstructured situations when information is needed but reliable channels do not exist.¹²

Because they are so readily influenced by emotions, rumors tend to be rapidly disseminated and to distort or falsify the facts. A rumor may begin as an inaccurate or distorted report because of the narrowing of perception in an emotionally charged situation. It may become progressively more distorted, because all oral communication is subject to distortion. Even when emotional elements are lacking, factual reports tend to become shorter and simpler as they are passed on, with distortion of details in accordance with personal and cultural predispositions or "sets."¹³

Truth or falsity of rumor is irrelevant: a story is told and believed not because it is demonstrably true, but because it serves a need for the teller and for the listener who becomes a teller. Sometimes the need is to achieve status in the listener's opinion, and the story will be distorted in ways that will please him. The aim is not to convey information but to

induce in the listener the same emotional attitude toward the alleged information that the teller has.

Rumor both contributes to and is a product of emotional contagion.

1. Rumors make for an atmosphere of tension and crisis. By means of rumors, feelings are conveyed from one person to another and from one locale to another. In the 1919 Chicago race riot rumor spread the riot beyond its originally isolated area and created a general air of tension and excitement. Anger and fear-provoking rumors exaggerate hostile intent and tend to justify emotional and behavioral excesses.

2. Emotional contagion narrows the field of consciousness and diminishes critical ability. In times of distress, perception, which is always selective, is rendered even more so. People are apt to accept anything they hear and to revise it in accordance with their momentarily overpowering needs. Moreover they tend to misinterpret what they themselves observe.

In times of crisis and emergency, though information is of supreme importance, it is often unavailable. In a disaster like a flood or an invasion, official sources of information often disintegrate; in periods of social tension, they are often distrusted and lose their aura of authority. In such situations rumor rushes in to take the place of more secure knowledge.

¹² Tamotsu Shibutani, *Improvvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), p. 17.

¹³ Gordon W. Allport, *The Psychology of Rumor* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1947).

Adaptation 21 / RACE RIOT: LOS ANGELES, 1965

The Watts riot in the late summer of 1965 lasted six days, from August 11 to 17. During the worst days from Thursday through Saturday, as many as 10,000 Negroes took to the streets. They beat up white passersby whom they pulled from their cars, overturned and

SOURCE: Based on "Violence in the City—An End or a Beginning?" (The McCone Report) by the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots, 1965; Robert Conot, *Rivers of Blood, Years of Darkness* (New York: Bantam, 1967); Jerry Cohen and William S. Murphy, *Burn, Baby, Burn!* (New York: Avon Books, 1966); The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact—An Assessment* (Washington, D.C., 1967) Chap. 9; and press and periodical reports.

burned cars, looted stores, set buildings afire, stoned and shot at firemen, and exchanged shots with law-enforcement officers. A total of 3,927 people were arrested. The disorder spread through an area of 46.5 square miles and was ultimately controlled only with the aid of military authority and a curfew.

Thirty Negroes were killed and four whites, including a fireman and two law-enforcement officers. Of 1,032 reported injuries, 90 were Los Angeles police officers, 136 firemen, 10 National Guardsmen, 23 persons from other governmental agencies—almost all whites; and 773 civilians—the great majority of whom were Negroes.

Property loss is estimated at over \$40 million. More than 700 buildings were damaged by burning and looting. Of this number, more than 200 were totally destroyed by fire. The rioters concentrated primarily on food markets, pawn shops, liquor, furniture, clothing, and department stores. Service stations and automobile dealers were for the most part unharmed. No residences were deliberately burned, and damage to schools, libraries, churches, and public buildings was minimal.

The setting The South Los Angeles area, the scene of the 1965 riot, contains the largest concentration of Negroes in the city. It includes Watts for which the riot was named. In November, 1965, three months after the riot a special 10 percent sample census survey was conducted, and the report of the survey permits comparisons with the findings of the 1960 census.¹⁴ Interpretations should be made cautiously because part of the observed changes between 1960 and 1965, but certainly not all, may be consequences of the riot.

The South Los Angeles area roughly corresponds with the curfew zone established during the riot. The total population of 321,000 in 1965 had declined from 355,000 enumerated in the 1960 census, but the Negro population had increased from 248,000 to 260,000, or from 70 to 81 percent. At the same time whites with Spanish surnames (largely of Mexican ancestry) had declined from 43,000 to 32,000 and other whites

from 56,000 to only 24,000. In other words, South Los Angeles is a large, highly homogeneous segregated area—in current vocabulary, a ghetto. Its segregation is compounded by the lack of an efficient public transportation system so that citizens who need access to governmental offices or clinical facilities must use slow and costly buses. The area is not a ghetto in the sense of a slum made up of old tenements with a high density per acre and per room and with most dwelling units in dilapidated condition. However, about five percent of Negro-occupied dwelling units were classified as dilapidated, not suitable for habitation, and 26 percent as deteriorating. The statistics show a decline in the quality of housing compared with 1960, but despite that fact property values and median rentals had increased from \$69 to \$78 per month. Of the 260,000 Negro residents about 80,000, or 31 percent—the same percentage as in 1960—were living below the poverty

line, which is defined as expenditure of a third or more of income on food. Approximately 24 percent of the total population received public assistance. The median annual income of families was \$4,669, hardly changed from the 1959 figures.

Only 16 percent of male workers held white-collar jobs and 11 percent of the male labor force was unemployed. In sum, the Negro population of South Los Angeles lived in a predominantly Negro environment under poor and sometimes severely depressed conditions, highly isolated from the dominant population. Those who had the means to move elsewhere found it difficult or impossible to do so.

Initial episode (Wednesday)

The first incident was the arrest of a Negro youth for drunk driving on the complaint of another Negro. A white motorcycle officer made the arrest under rather ordinary circumstances in a predomi-

¹⁴ See "Characteristics of the South and East Los Angeles Areas: November 1965," *Current Population Reports* P-23, No. 18, June 28, 1966.

nantly Negro neighborhood near Watts on a hot evening, August the 11th. What began as a routine arrest with 25 to 50 curious spectators escalated as the youth's mother and brother became involved and the youth became physically resistant, eliciting forceful action by the several officers who were called for assistance. The hostility of the youth's family and the bystanders' belligerence, re-

sistance to arrest, and use of force by the police drew a crowd of 1,000 persons within half an hour. Before the officers withdrew, five arrests were made: the driver, his brother, his mother, a young Negro woman for spitting on an officer, and a young Negro man for inciting the crowd to violence. As the last police car left, it was stoned by the now irate mob.

The crowd did not disperse but

ranged in small groups within a few blocks of the arrest scene. Until midnight they stoned automobiles, pulled white motorists out of their cars and beat them, and menaced a police command post that had been set up in the area. Although the outbreak seemed to be under control by 1:00 A.M., there were sporadic reports of unruly mobs, vandalism, and rock-throwing until nearly daylight.



San Francisco, 1964: Long-harbored resentment is openly expressed as rioters carry an injured comrade.

Atmosphere of trouble (Thursday)

The next morning there was an uneasy calm, and a strong expectancy of further trouble kept the atmosphere tense. A meeting called by the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission at the request of county officials failed to lower tension. The meeting was held in the early afternoon twelve blocks from the scene of the first arrests, with every available representative of neighborhood groups, Negro leaders, elected officials and members of law-enforcement agencies, as well as about 100 unexpected teen-agers, and representatives of press, radio, and television with cameras focused on the microphone.

The meeting began with discussions of how to restore law and order. Even the mother arrested the night before asked the crowd to "help me and others calm this situation down so that we will not have a riot tonight." But the tone and conduct of the meeting shifted to a discussion of grievances, especially about police conduct. A Negro high school boy grabbed the microphone and shouted: "It's like this, the way the policemen treat you round here . . . It ain't going to be lovely tonight whether you like it or not! (Shouts of disap-

proval.) I was down on Avalon last night and we the Negro people have got completely fed up! They going out to Inglewood and everywhere else the white man supposed to stay. They going to do the white man in tonight!"

Catcalls and jeers from the audience drowned him out, and he was dragged away from the microphone. Other youths began to pummel him, and only the intercession of adults saved him from a beating. A youth leader returned to the microphone, declaring that the boy did not represent the consensus and that the majority of people wanted only a fair hearing. A group led by a woman Negro police sergeant pleaded with TV cameramen not to show the boy who had made the threatening speech. It was pointed out that there might be an unfortunate reaction if his isolated opinion were broadcast. The television newsmen were noncommittal. "Everybody has it. We can't say we won't use it, and then have some other station put it on the air." The inflammatory language was broadcast to television sets throughout the nation, and the boy's utterance was seldom balanced by less emotional statements made at the meeting. Some reports indicate that, during the riot, crowd behavior was deliberately manipulated for newsmaking purposes. Cameramen encouraged youths to throw stones so they could be photographed as "stars."¹⁵

Community proposals After the main meeting, a smaller group of leaders and representatives of youth gangs met to decide upon a

course of action. Early in the evening, they proposed to the police: (1) Withdraw uniformed officers from the troubled neighborhood and allow selected community leaders to undertake the responsibility for law and order. (2) If police found the first proposal unacceptable, substitute for white officers Negro officers in civilian clothes and unmarked cars. Both proposals were rejected, and the meeting at the 77th Street Police Station generated ill-feeling on both sides. Using only Negro officers was contrary to the LAPD policy of deploying Negro officers throughout the city and not concentrating them in the Negro area.

There were only about 200 Negroes on the force, a number far below parity, and they were scattered throughout the city, with only seven in the 77th. Police officials asserted that it would be too difficult to assemble the necessary number of Negro officers. They rejected the proposals as untested methods of handling a rapidly deteriorating situation. The police set up a perimeter to contain the trouble and to keep all others out.

About 5:00 P.M. on Thursday Police Chief Parker alerted Adjutant General Hill of the California Guard. A Guard Colonel was sent to Los Angeles as a liaison officer, and the 40th Armored Division in Southern California was alerted. In the absence of Governor Brown, Lieutenant Governor Anderson was informed of the situation.

Late in the afternoon inflammatory handbills were distributed, and around 7:00 P.M. crowds at the scene of the previous night's trouble had grown to more than

1,000. Firemen who came into the area to fight fires in three overturned automobiles were shot at and bombarded with rocks. The first fire in a commercial establishment was set only one block away, and police had to hold back rioters as firemen fought the blaze. Shortly before midnight, rock-throwing and looting crowds for the first time ranged outside the perimeter.

Lull (Friday) By 4:00 A.M. the police department felt that the situation was at least for the moment under control. At 5:00 officers were withdrawn from emergency perimeter control. Before 7:00 the intelligence officer on duty reported to the Lieutenant Governor that "the situation is rather well in hand," and the Lieutenant Governor left the city for a meeting.

Official indecision Around 8:00 A.M. crowds formed again and looting resumed. About 9:00 Mayor Yorty and Chief of Police Parker agreed by telephone to call out the Guard, but the Mayor then left the city to keep a speaking engagement in San Francisco. The Mayor told the McCone Commission: "By about 10:00 or so, I have to decide whether I am going to disappoint that audience in San Francisco and maybe make my city look rather ridiculous if the rioting doesn't start again, and the mayor has disappointed that crowd." The Mayor returned to Los Angeles at 3:35 P.M.

By late morning ambulance drivers and firemen were refusing to go into the riot area without

¹⁵ Conot, *op. cit.*, pp. 43 and 51.

armed escort. About the same time, Chief of Police Parker thought he would need approximately 1,000 men and formally requested the Governor's executive secretary in Sacramento to send the National Guard. The Lieutenant Governor received the request at 11:00 A.M. in Berkeley but did not act on it until 5:00 P.M. in Los Angeles, although in the meantime he was in consultation with Guard officers who agreed to assemble 2,000 men at the armories by 5:00 P.M., which was said to be the earliest feasible hour.

Approximately 850 Guardsmen were available, outfitted with weapons in Long Beach (12 miles from the riot) enroute to summer camp. The McCone report criticizes the Lieutenant Governor's delay: "... He hesitated when he should have acted. . . . Further escalation of the riots might have been averted if these Guardsmen had been deployed on station throughout the riot area by early or mid-afternoon Friday."

Meanwhile, Governor Brown was reached by telephone in Athens and briefed on the situation. He said he felt the Guard should be called immediately, that the possibility of a curfew should be explored, and that he would return to California as fast as possible.

Early Friday afternoon, rioters drove off firemen by sniper fire and by throwing missiles. By late afternoon, gang activity had spread as far as sixty blocks to the north.

Although assembled in armories as early as 6:00 P.M., the Guard was not deployed until shortly after 10:00 P.M.

The first death occurred between 6:00 and 7:00 P.M. Friday

when a Negro bystander, trapped between police and rioters, was shot and killed.

Peak of the riot On Friday night burning and looting were widespread, and the riot was out of control. At 1:00 A.M. Saturday, 100 engine companies were fighting fires—all of which were arson. Snipers shot at firemen. A fireman was killed on the fire line by a falling wall, and a deputy sheriff was killed when another sheriff's shotgun discharged in a struggle with rioters.

The law-enforcement officials tried a different tactic. Police made sweeps on foot, moving en masse along streets to control activity and enable firemen to fight fires. By midnight Friday another 1,000 National Guard troops were marching shoulder to shoulder clearing the streets. By 3:00 A.M. Saturday 3,356 Guardsmen were on the streets. Throughout the morning hours of Saturday and during the long day, the crowds of looters and arsonists spread out and increased until an 8:00 P.M. curfew was imposed on Saturday.

Beginning of control (Saturday) Again using sweep tactics, the Guardsmen and police were able to clear a major riot area by Saturday afternoon. Guardsmen rode "shotgun" on the fire engines and stopped the sniping and rock-throwing at firemen. Saturday evening, road blocks were set up in anticipation of the curfew.

When the curfew began at 8:00 P.M., police and Guardsmen were able to deal with the riot area as a whole. Compared with the holocaust of Friday evening, the streets were relatively quiet, with the only

major exception the burning of a block of stores. Snipers again prevented firemen from entering the area, and while buildings burned there was a gun battle between law-enforcement officers, the Guard, and the snipers. By midnight Saturday 13,900 Guardsmen were committed.

During the day Sunday the curfew area was relatively quiet. Because many markets had been destroyed, food distribution was started by churches, community groups, and government agencies. Governor Brown, who had returned Saturday night, personally toured the area and talked to residents. Major fires were under control but there were new fires and some rekindling of old ones. On Tuesday Governor Brown was able to lift the curfew.

Summary 1. Watts is an isolated, predominantly Negro ghetto but not a uniformly high-density slum.

2. The Negro population includes many low-income families and has a high unemployment rate.

3. The precipitating incident was a routine encounter with the police, of a sort that occurs many times every day throughout the country.

4. Officials were slow to take decisive action in calling out the National Guard and in declaring a curfew.

5. The mass media gave preferential exposure to the more intemperate behavior and in some cases stimulated such behavior to make a "good" picture. After the riot was under way, the saturated coverage by the media may have contributed to sustaining a high level of tension.

6. The loss of life and the number of gunshot injuries were low considering the amount of gunfire and the heavy property damage. Of 1,032 reported injuries, 118 were gunshot wounds.

7. No evidence has been reported that the riot was planned, but criminal elements and extremists used the riot after it began.

Conclusions 1. *Community initiative failed.* Tentative efforts to extemporize cooperative action were rebuffed by the police. The abortive effort to establish a dialogue confirmed poor relations between police and the community. Community organization and leadership were weak, and civil rights leaders were unable to establish effective communication with the rioters.

2. *Rumor dissemination* was facilitated by hot weather, which kept people out of doors, and by ecological segregation and cultural homogeneity. Inflated and distorted rumors about the first arrests spread quickly. For example, the young woman arrested was wearing a barber's smock, and the false rumor circulated that she was pregnant and had been abused by police.

3. The police were *distant from the community and perceived as abrasive.* The Los Angeles Police Department is regarded as efficient and incorrupt. It is a small force for the large area and population it serves, and it depends on advanced technology for crime control and detection. It is highly motorized and mobile. The department has integrated slowly and with reluctance. In 1965 only about 200 of 5,000 officers were Negro. Little attention is given to community relations. Police officials had little interest in communicating with civilians. The Department encounters the citizenry in the line of duty, but otherwise hardly at all.

The subordinate populations, both Negroes and Mexicans, had frequently complained of the harsh and abrasive attitudes of the police. Of 586 Negroes interviewed by UCLA researchers after the riot, 90 percent thought the police were insulting and used unnecessary force in the area and about 50 percent claimed to have seen such police behavior. Nearly 30 percent said they had been insulted by police and more than 5 percent said the police had used unnecessary force on them.¹⁶

4. There was *wide participation.* The Watts riot was a general outbreak in which all kinds of people took part—not just agitators, adolescents, criminals, new arrivals, the unemployed, or “riff-raff.” Of the 3,927 people arrested, most were Negroes, but only 556 were legally juveniles (under eighteen), while 2,111 were over twenty-five; 602 were over forty. They were not predominantly people with serious criminal histories. The riot was participated in by those who had a stake in the community as well as those who did not. For example, 10 percent of those convicted of various offenses were home owners.

More than half the Negroes interviewed by the UCLA survey thought the riot had “a purpose.” Expressions of “hostility, resentment and revenge” and “gaining attention” were the most commonly mentioned purposes. In the words of the Task Force report: “The implication is evident that many Negroes believe that if only the white community realized what the ghetto was like and how its residents felt, the ghetto would not be permitted to exist.”¹⁷

¹⁶ Reported by the President's Commission, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

¹⁷ The President's Commission, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

SECTION 3 PUBLIC OPINION AND PROPAGANDA

In emotional contagion, individuals are united by temporary psychological bonds, and the influence of the immediate situation is strong. However, emo-

tional contagion is not the only source of temporary and shifting unities. Some groups arise out of shared belief and common interest.

PUBLICS

A public consists of people who (1) regard themselves as affected by an event or activity, (2) can in some way register that concern, and (3) are taken into account. This is a general term that may apply to magazine subscribers, stockholders, voters, and many other groups or categories. *Political publics* develop when there is an issue, that is, a disagreement over what ought to be done, such as whether or not to support a program of medical care. Politics occurs when the public is split into factions and rival groups pursue divergent interests.

A public may be scattered. It need not have a definite membership nor a formal organization of roles. Since a public consists of those concerned with the consequences of an event, the composition of the public changes as the situation changes and the same event comes to be seen in a different light. New people become interested; others lose interest and turn elsewhere; there may be a realignment within the public. When government support of medical care is labeled "socialized medicine," some shy away from discussions; others may join a health plan at their place of work and lose interest in the general issue. Publics are temporary collectivities of varying size and composition that can be identified only by their common concern with an event or issue.

If an issue recurs, a political public may become more stable. Within each area of interest, a core of people is formed who follow developments closely and whose support can be expected. On an issue like medical care, business groups can be expected to take one side, labor unions the other side, and veterans' groups split.

The existence of relatively stable publics implies a continuity of interest in a succession of related issues. Such publics can sometimes be identified by the books, newspapers, and magazines they read. By participating in common communication channels, they tend to define situations alike. Consequently, they consistently take the same sides on a variety of issues. Such publics, however, are only

partially organized, and their composition continually changes. They may provide the *social base* out of which organized groups grow and on which such groups depend. (See ASSOCIATIONS, p. 217.)

VALUES, ATTITUDES, AND OPINIONS

Personal integrity is highly prized in American culture. A man should be secure in what is most intimately his, such as his body, his ideas, and his family. This *value* affects a wide range of thought and behavior, in part by generating *attitudes*. (See CULTURE, p. 54.) For example, valuing personal integrity may dispose one to react negatively to the use of informers (who violate personal confidences), wiretapping, and the forcible pumping of a man's stomach to secure evidence against him. "An individual's attitude toward something is his predisposition to perform, perceive, think, and feel in relation to it."¹⁸ Attitudes are in turn reflected in *opinions*, which are specific judgments on particular issues. The sequence from value to attitude to opinion moves from the general to the specific, from a broad mental set or disposition to a narrower one and finally to a specific and concrete expression of it.

Opinions are *situational*, and therefore do not reflect values directly. An opinion may run counter to a mental set because of pressures in the immediate situation. An opinion is often the complex resultant of many attitudes. For example, attitudes derived from the value of personal integrity may call for rejection of wiretapping. But a belief that the community is in danger may bring other attitudes into play. The resultant opinion may accept wiretapping, perhaps with some reservations. When opinions reflect situational pressures, they may be held weakly, as in the case of legislators who respond to group threats or to shifting climates of opinion. (See Adaptation 22, p. 247.)

GROUP BASIS OF PUBLIC OPINION

Public opinion is relatively unstable and fluctuates with changes in the immediate situation even in matters of grave consequence. As a country becomes

¹⁸ Theodore Newcomb, *Social Psychology* (New York: Dryden, 1950), p. 118.




FIG. VIII:1 Popularity of President Johnson during Viet Nam War and President Truman during Korean War

Percent giving "Approve" answers to the question, "Do you approve or disapprove of the way _____ is handling his job as President?"

SOURCE: Gallup Political Index, 18 (November-December, 1966) and Gallup Opinion Index, various dates.

more exposed to rapid technological change and to pressures from the rest of the world, it is increasingly difficult to make statements beginning, "The people will never stand for . . ." Even matters on which near-consensus has been reached may become issues again in the swift movement of events. There is a large degree of unpredictability in the ebb and flow of public opinion, because the judgments are specific. The more general a judgment—for example, "The English people are our natural allies"—the more likely it is to endure. But opinions on specific policies and events—such as, "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Johnson is handling his job as President?"—tend to reflect immediate pressures.

The extent of popular approval for President Johnson and for President Truman is shown in Fig. VIII:1. Between January, 1965, and August, 1967, Johnson's "popularity" ranged from 71 percent approval to 39 percent approval, responding to transitory events as well as major trends. In a similar interval during 1950-1953, Truman's popularity was on the average far lower than Johnson's, falling below 30 percent for long periods, but it too fluctuated widely.

The level of popularity in the various sectors of the population is not a good measure of the likelihood that an officeholder would be reelected because all discontents are focused on an incumbent, dimin-

EVALUATING PERCENTAGES

How shall an analyst appraise the implication of a finding that 82 percent of a national sample believe that radio stations are doing an "excellent" or "good" job? Does this represent *overwhelming* public satisfaction? Shall the analyst note that *as many as* 18 percent were not satisfied, or shall he stress that *only* 18 percent did not show satisfaction? The extremes of zero *vs.* universal satisfaction are perhaps easy to evaluate, but here the analyst faces an intermediate figure that could be appraised in a variety of ways.

On attitudes toward advertising on the radio, about one-third of the public was found to be opposed to radio commercials. Does this represent serious criticism of the current pattern of American radio, or is this to be expected and regarded as innocuous from the point of view of change in the institution? The public was also queried on radio's degree of impartiality in handling controversial issues. Eighty-one percent regarded radio stations as being fair to both sides in general. Is this high praise of the radio industry, or should the fact be stressed that *as many as* 19 percent did not explicitly express the view that radio was fair?

In all these instances, the analyst can report the bare facts. Or he can use such neutral terms as "a majority," "a minority," and the like. But this is after all not the point of a descriptive survey. Such facts must be evaluated to be of some use, and they are bound to be capricious in the absence of norms for deciding whether such findings are large or small, frequent or rare.

Findings, apparently clear in their implications, can be misinterpreted in the absence of

a standard of comparison. In a survey by the National Opinion Research Center, 37 percent of a national sample indicated that they had a favorable feeling toward the English government. Should the analyst regard this finding as indicative of serious hostility to England? While 37 percent is not a very high figure in absolute magnitude, when attitudes toward England were compared with attitudes toward other countries, 37 percent represented an unusually favorable attitude on the part of the American public. Only toward Canada did a larger proportion of the public indicate a favorable feeling.

To safeguard interpretations, the analyst usually sets norms by collecting data on parallel phenomena from the same individuals. A similar juxtaposition of parallel phenomena provided norms for the previously mentioned 82 percent of the sample who were well satisfied with radio. Parallel questions on satisfaction with the churches, newspapers, schools, and local government did not yield a figure as high as the 82 percent for radio. Radio is therefore seen to stand in *unusual* public favor.

These examples illustrate one problem in the use of norms and a method for treating it. It is obvious that there can be considerable arbitrariness in choosing the parallel phenomena to be compared. For example, one might pick only institutions toward which there is great public dissatisfaction and thereby present a misleading picture of relative satisfaction with radio. The analyst must therefore pick a series of parallel phenomena ranging over the whole probable spectrum.

ishing his general popularity. The attrition of popularity of an incumbent during his tenure in office is commonly observed. In an election, however, the public estimates the candidate against a real opponent. Consequently a fairly "unpopular" incumbent might win an election.

Despite its instability, public opinion develops within a *social setting*. The more the setting is understood, the less arbitrary and unpredictable shifts in opinion appear. Though opinion emerges from day-to-day interaction, people have social backgrounds and group affiliations: they are not separate atoms moving about randomly.³⁰

1. *Social background*. An individual's social background affects the way he responds to events and consequently the opinions he forms. Although each population segment varies from one time to another in its attitudes toward an incumbent, the pattern of response shows that the following have tended consistently to be more favorable to President Johnson: men, manual workers, Democrats, Catholics, Easterners, and large-city people. Republicans, women, Protestants, Southerners, and rural people have been less favorable.

Because the categories listed are overlapping, it is necessary to break down each variable to make a precise interpretation. For instance, Catholics are heavily concentrated in urban areas. As we have seen, Catholics and big cities are favorable to Johnson. But is the preference a general large-city phenomenon or merely the consequence of a large Catholic population? To answer this question, big-city non-Catholics and big-city Catholics would have to be tabulated separately. It would then be possible to tell how much of the large-city approval is due to heavy urban representation of Catholics and how much is a large-city phenomenon without respect to religion. The statistical problem of which this is an example is called the "confounding effect."

2. *Reference groups*. Differences in social background affect perspectives and therefore opinions,

because they make people sensitive to different things, provide experiences that give them feelings of weakness or strength, make them more or less verbal, more or less tradition-centered, and more or less prone to join organized groups. In addition, people tend to see themselves and the world through the framework provided by the groups in which they participate. However, a person's "reference group" (that group whose perspectives he assumes) is not always derived from his occupational role or economic position. For example, many low-income people identify with and accept the standards of middle-class life. In modern society, with wide-open communication channels, people may assume the perspectives of groups they *aspire* to be in as well as (or in place of) those to which they actually belong. Furthermore, an individual may have many reference groups, affecting his opinions on specific subjects.

Reference groups³⁰ should be distinguished from social categories, e.g., people in the same income level, and from membership groups like trade unions. Social categories and membership groups often *become* reference groups. In studying opinion it is important to know to what extent social categories and membership groups have been transformed into reference groups. It is also necessary to know which of the many reference groups actually influence the individual on a given issue.

3. *Strong and weak groups*. Although many groups influence public sentiment, they are not equally effective. There are wide variations in group prestige, size, resources, and in the significance they have for the individual. To the extent that people think of themselves as "middle class," regardless of income, this reference group plays a significant role in the formation of opinion. Although middle-class values and attitudes are widely held, organization among white-collar workers and consumers is relatively weak. On many specific issues, therefore, well-organized labor and business groups have greater weight. Special legislation, on tariffs and labor, for

³⁰ See Herbert Blumer, "Public Opinion and Public Opinion Polling," *American Sociological Review*, 13 (October, 1948), 542-549.

³⁰ See Tamotsu Shibutani, *Society and Personality* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961), pp. 257-260.

example, reflects the views of these organized groups. Even strongly held opinions may not influence decisions unless they are expressed through organizations. On most subjects no popular vote is taken, and differences in organization and resources determine the final outcome.

Multiple membership accounts in part for the relatively unstable and shifting character of public opinion. The individual is constantly pulled in different directions by his various memberships and roles. Group strength is not to be judged by mere size. One interest group of 50,000 members may have little influence. Another of the same size may include a core of devoted workers who effectively mobilize the opinions of less committed members.

4. *Active and passive groups.* Those most concerned with controversial issues join or form interest groups. Others make up a large spectator-like body, interested enough to follow developments but not sufficiently concerned to participate directly. The passive elements are not necessarily without importance. As an audience whose reactions must be taken into account, they are arbiters in the struggle among interest groups. The pursuit of interests is limited not only by law and custom but also by the other members of the public whose approval is required. Interest groups try to show that their interests are tied to the general welfare, and active groups bid for the support of spectators who judge whether private and public interests are truly related. Therefore, trade unions, business associations, and professional organizations, like the American Medical Association, devote much effort to public relations.

In summary, knowledge of the group structure of society is indispensable to a proper understanding of public opinion. Opinions are affected by social experience; and the interaction of groups, varying in strength and activity, determines the weight and direction of public sentiment.

ASCERTAINING OPINION

In a free society people "vote" in many ways. They speak out at home and among their friends and associates, write letters to newspapers and legislators, join or quit organizations, and go to the polls. Because

opinion is expressed in many ways, there must be a number of different research methods. One approach is to study the organizational context of opinion and to examine the rise and decline of organizations, for example, the organizational basis of prohibition sentiment. (See Adaptation 22, pp. 246-250.) Another approach is to find out what the most active people (the "opinion leaders") in a community think. Another is to assess opinion in influential business, professional, and government circles. Finally, there is the problem of determining what the public believes, how people are likely to vote, and what their votes mean.

The prediction of election returns has been justly considered an important achievement of modern social science. The polls have helped to demonstrate that the behavior of large populations can be studied through the sophisticated use of sampling techniques. In Adaptation 23, page 253, Likert shows how a small nationwide sample can accurately reflect certain characteristics of the population as a whole.

Election polls are designed to predict a single, highly complex event. This is an exacting task, for it requires not merely one prediction but a whole chain of subordinate ones. The polls must be able to analyze the "Don't know" or undecided responses and predict how they will divide on election day. The pollsters must predict how many people will vote, and from what groups in society they will come, because many who state their preferences when asked do not take the trouble to vote. When the 1948 election polls were analyzed by a committee of the Social Science Research Council, it was shown that inadequate handling of the "Don't know" responses and the nonvoters probably led to the failure to predict President Truman's election.

By 1956 a number of improvements in polling techniques, referred to in Adaptation 23, were well established, and the errors in recent elections were within narrow limits. As can be seen in Table VIII:1, the surveys for 1956, 1960, and 1968 were quite close to the election results. The 1944 prediction was also very close, but the average error from 1936 to 1952 was over 4 percent and consistently underestimated the winner's vote.

TABLE VIII:1 GALLUP POLL ACCURACY IN NINE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, IN PERCENTAGES

YEAR	WINNER	FINAL SURVEY ^a	ELECTION RESULT	ERROR
1936	Roosevelt	55.7	62.5	-6.8
1940	Roosevelt	52.0	55.0	-3.0
1944	Roosevelt	51.5	53.3 ^b	-1.8
1948	Truman ^c	44.5	49.9 ^d	-5.4
1952	Eisenhower	51.0	55.4	-4.4
1956	Eisenhower	59.5	57.8	1.7
1960	Kennedy	51.0	50.1	0.9
1964	Johnson	64.0	61.3	2.7
1968	Nixon	43.0	43.5 ^d	-0.5

SOURCE: Based on Gallup Opinion Index, 42 (December, 1968).

^a Released to the press on the Sunday before Tuesday election.

^b Civilian vote only.

^c Dewey election predicted.

^d Winner with less than 50 percent of popular vote.

The election poll, however accurate, has all the limitations of the election itself as a way of ascertaining public opinion:

1. *Intensity.* A person who expresses his preference to an interviewer may or may not take his vote seriously; he may be very unhappy or quite undisturbed if his candidate loses. The strength of his opinion affects the chances that he will actually cast his ballot.

2. *Meaning.* A vote may mean quite different things to different people. Was the election merely a popularity contest? Did the voters mean to give the new administration a mandate on specific issues? Which issues were central and which peripheral? These questions remain unanswered, and there is room for interpretation after the election is over, especially when the results are very close, as they were in the Kennedy-Nixon contest of 1960.

3. *Action.* As a result of variation in intensity and meaning, it is difficult to say whether an expressed preference will lead to any action. This applies most immediately to whether a man votes at all, but beyond that it is important to know whether voting

leads to other forms of political action. The bare expression of preference does not tell.

Modern and sophisticated public opinion surveys that go beyond the simple expressions of preference attempt to overcome these limitations. Intensity can be gauged by avoiding simple yes-no answers and providing graded alternatives from which to choose. People may be asked directly whether they "strongly approve," "approve," "don't care," etc., or a more elaborate and carefully worked out series of alternatives may be presented. The problem of meaning can be handled by offering a series of increasingly specific questions on the same topic. Each succeeding question requires a more precise answer about what the words mean and what the implications of the point of view are. Superficial responses can be filtered out in this way, as shown in Table VIII:2.

TABLE VIII:2 FILTERING CONVENTIONAL RESPONSES

	Yes	97%
	No	1
	Don't know	2
<i>If "yes": Do you believe in it to the extent of allowing Fascists and Communists to hold meetings and express their views in this community?</i>	Yes	23%
	No	72
	No opinion	5

SOURCE: *From Gauging Public Opinion* by Hadley Cantril (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 22. The questions were asked by the American Institute of Public Opinion in November, 1940.

As it becomes more sophisticated, public opinion analysis places less emphasis on specific predictions and more on understanding of underlying trends. It is more important to know whether the coalition of social groups that contributed to a party's majority is basically intact than to predict a specific election. An election may result in part from accidental circumstances, whereas a trend may be related to more enduring changes in population composition, such as the assimilation of ethnic minorities, the improvement of the economic condition of some groups, or the development of new values.

PROPAGANDA

Propaganda may be defined as the calculated dissemination of partisan ideas with the intent of influencing group attitudes and opinions. It is a form of special pleading in which truth may be, and often is, subordinated to effectiveness. Some regard propaganda as morally neutral, justified or not according to the ends it serves. Others feel it is inherently manipulative and tends to corrupt the free formation of considered judgments, whether in choosing a toothpaste or a foreign policy. This debate turns largely on a matter of degree. Most propaganda operates within limits, foregoing the bare-faced lie and the more strident emotional appeals.

In an older and more restricted usage, "propaganda" is the dissemination of a systematic doctrine, such as Catholicism. The Communists hold to this usage, distinguishing "propaganda" from "agitation." The former refers to intensive work among small groups, with emphasis on communicating fundamental ideas, e.g., Marxist economic and political theories. Agitation is the spreading of a few ideas, usually with a heavy emotional content, to a great many people. In its restricted sense "propaganda" is closer to "indoctrination" and does not have many of the characteristics associated with the use of mass communications. Here "propaganda" is used in the more general sense, without distinguishing it from agitation.

Propaganda usually refers to writings, speeches, and other symbolic behavior. In addition the term "propaganda of the deed" is used to refer to the dramatic actions of nineteenth-century anarchists who attempted to win attention to purported evils by assassinations or other acts of violence. However, in recent history there are many examples of government action taken with a view to influencing attitudes. The Russian lead in constructing the Aswan Dam in Egypt was part of a propaganda effort comparable to U.S. activities in the field of foreign aid. Both are efforts to win the "hearts and minds of the people." Any act or event can have a symbolic meaning, communicating the intentions as well as the strength or weakness of the actor.

The nature and effectiveness of propaganda depend on objectives and on the characteristics of the target population. If the aim is to sell a particular brand of cigarettes, attention-getting techniques may suffice. But if the aim is to win support for a political belief or economic doctrine, the methods must be adapted to the experiences of the listener, and this usually requires a highly selective approach to various types of audiences. This discussion considers some characteristics of propaganda aims, methods, and targets.

Aims As a mass-communications activity, propaganda tends to have short-run, situationally-defined aims with an appeal to a diverse population on the basis of immediate interests, fears, or desires. The propaganda of advertisers, interest groups, and political parties is largely of this kind. The objective is not so much to influence the individual deeply as to win his support for some immediate issue, candidate, or product. The more short-run and superficial the aims, the easier it is to use propaganda tricks and gadgets. Long-run aims, which attempt to change basic attitudes, are more difficult to achieve.

Some propaganda, though ostensibly directed outward, is really a way of bolstering group morale. Political meetings usually bring together people already committed to the organization or candidate. They are "pep rallies" designed to stimulate confidence and increase involvement, though they may also be effective propaganda as demonstrations of strength.

Methods In the study of propaganda most attention has been given to techniques and relatively little to aims or targets. See "The Tricks of the Trade," page 244. A number of characteristic propaganda methods have been identified:

1. *Gaining attention.* Many varied techniques have been used, from luminous paint to the "big lie." The effectiveness of attention-getting techniques depends on the nature of the medium used as well as the disposition of the audience. Charges against an individual often receive wide publicity in the press, whereas answers to these charges seem inherently less interesting and are given less prominent display. An

emphasis on negative attitudes, as in the early twentieth-century anti-saloon propaganda (see *Adaptation*, 22, p. 249), is often successful in winning attention and support because it is easier to get agreement on the existence of an evil than on some particular solution.

2. *Associating a partisan cause with existing values, attitudes, and symbols.* The propagandist, pleading for a special interest, tries to identify himself with a wider community. He tries to transfer to himself symbols that are known to elicit favorable responses. Smear tactics or guilt by association are the obverse of the same mechanism, transferring to an opponent the negative feelings attached to some despised symbol. *Glittering generalities* are emotionally loaded symbols that associate a cause directly to a general value. It is also very common to employ prestigious figures, sometimes merely to grace a letterhead, as a way of legitimizing propaganda. (This is not necessarily to be deplored, because if the members of a public know the views of prestige figures, and prestige figures are actually involved, the device can help to identify the appeal and its source.)

In modern history the struggle for valued symbols has been a common feature of propaganda contests. Adolf Hitler took advantage of the fact that "socialist" was a high prestige word for many Europeans when he called his party the National Socialist German Labor Party.

3. *Concealing identity and aims.* The attempt to associate a cause with existing community sentiment is often jeopardized when the true aims and special interests of the sponsors are known. An evasive technique is the use of "front" organizations that have innocuous names and objectives but are controlled and manipulated by covert interests. The use of front organizations by extremists of various kinds has greatly increased the sophistication needed for effective political participation.

4. *Raising anxieties.* The critical ability of an audience may be impaired by techniques that induce anxiety and fear. This is widely practiced in advertising that makes people anxious about health, love, and status. In political propaganda *hidden enemies* are commonly emphasized.

5. *Showing strength.* Propagandists are sensitive to the reluctance of people to support a weak cause, and much effort is expended in putting on displays of strength. Sometimes this consists in propagating an ideology that history is necessarily moving in a particular direction and that the cause represents this "wave of the future." Parades, meetings, strikes, and similar demonstrations are also effective, but the turnout must in fact be impressive, lest the effort boomerang. Effective organizational work is necessary to supplement the propaganda and to sustain its effects.

Targets An understanding of the characteristics of the target and the psychological factors that influence susceptibility are essential to devising effective propaganda.

1. *Social composition and organization.* Propaganda must be adapted to the backgrounds and experiences of the audience. A knowledge of the social composition of a population can identify its *prior dispositions* to accept or reject propaganda emphases. For example, immigrant groups often retain sentiments of loyalty to their country of origin, and suburban populations are especially conscious of social status. Such interests and aspirations affect the success of propaganda themes and methods.

The way a population is *organized* determines the acceptable channels of communication. Where local leaders or special-purpose organizations are powerful, propaganda that bypasses these channels may go unheeded. Some groups are more accessible to appeals based on self-interest; others respond to ideological propaganda. This is not a matter of accident but a product of the special backgrounds and experiences of various elements in the population.

A community is made up of many different audiences, each of which responds in its own way to appeals. For example, propaganda directed at the *elites* (the most influential or self-conscious groups in a community), requires a more sophisticated and more pointed approach than propaganda aimed at a wider audience. An example of elite-oriented propaganda is the attempt to reach potentially disaffected Communists behind the "iron curtain," a project that must

THE TRICKS OF THE TRADE

Some of the devices now so subtly and effectively used by good and bad propagandists are as old as language. All have been used in one form or another by all of us in our daily dealings with each other. Propagandists have seized upon these methods we ordinarily use to convince each other, have analyzed and refined them, and have experimented with them until these homely devices of folk origin have been developed into tremendously powerful weapons for the swaying of popular opinions and actions.

The chief devices used in popular argument and by professional propagandists—together with our symbols for them—are:



Name calling—giving an idea a bad label—is used to make us reject and condemn the idea without examining the evidence.




Glittering generality—associating something with a “virtue word”—is used to make us accept and approve the thing without examining the evidence.



Transfer carries the authority, sanction, and prestige of something respected and revered over to something else in order to make the latter acceptable; or it carries authority, sanction, and disapproval to cause us to reject and disapprove something the propagandist would have us reject and disapprove.



Testimonial consists in having some respected or hated person say that a given idea or program or person is good or bad.



Plain folks is the method by which a speaker attempts to convince his audience that he and his ideas are good because they are “of the people,” the “plain folks.”



Card stacking involves the selection and use of facts or falsehoods, illustrations or distractions, and logical or illogical statements in order to give the best or the worst possible case for an idea, program, person, or product.



Band wagon has as its theme “Everybody—at least all of *us*—is doing it”; with it, the propagandist attempts to convince us that all members of a group to which we belong are accepting his program and that we *must therefore* follow our crowd and “jump on the band wagon.”

Once we know that a speaker or writer is using one of these propaganda devices in an attempt to convince us of an idea, we can separate the device from the idea and see what the idea amounts to on its own merits.

SOURCE: Abridged from Institute for Propaganda Analysis, *The Fine Art of Propaganda* by Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth Briant Lee (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1939). Reprinted by permission.

be based on a high degree of knowledge of the history and problems of Communism and Socialism.

2. *Susceptibility.* Some psychological mechanisms are known to affect vulnerability or resistance to propaganda. In ambiguous situations, people look for cues. They are more suggestible to ideas and rumors than they would be if the situation were clearly defined. Hence, propagandists play an important role during times of unrest. In general, whenever propaganda meets some *felt need* in the population, if only the relief of anxiety, it is likely to get a hearing. On the other hand, people *evade* propaganda by filtering out what they want to hear and rejecting the rest.

Although propaganda is significant in unstructured situations, it is not the only way opinion is influenced. In transmitting ways of looking at the world and one's self, socialization makes some ideas congenial and others alien. Furthermore, most opinions are acquired in the course of group participation rather than in response to mass communications.

Fears and prospects When several publics exist, and each has the opportunity to weigh conflicting views according to the criterion of self-interest, the multigroup character of society is preserved. Because of heterogeneity and self-interest, the conditions that make for emotional contagion are minimized. (See above, p. 223.) However, modern mass communication tends to make many millions available to similar and simultaneous influences. The danger that emotional contagion, based upon common fears of war or subversion, will lead to excessive and irresponsible reactions has been referred to as the degeneration of publics into crowds. Lederer²¹ said that the "mass-state," built upon the eradication of groups, replaces reason by propaganda, and enslaves man by delivering him to his emotions. In such a society, public opinion is not the result of the slowly working interplay of interests and ideas, but is the crowdlike response of an amorphous population.

A similar view has been expressed by Neumann:

Mob psychology, when it seizes a whole nation, destroys the web of its complex structure. Like the individual differentiation of its members, so the innumerable associations of the living community are melted into one gray mass. This process of "massification"—the dissolution of free organizations, the flattening of the social pyramid—in a way preceded the rise of modern dictators. They were the product of this disintegration of society which in turn became the basis of their established rule.²²

Views of this kind, which emphasize the extension of crowd behavior to many aspects of social life, have been common during the past century.²³ They are usually stated in exaggerated terms, but they probably point to an authentic underlying hazard.

A graphic depiction of an imaginary society dominated by the calculated manipulation of symbols is found in George Orwell's novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Orwell describes a society ruled by Big Brother and his Ministry of Truth. The Ministry systematically rewrites history and has for its slogans WAR IS PEACE, FREEDOM IS SLAVERY, IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH. The machinery of propaganda and intimidation is highly developed, including an official language, Newspeak, much of whose vocabulary is deliberately constructed for political purposes. (See "Newspeak and Expressive Symbolism," p. 53.) Orwell's account is a projection of some of the features of the totalitarian societies of Nazi Germany and Stalin's Russia.

Some of the anxiety about the future of public opinion is based on the *strong pressures toward conformity* in the mass communications industries. Since profit-making is the criterion of successful operation, the tendency is to try to please as many people as possible and to avoid antagonizing highly vocal groups. The industries are fearful of divergent views and tastes, and sensitive or controversial issues are likely to be avoided. The forums that should be available to differing opinion if the public is to be well informed

²¹ Emil Lederer, *The State of the Masses* (New York: Norton, 1940).

²² Sigmund Neumann, *Permanent Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1942), p. 115.

²³ See especially Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd* (London: Unwin, 1917); and E. A. Ross, *Social Psychology* (New York: Macmillan, 1908).

may be closed. It is also feared that a dead level of uniformity in taste, stirring no antagonisms yet rising to no new heights, may stultify the arts. No doubt these fears have some justification. On the other

hand, new technological developments may change the situation drastically, making many more channels of communication available to experimental and educational activities.

Adaptation 22 / Odegard THE ANTI-SALOON LEAGUE

In 1920 the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was ratified, prohibiting "the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors." Passage of the Eighteenth Amendment can largely be attributed to the national Anti-Saloon League, formed in 1895. This organization transformed the existing temperance movement from a moral appeal directed at individuals into a political power, with its strength based on Protestant churches.²⁴ The following account describes the nature and strategy of the Anti-Saloon League. Some implications for understanding public opinion and propaganda are noted in the concluding summary and interpretation.

The social base of prohibitionist opinion Although in theory the Anti-Saloon League was a nonsectarian organization, in fact it was almost entirely an instrument of the Protestant churches, principally the Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian, and Congregational denominations. Prohibitionist sentiment was strong among these groups, and the Anti-Saloon League was organized to give them effective political organization. In theory it was open to anyone; in practice it was controlled by the Protestant churches from whom it drew both its leadership and its principal membership support. The churches opened their pulpits to Anti-Saloon League speakers and

provided the League with an extraordinary access to church membership. According to one account, pastors in more than two thousand churches in Illinois discussed a pending temperance measure on a single Sunday.

During the prohibitionist heyday, Protestant church members were predominantly rural and native born. Even in the cities, Protestant churches were composed largely of people born in rural areas. Where Protestants were in the majority, as in the South, prohibitionist sentiment was strong: nine of the Southern states adopted prohibition prior to 1916. Connecticut and Rhode Island never ratified the Eighteenth Amendment;

Catholics made up 67 percent and 76 percent, respectively, of the total church population in these states.

The Anti-Saloon League did not have to create prohibitionist sentiment; the sentiment already existed in the rural native-born Protestant areas. Nor did it have to organize prohibitionist sentiment; it was already organized in the Protestant churches. But with singular success, the League mobilized the organized sentiment and directed it toward a political purpose, the passage of prohibitionist legislation.

Moral sentiment into political action The Anti-Saloon League, formed as a national organization

SOURCE: Abridged and adapted from Peter H. Odegard, *Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928). Published in this form by permission of Peter H. Odegard and Columbia University Press.

²⁴ See Joseph Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963).

in 1895, was, as its name suggests, a league of already established temperance organizations. Behind it lay almost a century of temperance agitation and largely unsuccessful efforts to pass prohibition legislation. One local organization, however, the Oberlin Temperance Alliance, had secured the passage of such legislation in Ohio. In 1887 the Oberlin Temperance Alliance circulated petitions demanding the passage of a state-wide Township Option Bill, by which individual municipalities might vote to outlaw the sale of liquor. The bill was put through the House and went to the Senate where, according to a preliminary poll, it had a majority of one. Two days before the vote was to be taken, Senator Crook of Dayton, one of the bill's supporters, announced that after having been visited by three committees of Dayton brewers, distillers, and saloonkeepers, he had been persuaded to vote against the measure.

Senator Crook's frankness was his own undoing. The prohibitionists reasoned that if he could be influenced by pressure from the liquor interests, he could be encouraged to return to the straight and narrow by greater pressure from the other side. That afternoon, the Rev. H. H. Russell, employed by the Alliance to push the bill, went to Dayton. Soon letters, telegrams, and petitions from citizens of that city poured in upon the recalcitrant Crook demanding that he support local option. The Senator did vote for it, and the measure was passed by a majority of one.

Senator Crook and his three committees of brewers, distillers, and saloonkeepers provided the Anti-Saloon League with a lesson in politics. Thereafter the temper-

ance movement diverted its efforts from appealing to conscience to applying pressure, especially on legislators.

Single-purpose politics With the Ohio experience as a model, the national Anti-Saloon League organized itself into a legislative pressure group. It set itself up as a single-purpose organization, concentrating solely on the passage of prohibition legislation. Some prohibitionists had earlier formed themselves into a Prohibition party, arguing that the existing parties would not and could not institute prohibition. But it had never won significant electoral support, and in 1896 it split on the silver and gold issue, each side putting its own presidential candidate into the field. The Anti-Saloon League avoided all side issues upon which disagreement and factional splits could occur, and which might alienate potential supporters. Advocates of silver or of gold, of free trade or of a high tariff could all join in the Anti-Saloon League's drive for prohibition legislation without compromising their other loyalties.

Instead of entering politics as another party, the League worked through the Republican and Democratic parties, supporting whatever dry candidates were nominated. It did not care what else a candidate stood for, so long as he stood for prohibition. It frequently supported both Republicans and Democrats in the same election, provided both candidates were dry. Nor did the Anti-Saloon League insist that a candidate be a personal abstainer. The League's theory was that it is better to have a drunkard who will "vote right,

than to have a saint who will vote wrong."

The League's objective was to hold the balance of power. With virtual control of a large block of voters, the League frequently forced the major parties to nominate candidates friendly to its interests, since the dry vote often spelled the difference between victory and defeat.

Having decided on a satisfactory candidate, the League did all it could to see that he was elected. Women and children were urged to gather near the polls to act as reminders of the evil of the saloon. They often paraded before polling places wearing badges: "Vote Against Whiskey and For Me," or "Vote Against the Saloon—I Can't Vote." The 19th Amendment to the Constitution, guaranteeing the right of women to vote, was not ratified until 1920. The following report in the *New York World* of May 13, 1919, describes a North Carolina election scene:

When a voter came within range he was immediately surrounded by . . . ministers . . . women and children. The clergymen employed words of advice and confined their activities to the proprieties. But the women and children were less tactful. They clutched at the coats of the voter. They importuned him to vote the dry ticket. A phrase constantly employed was "Mister, for God's sake don't vote for whiskey," repeated with parrot-like accuracy that results from thorough coaching. . . . A few of the wets ran the gauntlet of the women and children . . . but the greater majority of the voters viewed the conflict from afar and returned to their offices and homes. The dries won the day.

The League provided funds and personnel for more routine campaign activities, often employing

organizers to canvass voters in their homes. In 1906 in New York it promised aid in his current campaign to any state assembly member who had voted dry and was being opposed on that account. Thirty-six dry members requested such assistance, and all were re-elected.

When prohibition legislation was pending, the Anti-Saloon League employed many kinds of

direct action techniques designed to impress recalcitrant legislators with the size and strength of dry opinion. As in the campaign of the Oberlin Temperance Alliance, local League organizations saw to it that legislators received letters and telegrams from dry voters. Petitions were also effective. When national prohibition was up for debate in the House of Representatives in 1913, long slips of paper

listing the names of over six million petitioners hung from the balconies filled with prohibition supporters. One Congressman suggested that the House move out of Washington to avoid pressure from the dries. That same year Congress had been petitioned to submit prohibition to the states by a parade of four thousand men and women, many of them grown gray and infirm in the long campaign, wearing the white ribbon of temperance and marching to the strains of "Onward, Christian Soldiers."

The threat of defeat for wets and the promise of victory for dries was, however, the principal political weapon of the Anti-Saloon League. In 1917, just before the House passed the resolution to submit prohibition to the states, the *Washington Times* asserted, "If the ballot on the constitutional amendment were a secret ballot, making it impossible for the Anti-Saloon League bosses to punish disobedience, the Amendment would not pass." The newspaper implied that national prohibition was about to be passed not out of conviction but out of fear of political reprisal. The League's electoral effectiveness depended on two things: (1) its control of the rural vote and (2) the dependence at that time of both the state and national legislatures on rural areas. If the rural vote had not been very nearly a solid block firmly committed on the dry issue, the League's promise to deliver votes would have been far less effective than it actually was. If the legislatures had been as dependent on the cities as they were on the rural areas, the League's hold over the rural voters would have been a less potent political weapon.



The Recruiting Sergeant for the Army of Crime: This cartoon, depicting the saloon as a natural center for vice and crime, was widely used in Anti-Saloon League publications.

Influencing the legislators

When the Anti-Saloon League turned its energies from reforming the individual to pressing for the passage of prohibition, it sought to exert its influence where the rural population had its political power. This was in the state legislatures, which tend to overrepresent rural and small town areas wherever representation is based on geographical area rather than population. In the United States Senate a sparsely settled rural state like North Dakota has as many senators as a densely populated state like New York. In addition, the movement toward the cities tends to weight legislative bodies toward rural overrepresentation, since reapportionment lags behind actual population changes. In 1917, when the League put on its strongest drive for national prohibition, one of its leaders pointed out, "We have got to win it now because when 1920 comes and reapportionment is here, forty new Congressmen will come from the great wet centers with their rapidly increasing population."

In most cases the Anti-Saloon League opposed submitting the prohibition issue to direct popular vote, trusting rather to its influence in the state legislatures. In the debate on national prohibition it was proposed that ratification be by state conventions elected by popular vote for that purpose. To this the League spokesmen objected and insisted that the more usual procedure of ratification by state legislatures be followed. They ar-

gued that since state conventions would be chosen by the same electorate that had chosen the state legislatures, the proposal to submit ratification to a more direct vote was merely a delaying tactic. Although the League had pressed for a seven-year ratification period in case ratification in some states would prove difficult, three-fourths of the states ratified within fourteen months. The speed with which the amendment was ratified surprised the wets as well as the dries. "The grip held by the Anti-Saloon League over the state legislatures was never better illustrated than in the manner in which these bodies obeyed the command to ratify. In vain were suggestions made that the lawmaking bodies were without instructions from the people on this most important question. In vain were efforts made to have the sentiment of the electorate tested by referendum voting."²⁶

Propaganda strategy National prohibition was first written into the law as an aspect of food conservation during the first World War. A bill was passed under the pressure of the dries prohibiting the manufacture of foodstuffs into distilled spirits, and giving the President authority to extend the restriction to beer and wine. The war gave considerable impetus to dry propaganda, prohibition being presented as part of the war effort. Nor did the League hesitate to play upon anti-German attitudes prevalent at the time. "German brewers in this country have rendered thou-

sands of men inefficient and are thus crippling the Republic in its war on Prussian militarism. . . ."²⁶

The League directed its propaganda not so much for prohibition as *against* the saloon and its evils. This was an effective device because even drinkers who balked at the idea of absolute prohibition were willing to admit that the American saloon had become a noisome thing. The United States Brewers' Association itself had recognized the need for reform. Reform, however, would not satisfy the League, and it pictured the saloon as hopeless beyond redemption.

"The saloon is the storm center of crime; the devil's headquarters on earth; the schoolmaster of a broken decalogue; the defiler of youth; the enemy of the home; the foe of peace; the deceiver of nations; the beast of sensuality; the past master of intrigue; the vagabond of poverty; the social vulture; the rendezvous of demagogues; the enlisting office of sin; the serpent of Eden; a ponderous second edition of hell, revised, enlarged and illuminated."²⁷

The anti-saloon propaganda of the League tried to induce a favorable attitude toward prohibition by attaching it to an already existing attitude, a negative attitude toward the saloon. It used the same strategy when it attached its fight for local option to democratic values. Local option, by which any political unit—county, city, town, or even ward—could vote to ban the saloon, was presented as an exten-

²⁶ *Year Book of the United States Brewers' Association*, 1919, p. 18.

²⁶ *American Issue*, Ohio Edition, August 3, 1917. *American Issue* was the national organ of the Anti-Saloon League, also published in state editions.

²⁷ *American Issue*, Kentucky Edition, April, 1912.

sion of self-government and home rule. Many people who personally disliked prohibition felt obliged to support the drive for local option as consonant with democracy.

Woodrow Wilson, then Governor of New Jersey and no partisan of prohibition, wrote, "I am in favor of local option. I am a thorough believer in local self-government

and believe that every self-governing community which constitutes a social unit should have the right to control the matter of the regulation or the withholding of licenses."²⁸

Conclusion 1. Public opinion is usually ineffective unless it is transformed into political power. The Anti-Saloon League was distinguished from its predecessors by its use of prohibitionist opinion as an electoral weapon. It developed the political skill to defeat wets and elect dries. It concentrated its efforts on state legislatures, where prohibitionist votes were influential because of overrepresentation of the rural population.

2. Public opinion has a social base. Prohibitionist sentiment was not a matter of random individual opinion but was concentrated in native-white, rural, Protestant areas. It never gained significant following in large cities nor among immigrants and non-Protestants. The effectiveness of public opinion in determining governmental policy depends in large measure upon the social and political resources of its social base. The passage of prohibition legislation reflected the political and social importance of the rural population, especially in the state legislatures. The repeal of prohibition can be attributed in part to the growing dominance both of the political power of the city dweller and of the values and attitudes of urban life.

3. Ordinarily only a minority feels strongly about any issue, and propaganda to influence others and gain allies is important in making public opinion effective. Such propaganda does not usually set out to create entirely new sentiments but to focus, strengthen, and extend old opinions. If the saloon had not become a reprehensible institution and if temperance sentiments had not already been present in large sections of the American people, the Anti-Saloon League would probably not have succeeded in its drive for legislation. But given temperance attitudes and the repugnance which many people felt toward the saloon, it was easy to transform these feelings into attitudes favorable to prohibition legislation.

4. A consensus may be temporary and unstable.

a. The social base may melt away. The conditions under which the rural population lives are quite different from what they were in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, and the changes in these conditions have brought with them changes in attitudes and values.

b. The social base may lose its political dominance. The success of the prohibition movement came at the end of the period of rural political power. With a decline in political power, the rural population was less able to give to legislation the stamp of its own special attitudes and values.

c. Propaganda may gain allies and win a consensus on superficial or on unrealistic grounds. The adherence of many legislators to prohibitionist sentiments was not a matter of principle but of political expediency. Many people supported prohibition as a moral ideal but withdrew their support because criminals profited from prohibition and enforcement proved difficult and costly.

²⁸ *American Issue*, Vermont Edition, March, 1912.

Adaptation 23 / Likert PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

The following adaptation presents an assessment and critique of public opinion polls. Likert concludes that their failure to predict the 1948 Democratic presidential victory did not discredit public opinion polling but dramatized the need for improvements in techniques. As a result of the public and scientific criticism of the 1948 failure, the polling agencies were stimulated to self-criticism and to adopt more advanced methods.²⁹ The article on which this adaptation is based was influential in speeding the changes. [Comments in brackets have been added to indicate the situation of the 1960s.]

In 1948 Gallup forecast a 44.5 percent vote for President Truman, who actually received 50 percent of the vote and won the election. The failure of Gallup and other pollsters in predicting the outcome of the 1948 election has reinforced the skeptics of public opinion polling, who argue that the samples are too small or otherwise inadequate, that the problems are too complex to be dealt with in a few simple questions, and that the investigators are biased. How valid are these criticisms? How sound are the present polling techniques, and how reliable are their results? Is it possible to improve public opinion polling?

Polling methods The polling process divides conveniently into two major parts: (1) the population sample used; (2) the questionnaire, the method of interviewing, and the analysis of the replies. The accuracy of any poll obviously depends upon the accuracy of each of these parts.

Let us consider first the sample. In 1936 the now defunct *Literary Digest* magazine conducted a poll which forecast a Republican victory. Its conspicuous failure dramatized the fact that the design of a sample is as important as its size. Although the sample totaled more than two million persons, it erred by 20 percentage points because it was not representative of the total population. First, the poll was restricted to *Literary Digest* and telephone subscribers, that is, to those of a relatively high economic status. Second, it required that a mailed questionnaire be returned. This resulted in a further selection from an already highly-selected group; it selected out those who answer mailed questionnaires or who felt strongly enough in this case to go to the trouble to do so.

QUOTA SAMPLING

[The so-called "quota-controlled" method was the main sampling method used in public opinion

polls at the time of the 1948 election. It is a relatively cheap technique and is still used for some purposes.] Quota sampling depends for its accuracy on finding those variables that have a high correlation with the behavior being studied. Thus to design a sample for predicting an election, the pollsters use their knowledge of how voting correlates with party affiliation, age, economic status, and so on. They then attempt to find out how these variables are distributed in the whole population. For example, census data will tell them how many people in the total population are Negro, how many are women, how many live in cities, and how many earn above and below certain amounts. These characteristics may be related to how people vote, and the sample must contain its proportionate quota of Negroes, women, etc. When the social composition of the sample is determined, quotas are then assigned to interviewers, that is, the interviewer must poll a certain

SOURCE: Abridged and adapted from "Public Opinion Polls" by Rensis Likert, *Scientific American*, 179, No. 6 (December, 1948). Published in this form by permission of Rensis Likert and the *Scientific American*.

²⁹ Social Science Research Council, *Pre-election Polls of 1948* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1949).

number of persons in each age group, socioeconomic group, etc.

For maximum accuracy, however, a pollster would need to know all of the variables correlated with voting behavior, such as previous voting behavior, education, income, occupation, religion, party affiliation of the voter's father, mother, and close friends, and so forth. He would also need precise information on the distribution of all these variables in the population. Unfortunately for public opinion polling, these two conditions almost never exist. In the first place, many of the variables that affect voting or other behavior are unknown. In the second place, no data are available on the distribution in the population of most of the variables that are known.

In spite of these difficulties, pollsters using the quota method have usually been able to make surprisingly accurate predictions. The methods generally employed are, briefly, as follows. Quotas are set, usually on the basis of geographical region, size of community, age, sex and socioeconomic level. In some parts of the country, race also is included. In making election predictions, the results that these quota samples yield are generally tested by asking respondents how they voted in the previous presidential election and checking the percentages obtained with the actual election figures. Any discrepancy that exists is eliminated by weighting the results. For example, in a poll taken in Maine in 1944, 38 percent of the persons interviewed said they planned to vote for Franklin D. Roosevelt. An analysis of the respondents showed that the sample contained an underrepresentation of persons who

had voted for Roosevelt in 1940. When a ratio correction was applied, a weighted estimate of 48 percent for Roosevelt in Maine in 1944 was obtained.

Errors in the samples A major source of bias in quota samples is the fact that interviewers, in a perfectly human fashion, endeavor to fill their quotas in the easiest manner possible. They go to places where people are readily available and seek any who will fill the age, sex, and socioeconomic specifications of their quotas. They tend, therefore, to secure a sample which is biased in that it includes more people who are easily contacted than a truly representative sample should include.

An analysis of samples obtained with the quota-controlled method shows that this method tends to obtain data with biases which at times may be serious. For example, quota samples tend to include too few respondents from high income families, too few from the lowest income groups, too many with at least high school education, and too few with only a grade school education or less.

The basic weakness of the quota-controlled method is that it does not employ a random sample. A general human failing among interviewers—or errors in the fixing of quotas—may produce a sample which is systematically biased in the same direction. In other words, when deliberate human choice enters into the final selection of respondents, the usual laws of probability governing the sampling phenomenon do not apply; the errors or deviations may not balance one another as they tend to do in a purely random sam-

ple, but at times may become cumulative and produce a bias of large and unpredictable dimensions.

PROBABILITY SAMPLING

[By the 1960s most national polling agencies had turned to probability sampling.] The fundamental requirement of probability sampling is that the final determination of just which persons are to be polled must be left to chance. Because this procedure is in conformity with statistical laws, it is possible to calculate precisely the probability that the margin of error in any sample will not exceed a given amount.

A method based on these principles is known as the "area" sample. The basic principle of this method is that each person in the population is given an equal, or known, chance to come into the sample. This is done by associating each person with one, and only one, very small geographic area and then selecting a random sample of the small geographic areas into which the country is thus divided.

The first step is to make a purely random selection of counties and metropolitan areas. Then within each of these areas a subsample of small geographic segments is selected, again by random methods. The final sample may include all the dwellings in each selected segment, or every k th dwelling, depending on the size of sample desired. The selection of persons actually interviewed in each dwelling will then depend on the purpose of the survey; if its purpose is to predict an election, the sample will consist of all the eligible voters in the designated dwellings

or certain voters selected at random.

When this method is used, the interviewer has no choice whatever. He goes to the specified dwelling and interviews the specified person or persons. If a respondent is not at home he calls again and again until he gets the interview; if he finds it impossible to do so, he reports that fact to headquarters.

Results The representative character of the samples obtained by the area sampling method has been amply proved in practice. The Survey Research Center at Michigan has compared the composition of small nationwide samples (of only 500 to 3,500 persons) with the U.S. Census figures for the nation as a whole, and has found that samples obtained by the area sampling method reflect rather accurately the composition of the national population. In an analysis based upon an area sample of only 1,151 persons, the following results were obtained:

In the Survey Research Center sample, 91 percent of the persons interviewed were white; the census figure for the percentage of white persons in the whole population was 90.6.

In the sample 23 percent turned out to be in the age group 21 to 29; the census figure for the same group was 22.8 percent. In other age groups the correspondence was equally or almost equally close.

In the results on schooling, the proportion who had gone no farther than grade school was 44 percent in this survey and 46.1 percent in the census; those who had finished high school were 23 percent of the sample, 22.9 percent in the census; those who had finished college, 5 percent of the sample, 5 percent in the census.

The chief disadvantage of the area sample method is that it is more expensive. It costs more to design the sample and it costs much more for interviewers to take time to locate each respondent.

Turnout The prediction of elections involves a knotty problem which often is neglected. This is the "turnout problem"—predicting who will vote. To predict an election it is not sufficient to know what candidates are favored; it is necessary to know what candidates are favored by those persons who will actually go to the polls. This means that the pollster must know which voters are most likely to vote and which are most likely to stay home. Unfortunately, the pollsters have made few attempts to develop questions to measure the intensity of the determination to vote, and the results consequently have a large possible error.

After the 1948 election, Gallup is reported to have stated that his polls indicated a relatively small turnout, but that he did not mention this factor of uncertainty because his newspaper clients would have accused him of "hedging." As a rule, the larger the turnout the greater the Democratic vote, but this rule may not have applied. In any case, it appears likely that the "undecided" vote and the size and character of the turnout played a large part in the miscalculations of the pollsters. Had they obtained more data on these factors and analyzed them adequately, their predictions might have been less positive and less wrong.

INTERVIEWING

Questions The measurement of opinion on social, economic,

and international issues, and of public knowledge about these issues is more difficult, as a rule, than the prediction of elections. The problems in this field of polling are still so serious that opinion-poll results should be taken with even greater caution than predictions about elections.

Perhaps the greatest of these problems is that of meaning. Most of the issues of the day involve words and concepts that have different meanings for different people. On some issues large sections of the population may have no understanding of the major dimensions of the issue or the terms used. To understand the meaning of the percentages obtained in a poll, it is essential to know what respondents meant when they answered each question. Unfortunately, such data are not available. Yet polling results are often presented and discussed with the implicit assumption that each respondent understood the question and answered it from precisely the same point of view as that of the person conducting the poll.

An indication of the inadequacy of the usual polling questions can be obtained by asking a very small sample of respondents a question taken from any poll on a complex current problem and permitting these respondents to answer in their own words and to elaborate their answers. Several tests of polling questions have been made in this fashion. Quite consistently evidence has been obtained that questions on complex issues have different meanings for different people who are called upon to answer them.

Richard L. Crutchfield and Donald A. Gordon while at

Swarthmore College ran a test on the following Gallup Poll question which appeared in news releases of August 22, 1943:

"After the war, would you like to see many changes or reforms made in the United States, or would you rather have the country remain pretty much the way it was before the war?"

To test interpretations of this question, the investigators interviewed a cross-section sample of 114 New York City residents. After recording the respondent's initial reaction to the question, "the interviewer then encouraged the respondent to enlarge upon his answer in an informal conversational manner." The interviewers found that the initial response of their New York respondents gave substantially the same results as those obtained by Gallup for the country as a whole. But they also found that their respondents had seven different frames of reference in mind when answering the question. Some persons thought the question referred to "domestic changes or reforms"; others "technological changes"; others changes in the "basic political-economic structure of the U.S."; and still others thought it referred to changes in "foreign affairs of the U.S."

Respondents also had quite dif-

ferent meanings in mind when they answered "change" or "remain the same." For example, among those who answered in terms of "domestic changes and reforms" the word "change" for some persons meant shifts in a more liberal direction, such as "increases in social security," "higher pay levels," and "greater social equality for members of minority groups." Other persons meant a shift in the conservative direction, such as "change to a Republican administration," "less government control of business," and "more control of labor unions." Similarly, some of those who answered "remain the same" had in mind conservative aspects of our economy; others giving the same answer referred to liberal aspects, such as "maintaining high wages." It is obviously impossible to interpret percentages which combine into single totals answers which have such widely different meanings.

This study of what the respondents really meant by their answers substantially altered the interpretation of the poll. Thus, in their first answers, 49 percent of the New York City respondents said they wanted the country to "remain the same," and 46 percent voted for "changes or reforms." But further questioning of

those who were thinking in terms of domestic changes showed that 60 percent wanted "changes or reforms," and 40 percent favored "remain the same"—a direct reversal of the results with respect to this phase of the question. Most of those who thought the question meant technological change favored such change, while those who thought it referred to the basic political-economic structure of the U.S. did not want change.

The future of the polls The public opinion poll is only one area of application of a far more important instrument: the *sample interview survey*, one of the research tools of the social sciences. It is being used increasingly to study such widely different problems as the behavior of consumers, the distribution of income, principles of organization and management, religious behavior, the factors affecting political behavior, the production plans of farmers, and the processes of propaganda. Either alone or in combination with experimental methods, this tool enables the social sciences to deal with their problems quantitatively and on a large scale.

SECTION 4 SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND SOCIAL CHANGE

The fluid conditions of a rapidly changing society are conducive to collective behavior. Active protests sometimes leading to violence occur when rising

aspirations are not met by speedy and visible fulfillment. Religious sects emerge when established churches fail to respond to the needs of new life

situations. Swift alternations of war and peace bring widespread shifts in public opinion. Collective behavior *reflects* underlying changes, and in responding to them it *creates* new perspectives, new lines of action, and new institutions.

PERSPECTIVES AND DOCTRINES

A perspective is a complex pattern of attitudes, values, and perceptions that together make up an ordered view of the world. It includes what one sees as foreground and as background, a hierarchy of values, and specific conceptions about persons, groups, and oneself. People in similar situations tend to have *shared perspectives*: they see the world alike and have the same assessments of what is good, what is likely, and what is possible. When circumstances change, a period of uncertainty and exploratory behavior occurs until a new perspective or "definition of the situation" is adopted that seems to fit the world, as it is experienced by people in like circumstances.

In the study of social change, nothing is more fundamental than an understanding of altered perspectives. Every epoch has its distinctive evaluations of the role of the individual and the meaning of history. The nineteenth century was a period of great industrial expansion and self-confidence. Ideas that stressed the power of the individual and hailed change as progress were widely held. The twentieth century is typically an age of wars and revolutions, of pessimism and anxiety, and the idea of progress is questioned, although the development of vast resources and the expansion of productivity have raised hopes of a better life. These changes in perspective have, for better or worse, made possible and perhaps inevitable many of the movements and institutions that characterize the times, such as collectivism, bureaucratization, and increased state control.

Two types of perspectives are often associated with fundamental historical change.

1. *Perspectives affecting group identity.* Perhaps the most potent force in history is the sense of common belonging felt by many people. New perspectives may lead to the alteration of established group-

ings. Citizens may think of their national interests in terms of local or linguistic factions, or color or racial identities.

2. *Perspectives that initiate change.* In the perspectives of rulers and merchants, the geographical position of England in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries shifted from the perimeter to the center of the maritime world. The result was an epoch of trade and conquest that has only recently run its course. Religious and political ideas have also broadened perspectives and sent men out as missionaries, colonists, and warriors. Before the Pilgrims could come to New England, ordinary men had to transform their conceptions of what the world was like and what kinds of action made sense.

Perspectives of Negroes The increasing militancy of Negroes that has characterized the past decade supports the principle that protest is most likely to be expressed when there is hope and some sign of progress achieved. The absolute status of many Negroes has improved in some respects in the recent past, although it is by no means evident that their status relative to whites has improved.

Table VIII:3 shows the percentage of whites and Negroes who reported themselves satisfied on four topics in 1963-1965 and at the end of 1966. The

TABLE VIII:3 PERCENT REPORTING SATISFIED IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION:

"On the whole are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the work you do . . . etc.?"

	WHITES		NEGROES	
	1963-65	1966	1963-65	1966
Work	88	87	51	69
Children's education	73	76	43	64
Housing	76	77	36	51
Family income	68	67	34	45

SOURCE: Gallup Political Index, 18 (November-December, 1966), 14.

percent of whites reporting satisfaction was stable, but the percent of Negroes satisfied increased for each sphere of concern. Apparently more Negroes were satisfied with their lot in late 1966 than a short time earlier.³⁰ Despite that fact, the percent satisfied was far smaller than for whites, and the percent dissatisfied far larger than for whites on all topics. In 1966 Negroes reported themselves dissatisfied as follows: with work 18 percent, with children's education 23 percent, with housing 44 percent, with family income 49 percent.³¹ The more militant perspective of Negroes has much dissatisfaction—and realistically grounded dissatisfaction—to feed upon despite the improvement in their satisfaction index. (See SOCIAL STRATIFICATION, p. 163.)

Ideologies When self-conceptions and world views change, people grope uncertainly for some way of expressing their new understandings and hopes. The time is ripe for *ideologies*, doctrines that purport to formulate the distinctive perspectives of social groups.³² These ideologies profess to be "true" not only in upholding certain values but in giving a correct picture of what the world is really like. Some go far in attempting to provide detailed formulations of group perspectives. In an epoch of change, ideologies are active, proposing many different systems of belief for groups to adopt. Only a few ever gain wide acceptance because to be effective the beliefs must fit the shared perspectives of many people and must make sense in terms of their historical experience.

The twentieth century has seen a waning of individualism and a development of collectivist ideologies, doctrines that stress the importance of social

cohesion and planning. There are many variations and vital differences among these doctrines. Socialist and "welfare" states retain political freedom while Communism and Fascism have instituted unparalleled tyrannies. Despite these differences, collectivist ideologies are alike in calling for increased social control, a strong and active government, and more social responsibility, solidarity, and community. These ideologies have gained wide acceptance because they are in some way consistent with the understandings and aspirations of millions. It is probable that proposed alternatives to Communism and Fascism must likewise be consistent with underlying perspectives if they are not to fall on deaf ears.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

For the most part, social change occurs gradually and without design. However, new perspectives and aspirations often generate collective action to combat presumed evils and to institute new ways of life. Sometimes the action is sporadic and temporary, as in the case of isolated uprisings against oppressive conditions. Collective action is called a social movement when it is unified, lasting, and has the following main features:

1. *A distinctive perspective and ideology.* The women's suffrage movement arose out of redefined perspectives regarding the place of women, and these were formulated in a doctrine that was widely accepted. The ideology of a movement provides direction and self-justification; it offers weapons of attack and defense; and it holds out inspiration and hope.³³ Social movements place great emphasis on ideology, particularly when other sources of orientation and cohesion are lacking.

³⁰ For results from the Harris Poll, compare William Brink and Louis Harris, *Black and White* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), Chap. 2, esp. p. 27.

³¹ Gallup Political Index, 18 (November-December, 1966), 14.

³² "Ideology" is sometimes defined as a pattern of ideas that justifies and helps preserve a social system. This defensive and justifying function usually follows if a doctrine successfully formulates a group perspective. Even if an ideology includes reformist or revolutionary ideas, it is usually self-justifying from the standpoint of the group that accepts it. On the other hand, an ideology usually has other characteristics and consequences. For the more restricted view, see Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1936); and on the general topic of the "sociology of knowledge," see R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), Chap. XII.

³³ See Herbert Blumer, "Social Movements," in A. M. Lee (ed.), *New Outline of the Principles of Sociology* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1951), pp. 210-211.

2. *A strong sense of solidarity and idealism.* Membership in a "movement" typically means more to the individual than other affiliations. He is a "dedicated" man and feels part of an idealistic and active enterprise. Especially in the early stages, idealism plays a role in all movements, political or religious, "progressive" or "reactionary."

3. *An orientation toward action.* The very word "movement" suggests unconventional methods of appeal, such as street meetings and the sale of propaganda tracts. Small movements can sometimes gain wide attention by dramatic actions, particularly if they involve violence. The stress on action in part reflects the problem of maintaining interest and solidarity. There is a constant need to "give the members something to do" to keep them from slipping away to other interests and involvements.

A movement is usually made up of a *variety of forms and groupings*. For example, the prohibition movement included the Anti-Saloon League, the Prohibition party, the Women's Christian Temperance Union, and many church groups. The socialist movement in England has included a number of different political parties, trade unions, newspapers, and groups of intellectuals such as the Fabian Society. This tends to give a movement a somewhat amorphous character, because there is usually no official leadership for the movement as a whole, and there is often much discussion about what constitutes the boundaries of the movement.

Civil rights movement A diversity of organizations, ideologies, and strategies is exemplified by the civil rights movement. Each organization tends to adopt a distinctive mission and role and to some extent a distinctive appeal to its constituency.³⁴ The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) has concentrated on legal change and has succeeded in winning court cases vindicating Negro rights under the U.S. Constitution. The National Urban League has defined its mission as enlarging job opportunities, and its charac-

teristic method is negotiation with businesses and business associations. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), headed by Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) have organized direct action such as freedom rides, sit-ins, demonstrations, and marches. The Black Muslims, on the margin of the movement, have fostered self-improvement, Negro isolation, and the rejection of white society. As the movement has grown and passed through a series of crises, the several organizations have maintained a sometimes uneasy collaboration. To some extent the moderates depend on the radicals, whose "threats" to the white community give the moderates some leverage but also risk embarrassing the movement and alienating white support.

The goals and strategies of the civil rights movement have been strained between the polar orientations of isolation and integration. Integration with white society remains the dominant long-run goal, but many members and leaders of the movement regard "Black Power" as an essential short-run condition. As is true of many social movements, there is continuing tension between militant self-assertion and gradualism. The militants seek immediate political gain but make demands that can be fulfilled only over the long run. The gradualists strive for short-run piecemeal gains as the means to further strength and achievement. The outcome of this conflict over the "soul" of the movement depends on the experience and the changing perspectives of large numbers of Negroes who are not directly involved in civil rights organizations. Meanwhile elements in the activist wing, exemplified by the leadership of the SNCC, tend toward more radical strategies and appeals. Consequently it is clear there is an increasing possibility of a fundamental cleavage in the movement.

A social movement tends to follow a roughly discernible "career," from its origins in unrest to its end in institutionalization.

³⁴ See August Meier and Elliott M. Rudwick, *From Plantation to Ghetto* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1966), Chap. 7, and William Brink and Louis Harris, *Black and White* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967).

CHAPTER IX

POPULATION AND ECOLOGY

SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION

The study of population is an important source of knowledge about society. "A population" is the total number of human beings in a society or community. They may be counted and classified by age, sex, occupation, or any other useful criterion. Such data are then analyzed to measure major social trends and to explore the underlying causes and significance of population facts, such as a declining birth rate, a preponderance of males, or a dearth of individuals in their productive years.

The technical study of human populations (*demography*, from the Greek *demos* meaning "people") largely depends on the collection of statistics either from official records like birth, death, and marriage registrations or from periodic censuses. As records and censuses become more rigorous and detailed, demographers are able to take into account a larger number of population characteristics and to examine more fully the interrelations of the various factors.

Since much knowledge about population must be interpreted by reference to sociological or economic

factors, demography is closely related to sociology and economics; most courses on population in universities are given in sociology departments. The field of public health also makes use of demographic data and contributes to population analysis.

The techniques of population analysis and ecology are essential adjuncts to sociological research, especially to the study of large-scale social phenomena and major trends related to size, composition, concentration, and shifts of population. Knowledge of population composition and distribution is necessary in designing samples for social surveys and in determining how far the findings from such surveys can be generalized to the whole population.

An understanding of population phenomena offers clues to underlying forces in the society that would be difficult or impossible to perceive by compiling opinions of people or studying their life histories. For example, one of the most serious problems confronting man is the pressure of uncontrolled growth being experienced by most of the world except Western Europe and North America. The populations of

Thomas Malthus (1766–1834)

Modern work in population began with Thomas Malthus,¹ whose *“Essay on the Principle of Population, etc.”* was first published in 1798. Malthus posed the problem of the unchecked growth of human population versus the slower growth of the means of subsistence. He held that population tends to increase up to the limit of the food supply, thus preventing any considerable rise in the standard of living.

In later editions of his work, he brought together empirical data and developed the idea of positive checks that keep population growth from approaching a geometric ratio. The positive checks are: (1) hunger, (2) disease, (3) war, and (4) vice. He also recognized preventive checks which might depress the birth rate: (1) deferred marriage and (2) celibacy. He regarded the use of contraception as a “vice,” which permitted men to escape the consequences of intercourse.



developing countries are increasing with great rapidity and will continue to grow for some time. The consequent pressure on resources, on the means of production, and on land use will have profound effects on the organization of their societies and on relations among nations.

The problem of population pressure is not, however, a matter of arithmetic on one hand and of birth control technology on the other. As will be seen on pages 283–285, the future population of the world will be determined by such distinctively social considerations as the following: the willingness of people to reevaluate deeply engrained attitudes toward family size, toward preferred age at marriage, and toward interfering with biological processes.

Social or human ecology is closely related to population analysis. Population increase can be viewed as a problem in ecology in that it involves a change in the relation between mankind and natural resources and increasing competition for limited land.

The numerous blanks and question marks about the populations of many underdeveloped countries

impede their progress and planning and impair the comparative analysis of international trends. No modern state can develop wise, long-term plans for the training and effective use of its human resources without the sort of knowledge compiled by sophisticated census taking. The most important single source of information on population is the census, periodically conducted in many countries. Adaptation 24 (pp. 261 ff.) briefly reviews the history and operations of the United States Census, which has become a continuing, year-round activity as well as a population count conducted each decade.

The addition of the new states of Alaska and Hawaii creates some minor reporting problems to which the reader should be alert. Many earlier statistical series are for continental United States except Alaska. Although the populations of Alaska and Hawaii combined make up less than half of one percent of the national total, they include 30 percent of all nonwhites other than Negroes. Precision dictates that a distinction be made between the 50 states taken as a whole and the continental states, excluding

¹ See D. V. Glass (ed.), *Introduction to Malthus* (London: Watts and Company, 1953).

Alaska. When the latter is intended, the term *conterminous* is used in Census reports and in this book. Otherwise, the designation "United States" refers to the country as it existed at the time indicated in the discussion. The same caution applies in comparing any time series during which there was change in the geographic areas being covered.

Section 2 of this chapter discusses some of the main characteristics of population and some of the elementary techniques used to present and interpret data about population composition.

Section 3 discusses the measures of fertility and

mortality, trends in birth and death rates, a comparison of differences in these rates in various parts of the world, and the prospects for longevity.

Section 4 reviews in broad perspective the sweeping changes in population growth in the Western world as well as in less developed areas, and summarizes information about migration.

Section 5 introduces human or social ecology, the study of the relation of populations to their environment, both animate and inanimate, and to each other. Such relations are frequently expressed in terms of spatial distribution.

SOURCES AND READINGS

See pages 292–293 for readings in ecology.

See page 265 for the chief guides for using United States Census information and other official sources.

Texts

Paul H. Landis and Paul K. Hatt, *Population Problems* (2nd ed.; New York: American Book, 1954).

William Petersen, *Population* (New York: Macmillan, 1961).

Ralph Thomlinson, *Population Dynamics* (New York: Random House, 1965).

Warren S. Thompson and David T. Lewis, *Population Problems* (5th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).

Dennis H. Wrong, *Population* (Rev. ed.; New York: Random House, 1962).

Symposia and reference works

Donald J. Bogue, *The Population of the United States* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959).

Kingsley Davis (ed.), "A Crowding Hemisphere: Population Change in the Americas," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 316 (March, 1958).

Ronald Freedman (ed.), *Population: The Vital Revolution* (Garden City, N.Y.: [Anchor] Doubleday, 1964).

D. V. Glass and D. C. Eversley, *Population in History* (London: Arnold, 1965).

Paul K. Hatt (ed.), *World Population and Future Resources* (New York: American Book, 1952).

Philip M. Hauser and Otis Dudley Duncan (eds.), *The Study of Population* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959).

Joseph J. Spengler and Otis Dudley Duncan (eds.), *Population Theory and Policy* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956).

Periodicals

Demography, published by the Population Association of America.

Population Index (formerly *Population Literature*), a periodical chiefly devoted to an annotated bibliography.

The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly

Statistical Bulletin, issued monthly by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.

Demographic Yearbook of the United Nations continues the *International Statistical Yearbook* published under the auspices of the League of Nations from 1927–1945. The U.N. has also assumed publication of the *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, formerly put out by the League.

Adaptation 24 / THE UNITED STATES CENSUS

Background The United States was the first modern nation to make a legal provision for regular census taking. A census is called for in the apportionment clause, Article I, Section 2, of the *Constitution*, which reads in part as follows:

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years. . . .

The scope of the First Census in 1790, although limited to population, was somewhat greater than that required by the *Constitution*. The name of the head of each family was recorded and the total number of persons in the family, classified as free or slave. Free persons were further classified as white or other, free whites as male or female, and free white males as over or under sixteen years of age. (See Table IX:1 Growth of the Decennial Census.) Slaves were "other Persons" in the *Constitution*, and 60 percent of their number counted in the apportionment.

The First Census was taken under the supervision of the 17 United States marshals, and the actual work of enumeration was per-

formed by about 650 marshals' assistants. The enumeration began in August, 1790, and according to law should have been completed in nine months, but double the time elapsed before the returns were all in. The returns were made by the marshals directly to the President, and he turned them over to the Secretary of State, who transmitted them to the printer. No clerical force was employed for compilation, verification, or correction, and the results were printed without the explanatory text, percentages, and detailed analyses that now accompany census statistics. The report of the First Census is contained in a pamphlet of 56 pages.

Not until the 5th Census (1830) were printed schedules used. Before that the marshals' assistants had used such paper as they happened to have, ruling it, writing in the headings, and binding the sheets together themselves. Before 1850 the family was the unit of enumeration. Because of varying family composition, it was an unwieldy unit and impeded analysis and interpretation. Beginning with the 7th Census, a number of important improvements were made. The individual became the unit of enumeration, and additional data such as age, sex, race, and occupation were reported. The change of unit greatly increased the analytic usefulness of the census by improving the accuracy of enumeration, by permitting detailed tabulations of the additional data, and by fa-

cilitating cross-tabulations. The 9th Census (1870) made the first use of machine tabulation. Another innovation was the use of maps, charts, and diagrams to present graphically the more significant facts. These were published in a separate volume called *The Statistical Atlas of the United States*.

In 1880 field operations were reorganized. Specially qualified supervisors were appointed, and they were able to give closer supervision to the work of enumeration.

The number and types of inquiries were greatly increased in the censuses of 1880 and 1890 and resulted in reports on a wide variety of subjects, but in spite of new techniques of more rapid enumeration and tabulation, publication was delayed. Two things became apparent. First, the decennial census had become burdened with fields of investigation that might better be subjects of continuous inquiry throughout the decade. Second, the process of building a completely new temporary organization for each census was no longer economical of time or money and a permanent organization was needed.

In recognition of the first problem, the 1900 decennial census was limited to four subjects: population, manufactures, agriculture, and mortality. In 1902 the Bureau of the Census was established as a permanent agency, known as the Census Office.

The 1960 Census introduced further innovations: it gathered

SCHEDULE of the whole Number of PERSONS within the several Districts of the UNITED STATES, taken according to "An Act providing for the Enumeration of the Inhabitants of the United States;" passed March the 1st, 1790.

DISTRICTS.	Free white Males of sixteen years and upwards, including heads of families.	Free white Males under sixteen years.	Free white Females including heads of families.	All other free persons.	Slaves.	Total.
* Vermont	22,135	22,328	40,505	255	16	85,539
New-Hampshire	36,086	34,851	70,160	630	158	141,885
{ Maine	24,384	24,748	46,870	538	NONE	96,540 }
{ Massachusetts	95,453	87,289	190,582	5,463	NONE	378,787 }
Rhode-Island	16,019	15,799	32,652	3,407	948	68,825
Connecticut	60,523	54,403	117,448	2,808	2,764	237,946
New-York	83,700	78,122	152,320	4,654	21,324	340,120
New-Jersey	45,251	41,416	83,287	2,762	11,423	184,139
Pennsylvania	110,788	106,948	206,363	6,537	3,787	434,373
Delaware	11,783	12,143	22,384	3,899	8,887	59,094
Maryland	55,915	51,339	101,395	8,043	103,036	319,728
{ Virginia	110,936	116,135	215,046	12,866	292,627	747,610 }
{ Kentucky	15,154	17,057	28,922	114	12,430	73,677 }
North-Carolina	69,988	77,506	140,710	4,975	100,572	393,751
South-Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-
Georgia	13,103	14,044	25,739	398	29,264	82,548
	Free white Males of twenty-one years and upwards, including heads of families.	Free Males under twenty-one years of age.	Free white Females, including heads of families.	All other Persons.	Slaves.	Total.
S. Western Territory	6,271	10,277	15,305	361	3,417	35,691
N. Do.	-	-	-	-	-	-

Truly stated from the original Returns deposited in the Office of the Secretary of State.

TH: JEFFERSON.

October 24, 1791.

* This return was not signed by the marshal, but was enclosed and referred to in a letter written and signed by him.

more information on a sample basis than in previous years; for the first time it asked householders to fill out questionnaires instead of only responding to enumerators'

questions; and it made extensive use of high-speed, electronic data-processing equipment. The census has been a leader in experimentation with statistical processing.

In 1960, the information was entered on a schedule designed for FOSDIC (Film Optical Sensing Device for Input to Computers). FOSDIC scanned microfilm of completed schedules and from the position of marks on the schedules converted the information into magnetic impressions on tape. The tape was then processed by electronic computers. The use of FOSDIC eliminated the card-punching operation, and, thus, one important source of clerical error. The enormous capacity of the electronic computer made it possible to do much more uniform editing and coding than in earlier censuses and to ensure consistency among a large number of interrelated items.

Accuracy The management of the census must consider basic social attitudes as well as the improvement of such techniques as enumeration, computing, and tabulating. Essentially a vast reporting procedure, the census can be only as accurate as its reporters and respondents. Many countries have difficulty in conducting censuses because the people mistrust the intentions of the government and elude the enumerator or give him incomplete and faulty information. Although some people in the United States mistrust the census and regard it as an invasion of privacy, it has been remarkably free of this kind of impediment. This fact probably reflects a degree of confidence in the good intentions of the government and some awareness of the uses to which census findings can be put.

On the other hand, the American competitive spirit has occasionally affected not only the interpretation of census statistics but

also their actual gathering. *The Story of the Census* reports:

Dishonest enumerators may sometimes yield to the temptation to increase their pay (which in most cases is based on the number of names turned in by them) by returning fictitious names. But the "padding" of returns from motives of personal gain has been a less serious obstacle to accurate census taking than . . . organized attempts on the part of certain cities and towns to inflate their population figures. The voice of local business interests—disguised as that of local patriotism—has sometimes called more loudly to the supervisor or the enumerator than has the voice of honor, duty, or fidelity to oath of office. After the census of 1910, 69 indictments were brought against enumerators and others believed to be responsible for the falsity of the returns in 14 cities and towns.

In 1960 some cities with aspirations to be as large as possible questioned the accuracy of census figures. The census reported in many areas that a central city had not grown very much or had even declined in population, an expected fact in view of the movement to the suburbs. This news was received with angry protests from municipal officials and local patriots and some cities incurred considerable expenses to check on the accuracy of published figures. Sociologists had predicted the census finding of slow growth or decline in many central cities as well as the civic indignation that would follow publication of the findings.

Checking census accuracy To

check on the accuracy of the census a number of techniques are used.² For instance, birth and death statistics for the period between censuses are examined, and an estimate of "expected" population is made. This is done for the country as a whole and for regions and cities. Then the actual count is compared with the "expected" population. Where a significant difference exists, close analysis is made for possible error.

Toward the end of the enumeration period in 1960 many newspapers published "Were You Counted?" forms, which contained the questions asked of 100 percent of the population. The reader was urged to fill in the form and send it to the Census District Office if he

² This discussion is based on *U.S. Census of Population 1950*, Vol. 11, *Characteristics of the Population*, Part 1, U.S. Summary, Chapter C, 1953, pp. xxviii-xxx.

TABLE IX:1 GROWTH OF THE DECENNIAL CENSUS: 1790-1960

CENSUS YEAR	NUMBER OF ENUMERATORS:	LENGTH OF ENUMERATION (months)	COST PER CAPITA	POPULATION ENUMERATED CONTINUOUS U.S. (in thousands)
1790	650	18.0	\$0.011	3,929
1810	1,100	10.0	0.024	7,239
1830	1,519	14.0	0.029	12,866
1850	3,231	20.5	0.061	23,191
1870	6,530	15.0	0.087	38,558
1890	46,804	1.0	0.183	62,947
1910	70,286	1.0 ^a	0.173	91,972
1930	87,756	1.0	0.321	122,775
1950	151,814	1.0	0.601	150,697
1960	159,321	3.8 ^b	0.60 (est.)	178,464

SOURCE: Based in part on *Bureau of the Census, Factfinder for the Nation, 1948; The Story of the Census, 1790-1916; U.S. Census of Population and Housing, 1960, Principal Data-Collection Forms and Procedures* (1961); and other publications of the Bureau, Washington, D.C.

^a Not including time spent in making investigations and recounts in places where fraudulent enumeration had been detected.

^b Enumeration was 99 percent complete in six weeks.

believed that he or members of his household had been missed in the enumeration.

In 1950 and 1960 Post-Enumeration Surveys^a were performed by specially trained and supervised enumerators. The sample recounts found that many people had been erroneously enumerated or omitted from enumeration. The techniques of such surveys are far too costly to be used for the whole Census, but they provide a check on its methods and accuracy. Estimates of enumeration errors expressed as percents of the Census enumerated population are as follows:

Enumeration errors	1960	1950
Omissions	3.0%	2.3%
Inclusions	1.3%	0.9%
Net undercount	1.7%	1.4%

The percentages seem small, but the 1.7 percent undercount in 1960 represents about three million people, and the 1.4 percent in 1950 about two million. It might appear from the figures that the 1950 Census was more accurate than the 1960 Census, but this is probably not the case. Rather, the 1950 Post-Enumeration Survey and the methods of analysis associated with it were less precise than the survey conducted in 1960.

Probably all censuses undercount the population. The sociological usefulness of the census is somewhat impaired by this fact, but even more by the fact that different parts of the population are counted more accurately than others. The very young, old, mobile,

and poor are most likely to be underenumerated.

Sampling in the Census It would be impossible for the Bureau to gather the amount of data that it does during the regular decennial census or to conduct current surveys (see p. 265) if it did not use sampling techniques. Much population information for 1950 and 1960 is based on samples—20 percent for 1950 and 25 percent for 1960—which are so identified in the census reports.

Estimates of the total number of persons with specified characteristics are obtained by multiplying by five the number of persons with these characteristics in the 20 percent sample; by four the number in the 25 percent sample. This procedure of deriving overall figures from sample figures is a matter of probability. For example, the 1950 Census shows that 17.6 percent of males twenty-five years and over in a 20 percent sample had completed four years of high school. On the basis of this sample, the Census reports that 7,500,000 or 17.6 percent of all males in the total population twenty-five years and over have completed high school, but it does not mean that the national figure is exactly 7,500,000. On the contrary, the figure is used with the following understanding: The chances are approximately two out of three that the figure for the total population lies between 7,500,000 plus 5,440 and 7,500,000 minus 5,440. (The degree of probability and the range of accuracy claimed are derived

from the mathematics of statistics.) The figure 7,500,000 falls at the midpoint of a fairly narrow range within which the actual figure probably lies.

You might argue that two out of three chances are not very good odds. One chance out of three remains that the actual figure lies outside the $7,500,000 \pm 5,440$ range. It is easy to increase the chances of accuracy. If you are willing to take as a reasonably accurate figure a total of 7,500,000 $\pm 13,600$, then the chances increase to one hundred to one that the actual figure for the total population lies between 7,500,000 plus 13,600 and 7,500,000 minus 13,600.

In one sense total census figures based on sampling, like all such figures, are never precise. They are presented and must be used with the understanding that the actual figures are probably close to the computed figures. In another sense, however, they are very precise, because once the acceptable range of accuracy is specified, the degree of probability that it has been attained (e.g., odds of 2-1 or 100-1) can also be specified. Suppose a publisher is interested in estimating the potential market for a book on carpentry designed to be read by men of at least high school education. He would doubtless be pleased to know that the chances are as high as one hundred to one that his potential market lies between 7,513,600 and 7,486,400. In fact, he should be satisfied to know that the chances are two out of three that his potential market lies

^a See Conrad Taeuber and Morris H. Hansen, "A Preliminary Evaluation of the 1960 Census of Population and Housing," *Demography*, 1 (1964), 1-14. Tabular data at p. 4. See also U.S. Bureau of the Census Technical Paper No. 4, "The Post-Enumeration Survey: 1950," 1960.

between 7,505,440 and 7,494,560.

Although sample statistics for the U.S. as a whole may be accepted as approximating very

closely the results that would have been obtained from a complete enumeration of the population, this is not true of smaller populations.

In general the smaller the sample and/or the smaller the total population, the less reliable are the results of a sample.

Census sources

Guides for using the United States Census cover both decennial census publications and the results of other census surveys:

1. *Catalog and Subject Guide*, issued quarterly, cumulative since January, 1946.
2. *Catalog of U.S. Census Publications, 1790-1945*, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Washington, 1950.

The divisions of the *Catalogs* follow the organization of the Bureau of the Census:

- 1) *Agriculture*, first taken in 1840, quinquennial since 1920.
- 2) *Business*, first complete census taken in 1929, subsequently in 1933, 1935, 1939, 1948, and became quinquennial in 1954.
- 3) *Foreign trade*.
- 4) *Governments*, reports on finance and employment on state and local levels.
- 5) *Industrial*, prepares "Facts for Industry" series, annual surveys of manufactures since 1949; Census of Manufacturing first taken in 1810, subsequently at varying intervals, now quinquennial.
- 6) *Population and Housing*, the categories most frequently used by sociologists. See also U.S. Census of Population: 1960, *Availability of Published and Unpublished Data*.

Summary sources

Statistical Abstract of the United States, an annual summary of statistics on population, industry, and social, political, and economic characteristics. Convenient source book available from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

Historical Statistics of the United States (Colonial Times to 1957) should be used in conjunction with the *Statistical Abstract*. Contains a compilation of about 3,000 statistical time series. An excellent reference guide as well as a direct source of data.

Current Population Reports—In addition to the decennial census, the Bureau conducts periodically the Current Population Survey, covering a sample of about 35,000 households throughout the country.

Frequent publication of the findings from the Survey and from special censuses afford an almost continuous record of the population of the United States between decennial censuses. Current Population Survey procedures are treated in Census Bureau Technical Paper No. 7, *The Current Population Survey—A Report on Methodology*, which summarizes study design and operations up to 1963.

Other United States government sources

Monthly Labor Review, Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, gives characteristics of the labor force. Covers some subjects formerly published by the Bureau of the Census.

Indicators (monthly), Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, summarizes vital statistics, morbidity and accident rates, and various data concerning health, education, and welfare. A good multipurpose first reference.

Trends, annual supplement to *Indicators*.

National Health Survey, Series A (Program descriptions, survey designs, concepts and definitions), Series B (Health Interview Survey results by topics), Series C (Health Interview Survey results for population groups), and Series D (Developmental and Evaluation Reports).

Monthly Vital Statistics Report, National Center for Health Statistics, reports deaths, births, and marriages.

Vital Statistics of the United States, Annual Report gives detailed breakdown of vital statistics for the year by states and smaller areas and by such characteristics as sex, age, race, etc.

Vital Statistics—Special Reports. Topic and frequency of issue vary.

In 1963 publications of Health Survey Statistics and Special Vital Statistics were revised. A new set of series, *Vital and Health Statistics*, was initiated encompassing program reports, research methods, health survey and vital statistics (supplementary to annual and monthly *Vital Statistics* reports).

Immigration and Naturalization Reporter; also *Annual Reports of the Immigration and Naturalization Service*.

SECTION 2 COMPOSITION

Composition refers to the characteristics of a population according to significant biological or social categories, such as race, nativity, religion, sex, age, occupation, education, and urbanization. Population figures may be presented in different ways to answer the needs of government, science, and industry. For example, the number unemployed, the numbers at specified income levels, and the number with specialized higher education provide indices of important social phenomena. The proportion of unemployed is often used as an index of the health of the economy; changes in income levels may be a sign of emergent stratification patterns; the rate of growth of the population trained in engineering may indicate whether or not educational institutions are keeping pace with the needs of an expanding technology.

A description of composition is a cross-sectional view of population at a given time, but no population is ever truly stable. To interpret composition

data one must: (1) compare different populations, or (2) study a series of cross sections, that is, study the trends and changes in the same population.

A crude summary of the population composition of the United States by age, sex, and major activity is given in Table IX:2. A finer breakdown would give a more comprehensive picture but would be correspondingly more complicated. However, even this short statistical summary reveals the way the population may be differentiated into socially meaningful clusters.

Certain basic facts about composition, for instance age and sex, contribute in many ways to the understanding of society and economy.

The distribution of ages and the proportions of the sexes influence the marriage rate, the birth rate, the death rate, the ratio of producers to consumers, the percentages in the school or military ages, the numbers eligible for old-age assistance, and almost every

TABLE IX:2 POPULATION OF U.S. BY AGE AND ACTIVITY, 1965

CATEGORY AGE	POPULATION (in thousands)	FUNCTION
14 years and over	78,357	In labor force *
	2,722	In armed forces
	49,014	Civilian males
	26,621	Civilian females
	59,883	Not in labor force
	11,094	In school
5-13 years	35,556	Keeping house
	11,233	Retired and other
	2,000	In institutions
	34,455	In school
Less than 5 years	1,433	Not in school
	20,434	

SOURCE: *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1966*, Tables 5, 43, 149, 307.

* Unemployment rate was 4.6% of civilian total.

other significant item of national bookkeeping and planning. In social and economic spheres, valid comparisons are possible only if precautions are taken to ensure that comparable age and sex groups are being used.⁴

THE SEX RATIO

The proportion of males to females within a population is called its *sex ratio* (SR) and is stated as the number of males per 100 females. A sex ratio of 100 means that the population is evenly divided between males and females; a figure greater than 100, that there are more males than females; a figure less than 100, that there are fewer males than females. For example, Alaska's sex ratio (132) is higher than that of Washington, D.C. (SR = 88); that is, the proportion of males to females is higher in Alaska than in Washington.

At birth the sex ratio for whites in the United States approximates 106, but at successively older ages the proportion of males diminishes; that is, the sex ratio declines with increasing age. The American female seems to be a more durable organism than the American male, and the life expectancy for females is higher than for males. In some other countries this is not the case, nor was it necessarily so at earlier periods in American experience.

Unbalanced ratios A sex ratio that deviates markedly in either direction is thought to be biased or "out of balance."⁵ This attitude is traceable to the values of a monogamous marital system. A polygynous family system (one with plural wives) would not be concerned about an excess of females, and a polyandrous system (one with plural husbands) would welcome an excess of males.

In 1960 the sex ratio in the United States had declined to an all-time low of 97 from 106 in 1910. In the preceding century it had fluctuated between about 102 and 105, but not until the 1940s did the number of females exceed the number of males in the country as a whole. The relatively high sex ratio through

much of American history was due, at least in part, to the heavier immigration of males than females, except during the light immigration of the 1930s and 1940s.

The sex ratio for Negroes in the U.S. has been consistently lower than for whites, but the reasons for this are obscure. Whatever the cause, this low ratio aggravates the adjustment problems of the Negro family. (See Adaptation 14, pp. 145-148.) The high proportion of males of marriageable age among immigrants complicates their problems of adjustment and impedes family building, especially in the early stages of an immigrant community.

Viewed regionally, New England had the lowest sex ratio (95) in 1960, and the Mountain States the highest (101). Massachusetts had the lowest sex ratio of any state (93) and Alaska the highest (132).

Rural-urban sex ratios The American city has a strong attractive power to women. In 1960 the urban sex ratio was about 94, the rural 104. The urban sex ratio was even lower between the ages of 20 and 29 (SR = 92) and consequently reduced marriage prospects for many women. The rural sex ratio in the same age group was about 106, indicating a surplus of rural males of marriageable age. These biased sex ratios reduce the rate of marriage and tend to lower the crude birth rate. Cities vary in their sex ratios, depending on the character of industry in the area. Heavy industry, such as steel, is associated with a relatively high sex ratio. On the other hand, commercial activities and light industry, such as the assembly of small equipment requiring manual dexterity, are associated with a low sex ratio. The urban concentration of women probably contributed to the development of women's political activities, which resulted in the suffrage movement and ultimately in the Nineteenth Amendment (1920) extending the franchise to women.

Despite the association between a low sex ratio and urbanization in North America and Western Europe, the relationship cannot be generalized to the whole

⁴ T. Lynn Smith, *Population Analysis* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948), p. 112.

⁵ Cf. Hans von Hentig, "The Sex Ratio," *Social Forces*, 30, No. 4 (May, 1952), 443.




FIG. IX:1 Population of the U.S. by age categories, 1850-1965 (projected to 1970)

world. In many countries urbanization seems to be associated with a high rather than a low sex ratio. India, for example, has a fairly high rural sex ratio

as does the United States, but unlike the U.S., India has a very high urban sex ratio.⁶

AGE COMPOSITION

The industrial and military potentials of a nation depend in large part on its age composition. A population with heavy concentrations in the productive years has a larger labor force and a larger potential force for mobilization in time of emergency. A population with smaller proportions in the productive years is less able to respond to threats against its security and is probably less adaptable to technological change. A population concentrated at either extreme of the age distribution has a high *dependency ratio*, that is, the number of nonproductive individuals is relatively great and burdens the productive population.

For most of its history, the United States has had a young population. Large numbers were concentrated at the early ages, the birth rate was rather high, and the death rate was fairly high. Over the decades both

⁶ Kingsley Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951).




FIG. IX:2 Population pyramids, United States: 1900, 1940, and 1965

birth and death rates have declined and the proportion of the population in the lower ages has been reduced. Figure IX:1 depicts the change in the proportion of the major age groups over more than a century. Although for much of that period the population in the most productive years increased faster than the old and the young, this is not now the case. However, compared with many countries, the United States has a favorable dependency ratio.

Population pyramid The study of the population pyramids permits closer analysis of changes in the age (and sex) composition of a population. Figure IX:2 shows the age-sex distribution of the population of the United States for 1900, 1940, and 1965. Sometimes called "the tree of ages," the population pyramid summarizes age and sex characteristics at a given time. A vertical line divides the percentages of males on the left from the percentages of females on the right. The percentages indicated on the scale are calculated from population figures compiled by age categories, that is, males under 5 years of age, between 5 and 9 years old, and so on. The age groupings are shown on the pyramid steps. The figure for 1900 has the shape of a true pyramid, typical of a population increasing because of a high birth rate but also showing a high death rate. "... each year's crop of babies was larger than that of the year before, and the older birth classes, besides being smaller to begin with, had tended to die at a relatively early age."⁷

The 1940 figure describes a much different population. The birth and death rates had declined. The proportion of population in the most productive years (between 20 and 50) had increased. The proportion in the older dependent ages had also increased, but the proportion of children had declined. The very sharp reduction in the percentages of children under 10 years of age is undoubtedly related to the depression of the 1930s.

The pyramid for 1965 shows an increase in the population under 25 years of age—the result of the high birth rate in the 1940s and 1950s. The increase reversed the trend of the 1930s toward lower birth




FIG. IX:3 Population pyramid for Germany—actual and without World War I

After Frank W. Notestein, *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1944), Fig. 27, p. 101.

rates. (See Sec. 3, p. 279.) The short age bars, which were at the base of the pyramid in 1940, moved up in 1965 to become a notch at ages 25-34. This pyramid graphically reveals the earlier history of a population. It does not tell the reasons for irregularities and changes; it does call attention to questions about why the irregularities occur. On page 270 "The Population Pyramid of a Minority" applies the pyramid technique to understanding some of the demographic consequences of international migration.

Depressions, wars, and epidemics leave their scars on the population pyramid, not merely for the lifetime of those directly affected but for generations. Figure IX:3 shows the effects of World War I on the

⁷ Frank W. Notestein, "Population," *Scientific American*, 185, No. 3 (September, 1951), 30.

THE POPULATION PYRAMID OF A MINORITY

Figure *A* on the facing page really represents two populations, the American-born (Nisei), shown also in Figure *B*, and the foreign-born (Issei), shown separately in Figure *C*. The reading of these pyramids raises a number of questions:

1. Why are the foreign-born males (Fig. *C*) rather older than the females? The Japanese males who first came to the United States about the beginning of this century were young, single men who later brought younger women as their wives. We may conjecture that originally many of the men planned to return to Japan.

2. Why are there virtually no foreign-born Japanese under thirty years of age? Japanese immigration was controlled by the Gentleman's Agreement with Japan in 1907 and the Japanese Exclusion Act in 1924.

3. Why does Figure *A* deviate from the true pyramid of a "normal" population? This is explained by the immigration history of mature males followed by mature females and may be understood most easily by referring to *B* and *C*.

At first there were few childbearing women (arrow 1, *C*), so that few persons of Japanese ancestry were born here (arrow 2, *B*). A few years later more Japanese females of childbearing age (arrow 3, *C*) entered as the wives of the Japanese males. These women bore the Nisei children (arrow 4, *B*). But note the diminution in the number of Nisei below the age of fifteen. As the foreign-born females began to pass beyond the childbearing age, there were no foreign-born females (arrow 5, *C*) to replace them, and the native-born females (arrow 6, *B*) were only entering the childbearing period.

4. What can we guess about the future of this population? There should be an increase of native-born children as the native-born population reaches maturity. In turn, as they pass beyond childbearing age, the narrowing of the base should recur, although less clearly. The effect of the immigration pattern may be perceptible in this wavelike reproductive pattern for several generations.

German population of 1940: (1) the war casualties, males aged 40–64 who were of military age in 1914–1918, (2) the notch at ages 20–24, a consequence of the depletion of potential fathers, and (3) the effects of this notch reappear at the bottom of the pyramid in the reduced size of the youngest age groups.

RACIAL AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION

Homogeneous countries lack the problems of nations that have *ethnic* minorities (those set off from the main population by culture) or *racial* minorities. Presumably, homogeneous countries can achieve cohesion and consensus with relative ease because they

do not experience the strain of fitting strangers into the social order. Nor do they have readily distinguishable groups whose *apparent* differences can be made the basis of discrimination.

On the other hand, countries like the United States must cope with racial and cultural diversity in building a coherent social order. This task is complicated by the fact that the diverse populations were introduced into the country rapidly, at different times, and in large numbers. Furthermore, many of the peoples are concentrated regionally or are ecologically segregated in urban areas, where they tend to develop subsocieties. Such isolation limits the access of a




FIG. IX:4 Age and sex composition of the Pacific Coast Japanese population, 1940

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census. Figures in thousands are given for each age group.

minority to the large social order and often prolongs its subordination and deprivations imposed upon it.

Table IX:3 gives estimates of the minorities of conterminous United States. Racially defined popu-

lations total about twenty-seven millions. "Negroes" include individuals ranging from persons who could easily pass as white to apparently unmixed African types. "Mexicans" include a large but unknown num-




FIG. IX:5 Population of the conterminous U.S. by race, 1790-1965 (projected to 1970)

ber of persons who are not different enough in their physical appearance to be distinguished from the white population, but this minority also includes many whose ancestry is largely American Indian. For this reason the United States census has had difficulty in enumerating persons of Mexican origin. In 1930 "Mexicans" were counted separately by "race," but since that time they have been included in the white population. Estimates for ethnic minorities are even less reliable than for racial groups. Many individuals in the ethnic categories are highly acculturated; others are easily identifiable as deriving from a different national or cultural background.

Because the new states of Alaska and Hawaii are so different in their composition, they are reported separately from the 48 states (see Table IX:4). Hawaii is unique in the United States in its preponderance of nonwhites and its Asian background, factors that aroused opposition to Hawaiian statehood. Now that Hawaii has achieved statehood, such antagonisms are rarely expressed.

Growth of the Negro population* Figure IX:5

TABLE IX:3 "RACIAL" AND ETHNIC POPULATIONS, CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES, 1965

POPULATION	NUMBER (in thousands)
"Racial" minorities	
Negroes	20,945
Mexicans	4,500
American Indians	650
Japanese	275
Chinese	215
Filipinos	115
Total "racial" minorities	26,700
(About 14% of total. Most physically visible.)	
Ethnic minorities	
Jews (U.S. and foreign-born)	5,250
Foreign-born French Canadians	250
Other foreign-born whites	10,500
Total ethnic minorities	16,000
(About 8% of total. Some culturally visible.)	

SOURCE: Racial estimates projected from *Census of Population, 1960*, Final Report PC(1)-1B, Table 44; foreign-born from PC(1)-1C, Table 70; Mexicans, both native and foreign-born, from reports on Spanish surname population; French Canadians from unpublished foreign-born and mother-tongue data; Jews from Current Population Reports, P-20, No. 79, February 2, 1958. *The American Jewish Yearbook, 1965*, p. 139, estimates 5,720,000 Jews for all 50 states.

presents the census figures on the growth of the Negro population of the United States (conterminous) compared with the rest of the population. Through most of American history the white population increased faster than the Negro population. Between 1800 and 1965 the number of Negroes grew from about three-fourths of a million to nearly twenty-one millions. In 1800 Negroes were 19 percent of the total population, but in 1965 they were 11 percent.

Since 1930 the rate of Negro increase has exceeded that of whites. Some of the "increase" is apparent rather than real, because Negroes are now being more accurately counted. Improvements in health and living conditions are belatedly reducing death

* "Subject Guide to 1960 Census Data for the Negro Population," Supplementary Reports, PC(S1)-46, 1964.

TABLE IX:4 RACIAL COMPOSITION, ALASKA AND HAWAII, 1960

	ALASKA		HAWAII	
	Number (thousands)	%	Number (thousands)	%
<i>Total</i>	226.2	100	632.8	100
<i>Native whites</i>	176.5	74.1	194.7	30.8
<i>Foreign-born whites</i>	7.1	3.1	7.6	1.2
<i>Negroes</i>	6.9	3.0	4.9	0.8
<i>American Indians</i>	14.4	6.4	0.5	0.1
<i>Japanese</i>	0.8	0.4	203.5	32.2
<i>Chinese</i>	0.1	0.1	38.2	6.0
<i>Filipinos</i>	0.8	0.4	69.1	10.9
<i>Aleuts, Eskimos, etc.</i>	28.6	12.7	—	—
<i>Hawaiians, Part Hawaiians, etc.</i>	—	—	114.4	18.1

SOURCE: *Census of Population, 1960. Alaska and Hawaii*, Final Reports PC(1)-3B and PC(1)-13B, Tables 15; and *Alaska and Hawaii*, Final Reports PC(1)-3D and PC(1)-13D, Tables 96.

rates for Negroes. The Negro population is younger and poorer than whites and its crude birth rate may be expected to remain higher than the white rate for some time.

The geographical distribution of the Negro population has important effects on race relations. There has been progressive dispersal of Negroes through the states and a steady reduction of the so-called "Black Belt," the area of the South with a preponderance of Negroes. Between 1900 and 1940 the number of Southern counties with 50 percent or more Negroes declined from 286 to 180, and from 1940 to 1960, the number declined to 134 (or 135, counting Washington, D.C.). The number of Negroes in such counties declined from about 4,000,000 in 1900 to about 2,600,000 in 1940, and to under 2,000,000

in the 135 counties in 1960. Negroes have been moving from the South in large numbers, and the trend of Negro migration will probably continue. The Negro population of the South, defined in the broadest terms to include seventeen states plus the District of Columbia,⁶ increased 15.3 percent between 1940 and 1960, while the white population of the South increased 34.7 percent. In the same period Negroes outside the South, principally in large urban centers, increased by more than 160 percent, from 2,717,000 to 7,158,000. The percentage of Negroes in the South declined from about 79 percent in 1940 to 62 percent in 1960. Although Negroes have become more widely distributed in regional terms, their extreme concentration in central cities has maintained a high degree of ecological segregation.

⁶ For the purposes of this discussion the following are counted as Southern: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.

SECTION 3 FERTILITY AND MORTALITY

The future of a population is determined by rates of birth and death and by immigration and emigration. If migration is held constant, analyses of detailed birth and death rates can be used to predict the size of a population, its potential growth or decline, and its age structure.

In population literature *fertility* refers to actual reproduction, *fecundity* to potential reproduction, that is, the biologically maximum number of births. In modern urbanized and industrialized nations fertility is only a fraction of the possible number of births, and even in agrarian countries, where fertility is very high, it does not reach fecundity, the biological maximum.

THE MEASURES OF FERTILITY

A simple way to measure fertility is to calculate the percentage of new births in a population. The percentage states the number of births in a year for each 100 persons in the population. For example, in 1965 there were 3,759,000 births recorded in the U.S.¹⁰ On the basis of a total population of 193,800,000, new births constituted 1.94 percent of the total. Conventionally, the calculation is expressed as the number of births per 1,000 population and is called the *crude birth rate*. The formula is:

$$\frac{\text{births in a year}}{\text{midyear population}} \times 1,000 = \text{crude birth rate}$$

Substituting 1965 figures for the U.S. in the formula:

$$\frac{3,759,000}{193,800,000} \times 1,000 = 19.4$$

The U.S. crude birth rate of 19.4 is less than half the rates of Africa and parts of Latin America and

Asia. For comparisons, see Table IX:5 which reports the latest available worldwide data.

Whether a given birth rate should be interpreted as high or low depends on the number of women of childbearing age in the population. In fact the current fertility of U.S. women, compared with earlier periods in American history or with the fertility of women in Asia or Africa, is even lower than is indicated by the crude birth rate because of differing age characteristics. A relatively large proportion of the U.S. population is composed of females in the childbearing ages, whereas in less developed countries large numbers of females are children.

Measures of fertility expressed as births among women of childbearing age have analytical advan-

TABLE IX:5 ESTIMATED BIRTH AND DEATH RATES, SELECTED REGIONS, 1960-1964

REGION	RATES PER THOUSAND OF POPULATION	
	Births	Deaths
WORLD	34	16
Africa	47	23
North America	23	9
Latin America	41	13
Asia ^{a,b}	38	20
Japan	17	7
Europe ^b	19	10
Australia and New Zealand	23	9
U.S.S.R.	23	7

SOURCE: United Nations, 1965 *Demographic Yearbook*, 1966, p. 103.

^a Includes Japan.

^b Excludes U.S.S.R.

¹⁰ Figures are given to the nearest thousand.

tages if the data are accurate. One such measure is the *age specific birth rate*,¹¹ obtained by dividing the number of births to mothers of a specific age group by the number of women of that group and multiplying by 1,000. For example, in 1959 there were 571,000 births to mothers 15 to 19 years of age, and the age specific birth rate for that group was 90.9. In the United States births are concentrated in the age range 20–29, and relatively few births occur to women under 20 or over 34. “The Case of the G.E. Babies,” pages 276–277, shows the necessity of applying appropriate measures of fertility to the correct segment of the population.

Fertility ratio Detailed vital statistics (in this case registration of births, including information on the mothers) required to calculate the age specific birth rate are lacking or imperfect in all but a few countries where human bookkeeping is most highly developed. As is so often the case, countries that might benefit most from such sophisticated information are least likely to have it. The *fertility ratio*, on the other hand, may be computed directly from census data without using birth records. To calculate the fertility ratio, it is necessary to know only the age and sex distribution of the population. The ratio is a statement of the number of small children to the number of women of childbearing age, arbitrarily defined, for example as 15–44 years of age. A typical calculation is as follows:

$$\frac{\text{children under 5 years}}{\text{women aged 15–44 inclusive}} \times 1,000 = \text{fertility ratio (FR)}$$

Substituting estimated U.S. figures for 1966:

$$\frac{19,851,000}{39,518,000} \times 1,000 = 502$$

Figure IX:6 depicts the fertility ratios of the United States since 1800. From about 1,000 in 1800 the fertility ratio declined to a low of 342 in 1942, recovered to 563 in 1960, and has since retreated to 502 in 1966. The increase in fertility following World War II was contrary to most predictions, which assumed an extension of the prolonged decline of the birth rate. The recent decline in the fertility ratio may be a reassertion of the long-term trend.

Assuming equally good enumeration of the young and the mature, within and between countries, fertility ratios are used for easy comparisons of the fertility of different countries or trends within the same country. However, if comparisons are made between interrelated areas, it is necessary to know if children live with their mothers. For example, if rural mothers migrate to the city but leave their children to be cared for in the rural areas, as is true in many developing countries, the comparison of fertility ratios for country and city would be misleading. The rural fertility ratio would be too high because of the “extra” children, and the urban fertility ratio would be too low because of the “extra” mothers.

Fertility differentials Groups within a population reproduce at different rates. Some of the fertility differentials that have been fairly well established for the U.S. are as follows:

1. Rural farm areas have higher fertility than rural nonfarm areas.
2. Rural areas have higher fertility than urban areas.

¹¹ Demographers use the age specific birth rate to construct a more refined measure of fertility, called the *standardized birth rate*.

Two other measures based on the age specific birth rate are the gross reproduction rate and the net reproduction rate. They are attempts to determine whether or not populations in the long run are maintaining their numbers. The *gross reproduction rate* tells us to what extent a given group of women are replacing themselves with daughters, assuming (1) that they live through their childbearing period and (2) that the age specific birth rates are maintained. To be practically useful, corrections need to be made to the gross reproduction rate. The *net reproduction rate* makes one of these corrections. It applies the age specific death rates prevalent at a given time. It assumes certain age specific birth rates, as does the gross reproduction rate. The net reproduction rate is usually expressed as follows: A net reproduction rate of 1.00 means that if the age specific birth and death rates existing in a given year continue, the population of women would just replace themselves in one generation; 1.50 means that in one generation they would increase by 50 percent; 0.50 means that in one generation they would decrease by 50 percent.

THE CASE OF THE G. E. BABIES

On January 14, 1953, General Electric announced that it would award five shares of its common stock to any employee who had a baby on October 15—the company's seventy-fifth anniversary. Originally the company said it expected about thirteen winners. It arrived at this figure by applying a daily U.S. birth rate to its own 226,000 employees. This computation actually yielded a prediction of fifteen births; but a G.E. public-relations man thought it might be nice to trim the figure to thirteen, the number of original G.E. investors. The mathematics suffered from more than public relations, however. G.E. employees, since they include no children and no one over sixty-five, are obviously a much more fertile group than the population as a whole. When this fact sank in, a company statistician made a new assault on the problem. He estimated that the size of an average G.E. family was 4.2. This meant that the total number of people in the G.E. families was close to a mil-

lion. Applying the crude annual birth rate to *this* group, and dividing by 365, he came up with a new prediction of seventy-two births on the big day.

As it turned out, there were not thirteen, fifteen, or seventy-two babies born to G.E. employees on October 15. There were 189.

Subtracting the company's highest expectation of seventy-two from 189 gives 117, "extra" babies. Where did G.E. go wrong? Well, among other things, the company made no allowance for the incentive provided by its own stock. This oversight, remarkable in a company that has had a lot to say about capitalist incentives, was apparently rectified by the employees. The latter not only enjoy having children, but, it appears, they rather enjoy the idea of becoming capitalists. And they seem to have known a good thing. In a generally declining stock market, G.E. common stock rose during the pregnant months from 69½ to 78½.

SOURCE: Reprinted from the January, 1954, issue of *Fortune* by Special Permission of the Editors; Copyright, Time Inc.

WHERE DID G.E. GO WRONG?

They applied the wrong rate to the wrong group. They applied the crude birth rate to G.E. em-

ployees, assuming that only the *employees* would have babies. If the crude birth rate were to be

3. The larger the city, the lower is the fertility; that is, size of city is inversely related to fertility.

4. In general, manual workers have more children than do white-collar workers.

5. Catholic fertility tends to be higher than Protestant fertility, but its trends follow the Protestant configuration.

6. Negro fertility is higher than white fertility, but it follows white trends.

In the Western world, in recent decades lower income groups and those with relatively low education have shown higher birth rates than the middle and upper classes and the relatively well educated. However, during the "baby boom" there is evidence

used at all, it should have been applied to the whole population of G.E. *families*, not just the workers but their wives, children, and other relatives. This is what they finally did when they included families in their calculations of the crude birth rate. But the crude birth rate requires a cross section of the total population, and they did not have one. Even the whole population of G.E. families is not representative of the whole population of the U.S. For instance, G.E. families contain an abnormally large proportion of individuals in the productive (and reproductive) years and few aged persons. The G.E. statistician also failed to consider: (1) the section of the country, (2) the size of the communities where the employees lived, (3) their income, (4) their education, and (5) their race, all of which affect the birth rate.

Could G.E. have done better? They could have made a closer approximation to the true number by applying age specific birth rates to the women of childbearing ages in G.E. employee families. This number could have been further refined by correcting for seasonal fluctuations in births. Corrections for the characteristics G.E. failed to consider would be far more difficult to make and, under the conditions noted below, pointless.

Because figures for the characteristics of the G.E. population are not available, a more refined estimate cannot be calculated. Probably, but not certainly (as *Fortune* assumes), the announcement of the award was an incentive. The influence of incentive could have been estimated and the quality of the prediction further improved by interviewing a sample of G.E. wives. Of course, G.E. could have eliminated the incentive entirely by announcing the anniversary award eight instead of nine months before October 15. The announcement was made about one week less than the 280 days of a full-term pregnancy, and a number of births may have been induced (hastened) by physicians.

There is at least one additional complication. Any estimate of a daily birth rate, even for a rather large population like the G.E. families, is subject to an additional source of error. Daily birth rates vary even more widely than seasonal or monthly birth rates. In 1950 U.S. registered crude birth rates ranged from 20.9 for the month of April to 25.5 for September. The shorter the time period, the greater the range of variation in birth rates (and the smaller the population, the greater the range of variation in birth rates). The chances of getting close to the mark on any particular day for any particular group are, therefore, not very good.

that well-educated elements shared more than proportionately in the increase. Furthermore, where large samples have permitted fine analyses of income categories, it becomes clear that the very highest income groups have greater fertility than the middle and medium high groups in such places as England, the United States, and the Scandinavian countries.

These differences in fertility have important social consequences. For example:

The burden of dependency is not evenly distributed through the population. Rural areas have a relatively greater financial burden of supporting young children.

More fertile populations may become increasingly




FIG. IX:6 Fertility ratio for the United States, 1800–1966

Children under 5 years of age per 1,000 women 16–44, United States.

ADAPTED from *Population Problems* by Warren S. Thompson (New York: McGraw-Hill), p. 175. Data for 1960 from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population: 1960*, PC(1)–1B, p. xiii. 1966 estimate from sample data.

preponderant where fertility is not offset by migration or other factors. Thus, high Catholic fertility is the subject of anxious comment by some individuals from religious groups of lower fertility.

Fertility trends in the United States In recent years the techniques of contraception have become sufficiently reliable so that people who want to limit family size can do so if they have the necessary knowledge and access to devices or materials. In the United States and other rich Western countries of high literacy, control of the timing and number of births is widely practiced.

In 1957 there were 4,334,000 births in the United States, an all-time high. Since then there has been a decline to 4,027,000 in 1964, to 3,759,000 in 1965, and to about 3,600,000 in 1966—the approximate level in 1950. This corresponds to a rate of 136 births per 1,000 married women under age 45 and is considerably below the rates after World War II but higher than the rates during the depression of the 1930s. The current decline is due to lower rates for second and subsequent children as reported in Figure IX:7. Information on birth rate by birth order is a sophisticated measure of fertility and a sensitive indicator of deliberate increase or restriction of family size.

After World War II there was a sharp increase in births, especially first births which are regarded as deferred fertility, but a *controlled* fertility may increase or decrease in response to historical events and economic changes.¹² The rate for first births peaked immediately after the war, the rate for second births remained high until the mid-1950s when a steady decline appeared, and the declines for third, fourth, and higher birth orders seem to have occurred in sequence. The rate for first births has been stable for several years at slightly less than 45 per 1,000 married women under age 45, but higher birth orders now show declining rates without exception. With the large cohorts of children born after World War II now reaching marriageable age, the absolute number of first births will probably increase even if the rate remains stable, and new record highs in total births may be recorded in the late 1970s. A current trend toward decreased family size is indicated by the sharp decline in the frequency with which moderate-sized families have another child, and the evidence suggests that the “baby boom” that began after World War II has ended.

MORTALITY¹³

The calculation of death rates raises the same problems discussed under fertility. The best-known death

¹² Harold F. Dorn, “Pitfalls in Population Forecasts and Projections,” *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 45 (September, 1950), 332.

¹³ Mortality should not be confused with morbidity, which refers to the occurrence of disease. Morbidity rates are usually expressed as the incidence of a disease or disorder per 100,000 population in one year.




FIG. IX:7 Birth rates by order of birth, United States, 1917–1965

Births per 1,000 married women under age 45.

SOURCE: Metropolitan Life Insurance Company *Statistical Bulletin*, October, 1966, p. 2.

rate, the *crude death rate*, is calculated as follows:

$$\frac{\text{deaths in a year}}{\text{midyear population}} \times 1,000 = \text{crude death rate}$$

In 1965 the U.S. crude death rate was:

$$\frac{1,828,000}{193,800,000} \times 1,000 = 9.43 \text{ per thousand}$$

This was a bit more than half of the 17.2 recorded in 1900 in the death registration states.

Table IX:5 (p. 274) shows the spread of estimated death rates for the several world regions. As in the measure of fertility, it is necessary to relate crude death rates to age structure in order to make accurate interpretations. In fact, the low rates of North Amer-

ica and Europe as expressed by the crude death rates understate their relative superiority because the populations of these countries are older. The high African and Asian death rates occur in populations with heavy concentrations in the younger years.

Age specific death rates are expressed as the number of deaths per thousand persons of specified ages. In 1959 the U.S. age specific death rates ranged from 0.5 in ages 5–14 to 202.8 per thousand for persons 85 years and over.¹⁴ The preoccupation of health officers with the mortality of certain groups has led to the development of special measures. Three of these follow:

1. The *infant mortality rate reports* for 1,000 live births how many infants die in the first year. The United States infant death rate was 25.7 in 1960,

¹⁴ *Vital Statistics of the United States*, 1959, Vol. 1, Table 6-C.

compared with rates for Sweden of 17, for New Zealand of 24, and for Romania of 77.

2. *Neonatal mortality rate.* As the infant mortality rate has been brought under control, more attention has been given to the large proportion of infant deaths occurring during the first month. One-third of all infant mortality is concentrated in the first day of life; three-fifths of infant deaths occur in the first week; and more than two-thirds are in the first month.¹⁵ A *neonatal mortality rate* is simply an age specific death rate for the age group, birth to one month. The very existence of this measure suggests how developments of medical technology and awareness of problems lead to changes in record-keeping. Viewed another way, vital statistics point out to the

medical scientist and practitioner where serious problems lie and where his efforts might be expected to produce most immediate benefits.

3. The *maternal mortality rate* states the number of mothers dying per 10,000 live births. The current American rate is under 5 maternal deaths per 10,000 live births, a decline from 58 in 1935. The risk of childbirth to the mother is greatest at the highest ages, and the most favorable period for childbearing is the early twenties. Maternal mortality statistics bear out the popular belief that the first birth is relatively the most hazardous for the mother, holding age constant.

The chances of survival Figure IX:8 shows how

¹⁵ *Statistical Bulletin*, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, February, 1952, p. 1.




FIG. IX:8 , Survivors from birth to successive ages, United States, 1850–1959

Forecast for 1975 on the basis of low mortality forecast by the Census, 1947.

SOURCE: Metropolitan Life Insurance Company *Statistical Bulletin*—March, 1952, and March, 1960.

dramatically the chances of survival have improved in a century and forecasts a slight continued improvement. In 1850 only three-fourths of the newborn in the United States reached age 5; in 1901 the same proportion reached age 24; and in 1959, the same proportion survived more than 60 years. The age to which one-half of the newborn survive increased from 45 in 1850 to more than 73 years in 1959. Great advances in medical science and technology and in public health practice, and improvement in nutrition and the standard of living are responsible for the great gains. Some important consequences of these changes are the following:

1. An increasing number of persons are living through their working years, thus contributing to the productive efficiency of the nation.

2. A larger number of persons are reaching old

age, thus creating an important dependency problem.

3. The marked reduction in deaths of the young enables the population to sustain or increase its numbers with relatively fewer births.

4. "Premature" deaths have been reduced and may be reduced somewhat further, but there is no clear evidence that the upper age limits of human existence will be significantly raised. To assume so is to misinterpret improved average longevity as an extension in the limits of the human life span. Note in Figure IX:8 that the gain in survivors at the three-fourths point and above is not nearly so impressive as at one-half and one-fourth. Indeed, the 1959 curve presses closely against the 1975 forecast, suggesting relatively little anticipated improvement.¹⁶ It would take a major breakthrough in control of the disorders of age to extend significantly the human life span.

SECTION 4 POPULATION CHANGE

WORLD POPULATION GROWTH

In three centuries the population of the world has increased nearly sixfold. Improvements in the means of production and transportation, advances in agricultural technology and medical science, and the effects of the industrial revolution have combined in a large part of the world to reduce death rates, to prolong life, and at least in the West to raise the standard of living. Carr-Saunders¹⁷ estimates that there were half a billion inhabitants in 1650. In two centuries the population more than doubled, and in 1850 the total was about a billion and a quarter. In the last century it has again more than doubled, and the U.N. *Demographic Yearbook*¹⁸ sets its 1965 mid-year estimate at 3,285 million. Figure IX:9 depicts the world population growth since 1800 projected to the year 2000.

In 1650 people of European ancestry made up about one-sixth of the population of the world. By 1959 they constituted almost one-third of the world's people. Asia accounts for more than half of mankind, although her share of the world's population has decreased.

The rate of increase in Western Europe and North America has been slowing. The sharp decline in death rates was followed by a decline in birth rates. By the beginning of World War II the trend had gone so far that the U.S. and countries of Western Europe appeared to be approaching stable populations. Post-war trends indicate that a stable population is uncertain or at least further away for Western Europe and North America than it seemed before the war.

Demographic transition Students of population have tried to identify basic stages of growth and de-

¹⁶ Cf. *Statistical Bulletin*, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, August, 1965.

¹⁷ A. M. Carr-Saunders, *World Population* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 42.

¹⁸ United Nations, *1965 Demographic Yearbook*, 1966, p. 103.




FIG. IX:9 World population growth, 1800–1965 (projected to 2000)

SOURCE: Chart by Alexander Semenoick for *Fortune Magazine*, June, 1966, p. 110.

cline in the populations of various parts of the world. When a population seems to be passing from one stage to another, it is called *demographic transition*. Beginning about the middle of the seventeenth cen-

tury, Europe's population passed through these stages:

1. A period of explosive growth as the death rate declined

2. A leveling off of growth as the birth rate declined

3. A change in the age structure and a trend toward population stability or decline

Western Europe before World War II had a stable or incipiently declining population and appeared to be at the natural end of a cycle. The U.S. also seemed far advanced in the cycle, and the series of stages was thought to be a *necessary* sequence. Following these assumptions, population forecasts for the U.S. predicted a stable or declining population to be reached in the relatively near future. These predictions now appear to be very conservative. The "baby boom" following World War II arrested the trend toward stability and made obsolete estimates that were only a few years old. Indeed the population of the U.S. has already exceeded some of the prewar predictions of its ultimate maximum.

Although the highly technical problem of prediction cannot be reviewed here, it seems likely that many of the estimates were incorrect in assuming that the values and beliefs responsible for the declining birth rate were permanent elements of American culture and society.¹⁰ World War II undoubtedly had the effect of postponing some births to the immediate postwar period. The boom in births seems to be ending, but it has significantly changed the age structure of the country and the reproductive potential of coming generations. Even though some predictions have proved faulty, the main ideas of the demographic transition are instructive.

Thompson²⁰ groups the countries of the world in three broad categories according to the extent of their control over birth and death rates:

Group 1 countries have achieved significant control over both death rates and birth rates. Western peoples now have relatively low death and birth rates, and Thompson predicts that they will maintain rela-

tively low rates of natural increase. This group contains the United States, Canada (except Quebec), the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and most countries of north, west, and central Europe. They include about one-fifth of the world's people.

Group 2 countries show a declining death rate, but their birth rates have only begun to decline. They lag behind *Group 1* in their population trends, and their exceedingly high rates of natural increase may continue for some time. In this group are the countries of southern and eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, Japan, Quebec, and possibly north Africa, Argentina, and Uruguay. These regions also contain about one-fifth of the world's population. It is uncertain how long it will take *Group 2* countries to complete the sequence of changes to a stable or declining population—or if they ever will complete the cycle.

Group 3 countries, such as most of Asia, Latin America, and Negro Africa, have high, variable death rates and high, steady birth rates. Population trends in these countries depend largely upon what Malthus called positive checks (famine, war, disease, etc.), but the checks have been altered by the introduction of modern health measures in some areas. These countries contain about three-fifths of the world's population and most of the developing areas.

Control of fertility *Group 3* countries present a painful dilemma. Everyone wants to control disease and improve standards of living. But these improvements accelerate population growth, putting heavy pressure on the country's resources. Without accompanying social changes affecting fertility, the outcome may be "ever larger masses of humanity living close to the margins of existence and vulnerable to every shock in the world economic and political structure. Such 'progress' may amount to setting the stage for calamity.

¹⁰ For a bibliography on population forecasts and a critique, see Dorn, *op. cit.* A manual for making population forecasts for sections of the U.S. is: Van Beuren Stanbery, "Better Population Forecasting for Areas and Communities" (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1952). For recent examples of population projections see Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports* (February 20, 1967) Series P-25, No. 359: "Projections of the Population of the United States by Age, Sex, and Color to 1990, with Extensions of the Total Population to 2015"; and (May 5, 1967) Series P-25, No. 365: "Revised Projections of School and College Enrollment in the United States to 1985."

²⁰ A summary may be found in Warren S. Thompson, *Population Problems* (4th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953), pp. 267-272.

"No more striking illustration of the limitations, from the demographic point of view, of 'good government and economic development' can be given than the case of Java."²¹ Between 1860 and 1930 marked advances were made in sanitation and agricultural production, and in that time the population tripled. In 1930 Java had a density of 800 per square mile. The customary way of life had changed little; there was no evidence of significant improvement in the standard of living of the masses; the limits of agricultural production were being approached; and there were few signs of a decline in fertility. If the rates of increase are maintained, by 2000 Java will have a density of 1500 per square mile.

Recent advances in techniques of birth control and the acceptance of contraceptive measures in experiments in several countries have encouraged some demographic specialists to predict that "the world population crisis is a phenomenon of the 20th century and will be largely if not entirely a matter of history when humanity moves into the 21st century."²² Bogue bases his assertion on the following points:

1. Surveys in many countries showing widespread preference for small families
2. Political leaders in developing countries tending to favor fertility control
3. Increased professional support and the allocation of greater resources to research
4. A leveling off of progress in death control
5. Diffusion of attitudes fostering family limitation and of control techniques among the masses of the world's people
6. Improved technology of those types of contraception suitable for mass adoption by uneducated people

There is no unanimity among population specialists about how far the factors listed above are applicable to different countries. On balance, contemporary opinion is probably less confident than is Bogue about the speed of change. The end of the

population explosion may be almost in sight only if present efforts are greatly expanded to improve techniques of birth control and to diffuse their use, especially in developing countries. But many of the mothers of the children of the year 2000 are already born and, barring a catastrophe, it seems inevitable that the population of the world will again double by the end of this century. (See Fig. IX:9.) A population of 7.4 (or eight) billions will place unprecedented burdens upon resources, no matter how rapidly agricultural and industrial technology may advance and no matter how rapidly their benefits are diffused throughout the world.

Increasing attention is being given to the social consequences of very large populations. Apart from questions of sheer survival for large numbers who may not have enough to eat, there is growing concern about the possible effects of very large populations and very high densities upon human behavior and the texture of social relations. The success or failure of population control will depend upon widespread preference for small families, i.e., a fundamental shift in social values and an acceptance of a family form that even in the West has become dominant only in recent decades. In other words, the answer to the demographic question of overpopulation depends upon changes in cultural values governing the preferred size of the family, relations between spouses, between parents and their children, and the accommodation of religious prescriptions to the practice of birth control. Without such changes more efficient techniques of contraception will have relatively little effect.

Adaptation 25 reports the findings of research in Ceylon, a high-fertility area. Factors considered include the nature of the family pattern, the value placed upon relations between the sexes and upon women and children, the location of authority in the family and community, and the relationship between the family and larger kin and locality groups. The

²¹ Frank W. Notestein, "Summary of the Demographic Background of Problems of Undeveloped Areas," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 26, No. 3 (July, 1948), 249-255. Quotation at p. 252.

²² Donald J. Bogue, "The End of the Population Explosion," *The Public Interest*, No. 7 (Spring, 1967), pp. 11-20, quoted at p. 11.

analysis shows the necessity of taking such social and cultural factors into account and indicates the futility of using purely biological criteria in studying vital human trends.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

The largest migration before 1800 was the movement of slaves from Africa, mainly to the New World. Estimates of the number of Negroes transported are unreliable, but the actual number may fall between 10 and 20 millions. Most of the slave traffic was during the eighteenth century. By comparison, the number of migrants from Europe to the New World prior to 1800 may not have exceeded 4 to 5 million. However, during the nineteenth century a massive movement from Europe took place, and perhaps as many as 75 million people have entered the Western Hemis-

phere since the beginning of the nineteenth century. This spread of European peoples is the largest intercontinental population movement in recorded history.

The opening of the New World came at an opportune time in the demographic history of Europe. Migration to the Western Hemisphere relieved population pressure during a period of explosive increase. It must not be assumed, however, that emigration is always generated by population pressure. Portugal, for example, weakened her demographic structure in attempting to man her far-flung colonies from Asia to Brazil during the period of exploration.

Although the early data are hardly more than educated guesses, estimates for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can bear interpretation. Figure IX:10 presents the sources and destinations during the period of maximum intercontinental migration.




FIG. IX:10 The great intercontinental migration

For emigrants from countries specified in the left-hand figure, the period covered is 1846-1932; various dates apply for unspecified countries. For immigrants to the U.S.A., Canada, and Brazil, the period covered in the right-hand figure is 1821-1932; various dates apply for all other countries. Numbers inside the circles are emigrants or immigrants in thousands; numbers outside the circles are percentages of the total.

COMPUTED from A. M. Carr-Saunders, *World Population* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 49.

All but 2 million of the 53 million people involved in intercontinental migration between 1846 and 1932 were from Europe, and more than three-quarters of the total movement was from five countries: the British Isles, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Spain.

The figures for the countries of destination exceeded the reported emigration by some 6 million. This discrepancy is due to the difference in time span—111 years compared with 86 years for the emigration data—and to the fact that there are somewhat better records on immigration than on emigration. Both statistical summaries are incomplete, but the broad outlines are clear and would not be altered significantly by addition of more recent data. The chief donor countries were European; the chief receiving countries were in the Americas, and the United States alone received three-fifths of the total immigration.

Not all of this intercontinental movement was of permanent settlers, and it is not known how many migrants were temporary residents. Carr-Saunders estimates that about 30 percent of those entering the United States (1821–1924) returned to their homes and that 47 percent of Argentine immigrants returned.²³ It is often thought that those who returned did so because they were failures in the new countries. Insofar as they adjusted poorly and did not find useful employment, this is so. However, many immigrants had intended to return to their homelands, and others who planned to be sojourners became permanent settlers. Even temporary migrants play a significant part in developing new lands. For example, between 1901 and 1930 Australia had an immigration of 2,773,000 but a net gain (immigration minus emigration) of only 536,000. Yet the transient labor supply helped to build the nation.

²³ Carr-Saunders, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

TABLE IX:6 IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

DECADE	IMMIGRATION (in thousands)	CHIEF CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES
1820–1830	152	Ireland, Great Britain, France
1831–1840	599	Ireland, Germany, Great Britain
1841–1850	1,713	Ireland, Germany, Great Britain
1851–1860	2,598	Germany, Ireland, Great Britain
1861–1870	2,315	Germany, Great Britain, Ireland
1871–1880	2,812	Germany, Great Britain, Ireland
1881–1890	5,247	Germany, Great Britain, Ireland
1891–1900	3,688	Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Germany
1901–1910*	8,795	Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia
1911–1920	5,736	Italy, Russia, Austria-Hungary
1921–1930	4,107	Italy, Germany, Great Britain
1931–1940	528	Germany, Italy, Great Britain
1941–1950	1,035	Germany, Great Britain, Italy
1951–1960	2,515	Germany, Canada, Mexico, Italy
1961–1965 ^b	1,450	Mexico, Germany, Great Britain, Italy

SOURCES: *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1966*, Tables 123 and 125. Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for June 30, 1950, Table 4.

* Heaviest single year 1907: 1,285,000 immigrants.

^b Five years only.




FIG. IX:11 Foreign stock of the United States, by country of origin, 1960

SOURCE: U.S. Census of Population: 1960. General Social and Economic Characteristics, Final Report PC(1)-1C (1962), Table 69. Not separately listed: Other America, 581,000; Other Europe, 492,000; Not reported, 251,000; All other, 14,000.

The United States has been a chief beneficiary from intercontinental migration. As a receiving country, it gained great human resources at relatively small cost. The expansion of the American frontier, the maintenance of an adequate labor force, the broadening of the consumer market, and the introduction of knowledge and skills were all accelerated by the uniquely sustained and diverse migration. Un-

til recently the immigration was disproportionately composed of males in their productive years, and although this fact was an economic gain, the biased sex ratio complicated the integration of the new groups into American society. Even without the high sex ratio, acculturating a large number of immigrants was bound to generate stresses in the society.

Table IX:6 summarizes immigration to the United

States. The cumulative impact of this immigration is shown in Table IX:7. The peak number of foreign born in the United States, more than 14 million, was reported for 1930. Since then, both the number and the percentage of the population foreign born have declined. The 1960 Census counted less than 10 million for the fifty states, below the number in 1900. The 10.4 million in 1900 were nearly 14 percent of the total population; the 9.7 million in 1960 were only 5.4 percent of the total. The decline in the importance of immigration is a consequence of many influences, including a restrictive immigration policy.²⁴ During the 1950s the reported rate of immigration recovered from the low levels of the 1930s and 1940s, but at least part of the increase was "statistical" rather than real, that is, immigration from Mexico and Canada was more accurately reported than in earlier periods. The stringent immigration policy that has prevailed in recent decades was somewhat relaxed in 1965, but it appears that in percentage terms the foreign born will continue to diminish in importance. The origins of the foreign stock of the United States are given in Figure IX:11. Compare this with Table IX:6, which reports the chief contributing countries at various periods. "Foreign stock" includes the foreign-born and the native-born population of foreign or mixed parentage. The category thus comprises all first- and second-generation Americans. The third and subsequent generations in the U.S. are called "native of native parents." In 1960 there were 34,050,000 persons of foreign stock in the U.S., or about 19 percent of the total population.

Except for Western Hemisphere countries, immigration since 1921 has been limited by annual quotas that depend on the population of foreign born or foreign stock living in the U.S. The quota laws encouraged immigration from Western and Northern Europe, but those quotas often were not filled. However, quotas for Southern and Eastern Europe were quickly oversubscribed and the laws were criticized as being discriminatory. The Immigration Act of

TABLE IX:7 FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1850–1960

CENSUS YEAR	FOREIGN BORN NUMBER (in thousands)	PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION FOREIGN BORN
1850	2,244 ^a	11.2
1860	4,136 ^a	15.0
1870	5,567	14.4
1880	6,679	13.3
1890	9,249	14.8
1900	10,445	13.7
1910	13,630	14.8
1920	14,020	13.2
1930	14,283	11.6
1940	11,657	8.8
1950	10,431	6.9
1960	9,738	5.4

SOURCES: For the period 1850–1890, *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789–1945* (Washington, D.C., 1949), p. 30. Data for 1900 to 1960 from *Census of Population: 1960, PC (1) 1C, United States Summary, General Social and Economic Characteristics*, Table 66.

^a White and free colored population only.

1965 continued the quota principle but allowed unfilled quotas to be used by "preference" immigrants whose national quotas had been exhausted. Preference immigrants are those who would be reunited with their families or who have skills and talents needed in this country. Additional special provisions are made for persons whose immediate families live in the United States.

Beginning in 1968 a yearly limit of 170,000 has been set for immigrants from countries outside the Western Hemisphere, with a 20,000 maximum from any one country. Preference is given for family reunification and needed skills. A total of 120,000 immigrants from the Western Hemisphere are to be admitted on a first-come-first-served basis with no special limit on the number from any country.²⁵

It is often suggested that relief of population pres-

²⁴ See William S. Bernard (ed.), *American Immigration Policy* (New York: Harper, 1950); *Whom We Shall Welcome*, Report of the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1953); B. M. Ziegler (ed.), *Immigration* (Boston: Heath, 1953).

²⁵ *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1966*, pp. 89–90.

sures in other parts of the world should enter into the formulation of immigration policy. However, emigration cannot play a significant part in relieving the problems of such countries as India and China.

These countries are so large and their reproductivity is so high that emigration of a great many people would give only fleeting relief and at the same time might transfer the problem elsewhere.

Adaptation 25 / Ryan **FERTILITY AND FAMILY ORGANIZATION IN CEYLON**

The population in many Asian areas is rapidly increasing, but there is no assurance that birth limitation will be practiced as it has been in Western Europe and North America. In this adaptation Bryce Ryan examines social and cultural factors that may contribute to maintaining high birth rates in Ceylon.

It should not be assumed that what happens in Ceylon must happen elsewhere in Asia. Nevertheless this study is a useful corrective to Western presuppositions that the small family system is the emergent worldwide trend.

Ceylon has recently experienced a phenomenal decline in death rates but no significant change in birth rates. Although it is possible that fertility is declining, the rate of natural increase is nearly 3 percent per year. Even if urban fertility is changing, a matter undemonstrated, it cannot be assumed that Ceylon will follow the Western pattern of persistent diffusion of the small family system. Ceylon is overwhelmingly a rural country, and the difference between city and village is much greater than in most Western nations. It is unrealistic to expect the rapid diffusion of new values and new techniques from an urban population which itself is probably largely unresponsive to them. A revolutionary development is even less likely to appear

spontaneously in the countryside. Controlled fertility is typically associated with the individualistic and romantic marital union. No such social climate exists in Ceylon, nor is it likely soon to exist. If the small family pattern and birth limitation are to be introduced, they must be imposed upon a society now tied to large-family values.

The marriage pattern In Ceylon marriage is a calculated and rational extension of kinship; as a relation between two persons dominated by thoughts of each other, it is immoral and atypical. The individual is subordinated to the family. Evidence of social change may be found in the frequency of romantic suicides, which are protests

against the control of the kin group, but these also show the continuous power of community and kin. The individual has a lifelong involvement with his relatives, and this is true even among urban sophisticates.

The old system is sacred, and the accepted scope of individualism simply does not provide for personal preferences in marriage. Previous acquaintance is usually of little concern to the parties involved, and there is virtually no comprehension of the concept of romance and seldom even a hint of rebellion. There is a potent and intricate *interdependence* of individual and kin. The arranged match is crucial and romantic marriage is abhorrent and socially disorganizing. Rigid criteria are applied in spouse

SOURCE: Abridged and adapted from "Institutional Factors in Sinhalese Fertility" by Bryce Ryan, *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 30 (October, 1952), 359-381. Published in this form by permission of Bryce Ryan and The Milbank Memorial Fund.

selection: (1) membership in the same ethnic community, i.e., Sinhalese; (2) identity of caste; (3) bride younger than groom; (4) bride a virgin; (5) horoscopes of each closely matched. In addition, the dowry power of the girl's people, security and occupational prestige of the boy, and the status of family lines are considered in matchmaking.

A number of factors support familism and are inconsistent with the romantic complex. The greatest moral duty of a father is a "good" marriage for his daughter, and this duty falls on a son at the father's death. These are responsibilities to blood kin, fully as much as to the child. Desire for family prestige may press the father or brother toward almost impossible financial sacrifices.

In marriage the individual is both imprisoned and sheltered by his kinship group. The son helps with his sister's dowry and in so doing protects his own status which in turn is rewarded in dowry. A challenge to the arranged match is a challenge to the prerogatives of kin. The lineal family as a status-bearing entity in the community has its most critical time in the period of approaching marriage. Every relative has his funds or status at stake. Romantic marriage is not consistent with the rigid dictates of caste, prestige, and house honor. It threatens not merely the father's rightful authority but the honor of the generations, past and future, of which the father is the legitimate guardian. Marriage by choice has no claim upon kin for dowry, no claim for help in harvest and no claim for cooperation in marrying some ultimate daughter

of the union. Although the infrequent romantic marriages in villages do not necessarily meet with ostracism if caste propriety and other rigid matters have been observed, there is partial or complete estrangement from kinfolk. In the closely knit affairs of the village, life for such a couple may be far from pleasant.

The requirement of astrological suitability deserves special mention. Almost universally the Sinhalese, young and old, educated and uneducated, believe that suitably matched mates are perfectly revealed in the horoscopes.

Dominance of the male The Sinhalese family is usually patrilineal, descent following the male line, and patrilocal in the limited sense that the couple settles in the husband's village. A new marital unit is dominated by the husband's kin through their very proximity. The father-husband is the social authority. Except toward small children, he avoids overt expressions of affection and gives much evidence of his dignity and prerogatives. This patriarchalism is not harsh; few relations among Sinhalese are that.

From early childhood the male is schooled in his superiority. A family of many males is a "fortunate one"; one of many daughters is "burdened." To the father's position services are due and deference is paid. There is a deeply seated belief that in marriage the wife must give complete loyalty and subservience to her husband. He stands in the place of her father as well as in the role of her husband. On the other hand, it is generally agreed that the husband owes his first allegiance to his own parents rather

than to his wife. Rarely a rigid disciplinarian, the father is still *master* in a society where that concept has a living feudal history.

Marriage and fertility The village studied is in the Ceylon "Low Country," six miles from a market town. The mean age at marriage for village women (based on a one-fourth sample of existing marital units) was 21.9 years, and for men, 28.4 years.²⁰ There is some reason to believe that the age of women at marriage is rising, but there is no evidence of such a change among men. It is probable that the relatively high ages at marriage are influenced by the difficulties of dowry. About one-fourth of the marriages had no dowry, due to poverty, a few romantic marriages, and other reasons. The proportion of dowryless matches has not changed with passing years. Marriages by personal choice but with parental approval account for 13 percent of marriages and show no increase. Only 4 percent claim to have married in spite of their parents' wishes. More than 80 percent of all marriages and more than two-thirds of recent marriages were arranged by the parents. Most marriages conform closely to traditional patterns.

Children are viewed by all as products of destiny. When women say "all children are a blessing," they are expressing the mores of the community; but for a substantial proportion of mothers, it might be said that *many* children are *imposed* as a blessing. Many mothers accept only reluctantly a pattern of childbearing that approaches fecundity, that is, the biological limit. Women do not face continu-

²⁰ The mean age at marriage for women in the United States is about the same, and for men somewhat younger.

ous pregnancies without misgivings, although most accept them with fatalistic composure.

Attitudes toward birth control

To wish that destiny might be kind is one matter; to seek actively the prevention of birth is another. In response to this suggestion a woman said: "If a dead 'soul' wishes to be born into your family, it would be a terrible sin to prevent its birth. We will pay for such acts in our next life. Children that are to be born to you must be allowed to be born. That is how life goes on. We cannot and should not prevent this." Here speaks the voice of the community, echoed by men and women alike. A rebirth in the great cycle must not be denied to any being. (The belief in reincarnation is a basic tenet of Sinhalese culture.) A former Prime Minister of Ceylon supported this village interpretation, a position not held, however, by several other prominent Buddhist political leaders. In spite of verbal conformity by the villagers, the interviewers agree that a majority of the mothers would welcome some morally suitable relief from the imminent arrival of the next baby. They also agree that the fathers see no cause for worry and have nothing ill to say of the most fertile marriage.

The attitudes of men toward family size and birth control are not modified by the burden of childbearing and child care. Men sincerely want large families, and especially many sons: "Children are prosperity." Not once in the extensive discussions with village men was there a mention of the difficulties of child care. The personal trials and burdens of parenthood are almost wholly the mother's. Father is proud parent toward

his neighbors, a caresser of infants in the home, and contributor to his kin status through well-calculated marriages. He is served by his household, and the larger his small kingdom, the greater his dignity and glory. Through children, especially sons, he gains status as a man, is assured that his responsibilities will be inherited by others and that he himself will have security in his old age. The wife has no avenue of escape from the increasing demands upon her made by the growing family. The father works no harder to provide for a large family. He merely lives less well until the youth begin earning.

The husband's sexual authority is the most important single element for an understanding of fertility. Time and again the word "property" appears, describing the wife, and frequent allusions are made to the transfer of paternal authority from the wife's father to the husband. The woman's lot is cast with an unknown male prepared for the role of patriarch. Economic dependence supports this pattern. Once a woman is given in marriage, she is expected to stick to her husband regardless of how trying married life with him may be. Her parents cannot afford to maintain grandchildren or meet the expense of a second marriage.

Only with respect to age at marriage is the Sinhalese pattern inconsistent with high reproductivity. (In the more remote districts, however, girls are frequently married soon after puberty.) For the most part family structure and mores are consistent with high reproduction, and the economic cost of children is slight. The village girl fears spinsterhood or being a childless wife; infertility is treated with contempt. However, the stigma of

infertility is relieved with the birth of even a single child, and the difficulties of childbearing and child care increase in at least arithmetical ratio to numbers. With these difficulties the husband has no part and rarely much concern, for they are the natural functions of his wife and her god-given means of pleasing him. The husband is also motivated by something the wife can never fully share. Children are contributions to *his* family, not to hers; the wife is an agent for the husband's kin; he is of its very substance. To her, children may be assets of the conjugal union, but to him they are also assets in the society to which his first loyalties belong.

Doubtless a substantial minority of village women are today trying to reduce the frequency of pregnancies. Lack of technical knowledge is perhaps no greater a handicap than the unsympathetic attitudes of dominant males. It seems fair to conclude that *if* women were provided with simple contraceptive techniques which were made consistent with moral precepts, and *if* the techniques were used without their husbands' knowledge, the more youthful mothers of several children would use them. The "moral rationalization" of contraception should present no great difficulties, for the Buddhist position is not doctrinaire, and the people are skilled in adapting and compromising even rigid precepts. However, the secret use of contraceptive devices is improbable. The combined effects of male sex dominance and the distinctive male rewards for numerous progeny may retard a small-family movement more than might be expected from Western experience.

SECTION 5 ECOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

Ecology (from *oikos*, the Greek word for house, and by extension, habitat) is the study of the adaptation of living things to the environment and the mutual relations that occur in the course of that adaptation. The environment includes both other organisms and the inanimate physical setting, and the basic data for ecology are spatial distributions. Ecology as a branch of the biological sciences developed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and was greatly stimulated by the observations and writings of Charles Darwin (1809–1882), and by the German biologist Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919) who coined the term *ecology* in 1866.

Long before Park introduced “human ecology” in American sociology in 1921, studies of the spatial distribution of interrelated social facts such as crime rates and population characteristics were being done in Europe.²⁷ Such ideas became increasingly prominent through the nineteenth century, and in his *Division of Labor*, first published in 1893, Durkheim conceived of a “social morphology” to cover “(1) the study of the environmental basis of social organization and (2) the study of population phenomena, especially size, density, and spatial distribution.”²⁸

Cooperation and competition An important theme of ecology is cooperation-competition. Organisms and species compete for limited space and resources. Some organisms help each other to achieve a stable adjustment and to control the environment.

Others compete directly and tend to displace each other, for example, man and predatory animals. In the course of this competition, certain organisms or species come to dominate a given natural area. The basic ideas of ecology (e.g., cooperation-competition) are strongly sociological, as Darwin was aware and intended. It is not surprising, therefore, that efforts were made to study the spatial distribution of human groups and their institutions in the framework of ecological ideas. The fact that the discipline cuts across biological and social sciences has encouraged some to suggest that ecology may contain the seeds of a unifying science.

Social or human ecology is closely related to population analysis. Many of its data are population data, and the skills required for research in this field are essentially those of the population expert. However, ecology is not concerned with all population data but primarily those which can be expressed as spatial distributions. Furthermore, it has a distinctive theoretical focus, competition for space and resources. Ecological studies have been made of areas as large as regions (and studies of regionalism²⁹ have some of the same basic ideas as ecological research), but thus far the American metropolis has been the chief topic for the social ecologist, whose attention is turning to problems of population pressure and environmental pollution.

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²⁷ George A. Theodorson (ed.), *Studies in Human Ecology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), p. 3.

²⁸ Leo F. Schnore, “Social Morphology and Human Ecology,” *American Journal of Sociology*, 63 (May, 1958), 620, reprinted in Leo F. Schnore, *The Urban Scene* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1965).

²⁹ See, for example, H. W. Odum, *Southern Regions of the United States* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1936); and H. W. Odum and H. E. Moore, *American Regionalism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1938).

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ECOLOGICAL SUCCESSION

The process of competition begins when a group or species newly enters an area. The ecologists call this entry *invasion* and if the new group displaces the original occupants, it is called *succession*.

The Hawaiian case The principle of succession is illustrated in an analysis of changing land use and the changing occupational distribution of the various racial groups in Hawaii.⁸⁰ Prior to extensive contacts with Western civilization, Hawaiians lived under conditions of *closed* resources; that is, at their level of technological development the land and other resources were supporting the largest feasible population. It was a balanced relationship between man and the natural environment.

The advent of settlers from outside the Islands disturbed this relationship, and over the years new opportunities were created. Western technology and agricultural techniques from both East and West opened up new uses for the land and changed the condition of closed resources to one of open resources. The subsequent history of land use in the Islands has been the utilization of the land by increasingly advanced agricultural technology and progressive steps toward another state of closed resources based on new uses of the land. This took the

form of a plantation economy with large production of money crops, sugar, and later pineapples, for the world market.

More manpower was needed to exploit the land because the Hawaiians could not fill the demand for workers. The plantations, therefore, imported contract labor largely from Asia. "But under the conditions of open resources [then] prevalent . . . in Hawaii, the population recruited for the plantation has been unwilling to accept plantation labor as a permanent occupational and social adjustment, and a series of movements away from the plantation and into vocations believed to be more remunerative and socially desirable has occurred."⁸¹

The movements away from the plantation created recurring labor shortages, which the plantations solved by successive importations.⁸² Internal adjustments in the Island community were complicated by the fact that the several corps of workers came from different nations (see Table IX:8).

"Each of the major immigrant groups . . . may be conceived as invaders whose position in the new land is determined by the intensity of the existing occupation and their ability to compete. The latest arrivals occupy the places of lowest esteem in the region, and their subsequent locations measure their rise in status."⁸³ The earlier immigrants had advantages over those who came later, so that at any time the early migrants tended to be disproportionately located in the upper levels of the status hierarchy. The Hawaiian case is almost a model illustration of the process of invasion and succession as the immigrants entered the labor market and then followed each other up the occupational hierarchy. Table IX:9 reports the sequence in which three major immigrant populations left agricultural labor for other employment. Compare Table IX:9 with the order of immigration summarized in Table IX:8. By 1910 the process of leav-

⁸⁰ Andrew W. Lind, *An Island Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).

⁸¹ Lind, *op. cit.*, p. vi.

⁸² Plantation systems based on slavery were devised to solve such manpower problems. They were designed to retain labor on the estates whether or not there were good work opportunities elsewhere. Nieboer holds that slavery arises as an attempt to keep labor on the land when there are ample unsettled areas, a condition of open resources. See H. Nieboer, *Slavery as an Industrial System* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1900).

⁸³ Lind, *op. cit.*, p. v.

ing plantation labor was already far advanced for the Chinese, the earliest immigrants, and well under way for the Japanese.

TABLE IX:8 PRINCIPAL IMMIGRATIONS TO HAWAII, 1876-1934

IMMIGRANTS	CHIEF PERIOD	TOTAL IMMIGRANTS (estimate)*
<i>Chinese</i>	1876-1900	45,000
<i>Japanese</i>	1890-1919	140,000
<i>Filipinos</i>	1909-1934	125,000

* Estimates, courtesy of Norman Meller.

TABLE IX:9 PERCENT OF MALE LABOR FORCE IN AGRICULTURAL LABOR FOR THREE RACIAL GROUPS, HAWAII, 1910-1940

RACIAL GROUP	1910	1920	1930	1940
<i>Chinese</i>	38.4	32.7	18.4	5.1
<i>Japanese</i>	55.3	47.5	26.5	19.7
<i>Filipinos</i>	—	82.2	83.0	69.9

SOURCE: Data from U.S. Bureau of the Census.

In addition to the sequences of occupational succession, similar changes occurred in the demographic characteristics of the immigrants, their degrees of residential segregation in the metropolitan area of Honolulu, and their patterns of intermarriage.

LIMITED ALTERNATIVES

In a pure market economy the process of ecological competition leads to the determination of land use strictly on the criteria of cost and efficiency. Land is allocated to those uses that yield the highest rents or earnings; there is complete competition between land uses as well as land users. Land which is first utilized for grazing is taken over for cultivation, then for residential development, and finally for industrial or

commercial use. Each succession in such competition for occupancy leads to more intensive land use with progressively higher financial yield per acre.

Land exhaustion If there were an inexhaustible supply of all kinds of land, the objections to a free market approach would be less vehement. However, the most productive kinds of land are in short supply and the most productive soils are often those on which it is cheapest to place real estate developments or factories. Houses would cost more if they were built on slopes unsuitable to agricultural use, because of lower density and the need for expensive safeguards. But the added cost would, according to some scholars, be counterbalanced by preserving the land for agriculture.

In 1960 about 2.5 percent of all California land was in urban use, and it is estimated that by 1975 about 4 percent will be urban. Although in absolute terms 4 percent may seem a small amount, "urban expansion occurs almost entirely on the very finest agricultural land."⁴⁴ Furthermore, the increase of 1.5 percent from 2.5 percent to 4 percent is in fact an increase of 60 percent in fifteen years. The succession from agricultural to urban use is going on all over the world at a time of rapid population growth and the increasing hazard of a worldwide food shortage. The risks are complicated by the fact that the process of shifting land use changes the land. It now costs too much to return land from urban to rural use. The urbanization process is for all practical purposes irreversible, except over a long period of time. Not all ecological processes are irreversible and no strict determinacy should be assumed. However, ecological study instructs the planner to consider the cost of undoing the successively more intensive land uses.

We know that today many cities have within their present boundaries enough vacant land to take care of growth for the next twenty years. We know that if we want to we can insist that housing and industry and other developments be located on lovely rolling hills instead of on desirable agricultural land. We know that we can run our highways along the edges of the fine land instead of through it.

⁴⁴ Emil M. Mrak, "Food and Land: The Coming Shortage," *Cry California*, 1 (Summer, 1966), p. 6.

Doing some of these things might cost us more money today than not doing them. But surely we will live to rue the day when we worried about the cost of housing developments and highways rather than retaining our finest agricultural areas for future production.³⁵

The ecosystem and open space The foregoing quotation runs counter to the precepts of urban land use planning in that it calls for higher densities inside cities in order to preserve other lands for agricultural production. This collision of two enlightened atti-

tudes points out that the interrelation of different social uses of land needs to be studied in a broader framework than heretofore. Large regions encompassing both rural and urban land uses are coming to be viewed as systems of patterned ecological relations, in which changes in one part rebound upon the other parts of the ecosystem. However, the multitude of municipal, county, and state jurisdictions within any such region inhibit planning for the area as a whole.

The changed perspective toward open spaces was

³⁵ *Loc. cit.*


*Encroachment
of urban uses:
Santa Clara
and Almaden
Valleys,
California*



ECOLOGICAL CORRELATIONS

A substantial amount of research in social ecology has attempted to relate characteristics of areas as measured by rates, averages, and the like to the characteristics of individuals within those areas. It has been shown that correlations between rates or averages for areas need not and often do not accurately represent the characteristics of the individuals within the areas.

To demonstrate the risks of inferring individual characteristics from ecological correlations, Robinson first plotted for each of the Census Bureau's nine geographic divisions (groups of states) the percentage of the population ten years old and over which was Negro in 1930 and the percentage of the population in each division which was illiterate. This is shown in the scattergram, in which the percent Negro for each division is plotted on the x (horizontal) axis and the percent illiterate on the y (vertical) axis. He then calculated the Pearsonian correlation and found it to be .946. (See p. 173.) At this point the dangers of reasoning from ecological correlations become apparent. The scattergram shows only that the divisions with relatively large proportions of Negroes are also the



divisions with relatively large proportions of illiterates. One may erroneously assume that the Negroes contribute to illiteracy to the extent suggested by the correlation. In this case, because the correlation approaches 1.00 (unity), this faulty reasoning would lead to the conclusion that the Negroes were responsible for practically

SOURCE: Based on W. S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review*, 15 (June, 1950), 351-357.

expressed first in efforts to preserve areas in their original "natural" condition for future generations. As cities grow larger and as more people can afford to travel, they have sought respite from high density environments. But during the vacation season the efficiencies of automobiles and good roads have changed the more popular parks into rustic concentrations of urban density. The press reports smog in Yosemite National Park and the same social prob-

lems that characterize cities. The broader view of the ecosystem considers agricultural land not merely in its productive capacity but as part of the heritage of open space. It has been proposed that metropolitan regional plans provide for taxing such lands according to open-space use rather than high-density and residential use.

Caution The ideas of human ecology have been

all of the illiteracy. In fact this is not so. Table IX:10 shows how many thousands of Negroes and whites in the United States were literate and illiterate in 1930.

Negroes did include among their number a larger percentage of illiterates, but the correlation between race and illiteracy for individuals is only .203, about one-fifth of the ecological correlation. Whites as well as Negroes in the divisions of high illiteracy were illiterates. One cannot tell from an ecological correlation *which* individuals in an area are responsible for the correlations.

In political ecology the problem may present itself in the following way. Suppose that a dominantly Catholic district moves from its tradi-

tional place in the Democratic column into the Republican column by a modest margin. If individual voting was not studied, three hypotheses are plausible: (1) the Catholic-Democratic bloc may be breaking down, and enough Catholics may have voted Republican to swing the district. (2) On the other hand, a minority of Protestants who had previously voted Democratic may have turned Republican, and the change in a "Catholic-Democratic" district may actually be caused by Protestants. (3) The change may be due to a difference in turnout. Individuals who did not participate in earlier elections may have decided to vote, and they may have been the decisive factor; or persons who had voted Democratic in earlier elections may not have voted at all.

TABLE IX:10 THE INDIVIDUAL CORRELATION BETWEEN COLOR AND ILLITERACY, UNITED STATES, 1930 *

	NEGRO		WHITE		TOTAL	
<i>Illiterate</i>	1,512	(16.1%)	2,406	(2.7%)	3,918	(4.0%)
<i>Literate</i>	7,780	(83.9%)	85,574	(97.3%)	93,354	(96.0%)
<i>Total</i>	9,292	(100%)	87,980	(100%)	97,272	(100%)

* Robinson, *op. cit.* (For population ten years old and over. Figures are in thousands.)

drawn from observations of the adaptation of the lower animals and plants to their environments. Such analogies should be used with caution. Man's behavior is not merely an immediate adaptation to an immediate environment. It is adaptive in a much

broader sense. Man is capable of modifying his environment in many ways, and he may attach sentiments and values to his environment. He may then adjust according to the dictates of sentiments rather than directly to the natural environment.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Cf. Walter Firey, *Land Use in Central Boston* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), *passim*; and Warner E. Gettys, "Human Ecology and Social Theory," *Social Forces*, 18 (May, 1940), 469-476.

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
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